Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs own properties surrounded by or adjacent to the Shasta-Trinity National Forest, the largest national forest in California, encompassing approximately 2.1 million acres. In 2008 the “Iron Complex” wildfires burned within the Forest. The U.S. Forest Service intentionally lit fires to reduce unburned timber that might fuel the fires, causing destruction of 1,782 acres of marketable timber on plaintiffs’ properties. Plaintiffs alleged a taking for which they should be compensated. The district court dismissed, citing the doctrine of necessity, which absolves the government from liability for any taking or destruction of property in efforts to fight fires. The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, reasoning that not every action taken for the purpose of fire prevention is protected by the necessity doctrine. The facts pled in the complaint do not demonstrate that the Iron Complex fire created an imminent danger and an actual emergency necessitating the burning of 1,782 acres. View "TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against Appellee, an oil company, seeking to compel Appellee to remediate environmental contamination at a gas station he owned. After Appellee allegedly conceded that it would clean up Appellant's gas station, Appellant filed a motion for voluntary dismissal. After settlement negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, the district court granted Appellant's motion and dismissed the case with prejudice, assessing attorneys' fees and costs against him. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the dismissal order and remanded, holding that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the case with prejudice based on Appellant's refusal to accept Appellee's settlement offers. Remanded. View "Colon-Cabrera v. Esso Standard Oil Co." on Justia Law

The Federal Highway Administration and the Indiana Department of Transportation decided to complete an Indiana segment of I-69, which will eventually run from Canada to Mexico. Environmentalists opposed the route and sued under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344, which authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits for discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the United States. A permit will be denied if there is “a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem,” 40 C.F.R. 230.10(a), or if the discharge “would be contrary to the public interest.” 33 C.F.R. 320.4(a)(1). The permit at issue allows six streams to be filled where the highway crosses them and permits destruction of wetlands. The environmentalists proposed, in the alternative, simply upgrading to federal interstate highway standards, and existing route. In an environmental impact statement, the Corps concluded that no less environmentally damaging alternative was practicable, that the project was not contrary to the public interest, that damage to wetlands would be modest and would be offset by creation of new wetlands. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the environmental analysis. View "Hoosier Envtl. Council, v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Environmental groups petitioned for review of the EPA's "Deferral Rule," which deferred regulation of biogenic carbon dioxide for three years. The EPA justified this Deferral Rule on the basis of the de minimis, one-step-at-a-time, and administrative necessity doctrine. Concluding that the dispute was ripe for review, the court rejected the EPA's use of the de minimus doctrine where EPA expressly disavowed this doctrine, explaining that the Deferral Rule had a three-year sunset provision whereas the de minimis doctrine was used to establish permanent exemptions; the EPA's invocation of the one-step-at-a-time doctrine was arbitrary and capricious where the EPA failed to explain in the Deferral Rule what "full compliance" with the "statutory mandate" means; the court rejected the administrative necessity doctrine where the EPA rejected a proposed middle-ground option; and the court rejected the absurd results doctrine that the EPA raised for the first time in its brief. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

Portland Generating Station is a 427-megawatt, coal-fired, electricity generating plant in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, directly across the Delaware River within 500 feet of Warren County, New Jersey. The EPA found that Portland emits sulfur dioxide in amounts that significantly interfere with control of air pollution across state borders. In response to a petition under the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7408, 7409)), the EPA imposed direct limits on Portland‘s emissions and restrictions to reduce its contribution to air pollution within three years. The Third Circuit upheld the EPA actions. It was reasonable for the EPA to interpret Section 126(b) as an independent mechanism for enforcing interstate pollution control, giving it authority to promulgate the Portland Rule. The contents of the Portland Rule are not arbitrary, capricious, or abusive of the EPA‘s discretion. View "GenOn REMA LLC v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a nuisance action against CTS because their well water contained solvents that had carcinogenic effects. The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that North Carolina's ten-year limitation on the accrual of real property claims barred the suit. The court reversed and remanded, holding that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Liability, and Compensation Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675, preempted North Carolina's ten-year limitation. In so holding, the court furthered Congress's intent that victims of toxic waste not be hindered in their attempts to hold accountable those who have strewn such waste in their land. View "Waldburger v. CTS Corp." on Justia Law

Between 1994 and 1999 Commonwealth Edison modified five Illinois coal-fired power plants that had been operating on August 7, 1977, and were, therefore, grandfathered against a permitting requirement applicable to any “major emitting facility” built or substantially modified after that date in parts of the country subject to the rules about prevention of significant deterioration, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a), until the modification. The permit requires installation of “the best available control technology for each pollutant subject to regulation.” Commonwealth Edison did not obtain permits. There was no challenge until 2009, a decade after completion of the modifications. The district court dismissed a challenge as untimely. After finishing the modifications, Commonwealth Edison sold the plants to Midwest. The federal government and Illinois (plaintiffs) argued that the district court allowed corporate restructuring to wipe out liability for ongoing pollution. Midwest and its corporate parent (Edison Mission) filed bankruptcy petitions after the appeal was argued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Midwest cannot be liable because its predecessor would not have been liable had it owned the plants continuously. Commonwealth Edison needed permits before undertaking the modifications. The court rejected arguments of continuing-violation and continuing-injury. View "United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concerned the 1999 Final Rules, identifying which navigable waters within Alaska constituted "public lands," promulgated by the Secretaries to implement part of the Alaska National Interstate Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA), 16 U.S.C. 3101-3233. The court concluded that Katie John I was a problematic solution to a complex problem, in that it sanctioned the use of a doctrine ill-fitted to determining which Alaskan waters were "public lands" to be managed for rural subsistence priority under ANILCA; but Katie John I remains the law of this circuit and the court, like the Secretaries, must apply it the best it can; in the 1999 Rules, the Secretaries have applied Katie John I and the federal reserved water rights doctrine in a principled manner; it was reasonable for the Secretaries to decide that the "public lands" subject to ANILCA's rural subsistence priority included the waters within and adjacent to federal reservations; and reserved water rights for Alaska Native Settlement allotments were best determined on a case-by-case basis. View "John v. Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund" on Justia Law

In the 1980s, the owners bought the Cottonwood seasonal campground in Cedar Grove, Indiana. Each of 50-80 campsites has a water spigot and sewer hookup for recreational vehicles. The property also has two restrooms with working toilets, sinks, and showers. In 1998, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an Administrative Order under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. 300g-3(b), (g), finding that Cottonwood operated as a public water system and was required to sample its water system, and to notify any individuals who use the property of its past failure to monitor the water system. The owners tested the water only sporadically over the following years. They denied that the water system constituted a public water system under SDWA because the water spigots are marked as “Non-Potable,” so users would know that water is not provided for human consumption. The district court entered summary judgment, finding violation of SDWA. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, finding that the owners had not raised any of their appellate arguments in the district court. View "United States v. Ritz" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether Denver could properly use quantified transmountain lawn irrigation return flows (LIRFs) as a substitute supply of water for its Civil Action (C.A.)3635 exchanges. The Court held that that properly quantified transmountain LIRFs are legally indistinguishable from reusable transmountain effluent and, therefore, the water court correctly determined that Denver could use its properly quantified transmountain LIRFs as substitute supply for the appropriative rights of exchange in C.A. 3635. In addition, the Court affirmed the water court's holding that junior appropriators could not claim injury premised solely upon the proper operation of the C.A. 3635 exchanges. View "Denver v. Englewood" on Justia Law