Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against GenOn, on behalf of a putative class of at least 1,500 individuals who own or inhabit residential property within one mile of GenOn’s 570-megawatt coal-fired electrical generation facility in Springdale, Pennsylvania. The complaint asserted state tort law claims, based on ash and contaminants settling on plaintiffs’ property. The district court dismissed, finding that because the plant was subject to comprehensive regulation under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, it owed no extra duty to the members of the class under state tort law. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the plain language of the Clean Air Act and controlling Supreme Court precedent indicate that state common law actions are not preempted. View "Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, Genon Power Midwest, L.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged the EPA's permit allowing Shell to construct, operate, and conduct "pollutant emitting activities" associated with a drill vessel (the "Kulluk") in the Beaufort Sea off Alaska's North Slope. The court rejected Plaintiff's argument that the Environmental Appeals Board's (EAB) Decision was not entitled to Chevron deference; Section 7661c(e) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7661c(e), was ambiguous, and the EPA's interpretation was reasonable under the applicable statutes' plain language; the court owed Chevron deference to the EAB Decision not to require a preconstruction increment analysis for the "Kulluk;" and the EPA permissibly granted a 500-meter exemption to the "Kulluk" from "ambient air" standards. View "Alaska Wilderness League v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Wisconsin DNR decided to terminate a separate Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (WPDES) permit for Flambeau’s mining operation and to regulate Flambeau’s storm water discharge under its mining permit, allowing more frequent inspections. Flambeau has been in compliance since the permit issued in 1998. Plaintiff filed suit under the Clean Water Act’s citizen‐suit provision, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a)(1), alleging that Flambeau violated the CWA by discharging pollutants without a permit. They argued that the CWA permit shield did not apply because Flambeau did not have a WPDES permit and its mining permit was not issued pursuant to the CWA because Flambeau could not establish that the EPA had specifically approved the regulation under which the DNR issued the permit. The district court agreed and, after a trial, determined that Flambeau had violated the CWA and assessed penalties. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the permit shield applies, characterizing the suit as an attempt to collaterally attack the WPDES program. View "WI Res. Prot. Council v. Flambeau Mining Co." on Justia Law

This case concerned a class action filed against defendants for contamination of plaintiffs' properties by gasoline and a gasoline additive (the Koch action). Former Koch class members subsequently filed a new class action (the Ackerman action). On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's order abstaining from exercising jurisdiction under the Colorado River doctrine. The court held that 28 U.S.C. 1446(d) affected only the jurisdiction of the state court only with regard to the case actually removed to federal court; because Koch was not removed, the state court maintained jurisdiction over it, and the amendment to the complaint in that case was not void ab initio; and the district court was correct to consider the amended Koch complaint in determining whether the Koch and Ackerman actions were parallel, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when concluding that exceptional circumstances warranted abstention in favor of the pending Koch action. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Ackerman v. ExxonMobil Corp." on Justia Law

Ownership of the Somerville property has changed many times. It has been used for manufacturing, for machining military parts during World War II, and as warehouses for commercial and industrial tenants, including JANR. The soil and the groundwater became contaminated, likely beginning in the 1940s, when a degreasing agent was dumped on the ground. Contamination worsened after 1983 when improper storage of hazardous waste in the JANR warehouse resulted in spills and leaks. Remedial actions may have contributed to the contamination. The current owner acquired the site in the 1980s. After several earlier suits concerning the contamination, the owner sued a former owner and the United States under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601, the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6972, and the New Jersey Sanitary Landfill Facility Closure Act and Contingency Fund. The district court entered summary judgment rejecting the RCRA claim, held a trial, and determined that the owner, the prior owners, and the United States were each liable for costs of remediation under CERCLA and the Spill Act and allocated percentages. The Third Circuit vacated with respect to award of prejudgment interest and the RCRA claim against the former owners, but otherwise affirmed. View "Litgo NJ, Inc. v. Comm'r NJ Dep't Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Environmental groups challenged the BLM's Resource Management Plan (RMP) for the Upper Missouri River Breaks National Monument. The court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs' Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1782(a), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), claims; held that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. 470f, claims; and vacated that portion of the judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the NHPA claim and to enter an appropriate order requiring BLM to conduct Class III surveys with respect to roads, ways, and airstrips that have not been subject to recent Class III surveys. View "Montana Wilderness Ass'n v. Connell" on Justia Law

This case concerned applications to transfer water rights from agricultural land in the Newlands Reclamation Project to the Carson Lake and Pasture, a wildlife refuge located within the Lahontan Valley wetlands at the terminus of the Carson River. At issue was whether diverting water to wetlands in order to sustain wildlife habitat constituted "irrigation." Concluding that the Tribe had Article III standing, the court held that diversion of water for waterfowl habitat was not "irrigation" within the meaning of the Alpine decree. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Nevada" on Justia Law

These appeals challenged the EPA's promulgation of rules in response to the Supreme Court's holding that greenhouse gases unambiguously qualify as an "air pollutant" under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401. At issue was implementation of Part C of Title I of the Act permitting requirements in several States without implementation plans for greenhouse gases as of January 2, 2011, when the emission standards in the Tailpipe Rule took effect. The court held that under the plain text of sections 165(a) and 167, the permitting requirements were self-executing without regard to previously approved state implementation plans. The court concluded that petitioners lacked Article III standing to challenge the rules because industry petitioners failed to show how they have been injured in fact by rules enabling issuance of the necessary permits and state petitioners failed to show how vacating the rules would redress their purported injuries. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. View "State of Texas, et al. v. EPA" on Justia Law

These five appeals concerned seepage over several decades of a toxic dry cleaning chemical into the ground under a Las Vegas shopping center. The court concluded that the application of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., to soil and groundwater contamination in Nevada did not offend the Commerce Clause; Maryland Square had not shown that it qualified for an exception to CERCLA liability, and it was clearly responsible for reimbursement under Nevada state law; NDEP was entitled to summary judgment against the operator, SBIC, on the CERCLA and state law claims; the district court did not decide the issue raised by Maryland Square's motion for reconsideration, so remand was required to determine whether Maryland Square had Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., liability for exposing the contamination to the elements; SBIC was liable to the previous owners under the indemnification provisions of the 1968 and 1982 leases; and the district court erred in holding Melvin Shapiro liable on his personal guaranty because the guaranty operated only prospectively and there was no evidence of spills occurring after he signed the guaranty. View "Voggenthaler v. Maryland Square" on Justia Law

This case involved long-running multidistrict litigation concerning contamination of groundwater by the organic compound MTBE, which was used as a gasoline additive by Exxon and others. The court concluded that the state law tort verdict against Exxon was not preempted by the federal Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401; the jury's finding that the MTBE levels in Station Six Wells will peak at 10ppb in 2033 was not inconsistent with a conclusion that the City had been injured; the City's suit was ripe because the City demonstrated a present injury and the suit was not barred by the statute of limitations; the jury's verdict finding Exxon liable under state tort law theories was not precluded by the jury's concurrent conclusion that the City had not carried its burden, in the design-defect context, of demonstrating a feasible, cost-reasonable alternative to MTBE available to satisfy the standards of the now-repealed Reformulated Gasoline Program; Exxon's demand for a retrial because of an incident of juror misconduct was unavailing; the jury properly offset the gross damages award by amounts it reasonably attributed to cleanup of contaminants other than MTBE; and the City was not entitled to a jury determination of Exxon's liability for punitive damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. View "In re: MTBE Products Liability Litig." on Justia Law