Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Five questions of South Carolina law were certified to the State Supreme Court by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: (1) when a plaintiff seeks recovery for a temporary trespass or nuisance, are the damages limited to the lost rental value of the property?; (2) does South Carolina law recognize a cause of action for trespass solely from invisible odors rather than a physical invasion such as dust or water?; (3) is the maximum amount of compensatory damages a plaintiff can receive in any trespass or nuisance action (temporary or permanent) the full market value of the plaintiffs' property where no claim for restoration or cleanup costs has been alleged?; (4) when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, may the plaintiff maintain an independent cause of action for negligence or is the plaintiff limited to remedies under trespass and nuisance?; and (5) if an independent cause of action for negligence exists under South Carolina law when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, does the standard of care for a landfill operator and breach thereof need to be established through expert testimony? The South Carolina Supreme Court answered: (1) damages recoverable for a temporary trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the lost rental value of the property; (2) a trespass exists only when an intrusion is made by a physical, tangible thing; (3) the damages recoverable for a permanent trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the full market value of the property; (4) a negligence claim based on offensive odors is possible, but that such a claim would have to satisfy all the elements of negligence like any other negligence claim; and (5) the Court was unable to make a definitive determination as to whether establishing the standard of care of a landfill operator in regards to offensive odors required expert testimony, but offered guidelines for making such a determination.View "Babb v. Lee County Landfill" on Justia Law

Aloha Tower Development Corporation filed a petition to expunge a deed restriction on a park requiring that it be preserved as a public park. Scenic Hawaii, Inc. subsequently intervened in the litigation. After a non-jury trial, the land court denied the petition. Scenic Hawaii filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs under the private attorney general doctrine. The land court granted the request. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversed the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and affirmed the final judgment of the land court, holding that the land court was correct in awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Scenic Hawaii under the private attorney general doctrine inasmuch as the three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine were satisfied in this case.View "In re Application of Honolulu Constr. & Draying Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (Expo Authority) approved a project to construct a light-rail line from Culver City to Santa Monica. Plaintiffs, Neighbors for Smart Rail, petitioned for a writ of mandate, alleging that Expo Authority's approval of the project violated CEQA in several respects. The superior court denied the petition, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Expo Authority abused its discretion by examining certain environmental impacts only on projected future conditions, and not on existing environmental conditions, but the abuse of discretion was non prejudicial; and (2) the Expo Authority's mitigation measure adopted for possible impacts on street parking near planned transit stations satisfied CEQA's requirements. View "Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Constr. Auth. " on Justia Law

Horace Bounds farmed in the Mimbres basin. Along with the New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau, Petitioners brought a facial constitutional challenge against the New Mexico Domestic Well Statute (DWS). Petitioners contended that the DWS violated the New Mexico constitutional doctrine of prior appropriation as well as due process of law. Petitioners' won at the district court level, but not at the Court of Appeals. Agreeing with the substance of the appellate court's opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the DWS does not violate either the doctrine of prior appropriation set forth in the New Mexico Constitution or the guarantees of due process of law.View "Bounds v. State ex rel. D'Antonio" on Justia Law

In 2006, Exxon Mobil Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company settled with two seafood processors, Nautilus Marine Enterprises and Cook Inlet Processing. The parties disputed whether the Settlement Agreement required interest to be compounded annually, or whether the federal District Court was free to award simple or compound interest at its discretion. Exxon filed an action in the Alaska Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment. The superior court found that the parties did not intend that prejudgment interest had to be compounded annually, but rather that they intended to reserve this issue for the District Court to decide. Because the superior court’s interpretation of the Settlement Agreement was not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Nautilus Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law

Several entities filed a petition to raise the water levels of Lake Koshkonong designated by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The DNR rejected the petition, and an ALJ affirmed. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the DNR's conclusions of law were subject to a de novo review; (2) the DNR has broad statutory authority to protect non-navigable wetlands and other non-navigable water resources and may consider the water level impact on all adjacent property under Wis. Stat. 31.02(1); (3) the DNR may consider Wis. Admin. Code NR 103 water quality standards when making a water level determination under section 31.02(1) that affects wetlands and may apply these standards when appropriate after weighing the factors in the statute; and (4) the DNR erroneously excluded most testimony on the economic impact of lower water levels in the lake on the residents, businesses, and tax bases adjacent to and near the lake. Remanded.View "Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law

Cherokee Metropolitan District intervened in a lawsuit to try to minimize the loss of its water rights to some of its wells. In a separate legal malpractice action, Cherokee sued its former attorneys James Felt and James Culichia, and their firm Felt, Monson & Culichia, LLC (collectively "FMC"), alleging that FMC's negligence led to the eventual loss of those water rights. FMC sought to intervene in the water rights action, arguing that intervention was necessary in order to minimize damages it may have suffered in the legal malpractice case. The water court denied FMC's motion to intervene. FMC appealed. The Supreme Court found that despite taking opposite sides in the malpractice action, Cherokee and FMC shared an identical interest in the underlying water rights litigation. Because FMC did not made a compelling showing that Cherokee could not adequately represent the interest that it shared with Cherokee, the Court affirmed the water court's denial of FMC's motion to intervene as of right. Similarly, the Court dismissed FMC's appeal of the water court's denial of FMC's motion for permissive intervention because the water court did not abuse its discretion. View "Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Felt, Monson & Culichia LLC" on Justia Law

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission owns and manages the Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area, 23,000 acres with multiple hardwood species and used for recreation and hunting. In 1948, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructed Clearwater Dam upstream from the Area and adopted the Water Control Manual, setting seasonally varying rates for release of water from the Dam. From 1993-2000, the Corps, at the request of farmers, authorized deviations from the Manual that extended flooding into peak timber growing season. The Commission objected that deviations adversely impacted the Area, and opposed a proposal to make deviations part of the permanent water-release plan. After testing, the Corps abandoned the proposed Manual revision and ceased temporary deviations. The Commission sued, alleging that the deviations caused sustained flooding during growing season and that the cumulative impact of the flooding caused destruction of Area timber and substantial change in the terrain, necessitating costly reclamation. The Claims Court judgment ($5,778,757) in favor of the Commission was reversed by the Federal Circuit, which held that government-induced flooding can support a taking claim only if “permanent or inevitably recurring.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable. There is no blanket temporary-flooding exception to Takings Clause jurisprudence and no reason to treat flooding differently than other government intrusions. While the public interests are important, they are not categorically different from interests at stake in other takings cases. When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, time is a factor in determining the existence of a compensable taking, as are the degree to which the invasion is intended or the foreseeable result of authorized government action, the character of the land, the owner’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations,” and the severity of the interference. View "AR Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act requires permits for stationary sources, such as factories and powerplants. The Act’s “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD) provisions make it unlawful to construct or modify a “major emitting facility” in “any area to which [PSD program] applies” without a permit, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C). A “major emitting facility” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” (or 100 tons per year for certain sources). Facilities seeking a PSD permit must comply with emissions limitations that reflect the “best available control technology” (BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act and it is unlawful to operate any “major source,” wherever located, without a permit. A “major source” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant,” under Title V of the Act. In response to the Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA promulgated greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission standards for new vehicles, and made stationary sources subject to the PSD program and Title V, based on potential GHG emissions. Recognizing that requiring permits for all sources with GHG emissions above statutory thresholds would render the programs unmanageable, EPA purported to “tailor” the programs to accommodate GHGs by providing that sources would not become newly subject to PSD or Title V permitting on the basis of their potential to emit GHGs in amounts less than 100,000 tons per year. The D.C. Circuit dismissed some challenges to the tailoring rule for lack of jurisdiction and denied the rest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the Act does not permit an interpretation requiring a source to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of potential GHG emissions. The Massachusetts decision held that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” includes GHGs, but with respect to PSD and Title V permitting provisions, EPA has employed a narrower, context-appropriate meaning. Massachusetts did not invalidate the long-standing constructions. “The Act-wide definition is not a command to regulate, but a description of the universe of substances EPA may consider regulating.” The presumption of consistent usage yields to context and distinct statutory objects call for different implementation strategies. EPA has repeatedly acknowledged that applying PSD and Title V permitting requirements to GHGs would be inconsistent with the Act’s structure and design, which concern “a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.” EPA lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s unambiguous numerical thresholds to accommodate its GHG-inclusive interpretation. EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require sources that would need permits based on emission of conventional pollutants to comply with BACT for GHGs. BACT, which has traditionally been about end-of-stack controls, may be fundamentally unsuited to GHG regulation, but applying BACT to GHGs is not "disastrously unworkable," and need not result in a dramatic expansion of agency authority. View "Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 960, contains a provision (section 9658) that preempts statutes of limitations applicable to state-law actions for personal injury or property damage arising from the release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant into the environment. Section 9658 adopts the discovery rule, so that statutes of limitations begin to run when a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the harm was caused by the contaminant because person who is exposed to a toxic contaminant may not develop or show signs of resulting injury for many years. CTS sold property on which it had stored chemicals as part its operations as an electronics plant; 24 years later, owners of parts of that property and adjacent landowners, sued, alleging damages from the stored contaminants. CTS moved to dismiss, citing a state statute of repose that prevented subjecting a defendant to a tort suit brought more than 10 years after the defendant’s last culpable act. Because CTS’s last act occurred when it sold the property, the district court granted the motion. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the statute’s remedial purpose favored preemption. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that section 9658 does not pre-empt state statutes of repose. Statutes of limitations promote justice by encouraging plaintiffs to pursue claims diligently and begin to run when a claim accrues. Statutes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability after a legislatively determined amount of time and are measured from the date of the defendant’s last culpable actor omission. Under the language of the statute, pre-emption is characterized as an exception to the regular rule that the “the statute of limitations established under State law” applies; it is proper to conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt statutes of repose. View "CTS Corp. v. Waldburger" on Justia Law