Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment decided to issue an air emission source construction to permit Sunflower Power Corporation for the construction of a coal-fired power plant at the site of Sunflower's existing plant. Sierra Club contended that the permit failed to comply with the requirements of the Clean Air Act, implementing federal regulations, the Kansas Air Quality Act (KAQA), and applicable Kansas Administrative Regulations. The Supreme Court reversed the KDHE's action of issuing the permit, holding that the KDHE erroneously interpreted and applied the CAA and the KAQA when it failed to apply the regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding emission limits for nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide during the permitting process, as the CAA, KAWA and implementing regulations required the KDHE to apply the EPA regulations during the permitting process.View "Sierra Club v. Moser" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the validity of an amended rule from the Department of Ecology that reserved water from the Skagit River system for future year-round out-of-stream uses, despite the fact that in times of low stream flows these uses would impair established minimum in-stream flows necessary for fish, wildlife, recreation, navigation, scenic and aesthetic values. The Swinomish Indian Tribal Community (Tribe) sued, challenging the validity of Ecology's amended rule reserving the water. The trial court upheld the amended rule and dismissed the Tribe's petition. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that Ecology erroneously interpreted the statutory exception as broad authority to reallocate water for new beneficial uses when the requirements for appropriating water for these uses otherwise cannot be met. "The exception is very narrow, however, and requires extraordinary circumstances before the minimum flow water right can be impaired." Because the amended rule exceeded Ecology's authority under the statute, the amended rule reserving the water was invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). View "Swinomish Indian Tribal Comm'y v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners of the surface of a thirty-acre tract of land. Defendant, an oil and gas corporation, claimed that, in 1949, it leased the rights to the gas under the tract. In 2006, the parties entered into a contract allowing Defendant to build a 200-foot access road. Defendant later constructed a roadway approximately 1300 feet long on Plaintiffs' surface tract, erected an above-ground pipeline across the tract, and drilled a natural gas well. Plaintiffs sued Defendant alleging breach of contract. Defendant asserted it was entitled to summary judgment because of an exculpatory clause within a 1941 deed that severed the surface of the tract of property from the minerals below. Defendant contended that, as a lessee of the oil and gas under the property, it was a beneficiary of the exculpatory clause and entitled to operate on Plaintiffs' tract without liability for any injury to the surface by reason of removing minerals. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained on whether Defendant breached the contract.View "Thornsbury v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law

In two consolidated cases involving remediation of contaminated properties, the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association (Guaranty Association) took over the administration of the claims of an insolvent insurance carrier on the risk pursuant to the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association Act. The solvent insurance company paid the property-damage claims in each of the two cases and then sought reimbursement from the Guaranty Association under the Owens-Illinois methodology. The Guaranty Association claims that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5 and -12b, it was not responsible for making any contribution until the policies of the solvent carrier were fully exhausted. The solvent carrier contended on appeal that the Guaranty Association must pay the share of the insolvent carrier in accordance with the Owens-Illinois allocation scheme, and that its position is consistent with the PLIGA Act. The trial court agreed that the Guaranty Association is subject to the Owens-Illinois allocation methodology. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5 expressly carves out an exception to Owens-Illinois and requires exhaustion of the solvent carrier's policies before the Guaranty Association's reimbursement commitments are triggered. Finding no error with the appellate court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass’n" on Justia Law

This proceeding arose from an application to amend an existing water-quality permit filed by the owner and operator of a dairy farm located in the North Bosque River watershed. The City of Waco and Bosque River Coalition opposed the proposed permit. After the executive director of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality determined that the application and draft permit met the requirements of applicable law, the Coalition asked to intervene as a party in a contested case hearing. The Commission denied the request, finding that the Commission lacked standing, and issued the permit. The district court affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed, finding that the Coalition was an "affected person" as defined by the Texas Water Code and thus was entitled to a contested case hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to Texas Commission on Environmental Quality v. City of Waco, the companion to this case, the Coalition's status as an affected person was not determinative of the right to a contested case hearing because the Water Code expressly exempted the proposed amendment from contested case procedures.View "Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality v. Bosque River Coalition" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) assessed a penalty against Plaintiff for improper handling and disposal of roof shingles that contained asbestos. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that, pursuant to the Administrative Penalties Act, it was entitled to a notice of noncompliance and the opportunity to cure any violations before the imposition of a penalty. The commissioner of the DEP affirmed the penalty after accepting the recommendation of a hearing officer, finding that Plaintiff's failure to comply fell within one of the exceptions to the notice requirement because it was "willful and not the result of error." The hearing officer interpreted this language, otherwise called the "willfulness exception," as requiring only a showing of the "intent to do an act that violates the law if done." The Supreme Court affirmed the agency's disposition but on different grounds, holding (1) the DEP's decision was based on an error of law because its interpretation of the willfulness exception did not comport with the clear meaning of the relevant statute; but (2) Plaintiff's conduct was willful and not the result of error within the meaning of the Act because Plaintiff knew or should have known of the likely presence of asbestos in the shingles.View "Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. v. Comm'r of Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (Commission) granted an amendment to a dairy concentrated animal feeding operation's water-quality permit. A downstream city (City) sought to intervene in the permit process and obtain a contested case hearing, claiming that the dairy's operations under the amended permit would adversely affect the quality of the municipal water supply. By rule, an affected person may request a contested case hearing when authorized by law. The Commission granted the amended permit without a contested case hearing. The City appealed, claiming it was an "affected person" entitled to a contested case hearing. The district court affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the City was an affected person entitled to a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for the Commission, holding (1) a person affected by a proposed water-quality permit has the right to request a hearing, but the Commission has discretion to deny the request under certain circumstances; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the Commission's determination that the proposed amended permit did not foreclose Commission discretion to consider the amended application at a regular meeting rather than after a contested case hearing.View "Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality v. City of Waco" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a certain channel adjacent to the Yellowstone River. The disputed channel had been used for years to obtain river water to satisfy water rights held by Heart K Ranch. The City of Livingston owned land adjacent to the channel and argued that Heart K's maintenance activities in the channel harmed the City's property. The Park Conservation District (PCD) permitted Heart K's maintenance activities in the channel as provided in the Natural Steambed and Land Preservation Act. The City petitioned the PCD for a declaratory ruling that the channel was not subject to the permitting process in the Act because it was actually an irrigation ditch not subject to the Act. The PCD determined that the channel was part of the natural watercourse of the Yellowstone River, which was indisputably subject to the Act. The district court upheld the PCD. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City failed to show that the PCD's decision was arbitrary or capricious, characterized by an abuse of discretion, or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.View "Livingston v. Park Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

Appellants, several irrigation companies, and Appellee, a family ranch, were water-rights holders in the Sevier River system. Appellants filed a complaint in district court alleging that Appellee's water right had been partially forfeited and partially abandoned. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellee, finding (1) Utah law did not provide for partial forfeiture or partial abandonment prior to 2002, and (2) Appellee was protected from partial forfeiture and abandonment after 2002 by a statutory exception. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the post-2002 partial-forfeiture claim, holding that partial forfeiture has always been available in Utah; and (2) reversed the grant of summary judgment on the abandonment claim, holding that the district court erred in treating the abandonment claim as a claim under the forfeiture statute, as abandonment of a water right is a common-law claim, not a statutory claim. Remanded. View "Delta Canal Co. v. Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LC " on Justia Law

Respondent and rancher Joseph Lemire was directed by the state Department of Ecology to curb pollution of a creek that ran through his property. Respondent unsuccessfully challenged the order at the Pollution Control Hearings Board. He then filed an appeal at Superior Court. That court invalidated the agency order as unsupported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the Superior Court concluded that the agency order constituted a taking. The Department appealed. The Supreme Court reinstated the Board's order and the underlying agency order, holding that Respondent failed to establish a taking.View "Lemire v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law