Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission owns and manages the Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area, 23,000 acres with multiple hardwood species and used for recreation and hunting. In 1948, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers constructed Clearwater Dam upstream from the Area and adopted the Water Control Manual, setting seasonally varying rates for release of water from the Dam. From 1993-2000, the Corps, at the request of farmers, authorized deviations from the Manual that extended flooding into peak timber growing season. The Commission objected that deviations adversely impacted the Area, and opposed a proposal to make deviations part of the permanent water-release plan. After testing, the Corps abandoned the proposed Manual revision and ceased temporary deviations. The Commission sued, alleging that the deviations caused sustained flooding during growing season and that the cumulative impact of the flooding caused destruction of Area timber and substantial change in the terrain, necessitating costly reclamation. The Claims Court judgment ($5,778,757) in favor of the Commission was reversed by the Federal Circuit, which held that government-induced flooding can support a taking claim only if “permanent or inevitably recurring.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Government-induced flooding of limited duration may be compensable. There is no blanket temporary-flooding exception to Takings Clause jurisprudence and no reason to treat flooding differently than other government intrusions. While the public interests are important, they are not categorically different from interests at stake in other takings cases. When regulation or temporary physical invasion by government interferes with private property, time is a factor in determining the existence of a compensable taking, as are the degree to which the invasion is intended or the foreseeable result of authorized government action, the character of the land, the owner’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations,” and the severity of the interference. View "AR Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act requires permits for stationary sources, such as factories and powerplants. The Act’s “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD) provisions make it unlawful to construct or modify a “major emitting facility” in “any area to which [PSD program] applies” without a permit, 42 U.S.C. 7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C). A “major emitting facility” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” (or 100 tons per year for certain sources). Facilities seeking a PSD permit must comply with emissions limitations that reflect the “best available control technology” (BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act and it is unlawful to operate any “major source,” wherever located, without a permit. A “major source” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant,” under Title V of the Act. In response to the Supreme Court decision, Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA promulgated greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission standards for new vehicles, and made stationary sources subject to the PSD program and Title V, based on potential GHG emissions. Recognizing that requiring permits for all sources with GHG emissions above statutory thresholds would render the programs unmanageable, EPA purported to “tailor” the programs to accommodate GHGs by providing that sources would not become newly subject to PSD or Title V permitting on the basis of their potential to emit GHGs in amounts less than 100,000 tons per year. The D.C. Circuit dismissed some challenges to the tailoring rule for lack of jurisdiction and denied the rest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the Act does not permit an interpretation requiring a source to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of potential GHG emissions. The Massachusetts decision held that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” includes GHGs, but with respect to PSD and Title V permitting provisions, EPA has employed a narrower, context-appropriate meaning. Massachusetts did not invalidate the long-standing constructions. “The Act-wide definition is not a command to regulate, but a description of the universe of substances EPA may consider regulating.” The presumption of consistent usage yields to context and distinct statutory objects call for different implementation strategies. EPA has repeatedly acknowledged that applying PSD and Title V permitting requirements to GHGs would be inconsistent with the Act’s structure and design, which concern “a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.” EPA lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s unambiguous numerical thresholds to accommodate its GHG-inclusive interpretation. EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require sources that would need permits based on emission of conventional pollutants to comply with BACT for GHGs. BACT, which has traditionally been about end-of-stack controls, may be fundamentally unsuited to GHG regulation, but applying BACT to GHGs is not "disastrously unworkable," and need not result in a dramatic expansion of agency authority. View "Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 960, contains a provision (section 9658) that preempts statutes of limitations applicable to state-law actions for personal injury or property damage arising from the release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant into the environment. Section 9658 adopts the discovery rule, so that statutes of limitations begin to run when a plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, that the harm was caused by the contaminant because person who is exposed to a toxic contaminant may not develop or show signs of resulting injury for many years. CTS sold property on which it had stored chemicals as part its operations as an electronics plant; 24 years later, owners of parts of that property and adjacent landowners, sued, alleging damages from the stored contaminants. CTS moved to dismiss, citing a state statute of repose that prevented subjecting a defendant to a tort suit brought more than 10 years after the defendant’s last culpable act. Because CTS’s last act occurred when it sold the property, the district court granted the motion. The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the statute’s remedial purpose favored preemption. The Supreme Court reversed in part, concluding that section 9658 does not pre-empt state statutes of repose. Statutes of limitations promote justice by encouraging plaintiffs to pursue claims diligently and begin to run when a claim accrues. Statutes of repose effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from liability after a legislatively determined amount of time and are measured from the date of the defendant’s last culpable actor omission. Under the language of the statute, pre-emption is characterized as an exception to the regular rule that the “the statute of limitations established under State law” applies; it is proper to conclude that Congress did not intend to preempt statutes of repose. View "CTS Corp. v. Waldburger" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the EPA's decision in 2012 that it needed further studies before it could set a new, joint, "secondary" national ambient air quality standard for oxides of nitrogen and oxides of sulphur, and other related compounds found in the ambient air and considered precursors of acid deposits on the land and in the waters of the continental United States. At issue was whether EPA's decision to defer adopting a new standard at this time, pending further scientific study, violated the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(1). The court concluded that, because the Act requires a reasoned judgment, and because EPA found it could not form one, EPA's explanation conformed to the authorizing statute. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Center for Biological Diversity, et al. v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

The Energy Policy Act of 2005 directs the Department of Energy (DOE) to fund alternative energy projects called “biorefinery demonstration projects,” 42 U.S.C. 16232(d), to develop ways to convert trees, crops and agricultural waste into energy. Frontier sought a grant to construct a plant in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula that would use about 770 tons of wood chips per day to produce 20 million gallons of ethanol per year. As required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), DOE prepared a draft environmental assessment. After receiving input, DOE issued a final environmental assessment that proposed changes, including use of a biomass boiler instead of natural gas boilers to generate power for the plant. DOE issued a finding of “no significant impact” and awarded $100 million toward construction of the plant, about 34% of its total cost. Opponents sued, alleging violation of the NEPA. The district court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims also failed on the merits. The Sixth Circuit reversed with respect to standing, holding that the opponents did show injury subject to redress, but affirmed on the merits, stating that DOE completed a thorough environmental assessment and reasonably described the environmental impacts identified as not significant. View "Klein v. U.S. Dep't of Energy" on Justia Law

Imperial County and Air District filed suit against the Secretary, claiming that the environmental impact statement (EIS) regarding the Salton Sea did not comply with either the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., or the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401. Imperial Irrigation, San Diego Water, Coachella, and Metropolitan intervened as defendants. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, finding that neither plaintiff had standing to sue. Although the court concluded that plaintiffs had Article III standing to sue, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court where the district court correctly found in the alternative that the Secretary did not violate NEPA and the record made plain that the Secretary did not violate the CAA. View "People of the State of Cal. v. U.S. D.O.I." on Justia Law

Guardians and other environmental groups petitioned the EPA to add coal mines to the regulated list of statutory source categories under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7411(b)(1)(A). EPA denied the petition, explaining that it must prioritize its actions in light of limited resources and ongoing budget uncertainties. The court found that the EPA's action easily passed muster under the "extremely limited" and "highly deferential" standard that governed the court's review of an agency's denial of a rulemaking petition. The reasons given were consistent with the agency's delegated authority and supported by the record. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "WildEarth Guardians v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants regarding the roundup, or "gather," of approximately 1,600 wild horses and 160 burros from the Twin Peaks Herd Management Area (HMA). Plaintiffs claimed that the gather violated the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. 1331-1340, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370. The court held that the BLM did not violate the Act by implementing the 2010 gather on the Twin Peaks HMA; the BLM did not violate NEPA when it decided not to issue an environmental impact statement; and the BLM did not act arbitrarily and capriciously when it responded to comments highlighting the possibility of scientific dissent regarding the administration of the immunocontraceptive PZP. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "In Defense of Animals v. Dep't of the Interior" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's Final Rule regarding the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for fine particulate matter under Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), 7607(d)(9). The court concluded that the EPA did not fail to request comment on whether to revise the NAAQS where the preamble to the EPA's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requested comments on "all issues" related to the agency's proposal to lower the level of the particulate matter NAAQS; the EPA offered reasoned explanations for how it approached and weighed the evidence, and why the scientific evidence supported revision of the NAAQS; and the court rejected petitioners' contention that the EPA did not respond when petitioners' comments cited certain studies that supported retention of the existing particulate matter NAAQS because the EPA acted within its discretion by addressing the more significant comments. The court also concluded that the EPA fulfilled its obligation to reasonably explain its decision not to employ spatial averaging. The court rejected petitioners' challenge to the EPA's new requirement that States place monitors near heavily trafficked roads in large metropolitan areas where the statutory scheme granted the EPA substantial discretion and the EPA's decision and explanation were at least reasonable. Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument that the EPA should not have issued, or at least should not require compliance with, the 2013 NAAQS without first providing States and regulated certain implementation guidance. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Nat'l Assoc. of Manufacturers v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the 2013 Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) issued under section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o). The court held that Monroe Energy had Article III standing to challenge the Final Rule. On the merits, the court concluded that, in the absence of any express or implied statutory directive to consider particular factors, EPA reasonably concluded that it enjoyed broad discretion regarding whether and in what circumstances to reduce the advanced biofuel and total renewable fuel volumes under the cellulosic biofuel waiver provision. The court rejected Monroe Energy's arguments regarding vacatur of the Final Rule because it was untimely issued. EPA's decision to preserve the 2013 fuel standards while extending the compliance deadline to June 30, 2014 was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Monroe Energy, LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law