Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

A city in Georgia experienced ongoing pollution of its property from hazardous substances, including mercury and PCBs, allegedly released as a result of historical industrial operations at a nearby plant site. Georgia Power initially owned the site and later sold it to a Honeywell predecessor, with both companies involved in activities that contributed to the contamination. Over decades, these pollutants migrated into the city’s property and surrounding waterways. In the 1990s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) intervened and required the companies to investigate and remediate the site’s contamination under its oversight, culminating in a consent decree that obligated the companies to implement EPA’s official remediation plan.The city filed suit in Georgia’s Superior Court of Glynn County, asserting state-law claims for continuing nuisance and trespass, seeking damages and remediation costs. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, arguing several grounds for federal jurisdiction, including federal officer removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The district court rejected all removal grounds and remanded the case to state court, finding that the defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer. The defendants appealed the remand order while litigation continued in state court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review the remand order, finding that the defendants’ notice of appeal triggered an automatic stay of the district court’s remand, rendering subsequent state court proceedings void for these purposes. On the merits, the court held that federal officer removal was proper because the defendants’ remediation obligations arose from and were controlled by the EPA under a consent decree. The court reversed the district court’s remand order, allowing the case to proceed in federal court. View "City of Brunswick v. Honeywell International, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves environmental organizations seeking to enforce the Clean Air Act (CAA) against a petroleum refinery in Commerce City, Colorado, now operated by Suncor Energy. The refinery emits significant air pollution, affecting nearby residents' health and quality of life. Over twenty years ago, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) entered into consent decrees with Valero Energy Corporation and Conoco Phillips to enforce the CAA at these refineries. Suncor later acquired the facilities and became subject to the consent decrees. Despite ongoing EPA and Colorado enforcement actions, including compliance orders and notices of violation, the organizations allege continued violations of CAA standards and the consent decrees.The environmental groups, including GreenLatinos, Sierra Club, and 350 Colorado, filed a citizen suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, alleging 28 CAA violations and violations of the consent decrees. Suncor moved to dismiss, arguing that the suit was barred by the CAA’s diligent prosecution provision, which prevents citizen suits if EPA or a state is diligently prosecuting a civil action in court for the same violations. The district court granted Suncor’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), holding that ongoing enforcement actions by EPA and Colorado, including the consent decrees and administrative actions, triggered the diligent prosecution bar.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the diligent prosecution bar precluded the organizations’ claims. The court held that only standards or limitations being diligently prosecuted through a present judicial action (such as a consent decree) in court are preclusive, not merely similar standards enforced in administrative actions. The district court erred by applying the bar to claims that were only substantially similar or based on administrative actions. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the lower court to apply the correct standard and to assess diligence only for claims identical to those enforced in the consent decrees. View "GreenLatinos v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.)" on Justia Law

Enbridge sought approval to construct a tunnel beneath the Straits of Mackinac to house a new segment of its Line 5 pipeline, as part of a negotiated agreement with Michigan aimed at decommissioning the existing dual underwater pipelines. The project would replace the above-lakebed pipelines with a 30-inch pipe inside a concrete-lined tunnel, with ownership of the tunnel transferring to the Mackinac Straits Corridor Authority (MSCA) and Enbridge receiving a long-term lease. Several environmental groups and tribal communities opposed the project, citing environmental and public trust concerns, while labor and propane associations supported it.The Michigan Public Service Commission (PSC) referred the matter to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who largely limited the scope of review to the tunnel project itself and excluded broader issues such as the overall public need for Line 5, its operational safety, and climate impacts beyond the new segment. The ALJ found that prior approvals in 1953 established Line 5’s public need indefinitely. The PSC affirmed the ALJ’s approach, restricted its environmental review under Michigan’s Environmental Protection Act (MEPA) to the replacement project, and approved Enbridge’s application, finding no feasible or prudent alternatives and declining to examine the common-law public trust doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed the PSC’s decision, applying a deferential review standard.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, holding that courts must review agency MEPA determinations de novo, regardless of procedural origin. The Court found the PSC erred by not considering whether the tunnel project would factually and proximately cause the continued operation of Line 5 and attendant environmental harms, by inconsistently comparing alternatives, and by failing to assess impacts on public trust resources. The Supreme Court vacated the PSC’s order and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In Re Application Of Enbridge Energy To Replace & Relocate Line 5" on Justia Law

A company operates a pipeline transporting oil and natural gas liquids between the United States and Canada. A portion of this pipeline crosses twelve miles of land within a Native American reservation in northern Wisconsin. In 2013, the company’s rights-of-way over certain parcels of reservation land expired. During the intervening years, the tribal band acquired ownership interests in a number of these parcels. The company continued to operate the pipeline without securing the tribal band’s renewed consent for the necessary easements. Following a breakdown in negotiations, the tribal band filed suit, alleging trespass and public nuisance. The band also pointed to the risk of a pipeline rupture near a river bend where erosion threatened pipeline safety.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment for the tribal band on its trespass and unjust enrichment claims, and against the company on its breach-of-contract counterclaim. After a bench trial, the district court awarded the band restitution for past trespass, ordered future disgorgement of profits, and issued an injunction requiring the company to cease operations across the affected parcels within three years and to implement a monitoring and shutdown protocol to abate the alleged nuisance. Both parties appealed; the district court stayed the shutdown portion of the injunction while the appeal was pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding that the company was trespassing on the parcels at issue and that restitution and injunctive relief are appropriate remedies. However, the court vacated the district court’s restitution calculation and the three-year shutdown deadline, remanding for a new determination of remedies that accounts for the public interest and ongoing pipeline reroute efforts. The court also held that federal statutory law displaced the band’s federal common law nuisance claim and vacated the related injunction. View "Bad River Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa v Enbridge Energy Company, Inc." on Justia Law

A Georgia limited liability company purchased property in Greensboro, North Carolina, next to a gas station and convenience store owned by the defendants. After environmental testing revealed hazardous chemicals in the soil and groundwater on the company’s property, the company installed a vapor barrier and sought to recover the associated costs from the gas station owner and its members under both CERCLA and North Carolina law. The evidence showed that both properties had a long history of commercial and automotive use, with various underground storage tanks having been installed, removed, or closed in place over several decades. Notably, a waste-oil tank installed in the 1950s was closed in 1996 after evidence of petroleum and other contaminants was found in the soil.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The court held that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence that the contamination on its property was caused by releases from the defendants’ property, and that any released substances were covered by CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion. The court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert’s later declaration referencing chromium contamination, finding it was untimely new opinion testimony.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit clarified that the petroleum exclusion in CERCLA covers unadulterated petroleum and its fractions, but not petroleum contaminated with hazardous substances not normally found in such products. The appellate court found that evidence regarding the leaking waste-oil tank raised a factual question as to whether a contaminant outside the petroleum exclusion was released. The Fourth Circuit vacated the summary judgment and the exclusion of certain evidence, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Harris Investment Holdings, LLC v. BFJ of USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Several environmental organizations brought an action contesting a groundwater sustainability plan that had been adopted by two local groundwater agencies under California’s Sustainable Groundwater Management Act (the Act). The plaintiffs alleged that the plan failed to achieve sustainable groundwater management, specifically raising concerns about inadequate measurable objectives, unreasonably low minimum thresholds for groundwater levels, and insufficient measures to address impacts on surface waters and land subsidence. After the plan was adopted, it was submitted to the California Department of Water Resources (the Department) for review as required by the Act.The Superior Court of Butte County initially overruled the defendants’ demurrer, finding that the Act permitted reverse validation actions by interested parties, and allowed the action to proceed even though the complaint was filed slightly before the statutory waiting period had expired. The court later denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, holding it was premature and that an administrative record was necessary. While the litigation was pending, the Department completed its review and approved the plan, finding it likely to achieve the basin’s sustainability goal, though it identified corrective actions to be addressed going forward. The defendants then moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Department’s approval rendered the judicial challenge moot. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case, reasoning that further judicial review would improperly intrude on the Department’s administrative functions.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s orders. The appellate court held that while the Act permits reverse validation actions by interested parties, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action under the primary jurisdiction doctrine after the Department completed its evaluation. The court concluded that, where a plaintiff’s challenge is based on the same sustainability evaluation committed to the Department’s expertise, courts may defer to the agency’s process to ensure uniform and technically informed application of the Act. View "AquAlliance v. Vina Groundwater Sustainability Agency" on Justia Law

A municipality in Alabama brought a lawsuit against a chemical manufacturer, alleging that the company’s products containing per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) contaminated the Alabama River. The contamination allegedly originated from PFAS-containing wastewater discharged by paper mills, which used the manufacturer’s products. The municipality relies on water from the river for its drinking supply, and PFAS are difficult to remove with its current filtration system, necessitating expensive upgrades.After being sued in Alabama state court for negligence, nuisance, and trespass, the manufacturer removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, asserting jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute. The municipality expressly disclaimed any claims related to PFAS contamination from aqueous film forming foam (AFFF), a firefighting product produced by the manufacturer for the military. The district court found that the heart of the claims was the supply of PFAS products to paper mills, not federal conduct, and remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision de novo. The appellate court held that the manufacturer sufficiently alleged facts supporting federal officer removal jurisdiction. It concluded that the manufacturer plausibly acted under a federal officer when producing AFFF and that the complaint’s gravamen encompassed PFAS contamination generally, not just from paper mills. The court found the municipality’s disclaimers to be mere artful pleading that did not sever the causal connection required for removal. The manufacturer also plausibly asserted a colorable federal government contractor defense. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "The Town of Pine Hill, Alabama v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

The key facts concern allegations that Lockheed Martin improperly handled volatile organic compounds at its Orlando facility, resulting in environmental contamination that plaintiffs claim caused neurological illnesses, including multiple sclerosis and Parkinson’s disease, among workers and nearby residents. Plaintiffs relied on expert testimony to show that exposure to specific chemicals could cause the diseases in question.In the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the plaintiffs presented two general causation experts who used epidemiological and other scientific methodologies to link the chemicals to the illnesses. Lockheed Martin challenged the admissibility of these experts’ opinions, arguing they were unreliable. The district court agreed, finding that the first expert failed to adequately explain or reliably apply his “weight of the evidence” methodology and did not sufficiently analyze the Bradford Hill factors. The second expert’s opinions were largely based on the first expert’s report and a statistical analysis that did not properly assess background risk. As a result, the district court excluded both experts’ testimony and granted summary judgment for Lockheed Martin, concluding that plaintiffs lacked admissible general causation evidence. In the related DeMilt case, the summary judgment was partial, but the district court certified it for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the experts and granting summary judgment. The appellate court held that the district court acted within its discretion, as the experts did not adequately explain or reliably apply their methodologies, and their testimony was thus properly excluded. Without this expert evidence, plaintiffs could not establish general causation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders excluding the experts and granting summary judgment in favor of Lockheed Martin. View "Davis v. Lockheed Martin Corp." on Justia Law

Several environmental organizations challenged a rule issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that modified how the agency determines whether a stationary source of air pollution requires a permit for modifications under the Clean Air Act’s New Source Review (NSR) program. The core factual issue concerned whether, in assessing if a physical or operational change at a facility triggers the need for an NSR permit, the EPA may consider both emission increases and decreases attributable to a single project (“project emissions accounting”) at the initial step of the permitting process.Previously, the EPA used a two-step process: Step One evaluated whether a proposed project would itself cause a significant emissions increase, and Step Two determined whether any source-wide emissions decreases would offset that increase. The challenged rule allowed for netting both increases and decreases within a single project at Step One. Petitioners argued that this change would allow regulated entities to avoid NSR by aggregating unrelated activities and relying on emissions decreases that were not contemporaneous with increases.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the petitions after several environmental groups sought judicial review following the EPA’s adoption of the project emissions accounting rule and related interpretive guidance. The court found that at least one petitioner had standing based on alleged injury from increased emissions at a specific facility. The court held that the EPA’s rule was not contrary to law and did not violate the Clean Air Act, as it consistently applied the statutory definition of “modification” and fell within the agency’s reasonable interpretive discretion. The court further held that the rule was not arbitrary or capricious, finding the EPA’s explanations for its approach to project aggregation and recordkeeping requirements sufficient. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA" on Justia Law

Robert and Jennifer Audette purchased a lakefront property in Minnesota and constructed a 12-foot-wide concrete ramp from their home to the lake’s ordinary high-water mark without first obtaining approval from Lake of the Woods County. County officials had previously advised them about permissible improvements, including limitations on new concrete and the importance of staying within existing fill, but the Audettes exceeded these instructions. Subsequent inspections revealed substantial wetland impacts, and the County issued restoration orders and identified violations of both zoning ordinances and a state-funded shoreline stabilization project.After the ramp was constructed, the Audettes sought an after-the-fact conditional use permit, citing the need for handicap accessibility for Jennifer Audette, who has multiple sclerosis. The Lake of the Woods County Planning Commission recommended approval with conditions, but the Lake of the Woods County Board denied the permit, emphasizing environmental concerns, procedural violations, and the availability of less impactful alternatives. The Audettes then applied for approval under the Wetland Conservation Act, which was also denied by the County and, upon appeal, by the Minnesota Board of Water and Soil Resources. The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources later cited the Audettes for failure to comply with restoration orders.The Audettes filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota, alleging discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act due to denial of their permit application. The district court granted summary judgment for the County, finding the Audettes had not timely requested an accommodation and had violated County instructions. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo and affirmed. The Eighth Circuit held that the County did not violate ADA accommodation duties, as the Audettes never sought a reasonable accommodation at the appropriate time and provided no evidence of intentional discrimination. View "Audette v. Lake of the Woods County" on Justia Law