Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Sable Offshore Corp. and Pacific Pipeline Company acquired the Las Flores Pipelines, which run through the coastal zone in Santa Barbara County, California. After the 2015 Refugio Beach oil spill, the pipelines were inactive until Sable purchased them in 2024 and began repair and maintenance work at numerous sites. The California Coastal Commission sent Sable a Notice of Violation, then issued Executive Director Cease and Desist Orders, directing Sable to seek permits for both prospective and already completed work. Sable submitted zoning clearance applications to the County, which declared the repair work authorized by existing permits and declined to act on the applications. The Commission subsequently issued further cease and desist orders and filed a cross-complaint seeking injunctive relief. After observing ongoing construction, the Commission requested a preliminary injunction.The Superior Court of Santa Barbara County held hearings and ultimately granted a preliminary injunction enforcing the Commission’s cease and desist order. Sable appealed, arguing the Commission lacked jurisdiction to issue the order because the County had determined no new permits were necessary and had declined enforcement action.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. It held that under Public Resources Code section 30810, the Commission was authorized to issue a cease and desist order when the County declined to act regarding an alleged violation, regardless of the County’s reasons for its decision. The court found that the trial court properly issued the preliminary injunction upon a prima facie showing of a Coastal Act violation, and no balancing of equities was required under section 30803. The court also rejected Sable’s due process and federal preemption arguments and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Sable Offshore Corp. v. Cal. Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

A dispute arose over the operation of the Klamath Project, a large federal water management system serving both agricultural and wildlife needs in Northern California and Southern Oregon. The Bureau of Reclamation manages the project, which involves distributing water from Upper Klamath Lake, a reservoir that also provides habitat for endangered and threatened species, including two species of suckers and coho salmon. In response to ongoing drought and the listing of these species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Bureau consulted with federal wildlife agencies and adopted procedures requiring minimum water levels and stream flows to protect the listed species. Competing interests include tribal fishing rights, agricultural irrigation, and wildlife conservation.The conflict intensified when the Klamath Water Users Association and Klamath Irrigation District challenged the Bureau’s authority to release water from Upper Klamath Lake to comply with the ESA, arguing such releases diminished water available for irrigation and exceeded the Bureau’s authority under state and federal law. The Oregon Water Resources Department issued an order to halt these releases, which led federal agencies and tribal groups to seek declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court held that the Bureau's operations were subject to the ESA and enjoined enforcement of the state order.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the ESA applies to the Bureau’s operation of the Klamath Project, whether the district court’s order constituted a judicial taking of water rights, and whether the district court had jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA applies to the Bureau’s Klamath Project operations, reaffirming its precedent that the ESA governs such federal water management actions. The court rejected the judicial taking claim, finding no adjudication of water rights occurred, and determined that neither prior exclusive jurisdiction nor Colorado River abstention doctrines barred the district court from deciding the case. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "YUROK TRIBE V. KLAMATH WATER USERS ASSOCIATION" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations challenged the decision by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (VDEQ) to grant a water quality certification for the Southgate Project, a proposed pipeline crossing parts of Virginia and North Carolina. The organizations argued that the certification was improperly issued because VDEQ failed to adequately address the pipeline developer’s past record of environmental violations and did not include all necessary conditions to ensure compliance with water quality standards. VDEQ had previously approved the developer’s erosion and sediment control plans, received public comments, and ultimately issued the certification after addressing those comments.After VDEQ issued the certification, the petitioners sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and filed a motion to stay the certification pending judicial review, pointing to the imminent start of pipeline construction. Their main contentions were that VDEQ did not rationally justify its prediction that the pipeline would not violate water quality standards, especially given the developer’s history of noncompliance, and that the certification failed to explicitly require compliance with certain state environmental plans and agreements.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered the motion for a stay and denied it. The court found that the petitioners had not made a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court noted that VDEQ provided a detailed explanation for its decision, including differences between the current project and past projects, and incorporated relevant environmental plans by reference in the certification. The court also determined that the remaining factors supporting a stay did not outweigh the petitioners’ failure to demonstrate likely success on the merits. The motion for a stay pending review was therefore denied. View "Dan River Basin Association v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

A proposed pipeline project, known as the Southgate Project, is planned to traverse portions of North Carolina and Virginia. This project is an extension of an existing pipeline system, and its construction has generated substantial environmental and legal concerns. The Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC, sought a water quality certification from the North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality (NCDEQ), which is required under the Clean Water Act for such projects. After considering public comments, a public hearing, and a report from its hearing officer, NCDEQ issued the necessary certification in November 2025, finding that the project, if conducted according to specified conditions, would comply with state water quality standards.Previously, in 2020, NCDEQ had denied a water quality certification for the project, but that decision was vacated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2021. After the main pipeline was completed in 2024 and project plans were revised to reduce its length in North Carolina, NCDEQ reviewed and ultimately granted the new application. Environmental groups then petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for review of NCDEQ’s decision, and, as construction appeared imminent, sought a stay to prevent the project from proceeding while the case was pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the motion for a stay, applying the traditional four-factor test for such relief. The court held that the petitioners did not make a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their challenges to NCDEQ’s decision, particularly given the deference owed to the agency’s expertise under the Administrative Procedure Act. As a result, the motion for preliminary relief was denied, though the underlying merits of the challenge remain for later determination. View "Sierra Club v. North Carolina Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Forward, Inc. operates a landfill near Stockton, California, which is bordered by several state facilities. Forward was required by a local water quality board to remediate groundwater contamination at its landfill. During this process, Forward suspected that nearby state facilities—including correctional and health care centers—were contributing hazardous waste to the groundwater, hindering its remediation efforts. Forward entered into an agreement with two California state agencies to access these facilities and collected data suggesting ongoing hazardous waste generation stemming from activities such as dry cleaning, solvent use, and well-water treatment at the state facilities.Forward filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and the Director of the California Department of General Services (DGS). Forward alleged that, due to their official positions, these defendants had control over the generation, handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste at the relevant facilities. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Forward had not established a sufficiently direct connection between the defendants and the alleged violations under the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that Forward failed to establish the “fairly direct” connection required by Ex parte Young. The court found that the defendants’ general supervisory roles over their respective agencies did not suffice to subject them to suit for the alleged RCRA violations, as neither their statutory duties nor alleged actions were directly tied to the waste management at the specific state facilities. The Ninth Circuit’s disposition was to affirm the district court’s dismissal. View "FORWARD, INC. V. MACOMBER" on Justia Law

The case centers on the operations of a chemical manufacturing facility in Parkersburg, West Virginia, owned by The Chemours Company. Chemours used hexafluoropropylene oxide dimer acid (HFPO-DA), a member of the PFAS class of chemicals, as a processing aid in polymer production. The company discharged wastewater containing HFPO-DA into the Ohio River under a Clean Water Act (CWA) permit that established specific effluent limits. However, from 2022 onward, Chemours exceeded these limits on multiple occasions. Local water testing showed that HFPO-DA concentrations sometimes surpassed newer, not-yet-enforceable federal health standards but did not exceed West Virginia’s own goals. Chemours entered into an administrative consent order with the EPA to address permit compliance.The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia reviewed a citizen suit brought by West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc., seeking a preliminary injunction against Chemours for ongoing permit violations. The district court found that the Coalition had Article III associational standing through a member who avoided boating in the Ohio River due to Chemours’ discharges. The court granted the preliminary injunction, enjoining Chemours from exceeding permit limits and requiring remedial measures. Chemours appealed, challenging both the standing determination and the irreparable harm finding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined both issues. The court agreed that the Coalition had established a substantial likelihood of standing at this stage. However, it found that the district court committed legal errors in its irreparable harm analysis, including incorrectly presuming harm from permit violations and conflating harm to the public with harm to the plaintiff. The Fourth Circuit also found clear error in the factual findings regarding irreparable harm. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction granted by the district court. View "West Virginia Rivers Coalition, Inc. v. The Chemours Company FC, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of Idaho cities, collectively known as the Coalition of Cities, hold junior ground water rights in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (ESPA). These cities became involved in ongoing water rights litigation after the Surface Water Coalition (SWC), representing senior surface water right holders, initiated a delivery call in 2005. The SWC argued that junior ground water pumping reduced water availability for senior surface water users due to the hydrologic connection between the aquifer and the Snake River. This dispute led to a series of orders by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (IDWR) that established and modified the methodology for determining whether pumping by junior users caused material injury to senior rights.Following the issuance of the Fifth Amended Final Order (Fifth Methodology Order) and a subsequent Post-Hearing Order, the Director issued a Sixth Methodology Order, which superseded all previous orders. The Cities filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) district court, challenging only the Post-Hearing Order (which addressed the Fifth Methodology Order) and not the operative Sixth Methodology Order. The district court affirmed the Director’s Post-Hearing Order, rejecting the Cities’ challenges to various factual findings and methodological choices.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Cities’ appeal because they failed to timely challenge the Sixth Methodology Order—the operative agency action currently in effect. As a result, the appeal was dismissed. The court awarded costs, but not attorney fees, to the IDWR and SWC, ruling that the statutory basis for attorney fees was inapplicable. The primary holding was that failure to timely appeal the operative final order deprived the court of jurisdiction to grant relief. View "City of Idaho Falls v. Department of Water Resources" on Justia Law

A licensed California fisherman sought public access to fish at the Calaveras Reservoir, which is owned by the City and County of San Francisco and managed by the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission. The reservoir, a source of drinking water for millions, is governed by a watershed management plan that currently prohibits public access and fishing. After the City determined that, subject to environmental review and regulatory approval, shoreline fishing could potentially occur without compromising water quality, it began planning for a fishing program, which included infrastructure improvements and compliance with environmental laws.Previously, in a related proceeding, the Alameda County Superior Court ordered the City to determine whether fishing could occur without affecting water purity, but it did not require the City to immediately open the reservoir or apply for a permit. The City complied by starting the environmental review and planning process. Dissatisfied with the pace, the fisherman filed a new petition for a writ of mandate, seeking to compel the City to immediately apply for an amended water supply permit and open the reservoir for fishing. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding no ministerial duty requiring the City to proceed immediately and concluding that legal requirements, including environmental review and program planning, must be satisfied first.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff had not established a clear ministerial duty requiring the City to immediately apply for a permit or open the reservoir for fishing. The court found that the governing statutes and regulations allow for the exercise of discretion and require compliance with environmental and permitting processes before fishing access can be provided. The judgment was affirmed. View "Dummer v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

The dispute centers on land in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana, owned by a public entity, where oil and gas exploration occurred for decades under a mineral lease originally granted in 1943. The plaintiff acquired several tracts of this land between 1968 and 1987, with prior owners reserving mineral rights. The mineral lease was assigned multiple times before terminating in 2020. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, or their predecessors, caused environmental damage to the property through oil and gas operations predating the plaintiff’s ownership, and sought damages under both tort and contract theories.Defendants filed exceptions of no right of action, arguing that under the “subsequent purchaser rule” articulated in Eagle Pipe and Supply, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., a property owner cannot recover for damage inflicted before their purchase unless assigned the prior owner’s rights. The trial court denied these exceptions. On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, reversed in part. It dismissed all claims against one defendant (Honeywell) for preacquisition damage, and limited claims against the other (Texas Pacific) to an 87-day period when both the plaintiff and Texas Pacific’s predecessor simultaneously held interests in one tract.The Supreme Court of Louisiana granted review. It extended the subsequent purchaser rule from Eagle Pipe to cases involving mineral leases, holding that a purchaser of property, absent an assignment or subrogation, has no right of action for preacquisition property damage caused by mineral lessees. However, the court recognized an exception for damages occurring during the period when the plaintiff owned the property and the defendant held lease rights. Additionally, the court held that a current surface owner may enforce the prudent operator standard under Mineral Code article 122 for end-of-lease obligations that become due upon termination, but not for historic operational damage. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "VINTON HARBOR & TERMINAL DISTRICT VS. REUNION ENERGY COMPANY" on Justia Law

Oak Run Solar Project, L.L.C. sought approval from the Ohio Power Siting Board to construct a solar-powered electric generation facility in Madison County, Ohio. The proposed facility would occupy approximately 4,400 acres and include an 800 MW solar array, a 300 MW battery energy storage system, and two transmission lines. Oak Run entered agreements with landowners for the project site and committed to an agrivoltaics program, maintaining agricultural productivity alongside solar generation. Local governments and other parties intervened, raising concerns about environmental, visual, water, plant, wildlife, and safety impacts. The board’s staff issued a report, and a hearing was held, resulting in project approval subject to conditions for landscape screening and safety.Prior to reaching the Supreme Court of Ohio, the Ohio Power Siting Board considered Oak Run’s application and allowed intervenors, including several township boards and the county board of commissioners, to participate. After a hearing and review, the board granted Oak Run’s certificate for construction, finding the statutory requirements satisfied and imposing conditions related to visual screening and emergency response. The local governments filed an application for rehearing, which was denied. They then appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio, arguing the board failed to obtain necessary information, especially regarding visual impacts and environmental effects.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case, applying a standard of review for “unlawful or unreasonable” board orders. The court held that Oak Run failed to provide required photographic simulations or sketches of substations, as mandated by administrative rules, thereby depriving the board of necessary information to assess visual impacts. The court affirmed the board’s orders in part, reversed in part regarding the visual-impact information, and remanded the matter to the board for further consideration of the project’s visual effects. View "In re Application of Oak Run Solar Project, L.L.C." on Justia Law