Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Teddy and Melanie Scott filed a lawsuit against Dyno Nobel, Inc., alleging that Teddy suffered serious injuries from exposure to a toxic gas cloud negligently emitted from Dyno’s nitric acid plant in Louisiana, Missouri. The incident occurred on March 20, 2015, when an equipment failure during a startup led to the release of nitrogen oxide gas, which enveloped Teddy while he was working at a nearby plant. Teddy experienced immediate physical symptoms and has since suffered from ongoing health issues, including irritable larynx syndrome, headaches, and back pain. Melanie claimed loss of consortium due to Teddy’s injuries.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri initially granted summary judgment in favor of Dyno, concluding that Dyno owed no duty of care to Teddy. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed this decision, finding that the issue of foreseeability, which determines duty, should be decided by a jury. On remand, a jury trial resulted in a verdict for the Scotts, awarding Teddy $13,750,000 in compensatory damages and $30 million in punitive damages, and Melanie $3 million in compensatory damages. Dyno’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment in part. The appellate court found that the jury had sufficient evidence to determine that Dyno’s actions created a foreseeable risk of harm and that Dyno breached its duty of care. However, the court reversed the award of punitive damages, concluding that the Scotts did not provide clear and convincing evidence that Dyno acted with a culpable mental state necessary for punitive damages under Missouri law. The case was remanded for entry of an amended judgment omitting the punitive damages award. View "Scott v. Dyno Nobel, Inc." on Justia Law

In October 2014, while guiding a hunting party on their property, the Olsens' son observed a crop duster spraying herbicide, which allegedly damaged the Olsens' ponderosa pine trees. The Olsens claimed the herbicide caused significant damage and death to the trees. They filed a lawsuit against the Defendants, who argued that expert testimony was required to prove causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, leading to the Olsens' appeal.The Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in Spink County, South Dakota, reviewed the case. The court found that without expert testimony, a jury would be left to speculate about the cause of the damage to the trees. The court noted that the fields of chemistry, botany, and agronomy were beyond the understanding of a typical layperson. Consequently, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the Olsens' complaint in its entirety.The Supreme Court of South Dakota reviewed the appeal. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision regarding the need for expert testimony to establish causation for the damage to the trees. However, it reversed the summary judgment on the claims of trespass, statutory nuisance, and common law nuisance, noting that these claims do not require proof of damages to survive summary judgment. The court remanded these claims for further proceedings, allowing the Olsens to potentially recover nominal damages. The court affirmed the summary judgment on the claims of promissory estoppel and civil conspiracy due to the lack of evidence on causation for damages. View "Estate of Olsen v. Agtegra Cooperative" on Justia Law

The case involves Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Company, LLC (Transco), a natural gas company that sought to abandon and expand its pipeline facilities in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. To do so, Transco needed a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which it obtained. However, the certificate was subject to conditions, including that Transco receive three additional permits from the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP). After receiving these permits, Transco began its pipeline project. However, three environmental advocates filed an administrative appeal with the Environmental Hearing Board (EHB) challenging PADEP's issuance of the permits. In response, Transco initiated a lawsuit in the District Court seeking to enjoin the administrative appeal, arguing that the Natural Gas Act preempts the state law allowing the appeal.The District Court rejected Transco's preemption arguments and denied its motion for a preliminary injunction. Transco appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision, finding that none of the theories of preemption advanced by Transco or the state agency applied in this case. The Court held that the Natural Gas Act does not expressly preempt administrative appeals to the EHB, nor does it field preempt such appeals. The Court also found that the possibility of multiple challenges in different fora to PADEP permitting decisions under the Clean Water Act for interstate natural gas pipelines does not impose an obstacle to the purposes of the Natural Gas Act. Therefore, the Court concluded that Transco's motion for a preliminary injunction was correctly denied. View "Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Co LLC v. Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board" on Justia Law

In March 2022, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued an order to seven chemical manufacturers/processors, managed by the Vinyl Institute, to test the chronic toxicity of 1,1,2-Trichloroethane (1,1,2-TCA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). The Vinyl Institute challenged the order, arguing that the EPA failed to comply with several statutory requirements. The Vinyl Institute also moved to supplement the administrative record with a scientific consultant’s report.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit granted the Vinyl Institute's petition for review. The court found that the EPA's reliance on non-public portions of the administrative record was not part of "the record taken as a whole" subject to review. The court held that the EPA failed to provide substantial evidence that met its statutory mandate. The court vacated the order and remanded the case to the EPA to satisfy that mandate with "substantial evidence in the record taken as a whole." The court also denied the Vinyl Institute's motion to supplement the record with scientific information it could have—and should have—submitted earlier. View "Vinyl Institute, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The case involves a family from Guatemala who entered the United States without valid entry documents and were served with Notices to Appear, charging them with removability under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The father, Roni Cruz Galicia, filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, with his wife and child as derivative beneficiaries. Cruz claimed that they were members of a particular social group ("PSG") defined as "climate refugees," having fled Guatemala due to severe environmental conditions and the government's inadequate response.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Cruz's testimony credible but rejected his asylum claim. The IJ determined that Cruz did not experience sufficient harm in Guatemala to constitute past persecution, the asserted PSG of "climate refugees" was not legally cognizable, and Cruz's fear of poor conditions in his home country did not constitute a well-founded fear of future persecution. Cruz appealed the IJ's asylum ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which summarily affirmed the IJ's decision.In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Cruz argued that his asserted PSG of "climate refugees" was legally cognizable and that he had experienced past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution due to his membership in the PSG. The court found no error in the determination that Cruz failed to show that his asserted PSG is legally cognizable. The court also rejected Cruz's argument that the BIA erred by affirming the denial of his asylum claim summarily and without a written opinion. The court denied the petition. View "Cruz Galicia v. Garland" on Justia Law

This case involves a catastrophic wildfire that occurred in 2016 in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park in Eastern Tennessee. The fire spread into Gatlinburg and Sevier County, resulting in the destruction of over 2,500 structures and the death of 14 people. The appellant insurance companies paid claims to policy holders and then filed claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the National Park Service (NPS), alleging negligence for failure to follow multiple mandatory fire-management protocols and for the failure to issue mandatory warnings to the public.The government moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that it was immune from suit under the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. The district court granted the motion on all three claims relating to fire-management protocols, but denied the motion on claims relating to the duty to warn. The insurance companies appealed, and the government cross-appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's order granting the government's motion to dismiss the insurance companies' incident-command claim. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the fire-monitoring claim and the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) claim as part of the discretionary fire-suppression decision-making process. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of the government's facial challenge to the insurance companies' duty-to-warn claims, and remanded these claims for further proceedings. View "American Reliable Insurance Co. v. United States" on Justia Law

The case involves the owners and operators of several coal-fired power plants who challenged the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) actions regarding the disposal of coal combustion residuals. The petitioners argued that the EPA's actions amended existing legislative rules governing such disposal and that the EPA was required to promulgate those amendments according to the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.The lower courts had previously reviewed the case, and the petitioners had sought extensions of the April 2021 closure deadline for their coal residual disposal sites. The EPA had proposed denials of these extension applications, concluding that the facilities failed to demonstrate compliance with other requirements of the coal residuals regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that the challenged documents straightforwardly applied existing regulations and did not amount to the kind of agency action “promulgating a[] regulation, or requirement” that the court had jurisdiction to review under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The court also found that the EPA's actions did not amend the existing regulations but simply explained, interpreted, and applied them. View "Electric Energy, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

The case involves the San Carlos Apache Tribe's challenge to the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality's (ADEQ) issuance of a 2017 Permit Renewal to Resolution Copper Mining, LLC (Resolution) for the discharge of water from a copper mine. The Tribe argued that the construction of a new mine shaft (Shaft 10) and other new features at the mine constituted a "new source" under the Clean Water Act (CWA), which would subject the mine to more stringent regulations.Previously, an administrative law judge (ALJ) had determined that ADEQ should have analyzed whether Shaft 10 and the other new features were a "new source" under the CWA before issuing the permit. The Arizona Water Quality Appeals Board remanded the matter to ADEQ, which concluded that Shaft 10 and the new features were "existing sources" under the CWA. The Board affirmed ADEQ's issuance of the 2017 Permit Renewal. The Tribe appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the Board's decision. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Shaft 10 was a "new source" under the CWA.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona disagreed with the court of appeals. The court applied a three-step test to determine whether a construction is a "new source" under the CWA. The court found that Shaft 10 was not a "new source" under the CWA because it was integrated with existing infrastructure at the mine and engaged in the same general type of activity as the existing source. The court also found that Shaft 10 did not have a new source performance standard "independently applicable" to it. Therefore, the court concluded that ADEQ acted within its discretion by issuing the 2017 Permit Renewal to Resolution. The court vacated the court of appeals' decision and affirmed the superior court's decision. View "SAN CARLOS APACHE TRIBE v STATE" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act envisions a collaborative effort between states and the federal government to regulate air quality. When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets standards for common air pollutants, states must submit a State Implementation Plan (SIP), providing for the implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of those standards in their jurisdictions. In 2015, the EPA revised its air-quality standards for ozone, triggering a requirement for states to submit new SIPs. Years later, the EPA announced its intention to disapprove over 20 SIPs because the agency believed they had failed to address adequately obligations under the Good Neighbor Provision. During the public-comment period for the proposed SIP disapprovals, the EPA issued a single proposed Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) to bind all those states.The D.C. Circuit denied relief to a number of the remaining states and industry groups who challenged the FIP, arguing that the EPA’s decision to apply the FIP after so many other states had dropped out was “arbitrary” or “capricious.” They asked the court to stay any effort to enforce the FIP against them while their appeal unfolded. The parties renewed their request in the Supreme Court of the United States.The Supreme Court granted the applications for a stay, halting enforcement of the EPA’s rule against the applicants pending the disposition of the applicants’ petition for review in the D.C. Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, timely sought. The Court found that the applicants were likely to prevail on their claim that the EPA’s action was arbitrary or capricious because the agency failed to offer a satisfactory explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, and ignored an important aspect of the problem. The EPA’s alternative arguments were unavailing. View "Ohio v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Several environmental organizations filed a citizen suit against private timber companies under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), alleging that the companies' planned logging project in Oregon would harm marbled murrelets, a species of threatened birds. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs and issued a permanent injunction against the logging project. The timber companies appealed, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' notice of the suit was invalid.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the ESA's citizen-suit notice requirement is not jurisdictional, but a claims-processing rule subject to waiver and forfeiture. The court found that the timber companies possibly forfeited their challenge to the notice letter, but decided to address the issue and concluded that the notice was sufficient.The court also held that the district court correctly applied the standard for "actual injury" under the ESA. The court found that the timber companies' planned actions would "harm" marbled murrelets, as the logging project would significantly impair the birds' breeding patterns by removing their habitat. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had established proximate causation under the ESA, and thus, the permanent injunction against the logging project was upheld. View "Cascadia Wildlands v. Scott Timber Co." on Justia Law