Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

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The case involves a dispute over the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation’s (TDEC) issuance of a water quality certification to Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company (TGP) for the construction and operation of a 32-mile natural gas pipeline in Tennessee. The pipeline would cross over one hundred bodies of water and require drilling across rocky terrain. Environmental groups Sierra Club and Appalachian Voices argue that TDEC failed to properly assess TGP’s application and ensure that the pipeline would not cause significant environmental damage.The lower court, TDEC, issued the water quality certification to TGP, authorizing temporary and permanent impacts to various water bodies and wetlands. TDEC imposed several conditions on TGP to minimize environmental disruption, including selecting the least impactful trenching techniques and obtaining written authorization before using controlled blasting. Petitioners filed a timely Petition for Review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, arguing that TDEC’s issuance of the certification violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and found that TDEC did not violate the APA. The court held that TDEC adequately evaluated the water quality certification application and reasonably explained its decision-making process regarding waterbody crossings, rock removal methodology, downstream sedimentation, trench excavation, and baseline conditions of waterbodies. The court concluded that TDEC’s actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or inconsistent with its regulations. Consequently, the court denied the Petition for Review. View "Sierra Club v. Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation" on Justia Law

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In August 2023, the Water Works and Sewer Board of the City of Gadsden ("Gadsden Water") filed a lawsuit in the Etowah Circuit Court against several corporate defendants, including DuPont De Nemours, Inc., and Daikin America, Inc., alleging contamination of its raw-water intake from the Coosa River with perfluoroalkyl and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS). Gadsden Water claimed that the defendants' actions led to substantial economic and consequential damages, including costs for future filtration systems, monitoring contamination levels, and remediation of contaminated property.Previously, in September 2016, Gadsden Water had filed a similar lawsuit ("Gadsden I") against other parties for PFAS contamination, which was settled before trial. The settlement funds were intended to cover the costs of a new water-treatment facility and its long-term operation. The Etowah Circuit Court denied motions to dismiss the current case, leading the defendants to file petitions for writs of mandamus with the Supreme Court of Alabama.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the petitions. For DuPont and Daikin, the Court found that Gadsden Water's claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, as the claims accrued no later than September 2016, when Gadsden Water first became aware of the PFAS contamination. The Court granted the petition for writ of mandamus, directing the Etowah Circuit Court to dismiss the claims against DuPont and Daikin.For INV Performance Surfaces, LLC, the Court determined that the Etowah Circuit Court lacked specific personal jurisdiction. INV's limited contacts with Alabama, including owning equipment in one or two Alabama carpet mills in 2006, were insufficient to establish jurisdiction. The Court granted INV's petition for writ of mandamus, directing the Etowah Circuit Court to dismiss the claims against INV. View "Ex parte DuPont De Nemours, Inc." on Justia Law

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The City of Bakersfield operates multiple weirs on the Kern River to divert water for its use and for several water agencies, including the North Kern Water Storage District (NKWSD) and the Buena Vista Water Storage District. Environmental groups, including Bring Back the Kern (BBTK) and Water Audit California (WAC), sought and obtained a preliminary injunction from the Superior Court of Kern County. The injunction prohibited Bakersfield from operating the weirs in a manner that reduced Kern River flows below the volume sufficient to keep fish downstream in good condition. The trial court refused to consider the potential harm to the City or the water agencies in determining the applicability of the injunction.The water agencies filed motions for reconsideration, arguing that the injunction and the subsequent order setting a flow rate were issued without proper consideration of their interests. The trial court stayed the flow rate order and modified the injunction, but the water agencies appealed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, held that under the self-executing provisions of article X, section 2 of the state Constitution, courts must always consider the reasonableness of water use when adjudicating such cases. The court found that the trial court's failure to consider the reasonableness of the water use it was ordering in the injunction was a constitutional error. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the injunction and the order setting a flow rate and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court also addressed issues related to the bond requirement and the due process rights of the water agencies, concluding that the trial court erred in setting a nominal bond and in issuing an implementation order that affected the water agencies without their agreement. View "Bring Back the Kern v. City of Bakersfield" on Justia Law

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United Water Conservation District (United) filed a lawsuit against the United States, seeking just compensation for an alleged taking under the Fifth Amendment. United claimed that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) required it to increase the amount of water bypassing its diversion dam to protect an endangered species of trout, resulting in a loss of water that United could otherwise use for beneficial purposes.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed United's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, determining that the claim should be evaluated as a regulatory taking. The court reasoned that United had not yet exhausted its administrative remedies by applying for and being denied an incidental-take permit under the Endangered Species Act, making the claim not ripe for adjudication.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court agreed that United's claim was regulatory in nature, as the NMFS's actions did not constitute a physical appropriation of water already diverted by United. Instead, the actions required more water to remain in the river, representing a regulatory restriction on United's use of the water. The court held that United's claim was not ripe because it had not yet obtained a final agency action by applying for and being denied an incidental-take permit. Therefore, the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was appropriate. View "UNITED WATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT v. US " on Justia Law

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Basecamp Teton WY SPV LLC (Basecamp) received a permit from the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) to construct and operate a septic system for its glamping operation in Teton County, Wyoming. Protect Our Water Jackson Hole (POWJH), a nonprofit organization, sought a declaratory judgment claiming that DEQ lacked the authority to issue the permit due to a delegation agreement transferring permitting authority to Teton County. POWJH also requested an injunction to stay the permit during the litigation. The district court dismissed the complaint, citing several arguments from DEQ and Basecamp, including POWJH's lack of standing.The district court found that POWJH did not establish that a favorable decision would remedy any injury it suffered, as it was unclear whether Teton County would have denied the permit if Basecamp had applied there instead of to DEQ. The court also noted that POWJH was not a party to the delegation agreement and thus could not enforce it. POWJH's motion for reconsideration or to amend the complaint was denied, and the district court's dismissal was based on POWJH's lack of standing among other reasons.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, focusing on POWJH's lack of standing. The court held that POWJH did not demonstrate a tangible interest that was harmed by DEQ's issuance of the permit. POWJH's allegations about its expenditures on water quality initiatives were deemed too vague and conclusory to establish a specific injury. Additionally, POWJH failed to show how the septic permit would directly harm its efforts or distinguish its interests from those of the general public. As a result, the court concluded that POWJH lacked standing to pursue the declaratory judgment action. View "Protect Our Water Jackson Hole v. Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

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In 2015, bipartisan legislation repealed the U.S. ban on crude oil exports, leading to expanded efforts to export U.S. crude oil. This case involves an administrative challenge to a construction permit issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for expanding operations at the Moda Ingleside Crude Export Terminal in Texas. The expansion includes constructing new docks and a turning basin, requiring dredging and discharging material into U.S. waters. The Corps conducted an Environmental Assessment (EA) and approved the permit. Plaintiffs, including Native American tribes and an environmental association, sued to invalidate the permit, claiming violations of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas denied summary judgment for the plaintiffs and granted summary judgment for the Corps, concluding that the Corps had adequately studied the environmental impacts of the proposed expansion. The court found that plaintiffs had associational standing but had waived certain claims by not raising them in summary judgment briefing. The court also found that plaintiffs forfeited claims related to increased vessel traffic by not raising them during the notice-and-comment period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Fifth Circuit held that the Corps did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its environmental impacts analysis, including its assessment of cumulative impacts and climate change. The court found that the Corps's EA was sufficient and that an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was not required. The court also agreed that plaintiffs had forfeited arguments related to increased vessel traffic. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Indigenous Peoples v. U.S. Army" on Justia Law

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Driftwood Pipeline LLC sought approval from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to build two new natural gas pipelines in southwestern Louisiana. FERC granted the approval, concluding that the project would serve a market need and that its benefits outweighed its adverse environmental impacts. Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club challenged this decision, arguing that FERC failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act.The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) issued a Section 7 certificate to Driftwood Pipeline LLC, determining that the project was required by public convenience and necessity. FERC also published an environmental impact statement, concluding that the project would have some adverse environmental impacts but none that were significant. Healthy Gulf and Sierra Club requested a rehearing, which was deemed denied when FERC did not act on it. They then petitioned for review, raising challenges under NEPA and the Natural Gas Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC adequately considered the environmental effects of the project, including its impact on greenhouse gas emissions, and found that FERC's refusal to characterize the significance of these emissions was reasonable. The court also found that FERC's determination of market need was supported by substantial evidence, including precedent agreements and an independent market study. The court concluded that FERC had properly balanced the project's benefits against its adverse effects and denied the petition for review. View "Healthy Gulf v. FERC" on Justia Law

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In 2019, New Hampshire filed two lawsuits in state court against 3M Company and other chemical companies, alleging that they produced defective PFAS products, negligently marketed them, and concealed their toxicity, leading to widespread contamination of the state's natural resources. One lawsuit sought damages for PFAS from aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF), while the other sought damages for non-AFFF PFAS contamination. The latter, referred to as the "Non-AFFF Suit," is the subject of this appeal.The Non-AFFF Suit proceeded in state court, and over the next three years, the court dismissed some of New Hampshire's claims. In August 2021, New Hampshire filed a second amended complaint. In December 2021, New Hampshire disclosed over 200 sites allegedly contaminated with non-AFFF PFAS. In April 2022, 3M removed the case to federal court, arguing that the contamination involved MilSpec AFFF PFAS, which it produced for the U.S. military, thus invoking the federal officer removal statute. New Hampshire moved to remand the case, and the district court agreed, citing that 3M's removal was untimely and did not meet the federal officer removal statute requirements.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction. The court assumed, without deciding, that the alleged commingling of MilSpec AFFF PFAS and non-AFFF PFAS satisfied the nexus requirement for federal officer removal. However, it found that 3M's removal was untimely. The court determined that New Hampshire's filings in 2019 and 2020 provided sufficient information for 3M to ascertain removability, starting the 30-day removal clock well before 3M filed for removal in April 2022. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "New Hampshire v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge by two environmental groups against the County of San Diego's adoption of certain thresholds of significance under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). These thresholds, if met, would generally eliminate the need for developers to perform an analysis of vehicle miles traveled (VMT) for proposed projects. The plaintiffs specifically contested two thresholds: one for "infill" projects within unincorporated villages and another for projects generating no more than 110 automobile trips per day.The Superior Court of San Diego County ruled in favor of the County, determining that the infill threshold was consistent with CEQA and supported by substantial evidence. The court also upheld the small project threshold, noting its alignment with recommendations from the Governor’s Office of Planning and Research (OPR).The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that the County's infill threshold was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on unsubstantiated assumptions about the transportation impacts of infill development without demonstrating that such development would generally result in insignificant VMT impacts in San Diego County. Similarly, the court determined that the small project threshold lacked substantial evidentiary support, as the County did not provide evidence that projects generating fewer than 110 trips per day would likely have a less than significant transportation impact under local conditions.The Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court's decision, directing the lower court to grant the petition for writ of mandate and to determine whether portions of the Transportation Guide are severable and may continue to be applied. The appellate court emphasized the need for substantial evidence to support the adoption of significance thresholds under CEQA. View "Cleveland Nat. Forest Foundation v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

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Petitioners challenged an amendment to the energy facility site certificate for constructing a high-voltage electrical transmission line from Boardman, Oregon, to Hemingway, Idaho. The Energy Facility Siting Council (EFSC) had previously approved the original site certificate, which was affirmed by the court in Stop B2H Coalition v. Dept. of Energy. EFSC later approved Idaho Power’s request to amend the site certificate, expanding the site boundary and making other changes. Petitioners contested the process EFSC followed and the substance of the amendment, arguing they were entitled to a contested case proceeding and that the amendment did not comply with legal protections for watersheds and wildlife habitats.The lower court, EFSC, denied petitioners’ requests for contested case proceedings and approved the amendment. Petitioners then sought judicial review, contending that the circuit court had jurisdiction over their process challenge and that EFSC’s decisions were substantively flawed.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon reviewed the case and held that it had jurisdiction to address the process challenge. The court found that EFSC did not err in denying the contested case proceedings, as the issues raised by petitioners were either untimely or did not present significant issues of fact or law. The court also rejected the substantive challenges, concluding that the bond requirements were adequately addressed in the original site certificate and that the expanded site boundary did not permit construction outside the micrositing corridors without further review.The Supreme Court affirmed EFSC’s final order approving the amended site certificate, holding that EFSC’s decisions were legally sound and supported by substantial evidence. View "Gilbert v. Dept. of Energy" on Justia Law