Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves the fate of the Frank J. Wood Bridge, a historic bridge in Maine connecting Topsham and Brunswick. Built in 1932, the bridge is no longer safe without substantial rehabilitation or replacement. The Maine Department of Transportation (MDOT) decided that replacing the bridge was more sensible than rehabilitating it. Since federal funds would be used, MDOT needed approval from the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and compliance with federal statutes, including Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, due to the bridge's historic status.The FHWA approved MDOT's plan to replace the bridge, despite objections from preservation groups. The plaintiffs challenged this decision in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, which rejected their challenges. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the FHWA's decision in part, remanding the case to determine whether a 53% price differential between rehabilitation and replacement constituted a cost of extraordinary magnitude under Section 4(f).On remand, the FHWA concluded that the 53% differential was indeed a cost of extraordinary magnitude. Plaintiffs argued that updated cost estimates showed that rehabilitation would now be cheaper than replacement. The FHWA, however, found the plaintiffs' updated estimates flawed and did not recalculate the differential. The plaintiffs then sued again, and the district court granted summary judgment for the agencies, finding that the FHWA had complied with the remand instructions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the FHWA acted within the scope of the remand by deciding whether the 53% price differential was a cost of extraordinary magnitude and was not required to reopen the record to consider new cost information. View "National Trust for Historic Preservation v. Buttigieg" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the construction of a substation by Park City Wind LLC (PCW) that will connect an offshore wind farm to the New England electric grid. Jacqueline Johnson, the petitioner, lives near the proposed substation site and raised concerns about the noise impact from the substation, which includes loud step-up transformers. PCW presented expert testimony and reports to the Energy Facilities Siting Board (the board) indicating that design features would mitigate the noise impact, keeping it within the allowable increase of ten A-weighted decibels (dBA) set by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).The board approved PCW's petition to construct the substation, subject to several conditions, including preconstruction and postconstruction reviews to ensure the noise levels at Johnson's home would not exceed an eight dBA increase. Johnson was allowed to participate fully in the administrative process, including discovery, briefing, and cross-examination of PCW's experts. The board required PCW to confirm that the predicted noise levels would not be exceeded once the equipment specifications were known and to implement additional noise mitigation measures if necessary.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. Johnson argued that the board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence because it relied on aggressive sound level design specifications for yet-to-be-manufactured equipment. The court concluded that Johnson failed to meet the heavy burden required to overturn the board's decision, which was supported by substantial evidence, including expert testimony and industry-standard sound modeling. The court also found that the board's conditional approval, requiring preconstruction and postconstruction compliance filings, was lawful and within the board's statutory authority. The court affirmed the board's decision. View "Johnson v. Energy Facilities Siting Board" on Justia Law

The State of Indiana approved a plan to retire a coal-fired facility and replace it with wind and solar energy sources, supplemented by two new natural gas turbines to ensure grid reliability. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved a natural gas pipeline to serve these turbines. The Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana challenged FERC’s approval, arguing that FERC’s environmental analysis was unreasonable and inconsistent with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Natural Gas Act (NGA). The core claim was that FERC should have analyzed non-gas alternatives before approving the pipeline.The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission initially denied CenterPoint Energy’s proposal for an 850-megawatt natural gas unit due to inadequate consideration of alternatives. CenterPoint then modified its plan to include wind generation and applied to build two smaller gas-fired turbines, which the Indiana Commission approved. CenterPoint contracted with Texas Gas Transmission for a 24-mile pipeline to supply natural gas to the new units. Citizens Action intervened in the FERC proceeding, raising environmental concerns. FERC prepared an environmental impact statement and approved the pipeline. Citizens Action’s request for rehearing was denied by operation of law, leading to the current petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that FERC acted lawfully and reasonably in its environmental analysis and public convenience and necessity determination. FERC was not required to consider non-gas alternatives outside its jurisdiction and properly identified the project’s purpose as supporting CenterPoint’s new natural gas units. The court also found that FERC’s use of emissions percentages and the absence of a significance label were reasonable and consistent with NEPA. The petition for review was denied. View "Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. FERC" on Justia Law

NorthWestern Corporation and the Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) appealed a District Court order vacating an air quality permit granted to NorthWestern for a natural-gas-fueled power plant near Laurel, Montana. The District Court found DEQ's analysis under the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) inadequate regarding the project's lighting impacts and greenhouse gas emissions.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court vacated the permit, ruling that DEQ's noise analysis was not arbitrary or capricious but failed to take a "hard look" at the facility's lighting impacts and greenhouse gas emissions. The court also found that DEQ did not comply with MEPA requirements in its environmental assessment (EA) and remanded the EA to DEQ for further analysis.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's ruling that DEQ's noise analysis was adequate but agreed that DEQ failed to properly analyze the lighting impacts. The Supreme Court also held that DEQ must analyze greenhouse gas emissions within Montana as part of its MEPA review, despite the absence of specific regulatory standards for greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act of Montana.However, the Supreme Court reversed the District Court's vacatur of the permit, citing the need for specific findings under § 75-1-201(6)(c)(ii), MCA, before granting such equitable relief. The case was remanded to DEQ for further MEPA analysis in accordance with the Supreme Court's opinion, with the permit reinstated pending this additional review. View "MEIC v. DEQ" on Justia Law

Tintina Montana, Inc. sought to operate an underground copper mine in Meagher County, Montana, which required the removal of substantial quantities of groundwater. Tintina planned to use part of this water for mining operations and return the rest to the aquifer. Montana Trout Unlimited and other environmental groups (collectively "MTU") challenged the issuance of a water use permit by the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC) for the mine's operations, arguing that the removal and discharge of water should be considered a beneficial use requiring a permit under the Montana Water Use Act (MWUA).The Fourteenth Judicial District Court denied MTU's petition for judicial review and affirmed DNRC's decision. The court held that DNRC correctly categorized the removal and discharge of water as neither a beneficial use nor waste, thus falling outside the permitting process of the MWUA. The court also found that DNRC's interpretation of the MWUA did not contravene the Montana Constitution.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that DNRC's longstanding interpretation of the MWUA, which categorizes mine dewatering as neither a beneficial use nor waste, was reasonable and consistent with legislative intent. The court also concluded that the MWUA's exclusion of mine dewatering from the permitting process did not render the Act unconstitutional, as the primary purpose of the MWUA is to regulate water rights, not the water resource itself. The court noted that other statutory frameworks, such as the Montana Water Quality Act and the Metal Mine Reclamation Act, provide for the regulation of water quality and environmental impacts. View "Trout Unlimited v. DNRC" on Justia Law

The case involves the Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment and Advocates for the Environment (collectively, SCOPE) challenging the County of Los Angeles and Williams Homes, Inc. (Williams) over the approval of a residential housing development project in the Santa Clarita Valley. SCOPE's lawsuit contested the County's approval of a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map, alleging violations of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Williams's motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, finding that SCOPE's claims were barred under Government Code section 66499.37 of the SMA because SCOPE failed to serve a summons within 90 days of the County's approval of the vesting tentative tract map. The court concluded that section 66499.37 applied to both the SMA and CEQA causes of action, as the CEQA claims were intertwined with the SMA claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 66499.37 does not bar SCOPE's CEQA claims to the extent they allege procedural violations of CEQA and the County's failure to analyze and disclose the project's environmental impacts, as these claims are unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA. However, the court found that section 66499.37 does apply to SCOPE's CEQA claims challenging the reasonableness of the conditions of approval of the vesting tentative tract map, specifically the mitigation measures adopted as a condition of approval.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to enter a new order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the first cause of action for violation of CEQA and granting the motion with respect to the second cause of action for violation of the SMA and zoning and planning law. View "Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The case involves a proposed residential housing development project near the University of Southern California (USC) by the City of Los Angeles. The project, which includes 102 units and various amenities, was found by the City to be exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) as a Class 32 urban in-fill development. The appellants, West Adams Heritage Association and Adams Severance Coalition, challenged this determination, arguing that the City abused its discretion by not finding the project consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan, improperly relying on mitigation measures for noise impacts, and failing to show the project would not have significant adverse impacts on traffic safety.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the appellants' writ petition, rejecting their challenges to the project. The court found that the City did not abuse its discretion in concluding the project would not have significant impacts on traffic or historical resources. The appellants then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court initially reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the City improperly relied on mitigation measures for noise impacts. However, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to reconsider in light of Assembly Bill No. 1307 and the Make UC A Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California decision.Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal held that under the new law, noise generated by project occupants and their guests is not considered a significant environmental effect under CEQA. Therefore, the noise concerns do not preclude the application of the Class 32 exemption. The court also determined that the City must assess whether the project is consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan before granting the exemption. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for the City to conduct this analysis. The court also concluded that the state density bonus law preempts the redevelopment plan's density provisions, allowing the City to calculate the project's allowable density based on the general zoning ordinance. View "West Adams Heritage Assn. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Best Development Group, LLC proposed to develop a Grocery Outlet store in King City. The King City Planning Commission approved the project, determining it was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development. Efrain Aguilera appealed this decision to the King City Council, which denied the appeal and upheld the exemption. Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County then filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the class 32 exemption did not apply because the project was not in an urbanized area and the environmental assessment was inadequate.The Monterey County Superior Court denied the petition, ruling that the class 32 exemption did not require the project to be in an urbanized area as defined by CEQA and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the project met the exemption criteria. The court also found that the City was not required to conduct a formal environmental review.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the terms “infill development” and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines section 15332 should not be interpreted using the statutory definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses” from other sections of CEQA. The court found that the regulatory intent was to reduce sprawl by exempting development in already developed areas, typically but not exclusively in urban areas. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses, based on the environmental assessment and aerial photographs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that the class 32 exemption for infill development applied to the Grocery Outlet project, and no further CEQA compliance was required. View "Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Com." on Justia Law

Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) regarding the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested disability accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, seeking extensions of time and other procedural relief. The trial court granted six of these requests over eight months but denied the seventh request, leading to this appeal.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG argued that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request prevented a fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the incomplete response.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that further delays would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which it failed to do. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection" on Justia Law

Casa Mira Homeowners Association (Casa Mira) applied for a coastal development permit to construct a 257-foot seawall to protect a condominium complex, sewer line, apartment building, and a segment of the Coastal Trail in Half Moon Bay from erosion. The California Coastal Commission (Commission) denied the request for the condominiums and sewer line, built in 1984, but approved a 50-foot seawall for the apartment building, built in 1972, and concluded that relocating the Coastal Trail inland was a feasible alternative to shoreline armoring.The San Mateo County Superior Court granted Casa Mira's petition for a writ of mandate, vacating the Commission's decision. The court found that the Commission misinterpreted "existing structures" in the California Coastal Act to mean structures existing before January 1, 1977, and concluded that the Commission's finding regarding the feasibility of relocating the Coastal Trail was not supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that "existing structures" in section 30235 of the Coastal Act refers to structures that existed before the Act's effective date of January 1, 1977. Therefore, the condominiums and sewer line built in 1984 are not entitled to shoreline armoring. However, the court also found that the Commission's decision to relocate the Coastal Trail inland was not supported by substantial evidence, as the original staff report indicated that rerouting the trail would sacrifice its aesthetic and recreational value and was not a viable alternative.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment regarding the interpretation of "existing structures" but affirmed the trial court's determination that there was no substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding that armoring was unnecessary to protect the Coastal Trail. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs of appeal. View "Casa Mira Homeowners Assn. v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law