Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The case centers on the United States Bureau of Land Management’s decision to approve a contract with JS Livestock for a new off-range corral on private land near Winnemucca, Nevada, intended to house and care for up to 4,000 wild horses and burros removed from public lands. Friends of Animals, an advocacy group, challenged this decision, arguing that the Bureau’s actions violated both the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. The group raised concerns about the adequacy of animal welfare protections and environmental impacts, including the facility’s design, animal density, disease management, and mitigation of adverse effects on soil and groundwater.Prior to this appeal, the United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court found no statutory violations, holding that the Bureau had complied with both the Wild Horses Act and NEPA. Specifically, the court determined that the Bureau’s reliance on its established animal welfare standards and contract requirements was reasonable and that the environmental assessment sufficiently considered the project’s impacts as required by law. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Bureau and denied Friends of Animals’ motion.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that Friends of Animals had representational standing to bring the case. The court found that the Bureau did not abuse its discretion or act contrary to law: it properly ensured humane treatment of the animals, took a “hard look” at environmental impacts as required by NEPA, reasonably relied on compliance with state permits, considered appropriate project alternatives, and adequately explained why the facility’s impacts would not be significant. The summary judgment for the Bureau was affirmed. View "FRIENDS OF ANIMALS V. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, comprised of several California cities and counties, initiated legal action against Citgo Petroleum Corporation and other fossil fuel companies, alleging that their purchase, distribution, and sale of fossil fuel products in California contributed to climate-related harms within the state. The plaintiffs asserted that Citgo and others participated in extensive business operations involving fossil fuels in California from the 1980s to the mid-2000s. They claimed the defendants knew about the environmental dangers posed by fossil fuels but failed to warn the public, instead allegedly engaging in deceptive marketing and disinformation campaigns to obscure climate-related risks.After identical complaints were filed against all defendants, Citgo moved to quash service of summons, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction. Citgo maintained its activities in California were too limited and lacked sufficient connection to the alleged injuries. The Superior Court of San Francisco granted Citgo’s motion, finding that Citgo’s contacts with California did not satisfy the “relatedness” requirement for specific jurisdiction, as there was insufficient evidence of deceptive conduct directed at California. The court denied similar motions by other defendants, concluding that their broader contacts with California supported jurisdiction.Reviewing the case de novo, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, determined that specific personal jurisdiction over Citgo was proper. The court held that Citgo’s direct involvement in the distribution and sale of branded gasoline in California, without providing warnings about climate risks, sufficiently related to plaintiffs’ claims. The court further found that exercising jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable given California’s significant interest in redressing local climate harms. The order granting Citgo’s motion to quash was reversed, with instructions to deny the motion, allowing the case to proceed against Citgo in California. View "In re Fuel Industry Climate Cases" on Justia Law

A group of cities holding junior ground water rights in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer sought judicial review of a final order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources. This order updated the methodology used to assess whether pumping by junior ground water users caused material injury to senior surface water rights holders who divert water from the Snake River. The Director’s Fifth Amended Final Order revised technical aspects of the model and data, and after a hearing on objections by the cities, the Director affirmed the methodology with modifications and issued a Sixth Methodology Order, which expressly superseded all prior methodology orders.The cities filed a petition for judicial review in the Snake River Basin Adjudication district court, challenging the Director’s Post-Hearing Order regarding the Fifth Methodology Order. The district court affirmed the Director’s findings and conclusions, upholding the methodology and the application of the clear and convincing evidence standard, and found that the Director did not prejudice the cities’ substantial rights. The district court’s judgment specifically affirmed the Post-Hearing Order but did not address the operative Sixth Methodology Order.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the cities had properly invoked its jurisdiction. The Court held that the cities failed to challenge the currently operative Sixth Methodology Order in district court, and therefore, under Idaho law, the Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal or award the requested relief. As a result, the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court awarded attorney fees and costs to the Idaho Department of Water Resources but denied attorney fees to the intervening Surface Water Coalition, granting them costs only. View "City of Idaho Falls v. IDWR" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on the City’s decision to relocate a piece of playground equipment known as the Sky Track within Arroyo Park, Davis, California, due to noise complaints from nearby residents. After its installation in 2019, the City received complaints about excessive noise, particularly at night, and responded by commissioning noise studies and implementing mitigation measures, such as restricted hours and physical sound dampening. These measures proved challenging to enforce, leading the City to investigate alternative locations within the park. Expert analysis indicated that relocating the Sky Track to a specific area (Location B) would reduce noise levels at the nearest residences compared to its previous location.Following approval by the City Council to move the Sky Track and the filing of a notice of exemption under three categorical exemptions from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the plaintiffs challenged the exemption. They filed a verified petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Yolo County, arguing that the unusual circumstances exception to the categorical exemption should apply because of the potential for significant noise impacts. The Superior Court denied the petition, finding substantial evidence that the project fell within the scope of the exemptions and that relocating the equipment would reduce, not increase, noise impacts, thus failing to establish unusual circumstances.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed whether the unusual circumstances exception was triggered. The court held that mere violation of the City’s noise ordinance does not itself amount to substantial evidence of a significant environmental effect. Furthermore, it found no substantial evidence to support a fair argument that relocating the Sky Track would create a significant adverse noise impact. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, concluding that the City acted within its discretion and complied with CEQA’s exemption procedures. View "Krovoza v. City of Davis" on Justia Law

A group of 169 individuals who worked at the Clark County Government Center in Las Vegas brought claims alleging that they suffered serious injuries due to exposure to toxic chemicals, including polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), at their workplace. The site of the Government Center had previously been used as a rail yard by Union Pacific Railroad, and plaintiffs alleged that Union Pacific dumped waste, including PCBs manufactured by the former Monsanto Company, at the site. Plaintiffs asserted that Monsanto’s corporate successors inherited liability for harms caused by the production, sale, and distribution of PCBs, which allegedly caused a range of health issues for those exposed.The plaintiffs initially filed suit in Nevada state court against multiple defendants, including Union Pacific, the Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency, and Monsanto’s successors. The claims sought compensatory and punitive damages for injuries stemming from the alleged contamination. Monsanto’s successors removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs moved to remand the case back to state court, and the District Court granted the motion, finding that the local controversy exception to CAFA applied since the alleged injuries were localized to Clark County.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that CAFA’s local controversy exception did not apply because the principal injuries resulting from Monsanto’s conduct were not shown to have been incurred primarily in Nevada. The court found that plaintiffs’ allegations described nationwide distribution and harm from PCBs, with no facts indicating that Nevada experienced principal or unique injuries. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s order remanding the case and ordered the case to proceed in federal court. View "EMPLOYEES AT THE CLARK COUNTY GOVERNMENT CENTER V. MONSANTO COMPANY" on Justia Law

South Branch Solar, L.L.C. sought approval to build a 130-megawatt solar-powered electric generation facility in Hancock County, Ohio, on approximately 700 acres of agricultural land. The project included solar panels, related equipment, and infrastructure. Local government officials and residents had varied reactions, with some supporting the facility for its economic and environmental benefits and others expressing concerns about impacts on land use, aesthetics, property values, wildlife, and local drainage systems. Travis Bohn, who lives near the project site, opposed the project and intervened in the proceedings.The Ohio Power Siting Board reviewed South Branch’s application, which included environmental studies and mitigation plans. After a public hearing and extensive opportunity for public input, the board staff recommended approval subject to 50 conditions. A joint stipulation was agreed to by South Branch, the board staff, the county commissioners, and the Ohio Farm Bureau Federation, but not by Bohn. Following an adjudicatory hearing, the Board issued an order granting the certificate. Bohn unsuccessfully sought rehearing, arguing that the Board misapplied statutory criteria, failed to require adequate wildlife and flood analysis, and improperly weighed local opposition and economic impacts.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the Board’s order using a standard that allows reversal only if the order was unlawful or unreasonable. The court held that the Board’s determinations under R.C. 4906.10(A)(2), (A)(3), and (A)(6)—concerning environmental impact, minimum adverse impact, and public interest—were supported by sufficient probative evidence and complied with statutory and regulatory requirements. The court found no reversible error in the Board’s approval of South Branch’s application and affirmed the order granting the certificate. View "In re Application of S. Branch Solar, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A community group challenged the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) prepared by the Regents of the University of California for UC Berkeley’s 2021 long range development plan and a specific student housing project at People’s Park. The plaintiffs alleged that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze certain environmental impacts, including noise from student parties and the consideration of alternative sites for the housing project, in violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Alameda County denied the group’s petition and entered judgment for the Regents. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal initially agreed with the plaintiffs on two issues: the EIR should have evaluated noise impacts from student parties and considered alternative locations for the housing project. Both parties sought review in the California Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ petition on one issue, it granted the Regents’ petition on the two issues where the plaintiffs had prevailed. During the pendency of the appeal, the Legislature enacted new statutes specifically addressing and abrogating the appellate court’s holdings on noise and site alternatives for residential projects. The California Supreme Court then reversed the appellate court’s decision on those two issues, holding that the legislative changes rendered the EIR adequate and directed judgment in favor of the Regents.After remand, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees under the private attorney general doctrine, arguing they had been a “successful party” by securing important legal precedent. The trial court denied the motion, finding the plaintiffs did not achieve their litigation objectives. The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five affirmed, holding that because the Supreme Court reversed the rulings on which the plaintiffs claimed success, those opinions were no longer citable precedent and the plaintiffs did not qualify as a successful party under Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California" on Justia Law

A nonprofit environmental organization sued a manufacturer of feminine hygiene products, alleging that the company marketed certain products as “organic” or “made with organic ingredients” in violation of California’s organic products law. The complaint claimed that these products, such as period underwear, pads, and panty liners, contained much less than the minimum required percentage of certified organic materials, and included several synthetic or non-organic components not permitted under state and federal organic standards. The organization sought to prevent the manufacturer from advertising and selling these products as organic within California.The Superior Court of Alameda County granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the manufacturer. The court reasoned that California’s organic products law, known as the California Organic Food and Farming Act (COFFA), did not apply to personal care products like the ones at issue, but only to specifically enumerated items such as agricultural products, cosmetics, and pet food. Based on this interpretation, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims failed as a matter of law and entered judgment for the defendant.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case de novo. It concluded that the statutory text, legislative history, and public policy underlying COFFA support a broad interpretation. The Court held that COFFA applies to all products sold as “organic” or containing “organic” materials within California, including feminine hygiene and personal care products, unless specifically exempted. The Court rejected the argument that such products are categorically excluded and emphasized the statute’s intent to regulate consumer organic claims broadly. The judgment of the trial court was therefore reversed. View "Environmental Democracy Project v. Rael, Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a property owner in Sonoma County who, after a fire, conducted timber operations under an emergency waiver of waste discharge requirements. Following observations of waste discharge violations and failure to comply with cleanup orders, the regional water quality control board issued notices of violation and ultimately imposed administrative civil liability, assessing a penalty of $276,000. The property owner did not file a petition with the State Water Resources Control Board within the statutory 30-day period to seek review of the regional board’s order.Subsequently, the property owner filed a writ petition in Sonoma County Superior Court to challenge the civil liability order, and later requested the State Board to review the order on its own motion under Water Code section 13320. The State Board declined to exercise its discretionary review. The property owner amended his writ petition to add the State Board as a party, alleging abuse of discretion in its refusal to review. The State Board and the regional board demurred, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the State Board’s discretionary decision was not subject to judicial review. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for the respondents.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the State Board’s decision not to exercise its discretionary authority to review a regional board order under Water Code section 13320 is not subject to judicial review. The court rejected arguments that this interpretation violated the separation of powers doctrine, concluding that the State Board’s action was not quasi-judicial and did not adjudicate the parties’ rights. The court confirmed that only regional board orders, not the State Board’s discretionary refusals, are eligible for judicial review under the statutory scheme. View "Bareilles v. State Water Resource Control Board" on Justia Law

A company that owns and operates the only landfill in a particular town challenged a local law that required the landfill’s closure by a specified date. The law was enacted after community complaints regarding odors. When the law was first passed, the town’s attorney acknowledged that a State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA) review was required, but the Board adopted the law and related SEQRA documents without substantive discussion. After a subsequent law rescinded and then court action reinstated the original law, the landfill owner again brought a proceeding, claiming, among other things, that the Board failed to comply with SEQRA by not taking a “hard look” at environmental impacts.The Supreme Court initially dismissed the action on statute of limitations grounds, but the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed that decision, holding the claim was timely. After the parties resolved all non-SEQRA claims, Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the landfill owner, finding it had standing and that the Board did not properly comply with SEQRA. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding the owner lacked standing because it had not shown it suffered or would suffer an environmental injury. The dissent argued that under Matter of Har Enterprises v Town of Brookhaven and Gernatt Asphalt Products v Town of Sardinia, property owners directly affected by a government action do not need to allege environmental harm to have standing under SEQRA.The New York Court of Appeals held that the landfill owner has standing to challenge the Board’s SEQRA compliance simply by virtue of owning property directly affected by the local law, following the holdings in Har Enterprises and Gernatt Asphalt Products. The Court further declined to review the statute of limitations argument at this stage, as that issue had already been resolved and was not properly before it. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case for further proceedings. View "Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. Town of Seneca Falls" on Justia Law