Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a certain channel adjacent to the Yellowstone River. The disputed channel had been used for years to obtain river water to satisfy water rights held by Heart K Ranch. The City of Livingston owned land adjacent to the channel and argued that Heart K's maintenance activities in the channel harmed the City's property. The Park Conservation District (PCD) permitted Heart K's maintenance activities in the channel as provided in the Natural Steambed and Land Preservation Act. The City petitioned the PCD for a declaratory ruling that the channel was not subject to the permitting process in the Act because it was actually an irrigation ditch not subject to the Act. The PCD determined that the channel was part of the natural watercourse of the Yellowstone River, which was indisputably subject to the Act. The district court upheld the PCD. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the City failed to show that the PCD's decision was arbitrary or capricious, characterized by an abuse of discretion, or a clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.View "Livingston v. Park Conservation Dist." on Justia Law

Appellants, several irrigation companies, and Appellee, a family ranch, were water-rights holders in the Sevier River system. Appellants filed a complaint in district court alleging that Appellee's water right had been partially forfeited and partially abandoned. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellee, finding (1) Utah law did not provide for partial forfeiture or partial abandonment prior to 2002, and (2) Appellee was protected from partial forfeiture and abandonment after 2002 by a statutory exception. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the post-2002 partial-forfeiture claim, holding that partial forfeiture has always been available in Utah; and (2) reversed the grant of summary judgment on the abandonment claim, holding that the district court erred in treating the abandonment claim as a claim under the forfeiture statute, as abandonment of a water right is a common-law claim, not a statutory claim. Remanded. View "Delta Canal Co. v. Frank Vincent Family Ranch, LC " on Justia Law

Respondent and rancher Joseph Lemire was directed by the state Department of Ecology to curb pollution of a creek that ran through his property. Respondent unsuccessfully challenged the order at the Pollution Control Hearings Board. He then filed an appeal at Superior Court. That court invalidated the agency order as unsupported by substantial evidence. Furthermore, the Superior Court concluded that the agency order constituted a taking. The Department appealed. The Supreme Court reinstated the Board's order and the underlying agency order, holding that Respondent failed to establish a taking.View "Lemire v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

Five questions of South Carolina law were certified to the State Supreme Court by the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: (1) when a plaintiff seeks recovery for a temporary trespass or nuisance, are the damages limited to the lost rental value of the property?; (2) does South Carolina law recognize a cause of action for trespass solely from invisible odors rather than a physical invasion such as dust or water?; (3) is the maximum amount of compensatory damages a plaintiff can receive in any trespass or nuisance action (temporary or permanent) the full market value of the plaintiffs' property where no claim for restoration or cleanup costs has been alleged?; (4) when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, may the plaintiff maintain an independent cause of action for negligence or is the plaintiff limited to remedies under trespass and nuisance?; and (5) if an independent cause of action for negligence exists under South Carolina law when a plaintiff contends that offensive odors have migrated from a neighbor's property onto the plaintiff's property, does the standard of care for a landfill operator and breach thereof need to be established through expert testimony? The South Carolina Supreme Court answered: (1) damages recoverable for a temporary trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the lost rental value of the property; (2) a trespass exists only when an intrusion is made by a physical, tangible thing; (3) the damages recoverable for a permanent trespass or nuisance claim are limited to the full market value of the property; (4) a negligence claim based on offensive odors is possible, but that such a claim would have to satisfy all the elements of negligence like any other negligence claim; and (5) the Court was unable to make a definitive determination as to whether establishing the standard of care of a landfill operator in regards to offensive odors required expert testimony, but offered guidelines for making such a determination.View "Babb v. Lee County Landfill" on Justia Law

Aloha Tower Development Corporation filed a petition to expunge a deed restriction on a park requiring that it be preserved as a public park. Scenic Hawaii, Inc. subsequently intervened in the litigation. After a non-jury trial, the land court denied the petition. Scenic Hawaii filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs under the private attorney general doctrine. The land court granted the request. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) reversed the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the ICA and affirmed the final judgment of the land court, holding that the land court was correct in awarding attorneys' fees and costs to Scenic Hawaii under the private attorney general doctrine inasmuch as the three prongs of the private attorney general doctrine were satisfied in this case.View "In re Application of Honolulu Constr. & Draying Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Exposition Metro Line Construction Authority (Expo Authority) approved a project to construct a light-rail line from Culver City to Santa Monica. Plaintiffs, Neighbors for Smart Rail, petitioned for a writ of mandate, alleging that Expo Authority's approval of the project violated CEQA in several respects. The superior court denied the petition, and the court of appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Expo Authority abused its discretion by examining certain environmental impacts only on projected future conditions, and not on existing environmental conditions, but the abuse of discretion was non prejudicial; and (2) the Expo Authority's mitigation measure adopted for possible impacts on street parking near planned transit stations satisfied CEQA's requirements. View "Neighbors for Smart Rail v. Exposition Metro Line Constr. Auth. " on Justia Law

Horace Bounds farmed in the Mimbres basin. Along with the New Mexico Farm and Livestock Bureau, Petitioners brought a facial constitutional challenge against the New Mexico Domestic Well Statute (DWS). Petitioners contended that the DWS violated the New Mexico constitutional doctrine of prior appropriation as well as due process of law. Petitioners' won at the district court level, but not at the Court of Appeals. Agreeing with the substance of the appellate court's opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the DWS does not violate either the doctrine of prior appropriation set forth in the New Mexico Constitution or the guarantees of due process of law.View "Bounds v. State ex rel. D'Antonio" on Justia Law

In 2006, Exxon Mobil Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company settled with two seafood processors, Nautilus Marine Enterprises and Cook Inlet Processing. The parties disputed whether the Settlement Agreement required interest to be compounded annually, or whether the federal District Court was free to award simple or compound interest at its discretion. Exxon filed an action in the Alaska Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment. The superior court found that the parties did not intend that prejudgment interest had to be compounded annually, but rather that they intended to reserve this issue for the District Court to decide. Because the superior court’s interpretation of the Settlement Agreement was not clearly erroneous, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Nautilus Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation" on Justia Law

Several entities filed a petition to raise the water levels of Lake Koshkonong designated by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR). The DNR rejected the petition, and an ALJ affirmed. The circuit court and court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the DNR's conclusions of law were subject to a de novo review; (2) the DNR has broad statutory authority to protect non-navigable wetlands and other non-navigable water resources and may consider the water level impact on all adjacent property under Wis. Stat. 31.02(1); (3) the DNR may consider Wis. Admin. Code NR 103 water quality standards when making a water level determination under section 31.02(1) that affects wetlands and may apply these standards when appropriate after weighing the factors in the statute; and (4) the DNR erroneously excluded most testimony on the economic impact of lower water levels in the lake on the residents, businesses, and tax bases adjacent to and near the lake. Remanded.View "Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res." on Justia Law

Cherokee Metropolitan District intervened in a lawsuit to try to minimize the loss of its water rights to some of its wells. In a separate legal malpractice action, Cherokee sued its former attorneys James Felt and James Culichia, and their firm Felt, Monson & Culichia, LLC (collectively "FMC"), alleging that FMC's negligence led to the eventual loss of those water rights. FMC sought to intervene in the water rights action, arguing that intervention was necessary in order to minimize damages it may have suffered in the legal malpractice case. The water court denied FMC's motion to intervene. FMC appealed. The Supreme Court found that despite taking opposite sides in the malpractice action, Cherokee and FMC shared an identical interest in the underlying water rights litigation. Because FMC did not made a compelling showing that Cherokee could not adequately represent the interest that it shared with Cherokee, the Court affirmed the water court's denial of FMC's motion to intervene as of right. Similarly, the Court dismissed FMC's appeal of the water court's denial of FMC's motion for permissive intervention because the water court did not abuse its discretion. View "Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Felt, Monson & Culichia LLC" on Justia Law