Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Respondents, owners of coal-bearing properties in Taylor County, challenged tax assessments on their properties during the 2010 tax year. The County Assessor challenged the State Tax Commissioner's appraisals of Respondents' property in hearings before the Board of Equalization and Review after she had previously accepted those appraisals. The Board of Equalization and Review accepted the Assessor's proposed changes and changed the valuations of Respondents' properties, thus increasing the natural resources property tax owed by Respondents. The circuit court reversed the Board's valuation changes, finding that the Assessor violated W. Va. Code 11-1C-10(g) by challenging the Commissioner's appraisals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to section 11-1C-10(g), upon receiving the appraisal of natural resources property from the Commission, a county assessor may either accept or reject that proposal; (2) if the assessor rejects the appraisal, the assessor must show just cause for doing so; and (3) if the assessor accepts the appraisal, the assessor is foreclosed from later challenging the appraisal.View "Collett v. Eastern Royalty, LLC" on Justia Law

Applicant Charles Ferrera and property owners Ronald and Susan Fenn appealed a Superior Court, Environmental Division order that affirmed the Town of Middlebury's denial of their application to operate a gravel pit. Applicants contended: (1) several key findings and conclusions were unsupported by the evidence; and (2) provisions of the Town's zoning regulations are unconstitutionally vague. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "In re Ferrera & Fenn Gravel Pit" on Justia Law

The Nebraska Public Power District (NPPD) filed an application with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to appropriate additional surface water from the Niobrara River. The Middle and Lower Niobrara Natural Resources Districts (collectively, NRDs) and Thomas Higgins, who held senior existing and pending Niobrara River surface water appropriations, objected to the application. The DNR dismissed all objections sua sponte, concluding that the objectors lacked standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the DNR did not err in (1) dismissing the NRDs' objections for lack of standing because they failed to allege any legal right, title, or interest in the subject water of the Niobrara River and because the NRDs' allegations that the granting of the application would cause a portion of the Niobrara River Basin to be declared fully appropriated in the future were based on mere conjecture; and (2) finding that Higgins lacked standing, as Higgins failed to allege sufficient allegations of harm.View "In re Application A-18503" on Justia Law

The Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment decided to issue an air emission source construction to permit Sunflower Power Corporation for the construction of a coal-fired power plant at the site of Sunflower's existing plant. Sierra Club contended that the permit failed to comply with the requirements of the Clean Air Act, implementing federal regulations, the Kansas Air Quality Act (KAQA), and applicable Kansas Administrative Regulations. The Supreme Court reversed the KDHE's action of issuing the permit, holding that the KDHE erroneously interpreted and applied the CAA and the KAQA when it failed to apply the regulations of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regarding emission limits for nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide during the permitting process, as the CAA, KAWA and implementing regulations required the KDHE to apply the EPA regulations during the permitting process.View "Sierra Club v. Moser" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the validity of an amended rule from the Department of Ecology that reserved water from the Skagit River system for future year-round out-of-stream uses, despite the fact that in times of low stream flows these uses would impair established minimum in-stream flows necessary for fish, wildlife, recreation, navigation, scenic and aesthetic values. The Swinomish Indian Tribal Community (Tribe) sued, challenging the validity of Ecology's amended rule reserving the water. The trial court upheld the amended rule and dismissed the Tribe's petition. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that Ecology erroneously interpreted the statutory exception as broad authority to reallocate water for new beneficial uses when the requirements for appropriating water for these uses otherwise cannot be met. "The exception is very narrow, however, and requires extraordinary circumstances before the minimum flow water right can be impaired." Because the amended rule exceeded Ecology's authority under the statute, the amended rule reserving the water was invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). View "Swinomish Indian Tribal Comm'y v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners of the surface of a thirty-acre tract of land. Defendant, an oil and gas corporation, claimed that, in 1949, it leased the rights to the gas under the tract. In 2006, the parties entered into a contract allowing Defendant to build a 200-foot access road. Defendant later constructed a roadway approximately 1300 feet long on Plaintiffs' surface tract, erected an above-ground pipeline across the tract, and drilled a natural gas well. Plaintiffs sued Defendant alleging breach of contract. Defendant asserted it was entitled to summary judgment because of an exculpatory clause within a 1941 deed that severed the surface of the tract of property from the minerals below. Defendant contended that, as a lessee of the oil and gas under the property, it was a beneficiary of the exculpatory clause and entitled to operate on Plaintiffs' tract without liability for any injury to the surface by reason of removing minerals. The circuit court granted Defendant's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained on whether Defendant breached the contract.View "Thornsbury v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp." on Justia Law

In two consolidated cases involving remediation of contaminated properties, the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association (Guaranty Association) took over the administration of the claims of an insolvent insurance carrier on the risk pursuant to the New Jersey Property-Liability Insurance Guaranty Association Act. The solvent insurance company paid the property-damage claims in each of the two cases and then sought reimbursement from the Guaranty Association under the Owens-Illinois methodology. The Guaranty Association claims that, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5 and -12b, it was not responsible for making any contribution until the policies of the solvent carrier were fully exhausted. The solvent carrier contended on appeal that the Guaranty Association must pay the share of the insolvent carrier in accordance with the Owens-Illinois allocation scheme, and that its position is consistent with the PLIGA Act. The trial court agreed that the Guaranty Association is subject to the Owens-Illinois allocation methodology. The Appellate Division reversed, finding that N.J.S.A. 17:30A-5 expressly carves out an exception to Owens-Illinois and requires exhaustion of the solvent carrier's policies before the Guaranty Association's reimbursement commitments are triggered. Finding no error with the appellate court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Salem v. N.J. Property-Liability Ins. Guar. Ass’n" on Justia Law

This proceeding arose from an application to amend an existing water-quality permit filed by the owner and operator of a dairy farm located in the North Bosque River watershed. The City of Waco and Bosque River Coalition opposed the proposed permit. After the executive director of the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality determined that the application and draft permit met the requirements of applicable law, the Coalition asked to intervene as a party in a contested case hearing. The Commission denied the request, finding that the Commission lacked standing, and issued the permit. The district court affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed, finding that the Coalition was an "affected person" as defined by the Texas Water Code and thus was entitled to a contested case hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, pursuant to Texas Commission on Environmental Quality v. City of Waco, the companion to this case, the Coalition's status as an affected person was not determinative of the right to a contested case hearing because the Water Code expressly exempted the proposed amendment from contested case procedures.View "Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality v. Bosque River Coalition" on Justia Law

The Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) assessed a penalty against Plaintiff for improper handling and disposal of roof shingles that contained asbestos. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that, pursuant to the Administrative Penalties Act, it was entitled to a notice of noncompliance and the opportunity to cure any violations before the imposition of a penalty. The commissioner of the DEP affirmed the penalty after accepting the recommendation of a hearing officer, finding that Plaintiff's failure to comply fell within one of the exceptions to the notice requirement because it was "willful and not the result of error." The hearing officer interpreted this language, otherwise called the "willfulness exception," as requiring only a showing of the "intent to do an act that violates the law if done." The Supreme Court affirmed the agency's disposition but on different grounds, holding (1) the DEP's decision was based on an error of law because its interpretation of the willfulness exception did not comport with the clear meaning of the relevant statute; but (2) Plaintiff's conduct was willful and not the result of error within the meaning of the Act because Plaintiff knew or should have known of the likely presence of asbestos in the shingles.View "Franklin Office Park Realty Corp. v. Comm'r of Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (Commission) granted an amendment to a dairy concentrated animal feeding operation's water-quality permit. A downstream city (City) sought to intervene in the permit process and obtain a contested case hearing, claiming that the dairy's operations under the amended permit would adversely affect the quality of the municipal water supply. By rule, an affected person may request a contested case hearing when authorized by law. The Commission granted the amended permit without a contested case hearing. The City appealed, claiming it was an "affected person" entitled to a contested case hearing. The district court affirmed, but the court of appeals reversed, concluding that the City was an affected person entitled to a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed and rendered judgment for the Commission, holding (1) a person affected by a proposed water-quality permit has the right to request a hearing, but the Commission has discretion to deny the request under certain circumstances; and (2) sufficient evidence supported the Commission's determination that the proposed amended permit did not foreclose Commission discretion to consider the amended application at a regular meeting rather than after a contested case hearing.View "Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality v. City of Waco" on Justia Law