Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") issued Austin Industrial Specialty Services, L.P. a citation for violations of hazardous-chemical regulations promulgated under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. After a hearing, the administrative law judge affirmed two items in the citation: (1) failure to identify and evaluate respiratory hazards in the workplace; and (2) failure to provide employee training regarding certain hazardous chemicals. The ALJ vacated the other three items. The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission denied discretionary review, and Austin filed a petition in this court, seeking to overturn the administrative law judge's decision on several grounds. Finding no reversible error, the Fifth Circuit denied Austin's petition. View "Austin Industrial Spclt Svc v. OSHC, et al" on Justia Law

The question presented to the Supreme Court in this case was whether Texas recognizes a legal right to stigma damages, which represent damage to the reputation of realty. Plaintiff, a ranch owner, sued Defendant, the owner of a metal processing facility, for nuisance, trespass and damages after the Commission found that Defendant had committed an unauthorized discharge of industrial hazardous waste that had affected Plaintiff’s property. As to damages, Plaintiff sought only a loss of the fair market value of the ranch and relied on an expert witness who testified that, in her opinion, the ranch had suffered a loss of market value due to stigma resulting from fear, risk, and negative public perceptions. A jury found that Defendant was negligent and that negligence caused the property to lose $349,312 of its market value. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if Texas law permits recovery of stigma damages, Plaintiff’s evidence was legally insufficient to prove them. View "Houston Unlimited, Inc. Metal Processing v. Mel Acres Ranch" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Department of Ecology erred in determining that no environmental impact statement (EIS) was necessary for a proposed energy cogeneration project, and failed to adequately consider the effects of carbon dioxide emissions and demand for woody biomass from the state's forests. In addition, the issue on appeal centered on whether the project was exempt from the EIS requirement as part of an energy recovery facility that existed before January 1, 1989. After review, the Supreme Court concluded Ecology adequately reviewed the relevant information in determining that the project would not have significant impacts on the environment, and the project was exempt from the EIS requirement. View "PT Air Watchers v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants, owners and operators of railyards, under the citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the emission from defendants' railyards of particulate matter found in diesel exhaust. The court concluded that defendants' emission of diesel particulate matter does not constitute "disposal" of solid waste within the meaning of RCRA, and that plaintiffs therefore could not state a plausible claim for relief under section 6972(a)(1)(B). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss with prejudice. View "Ctr. for Cmty. Action v. BNSF" on Justia Law

Solid wate, recycling, composting and waste water processing facility appellant Wilbros, LLC is subject to the requirements of the Georgia Comprehensive Solid Waste Management Act and related regulations. By Consent Order executed by Wilbros and the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (EPD), Wilbros agreed to pay the Department of Natural Resources $25,000 in compromise and settlement of various disputed violations referenced in the Consent Order. A few months afterward, Wilbros was charged with violation of Stephens County ordinance sections 34-73 (3) and (4). Wilbros and the state court solicitor filed a written stipulation in the case stipulating that Wilbros had been ordered by the EPD to pay a fine for statutory violations of odor issues at the facility and that the operative dates for those violations encompassed the same dates alleged in the local ordinance violation charge. Wilbros filed a plea in bar of prosecution, raising double jeopardy, a preemption challenge, and a constitutional challenge asserting the ordinance was void for vagueness. The trial court denied Wilbros's plea, specifically concluding there was no Georgia authority that permitted a corporation to assert Fifth Amendment double jeopardy protection under the Georgia or United States constitutions, finding that the preemption argument failed, and finding that the county ordinance was constitutional. The trial court also granted Wilbros the right to pretrial appeal. The case was transferred to the Supreme Court because it raised the constitutionality of the county ordinance, an issue over which the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction. Upon careful consideration, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Wilbros's plea in bar of prosecution. View "Wilbros, LLC v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred injunctive relief at common law. Appellees Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc. (and David and Melinda Egan) filed a declaratory judgment suit against Appellants Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and DNR's Coastal Resources Division (CRD), by and through its director A.G. "Spud" Woodward. In its suit, the Center sought to enjoin the State from issuing Letters of Permission (LOPs) to third parties authorizing land alterations to property within the jurisdiction of the Shore Protection Act. The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss the Center's petition, finding that the Center was not entitled to declaratory relief because the State had not waived sovereign immunity, and, even if it had, there was no justiciable controversy. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the trial court had correctly dismissed the Center's declaratory judgment claim as non-justiciable but improperly dismissed the injunctive relief claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that sovereign immunity barred injunctive relief against the State at common law. View "Georgia Dept. of Nat'l Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's approval of a proposal for the construction of a natural gas compressor station in the Town of Minisink, New York. Petitioners argued, among other things, that the Commission's approval of the project was arbitrary and capricious, particularly given the existence of a nearby alternative site (the Wagoner Alternative) they insist is better than the Minisink locale. The court concluded that the Commission's consideration of the Wagoner Alternative falls within the bounds of its discretion and the court had no basis to upset the Commission's application of its Section 7 of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. 717-717z, authority on this point; the court was satisfied that the Commission properly considered cumulative impacts of the Minisink Project; the court reject petitioners' argument that the Minisink Project violates the siting guidelines; and the court rejected petitioners' claims of procedural errors. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Minisink Residents for Enviro., et al. v. FERC" on Justia Law

Twelve individuals and the Ferrisburgh Friends of Responsible Growth, Inc. appealed the Environmental Division’s affirming the grant of a conditional use zoning permit to Champlain Oil Company. The permit allowed Champlain Oil to construct and operate a gasoline and diesel station with a retail convenience store and a drive-through food facility, including parking lot and overhead canopies for the gas and diesel pumps. Appellants argued that the proposed uses for a convenience, retail and drive-in facility are explicitly prohibited by the Ferrisburgh zoning ordinance and would not be consistent with the town plan. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Environmental Division's decision.View "In re Champlain Oil Company Conditional Use Application" on Justia Law

Arkansas imposed more stringent limits on the dissolved minerals EDCC could discharge into two unnamed tributaries (UTA and UTB), and granted EDCC three years to comply. EDCC then initiated a Third Party Rulemaking to increase the levels of dissolved minerals permitted in both UTA and UTB. Arkansas adopted these revisions but the EPA rejected the changes. On appeal EDCC, argued that EPA overstepped its authority in considering the effects on aquatic life in the two creeks at issue. The court concluded that the EPA's reading of its own regulations - that it may look at downstream waters when evaluating a state's water quality standards - was not plainly erroneous; the EPA's refusal to approve the proposed water quality criteria on the basis of incomplete information was not arbitrary or capricious and there was a rational basis for the EPA's disapproval; and the EPA's disapproval of the mass balance approach was not arbitrary or capricious. View "El Dorado Chemical Co. v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

The City and County of San Francisco approved the Parkmerced Development Project, which involves the long-term redevelopment of the privately owned, 3,221-unit residential rental complex on152 acres near Lake Merced, which were built as affordable housing. The Project contemplates demolition and, over 20-30 years, construction of a greater number of residential units, some affordable and some market-rate, and the addition of commercial and retail space, parks and open space, and transit facilities, with improved utilities. Objectors claimed that the Land Use Element of the San Francisco General Plan was inadequate for failing to include standards for population density and building intensity (Gov. Code, 6302, subds. (a), (b).) (2); that the project and the various approvals were inconsistent with the “priority policies” and other policies of the General Plan; that an environmental impact report (EIR) and findings underlying the City’s approval of the project were inadequate under standards established by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21000); and violation of its due process rights. The trial court rejected the challenges. The court of appeal affirmed. View "San Francisco Tomorrow v. City & County of San Francisco" on Justia Law