Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Issues of constitutional import stemming from cross-appeals taken from the Commonwealth Court's ruling on expedited challenges to Act 13 of 2012 were before the Supreme Court in this case. Act 13 contained sweeping legislation affecting Pennsylvania’s environment particularly the exploitation and recovery of natural gas in Marcellus Shale. The litigation was accelerated in part because the legislation itself was designed to take effect quickly and imposed obligations which required the challengers to formulate their legal positions swiftly; and in part in recognition of the economic importance of the legislation to the Commonwealth and its citizens. Following careful deliberation, the Supreme Court's decision found several challenged provisions of Act 13 were unconstitutional. Madame Justice Todd, and Mr. Justice McCaffery, found that several core provisions of Act 13 violated the Commonwealth’s duties as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources under the Environmental Rights Amendment; other challenges lacked merit; and several issues required further Commonwealth Court proceedings. Mr. Justice Baer, concurred in the mandate, and joined the majority in all but Parts III and VI(C); Justice Baer would have found the "core constitutional infirmity" sounded in substantive due process. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Robinson Township, et al v. Pa. Public Utility Commission and Attorney General -" on Justia Law

The County of Kauai Planning Commission approved a subdivision application for a Trust's development of land in Koloa, Kauai. During the Commission's consideration of the application, the parties assumed that a historic road (Road) that the Trust needed to breach to provide access into the subdivision belonged to the County of Kauai. Plaintiff filed a civil complaint alleging several claims against Defendants, including breaches of the public trust. Plaintiff subsequently amended his complaint because he discovered that the road belonged to the State and not the County and asserted two additional claims against the Trust for allegedly breaching the Road. The circuit court dismissed the claims, concluding (1) because the State had not given its approval to breach the Road, the issues raised in Plaintiff's complaint were not ripe; and (2) even if Plaintiff had claims that were ripe and severable, the court had the discretion to dismiss the claims in the interest of judicial economy. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court's final judgment, holding (1) all of Plaintiff's claims were ripe for adjudication; and (2) the circuit court erred in dismissing claims on the basis of judicial economy. Remanded.View "Blake v. County of Kauai Planning Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Power Siting Board issued a certificate to Black Fork Wind Energy, LLC to construct a proposed wind farm in Richland and Crawford counties. Appellants, who lived near or within the boundaries of the project area, appealed, arguing, among other things, that the Board violated their right to procedural due process by prohibiting Appellants from cross-examining Board staff members and by "prohibiting the presentation of evidence" at the evidentiary hearing on the application to site the project. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants failed to sustain their burden of showing that the Board's order was unlawful or unreasonable.View "In re Application of Black Fork Wind Energy, LLC" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) issued a permit allowing a limestone quarry to discharge water into Horse Creek. A wildlife sanctuary (sanctuary) filed a petition with the Tennessee Water Quality Control Board (Board) seeking to appeal the permit's issuance and requesting a declaratory order regarding the proper interpretation of the Antidegradation Rule (Rule). After the Board scheduled a contested case hearing, an ALJ dismissed the request for a declaratory order, concluding that Tenn. Code Ann. 69-3-105(i) provided the exclusive to obtain administrative review of TDEC's decision. Rather than pursuing the pending permit appeal, the sanctuary filed a petition in the chancery court seeking a declaratory judgment. The trial court issued a declaratory judgment regarding the proper interpretation and application of the Rule to the discharge permit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 69-3-105(i) disallows parties challenging the issuance of a discharge permit from seeking a declaratory order from the Board regarding the issuance of the permit and requires parties to first exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the issuance of a discharge permit; and (2) the sanctuary failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and therefore, the trial court should have declined to adjudicate the sanctuary's petition for a declaratory judgment.View "Pickard v. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd." on Justia Law

The University of Hawaii (UH) sought to construct an advanced solar telescope and observatory near the summit of Haleakala on Maui. Kilakila 'O Haleakala (KOH) opposed UH's conservation district use application to build on the project site to the Department of Land and Natural Resources (Department). KOH formally petitioned the Department for a contested case hearing on the application. Without either granting or denying KOH's petition, the Board of Land and Natural Resources (Board) voted at a regularly scheduled public board meeting to grant the permit. KOH filed an agency appeal. The circuit court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there had been no contested case hearing and concluded that KOH's appeal was mooted by the fact that the Board had subsequently granted KOH's request for a contested case hearing subject to a preliminary hearing on KOH's standing. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the lower courts' judgments, holding that KOH's appeal was not moot and that a contested case hearing should have been held, as required by law and properly requested by KOH, on UH's application prior to the Board's vote on the application.View "Kilakila 'O Haleakala v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res." on Justia Law

The Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT") and its director, John Cooper, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss all claims filed against them by Asphalt Contractors, Inc. ("ACI"). Trichloroethylene ('TCE') and other chemicals were used by ALDOT since the early 1970s. TCE was used extensively by ALDOT as a degreaser and/or cleaning agent and/or as a solvent. TCE is now contained in shallow groundwater in North Montgomery. Since at least April 2009, ALDOT has pumped groundwater into a Dewatering Pond and from there onto a Transfer Pond and then to the South Pond. A portion of the South Pond and wetland area used in ALDOT's remedial efforts is being discharged onto ACI's property. In 2010, ACI demanded that ALDOT immediately cease all dumping of contaminated water on ACI's property. However, the dumping of TCE-laden water onto ACI's property continued to the date of ACI filing its lawsuit. The complaint asserted trespass to realty and inverse condemnation and made claims for injunctive relief. ACI requested damages for the full fair-market value of its property, consequential and incidental damages, compensatory damages, punitive and exemplary damages, expenses, costs, interest, and attorney fees. ALDOT and Cooper filed a motion to dismiss the complaint arguing qualified immunity. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss ALDOT as a party to this action. Conversely, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to dismiss as to ACI's inverse-condemnation claim against Cooper in his official capacity. Further, the trial court properly refused to dismiss ACI's claim for injunctive relief against Cooper. Accordingly, the Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus in part and denied it in part. View "Asphalt Contractors, Inc. v. Alabama Dept. of Transportation " on Justia Law

This case was an appeal of a final water court order which voided a rule promulgated by the Office of the State Engineer regarding nontributary ground water extracted in the course of coalbed methane (CBM) production and other oil and gas development. The final rules were challenged by owners of vested water rights and citizen groups whose members owned vested water rights. After extensive briefing by the parties, the water court upheld the Final Rules in their entirety except for the "Fruitland Rule," which it invalidated. The water court held that although H.B. 1303 granted authority to the State Engineer to promulgate the Fruitland Rule, the Tribal Rule essentially divested the State Engineer of that authority. The water court also found that the State Engineer had issued an improper "advisory" rule, and thus could not promulgate the Fruitland Rule unless he first obtained a judicial determination of his authority over nontributary ground water underlying the Reservation. The State Engineer, the Tribe, and several Intervenors appealed the water court's decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule based on the Tribal Rule. The Court concluded the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of this authority: it stated on its face that the Final Rules themselves do not form the basis of or "establish" the State Engineer's authority to administer the nontributary ground water within Reservation boundaries. Because the Tribal Rule did not divest the State Engineer of his authority, the water court erred in invalidating the Fruitland Rule on that ground. Furthermore, the water court also erred in labeling the Fruitland Rule an "advisory" rule and in requiring the State Engineer to obtain a judicial determination that he had authority to administer nontributary ground water within the boundaries of the Reservation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the water court’s invalidation of the Fruitland Rule and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Dick Wolfe v. Pawnee Well Users, Inc." on Justia Law

WRB owns the Wood River Petroleum Refinery in Madison County. Following major renovations, WRB applied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency under the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-25) to have 28 of the refinery’s systems, methods, devices, and facilities certified as “pollution control facilities” for preferential tax assessment. IEPA recommended approval of two of the requests by the Pollution Control Board (PCB), which accepted the IEPA’s recommendations. The Board of Education sought to intervene in the proceedings where certification had been granted, arguing that it had a legally cognizable interest because the certifications would ultimately deprive it of tax revenue. PCB denied the petitions as moot. While requests to reconsider were pending, the IEPA recommended that the PCB approve WRB’s applications to certify the remaining 26 systems. Before PCB took action on those cases, the Board of Education sought to intervene. PCB denied the motion and granted certification in each case. The appellate court dismissed the Board of Education’s consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction under section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, under which the Board of Education sought review The court noted the specific provision for appeals in proceedings involving PCB’s “issuance, refusal to issue, denial, revocation, modification or restriction of a pollution control certificate,” contained in the Property Tax Code,35 ILCS 200/11-60. That provision requires that proceedings originate in the circuit court, rather than by direct administrative review in the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.View "Bd of Educ. of Roxana Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist/ No. 1 v. Pollution Control Bd." on Justia Law

WRB owns the Wood River Petroleum Refinery in Madison County. Following major renovations, WRB applied to the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency under the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/11-25) to have 28 of the refinery’s systems, methods, devices, and facilities certified as “pollution control facilities” for preferential tax assessment. IEPA recommended approval of two of the requests by the Pollution Control Board (PCB), which accepted the IEPA’s recommendations. The Board of Education sought to intervene in the proceedings where certification had been granted, arguing that it had a legally cognizable interest because the certifications would ultimately deprive it of tax revenue. PCB denied the petitions as moot. While requests to reconsider were pending, the IEPA recommended that the PCB approve WRB’s applications to certify the remaining 26 systems. Before PCB took action on those cases, the Board of Education sought to intervene. PCB denied the motion and granted certification in each case. The appellate court dismissed the Board of Education’s consolidated appeal for lack of jurisdiction under section 41 of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act, under which the Board of Education sought review The court noted the specific provision for appeals in proceedings involving PCB’s “issuance, refusal to issue, denial, revocation, modification or restriction of a pollution control certificate,” contained in the Property Tax Code,35 ILCS 200/11-60. That provision requires that proceedings originate in the circuit court, rather than by direct administrative review in the appellate court. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.View "Bd. of Educ. of Roxana Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Pollution Control Bd." on Justia Law

In this water right adjudication, the Water Master concluded that the water right of Claimants, property owners, had been abandoned. Claimants filed an objection to the Water Master's report, arguing, among other things, that the Water Master's application of 79 Ranch v. Pitsch to their existing right was an impermissible retroactive application of the law. The Water Court ruled (1) 79 Ranch applied to Claimants' case; but (2) the Water Master erred in finding that Claimants had failed to produce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of intent to abandon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court (1) correctly applied 79 Ranch analysis; and (2) correctly concluded that Claimants submitted sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of abandonment. View "Heavirland v. State" on Justia Law