Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was a performance bond issued by Stanley Black and Decker, Inc. to secure the obligation of an environmental consulting company to perform environmental remediation of contaminated property, a portion of which was owned by Stanley. A.J. Properties, LLC commenced the underlying action against Stanley alleging that it had been assigned the right to recover all funds paid to Stanley under the performance bond. Specifically, A.J. Properties argued that Stanley had assigned the rights to payment when it assigned a mortgage on the property to the Wyman-Gordon Company, which assigned the mortgage to A.J. Properties. A federal district court judge determined that A.J. Properties was entitled to the amounts paid to Stanley under the rule of Quaranto v. Silverman. Stanley appealed, and the court of appeals recommended certification of a question of law to the First Circuit. The First Circuit answered the question as follows: “Where a mortgage and a surety agreement secured an obligation, and both the mortgagor and the surety committed a breach of that obligation prior to a written assignment of the mortgage, the assignee does not necessarily acquire the right against the surety’s receiver for the surety’s breach of its obligation.” View "A.J. Props., LLC v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc." on Justia Law

Biodiversity Conservation Alliance challenged a United States Forest Service decision modifying trail use in the two-million-acre Medicine Bow National Forest in southern Wyoming. The Forest Service formally closed several hundred miles of unauthorized motorized trails, but allowed motorcycle use on an approximately five-mile trail in the Middle Fork Inventoried Roadless Area and several connecting trails. The Alliance argued the Forest Service did not properly consider the impacts on wetlands and non-motorized recreation in reaching its decision, and should have found that significant impacts required the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the Forest Service's Environmental Assessment adequately supported its finding that the proposed decision would have no significant impacts on wetlands or other users of the Middle Fork IRA. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court and upheld the Forest Service decision. View "Biodiversity Conservation v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The district court concluded that defendants were shielded from liability under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251, where defendants' non-stormwater discharges of coal into Resurrection Bay, Alaska, complied with the Multi-Sector General Permit for Stormwater Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity - a general permit under EPA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that the General Permit shielded defendants from liability for their non-stormwater coal discharges where the express terms of the General Permit prohibited defendants from such acts. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Alaska Cmty. Action v. Aurora" on Justia Law

Recently-adopted regulations required companies engaged in hydraulic fracturing to disclose the chemical compounds used in the process to the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. Appellants sought from the Commission disclosure of certain chemicals used in several companies’ hydraulic fracturing products. The Commission Supervisor refused to disclose the information, concluding that it was exempt from public disclosure as trade secrets under the Wyoming Public Records Act (WPRA). Appellants sought review of the Supervisor’s decision. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court did not have the authority to evaluate the Supervisor’s decision using an administrative standard of review, and rather, should have used the procedures specified in the WPRA; and (2) the definition of a trade secret under the WPRA is the one articulated by federal courts under the Freedom of Information Act. View "Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM), Indiana’s environmental agency, revised its interpretation of the regulatory term “chemical process plants.” After IDEM issued operating permits to two companies for ethanol and ethanol production facilities, NRDC sought administrative review of both permits based on the interpretation of the term “chemical process plants.” The Indiana Office of Environmental Adjudication (OEA) ordered the permits remanded to IDEM. The companies and others sought judicial review of the OEA order. The trial court reversed the OEA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) IDEM was not required to formally amend Indiana’s State Implementation Plan to effectuate its change in how it interprets the regulatory phrase “chemical process plant”; and (2) IDEM’s new interpretation was reasonable and supported the issuance of the permits in this case. View "Nat. Res. Defense Council v. Poet Biorefining- North Manchester, LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned the City's approval of a residential infill development project in downtown Fresno to build 28 two-story townhouses. The trial court decided that the City violated certain procedural requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code 21000 et seq., in approving the project, but applied the correct legal standards in determining the two houses at issue were not "historical resources" protected by CEQA. The court concluded that CEQA allows a local lead agency, such as the City, to delegate the authority to approve a mitigated negative declaration and a project to a nonelected decisionmaking body such as the Preservation Commission. In this case, the Fresno Municipal Code did not actually authorize the Preservation Commission to complete the environmental review required by CEQA and approve the mitigated negative declaration. Therefore, the Preservation Commission's approval of the mitigated negative declaration did not comply with CEQA. In regards to historical resources, the court confirmed the statutory analysis in Valley Advocates v. City of Fresno and concluded that the substantial evidence test, rather than the fair argument standard, applies to a lead agency's discretionary determination of whether a building or district is an historical resource for purposes of CEQA. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it applied the substantial evidence test to the City's determination that no historical resources were impacted by the project. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Citizens etc. L Street v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law

This case centered on a disputed permit for a wastewater system and potable water supply granted to applicants David and Martha Musto for a home on Lake Bomoseen. Next-door neighbor Carolyn Hignite appealed the environmental court's decision to deny her request to revoke the permit issued to applicants in 2009, and to dismiss her direct appeal of the permit. Applicants cross-appealed the environmental court's holding that neighbor had standing to appeal in either instance. Along with her brothers, Hignite was part owner of a lake property that has been in their family for sixty-two years. Applicants' property is a .38-acre lot on the western shore of the lake, which contained a single-story seasonal camp of about 960 square feet. In 2009, applicants submitted a permit application to the Agency of Natural Resources (ANR) to replace the camp's septic system and on-site water supply. On the permit application, applicants described the project as the "reconstruction of a 3 bedroom year-round single use family residence using a new wastewater disposal system and drilled bedrock water supply well." ANR issued the requested permit to applicants on March 30, 2009. In August 2009, Hignite filed a petition with ANR to revoke the permit, claiming that applicants submitted false or misleading information on the permit application regarding the number of bedrooms in the camp. ANR held a hearing in May 2010, and denied neighbor's petition to revoke the permit. Hignite subsequently appealed the permit to the environmental court in 2010, over a year after the permit was issued to applicants. Hignite also appealed ANR's denial of revocation in 2013. The environmental court reviewed both cases de novo but did not conduct a new hearing, instead basing its review on exhibits and testimony from the ANR hearing, as the parties stipulated. Hignite appealed the court's decision on both dockets. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court's holding in both of the neighbor's appeals. View "In re Musto Wastewater System" on Justia Law

Clifford Lippitt was a certified geologist employed at S.W. Cole, Inc. Worcester Associates retained S.W. Cole to provide the necessary technical assistance in order to complete the closure of a landfill Worcester owned. After S.W. Cole drilled bedrock wells and collected data from them, Lippitt submitted a report presenting the results of the tests and concluding that there was no evidence the landfill was impacting neighboring residential wells. The Board of Certification for Geologists and Soil Scientists determined that Lippitt had violated the Code of Ethics applicable to geologists and soil scientists because he had provided a professional opinion “without being as thoroughly informed as might be reasonably expected.” The Supreme Court vacated the superior court’s judgment affirming the Board’s decision, holding (1) the Board’s disagreement with a geologist’s opinion, without a concurrent determination that the opinion is false, is based on false data, or reflects the geologist’s incompetence, cannot be the basis for a determination that the opinion constitutes a violation of the geologists’ Code of Ethics; and (2) the Board erred in determining that Lippitt violated the Code of Ethics on the grounds that Lippitt’s opinion was not “reasonable” in light of the underlying data.View "Lippitt v. Bd. of Certification for Geologists & Soil Scientists" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, allows each state to craft a state implementation plan to control the levels of certain air pollutants. Most state plans include “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD) programs, to prevent backsliding in “attainment areas” that meet or exceed the Act’s air quality standards, while allowing some new sources of pollution. A PSD program prevents designated sources from propelling the region’s aggregate emissions over specified limits. The Act establishes these limits by setting a baseline and a cap on pollutants above that baseline. The Act grandfathers sources operational before 1975: the baseline incorporates their emissions, with post-1975 sources counting against the allowance. Title V of the Act requires each covered stationary source to have an operating permit. In 2002 Georgia-Pacific asked Wisconsin to renew the Title V permit for its pre-1975 paper mill. Meanwhile, Georgia-Pacific modified a paper machine at the plant. The application was unopposed and the modification permit issued in February 2004. In 2011 Wisconsin reissued the plant’s operating permit. Objectors claim that modifications to any part of a plant require all emissions from the plant, including pre-1975 emissions incorporated into the baseline, to count against the state’s allowance, so that the whole plant might need to close for lack of available allowance. The U.S. EPA declined to object, concluding that Wisconsin’s approach is consonant with its understanding of the statute. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. EPA presented a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision. View "Clean Water Action Council of NE WI, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

ASARCO, LLC ("Asarco") appealed the district court's dismissal of its contribution action brought under section 113(f) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"). Asarco sought to recover from Union Pacific Railroad Co. and Union Pacific Corp. a share of $482 million in cleanup costs Asarco paid for environmental harm at the Coeur d'Alene Superfund Site in Northern Idaho. The district court dismissed the action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that although Asarco's claim was timely, it was barred by a 2008 settlement agreement between the parties that settled Union Pacific's claims against Asarco at the same site. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Asarco's claim was timely, but that the parties' 2008 settlement agreement did not unambiguously release Asarco's claim in this case. Therefore reversed the district court's judgment dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(6). View "ASARCO LLC v. UPRC, et al" on Justia Law