Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The predecessor in interest to 71 Ranch filed statements of claim for four right rights located on Confederate Creek (Creek Rights), describing a new point of diversion and place of use for the Creek Rights. Donald Marks, whose water rights were junior to the Creek Rights, filed an objection to the Creek Rights’ place of use and point of diversion. The Montana Water Court dismissed Marks’ objection, concluding that Marks failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut 71 Ranch’s claimed point of diversion and place of use for its water rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court correctly concluded that Marks failed to present sufficient evidence to contradict 71 Ranch’s claimed point of diversion and place of use for its water rights. View "Marks v. 71 Ranch" on Justia Law

BNE Energy, Inc. submitted two petitions for declaratory rulings seeking the Connecticut Siting Council’s approval for the construction and operation of three electric generating wind turbines on two separate properties in the town of Colebrook. Plaintiffs intervened in the proceedings. The Council approved the petitions with conditions, and Plaintiffs appealed. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ appeals. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in concluding that the Council (1) had jurisdiction over BNE’s petitions; (2) was authorized to attach conditions to its approval of the petitions; (3) was authorized to approve the petitions even though it had not determined that the proposed projects comply with state noise law; (4) properly approved of shorter hub heights for one of the projects; and (5) did not deprive Plaintiffs of their right to fundamental fairness during the hearings on the petitions. View "FairwindCT, Inc. v. Conn. Siting Council" on Justia Law

San Francisco prevailed in a writ proceeding under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) brought by the Coalition for Adequate Review and Alliance for Comprehensive Planning. After securing judgment, the city filed a memorandum of costs totaling $64,144, largely for costs incurred in preparing a supplemental record of the proceedings. The trial court denied all costs, relying on the fact that the Coalition had elected to prepare the record itself, as allowed by CEQA’s record preparation statute and expressing concern that sizeable cost awards would have a chilling effect on lawsuits challenging important public projects. The court of appeals reversed in part and remanded, stating that neither rationale is a legally permissible basis for denying record preparation costs to the city. View "Coal. for Adequate Review v. City & Cnty of San Francisco" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the issuance of a permit by the State Department of Environmental Conservation, Division of Environmental Health to the Alaska Railroad Corporation for the use of herbicides to control vegetation along a railroad right-of-way. Two public interest organizations, Alaska Community Action on Toxics (ACAT) and Alaska Survival, contended that the Department’s issuance of the permit violated due process and the public notice requirement of AS 46.03.320; that the Department abused its discretion in accepting the permit application as complete and in denying standing and intervenor status to a third organization, Cook Inletkeeper; and that ACAT and Alaska Survival should not have been ordered to pay the costs of preparing the administrative record on appeal. The Department and the Railroad cross-appealed on the issue of attorney’s fees, contesting the superior court’s conclusion that ACAT and Alaska Survival were exempt from fees under AS 09.60.010(c) as constitutional litigants. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the challenges to the permit were moot due to its expiration and changes in the governing regulatory scheme. The Court affirmed the agency’s decisions regarding costs; the cross-appeals on attorney’s fees were withdrawn by agreement.View "Alaska Community Action on Toxics v. Hartig" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a severance deed conveying ownership of, and the right to remove, coal and timber underlying and appurtenant to a certain tract of land. The parties to this appeal were the successors-in-interest to the grantors named in the severance deed (the Surface Owners) and the successor-in-interest to the grantees of the coal rights named in the deed (the Coal Owner). The Surface Owners and the Coal Owner asserted conflicting claims to royalties generated by the extraction of coal bed methane gas (CBM) from the coal seams underlying the property. The Surface Owners filed this declaratory judgment action against the Coal Owner asserting that they were the sole owners of the CBM produced from their land and that they were entitled to all the royalties therefrom. The circuit court granted judgment for the Surface Owners, declaring that the Surface Owners owned the CBM and were entitled to receive the royalties therefrom. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Surface Owners had at all times owned all mineral estates within their lands except coal, and therefore, the Surface Owners were entitled to all royalties accrued from the production of CBM produced from their land and those yet to accrue. View "Swords Creek Land P'ship v. Belcher" on Justia Law

In May 2011, plaintiffs, six Alaskan children acting through their guardians, filed suit against the State of Alaska, Department of Natural Resources, seeking declaratory and equitable relief. The plaintiffs contended that the State breached "its public trust obligations [under] [a]rticle VIII of the Alaska Constitution" by failing "to protect the atmosphere from the effects of climate change and secure a future for Plaintiffs and Alaska's children." The minors argued that the superior court erred when it dismissed their complaint on grounds that their claims were not justiciable, specifically, that the claims involved political questions best answered by other branches of state government. The Supreme Court concluded the claims for declaratory relief did not present political questions, and affirmed their dismissal, because in the absence of justiciable claims for specific relief, a declaratory judgment could not settle the parties' controversy or otherwise provide them with clear guidance about the consequences of their future conduct. View "Kanuk v. Alaska, Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

MEIC filed suit against the Director of the Montana Department of Environmental Quality, claiming that the Director will violate duties imposed by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. 1201-1328. The district court granted the Director's motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and Intervenors' motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). MEIC alleged a pattern or practice of the Director granting mining permit applications without doing proper cumulative hydrologic impact assessments (chias). The court concluded that, assuming arguendo, those allegations established that the Director will not do a proper CHIA for the application at issue, MEIC did not establish a substantial risk that the Director will grant the application at all. Even if the court assumed that MEIC could bring suit on behalf of its members, the members do not have standing because they did not suffer an actual or imminent injury in fact. Under a constitutional ripeness standard, MEIC also failed to allege a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality because MEIC failed to demonstrate a substantial risk that the Director will grant the application. In regards to MEIC's argument under the firm prediction rule, the court concluded that the rule's standards were not met where the court could not make a firm prediction about whether or not the Director will grant the application. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "MEIC v. Stone-Manning" on Justia Law

NYSEG filed suit against FirstEnergy under section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., to recover certain costs incurred in remediating coal tar contamination at certain of NYSEG's manufactured gas plants in upstate New York. NYSEG contends that FirstEnergy is liable as the successor to NYSEG's former parent company, AGECO, for a portion of the cleanup costs. FirstEnergy filed counterclaims against NYSEG and third-party claims against I.D. Booth, the current owner of one of the sites, for cost contribution under section 113(f). The district court held that NYSEG was entitled to recover certain cleanup costs from FirstEnergy based on a veil piercing theory, but limiting that recovery to certain sites. The district court also found I.D. Booth liable for a portion of the cleanup costs at one site. The court held that NYSEG's CERCLA claims against FirstEnergy are not barred by the covenant not to sue; AGECO is not directly liable under CERCLA as an operator; FirstEnergy is liable to NYSEG on a veil piercing theory based on AGECO's control of NYSEG from 1922 to January 10, 1940, but not for contamination created by other AGECO subsidiaries before those subsidiaries merged into NYSEG; NYSEG's claims as to the (a) Plattsburgh site are timely, (b) Norwich site are untimely, and (c) Oswego site are untimely; the district court did not err in calculating total gas production at the sites; the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing NYSEG's recovery from FirstEnergy by a portion of NYSEG's $20 million insurance settlement; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce NYSEG's recovery to reflect the increased value of the remediated properties or NYSEG's alleged delay in the remedial efforts; and I.D. Booth is liable for a portion of cleanup costs and the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning liability in this respect. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "New York State Elec. & Gas v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

The California Coastal Commission appealed the grant of the writ of mandamus directing it to remove three conditions from a coastal development permit amendment issued to respondents Barbara Lynch and Thomas Frick. The Commission contended respondents waived any challenge to these conditions by signing and recording documents agreeing to them and then accepting the benefit of the permit by completing their project. The Commission further contended the conditions were valid and supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal agreed with both contentions and reversed the judgment. View "Lynch v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Elaine and Gerald Rominger challenged a mitigated negative declaration approved by defendant Colusa County with respect to a subdivision proposed by real party in interest Adams Group Inc. The trial court denied the Romingers’ petition based on the conclusion that, notwithstanding the county’s approval of a mitigated negative declaration, the county’s "action in approving the subdivision map was not a project for CEQA purposes and [thus] no review beyond the preliminary review stage was required." The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in determining the proposed subdivision was not a CEQA project, even though the proposal did not include any specific plans for development. On independent review of the Romingers’ other complaints, however, the Court found merit in only one: the Romingers adequately showed there was substantial evidence in the record that the subdivision may have had a significant unmitigated impact on traffic at a particular intersection adjacent to the project site. Accordingly, on that basis only, the Court reversed and remanded for the preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR). View "Rominger v. County of Colusa" on Justia Law