Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

MEIC filed suit against the Director of the Montana Department of Environmental Quality, claiming that the Director will violate duties imposed by the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 30 U.S.C. 1201-1328. The district court granted the Director's motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and Intervenors' motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). MEIC alleged a pattern or practice of the Director granting mining permit applications without doing proper cumulative hydrologic impact assessments (chias). The court concluded that, assuming arguendo, those allegations established that the Director will not do a proper CHIA for the application at issue, MEIC did not establish a substantial risk that the Director will grant the application at all. Even if the court assumed that MEIC could bring suit on behalf of its members, the members do not have standing because they did not suffer an actual or imminent injury in fact. Under a constitutional ripeness standard, MEIC also failed to allege a substantial controversy of sufficient immediacy and reality because MEIC failed to demonstrate a substantial risk that the Director will grant the application. In regards to MEIC's argument under the firm prediction rule, the court concluded that the rule's standards were not met where the court could not make a firm prediction about whether or not the Director will grant the application. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "MEIC v. Stone-Manning" on Justia Law

NYSEG filed suit against FirstEnergy under section 107(a) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., to recover certain costs incurred in remediating coal tar contamination at certain of NYSEG's manufactured gas plants in upstate New York. NYSEG contends that FirstEnergy is liable as the successor to NYSEG's former parent company, AGECO, for a portion of the cleanup costs. FirstEnergy filed counterclaims against NYSEG and third-party claims against I.D. Booth, the current owner of one of the sites, for cost contribution under section 113(f). The district court held that NYSEG was entitled to recover certain cleanup costs from FirstEnergy based on a veil piercing theory, but limiting that recovery to certain sites. The district court also found I.D. Booth liable for a portion of the cleanup costs at one site. The court held that NYSEG's CERCLA claims against FirstEnergy are not barred by the covenant not to sue; AGECO is not directly liable under CERCLA as an operator; FirstEnergy is liable to NYSEG on a veil piercing theory based on AGECO's control of NYSEG from 1922 to January 10, 1940, but not for contamination created by other AGECO subsidiaries before those subsidiaries merged into NYSEG; NYSEG's claims as to the (a) Plattsburgh site are timely, (b) Norwich site are untimely, and (c) Oswego site are untimely; the district court did not err in calculating total gas production at the sites; the district court did not abuse its discretion in reducing NYSEG's recovery from FirstEnergy by a portion of NYSEG's $20 million insurance settlement; the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to reduce NYSEG's recovery to reflect the increased value of the remediated properties or NYSEG's alleged delay in the remedial efforts; and I.D. Booth is liable for a portion of cleanup costs and the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning liability in this respect. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "New York State Elec. & Gas v. FirstEnergy Corp." on Justia Law

The California Coastal Commission appealed the grant of the writ of mandamus directing it to remove three conditions from a coastal development permit amendment issued to respondents Barbara Lynch and Thomas Frick. The Commission contended respondents waived any challenge to these conditions by signing and recording documents agreeing to them and then accepting the benefit of the permit by completing their project. The Commission further contended the conditions were valid and supported by substantial evidence. The Court of Appeal agreed with both contentions and reversed the judgment. View "Lynch v. California Coastal Commission" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Elaine and Gerald Rominger challenged a mitigated negative declaration approved by defendant Colusa County with respect to a subdivision proposed by real party in interest Adams Group Inc. The trial court denied the Romingers’ petition based on the conclusion that, notwithstanding the county’s approval of a mitigated negative declaration, the county’s "action in approving the subdivision map was not a project for CEQA purposes and [thus] no review beyond the preliminary review stage was required." The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in determining the proposed subdivision was not a CEQA project, even though the proposal did not include any specific plans for development. On independent review of the Romingers’ other complaints, however, the Court found merit in only one: the Romingers adequately showed there was substantial evidence in the record that the subdivision may have had a significant unmitigated impact on traffic at a particular intersection adjacent to the project site. Accordingly, on that basis only, the Court reversed and remanded for the preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR). View "Rominger v. County of Colusa" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was a performance bond issued by Stanley Black and Decker, Inc. to secure the obligation of an environmental consulting company to perform environmental remediation of contaminated property, a portion of which was owned by Stanley. A.J. Properties, LLC commenced the underlying action against Stanley alleging that it had been assigned the right to recover all funds paid to Stanley under the performance bond. Specifically, A.J. Properties argued that Stanley had assigned the rights to payment when it assigned a mortgage on the property to the Wyman-Gordon Company, which assigned the mortgage to A.J. Properties. A federal district court judge determined that A.J. Properties was entitled to the amounts paid to Stanley under the rule of Quaranto v. Silverman. Stanley appealed, and the court of appeals recommended certification of a question of law to the First Circuit. The First Circuit answered the question as follows: “Where a mortgage and a surety agreement secured an obligation, and both the mortgagor and the surety committed a breach of that obligation prior to a written assignment of the mortgage, the assignee does not necessarily acquire the right against the surety’s receiver for the surety’s breach of its obligation.” View "A.J. Props., LLC v. Stanley Black & Decker, Inc." on Justia Law

Biodiversity Conservation Alliance challenged a United States Forest Service decision modifying trail use in the two-million-acre Medicine Bow National Forest in southern Wyoming. The Forest Service formally closed several hundred miles of unauthorized motorized trails, but allowed motorcycle use on an approximately five-mile trail in the Middle Fork Inventoried Roadless Area and several connecting trails. The Alliance argued the Forest Service did not properly consider the impacts on wetlands and non-motorized recreation in reaching its decision, and should have found that significant impacts required the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the Forest Service's Environmental Assessment adequately supported its finding that the proposed decision would have no significant impacts on wetlands or other users of the Middle Fork IRA. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court and upheld the Forest Service decision. View "Biodiversity Conservation v. United States Forest Service" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The district court concluded that defendants were shielded from liability under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251, where defendants' non-stormwater discharges of coal into Resurrection Bay, Alaska, complied with the Multi-Sector General Permit for Stormwater Discharges Associated with Industrial Activity - a general permit under EPA's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. The court concluded that the district court erred in concluding that the General Permit shielded defendants from liability for their non-stormwater coal discharges where the express terms of the General Permit prohibited defendants from such acts. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Alaska Cmty. Action v. Aurora" on Justia Law

Recently-adopted regulations required companies engaged in hydraulic fracturing to disclose the chemical compounds used in the process to the Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. Appellants sought from the Commission disclosure of certain chemicals used in several companies’ hydraulic fracturing products. The Commission Supervisor refused to disclose the information, concluding that it was exempt from public disclosure as trade secrets under the Wyoming Public Records Act (WPRA). Appellants sought review of the Supervisor’s decision. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court did not have the authority to evaluate the Supervisor’s decision using an administrative standard of review, and rather, should have used the procedures specified in the WPRA; and (2) the definition of a trade secret under the WPRA is the one articulated by federal courts under the Freedom of Information Act. View "Powder River Basin Res. Council v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM), Indiana’s environmental agency, revised its interpretation of the regulatory term “chemical process plants.” After IDEM issued operating permits to two companies for ethanol and ethanol production facilities, NRDC sought administrative review of both permits based on the interpretation of the term “chemical process plants.” The Indiana Office of Environmental Adjudication (OEA) ordered the permits remanded to IDEM. The companies and others sought judicial review of the OEA order. The trial court reversed the OEA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) IDEM was not required to formally amend Indiana’s State Implementation Plan to effectuate its change in how it interprets the regulatory phrase “chemical process plant”; and (2) IDEM’s new interpretation was reasonable and supported the issuance of the permits in this case. View "Nat. Res. Defense Council v. Poet Biorefining- North Manchester, LLC" on Justia Law

This case concerned the City's approval of a residential infill development project in downtown Fresno to build 28 two-story townhouses. The trial court decided that the City violated certain procedural requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code 21000 et seq., in approving the project, but applied the correct legal standards in determining the two houses at issue were not "historical resources" protected by CEQA. The court concluded that CEQA allows a local lead agency, such as the City, to delegate the authority to approve a mitigated negative declaration and a project to a nonelected decisionmaking body such as the Preservation Commission. In this case, the Fresno Municipal Code did not actually authorize the Preservation Commission to complete the environmental review required by CEQA and approve the mitigated negative declaration. Therefore, the Preservation Commission's approval of the mitigated negative declaration did not comply with CEQA. In regards to historical resources, the court confirmed the statutory analysis in Valley Advocates v. City of Fresno and concluded that the substantial evidence test, rather than the fair argument standard, applies to a lead agency's discretionary determination of whether a building or district is an historical resource for purposes of CEQA. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it applied the substantial evidence test to the City's determination that no historical resources were impacted by the project. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Citizens etc. L Street v. City of Fresno" on Justia Law