Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Department of Environmental Protection (Department), acting through its office of Long Island Sound Programs (Office), ordered Plaintiffs, Gail and Thomas Lane, to remove a boardwalk and dock from their property because they had been installed without the statutorily required permits. The Office then denied Plaintiffs’ application for a certificate of permission to retain and maintain the structures and to install a new boardwalk pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-363b(a)(2). The Department upheld the Office’s rulings. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ administrative appeal. The Appellate Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Appellate Court properly interpreted section 22a-363b(a) in concluding that the trial court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ administrative appeal. View "Lane v. Comm’r of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

North Coast Railroad Authority (NCRA), a public agency established by Government Code section 93000, entered into a contract with the Northwestern Pacific Railroad Company (NWPRC), allowing NWPRC to conduct freight rail service on tracks controlled by NCRA. Two environmental groups filed suit under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code, 21050, 21168.5, to challenge NCRA’s certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of NWPRC’s freight operations. The trial court denied the petitions, concluding CEQA review was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA; 49 U.S.C. 10101) and rejecting a claim that NCRA and NWPRC were estopped from arguing otherwise. The appeals court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the ICCTA preempts only the “regulation” of rail transportation, whereas NCRA agreed to conduct a CEQA review of the rail operations and related repair/maintenance activities as part of a contract allowing it to receive state funds. NCRA and NWPRC are not estopped from claiming no EIR was required, due to positions taken in previous proceedings and the EIR was not insufficient for improperly “segmenting” the project, given that additional rail operations were contemplated on other sections of the line. View "Friends of the Eel River v. N. Coast RR. Auth." on Justia Law

Alabama Rivers Alliance and Friends of Hurricane Creek (collectively, "ARA") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Civil Appeals' decision reversing the trial court's decision to dismiss an appeal by Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. ("TRI") of a decision of the Environmental Management Commission. The Alabama Department of Environmental Management ("ADEM") oversees the Commission. The Alabama Supreme Court granted certiorari review to consider whether the Court of Civil Appeals' decision conflicted with its decision in "Price v. South Central Bell," (313 So. 2d 184 (1975)), and the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in "Personnel Board of Jefferson County v. Bailey," (475 So. 2d 863 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Civil Appeals' decision in this case conflicted with "Price" and "Bailey," and accordingly reversed its judgment. View "Tuscaloosa Resources, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Enviromental Management" on Justia Law

San Diego County approved a "Remedial Action Plan" (RAP) for a remediation project at the former Otay Skeet and Trap Shooting Range (Project) in Chula Vista, and adopted a "Final Mitigated Negative Declaration" (MND). The Project involved "investigation and remediation of surface and subsurface areas impacted from historic shooting range activities" and included "remediation of soil impacted by lead and polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), removal of 'White Material['], as well as the removal of target debris and wood debris from the site." The Otay Ranch, Sky Communities, and Sky Vista (collectively, Otay Ranch parties) were the former owners of the shooting range. They filed a petition for writ of mandate alleging the County: (1) did not comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) when it approved and adopted the MND and RAP without preparing an environmental impact report; and (2) did not comply with Health and Safety Code in approving the RAP. The Otay Ranch parties also sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Real party in interest, Flat Rock Land Company, LLC was the current owner of the shooting range property and project applicant, which undertook voluntary remediation of the site before future development. The central issue in this appeal was whether, after a voluntary dismissal of a petition for writ of mandate, the trial court erred by allowing the County to recover actual labor costs incurred for an attorney and paralegals to prepare an administrative record. Finding no error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order and judgment. Preliminarily, however, the Court dismissed the appeals of The Otay Ranch (a cancelled limited partnership), and Sky Communities, Inc. (a suspended corporation), for lack of capacity. The Court of Appeal denied the motion to dismissed the appeal of the remaining appellant, Sky Vista, Inc. (Sky Vista), which was an active corporation. View "Otay Ranch, L.P. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

The Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection issued a compliance order requiring Mallinckrodt US LLC and United States Surgical Corporation (collectively, Mallinckrodt) to excavate material containing mercury and other contaminants from five landfills located on a site adjacent to the Penobscot River and to transfer the material to off-site landfills. After a hearing, the Board of Environmental Protection modified and affirmed the order by requiring that Mallinckrodt excavate only two of the landfills and that it secure and monitor the others. Mallinckrodt appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Commissioner was statutorily authorized to issue the compliance order; (2) the Board did not err in conducting the proceedings in accordance with statutorily provided rules rather than promulgating its own; (3) the Board did not err by precluding Mallinckrodt from cross-examining two consultants who assisted the Board in evaluating technical evidence because the consultants did not offer testimony; and (4) the Board did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence relating to the Commissioner’s possible political bias.View "Mallinckrodt US LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

The Superfund Site encompasses the Lower Fox River and Green Bay, into which paper mills discharged PCBs until the 1970s, and is the subject of remedial efforts under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9606. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) divided the Site into five “operable units” (OUs). In 2002, EPA and WDNR issued a record of decision (ROD), calling for dredging in OU1, but for monitored natural recovery in OU2, excepting limited dredging as part of the OU3 remedy. In 2003, EPA and WDNR issued another ROD, including dredging in OU3 and OU4. The OU5 remedy was limited to monitored natural recovery, except some dredging near the River's mouth. Potentially responsible parties (PRPs) agreed to perform the work in OU1. NCR and another PRP agreed to perform remedial design work for OU2–OU5. In 2007, the agencies amended the ROD for OU2–OU5, keeping dredging as the default approach but allowing for capping and sand covering. EPA ordered the PRPs to conduct the cleanup required by the amendment. NCR led the remedial efforts in OU2 and OU3 and conducted significant action in OU4. In 2008 NCR sought contribution from the other PRPs and declined further compliance with EPA’s 2007 order. The district court ordered NCR to complete work scheduled for 2012. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court then upheld the agencies’ remedy selection and held that various OU1 PRPs were liable for downstream cleanup costs; the court entered a permanent injunction requiring the nonsettling PRPs to comply with EPA’s 2007 order. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part; the district court erred in its consideration of NCR’s divisibility defense and in its decision to enter a permanent injunction. View "United States v. P.H. Glatfelter Co." on Justia Law

The Superfund Site encompasses the Lower Fox River and Green Bay, into which paper mills discharged PCBs until the 1970s, and is the subject of remedial efforts under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9606. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources divided the Site into five “operable units” (OUs) and issued records of decision (RODs), calling for dredging in OU1, for monitored natural recovery in OU2; dredging in OU3 and OU4; and monitored natural recovery in OU5. Several potentially responsible parties (PRPs) agreed to perform the work in OU1. NCR and another PRP agreed to perform remedial design work for OU2–OU5. The agencies amended the ROD for OU2–OU5, keeping dredging as the default approach but allowing for capping and sand covering. EPA ordered the PRPs to conduct cleanup required by the amendment. NCR led the remedial efforts in OU2 and OU3 and conducted significant action in OU4. NCR sought contribution from the other PRPs and declined further compliance with EPA’s 2007 order. The district court ordered NCR to complete work scheduled for 2012. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court then held that NCR was not entitled to contribution from paper mills that recycled its scraps and that those mills had meritorious counterclaims for recovery from NCR. The Seventh Circuit vacated the decision to hold NCR responsible for all of the response costs at OU2- 5 in contribution, but affirmed that NCR may proceed only under CERCLA section 113(f); that NCR is not liable as an arranger; that another PRP’s insurance settlement may not be offset against NCR’s contribution share; that NCR can be required to contribute for natural resource damages; and that state-law counterclaims are preempted. View "NCR Corp. v. WTM I Co." on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals concern challenges to two logging projects in Montana's Flathead National Project: (1) the Weber case challenged the Forest Service's decision to authorize the Spotted Bear River Project, and (2) the Christiansen case challenged the Soldier Addition II Project. Wild Swan appealed the district court's denial of preliminary injunctions in both cases. The court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction because Wild Swan has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., claim where Wild Swan failed to demonstrate that the Forest Service acted arbitrarily in delineating the geographic boundaries of its cumulative effects analysis with respect to the lynx and grizzly bear; the Forest Service sufficiently addressed the effects of each project on the fisheries, but even if the Forest Service should have considered the cumulative impact of both worst-case sediment scenarios on the main channel of the South Fork, there is no immediate risk of irreparable injury justifying preliminary injunction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Wild Swan has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of its National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1604, claims, nor has plaintiff raised serious questions on the merits of this claim; and the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining Wild Swan has not demonstrated a likelihood of success or serious questions on the merits of its Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber" on Justia Law

Mines Management, Inc., Newhi, Inc., and Montanore Minerals Corp. (collectively, MMC) sued Defendants, challenging the validity of Defendants’ unpatented mining claims and asserting several tort claims. The district court ruled on several motions and granted injunctive relief for one defendant. MMC appealed. The Supreme Court remanded with instructions to vacate the injunction, concluding that the lower court had not made sufficient findings to support the granting of the injunction and permit appellate review. MMC then filed a motion for substitution of judge pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. 3-1-804(12). The district court ruled that substitution was unavailable at this stage in the proceeding. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly denied the motion because, upon remand, section 3-1-804(12) did not provide MMC an opportunity to request a substitution of judge. View "Mines Mgmt., Inc. v. Fus" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) adopted amendments to regulations pertaining to the protection of endangered and threatened species. The amendments established a formal process through which individuals could obtain a permit to allow for the incidental taking of a threatened or endangered species. Before the agency implemented the regulations at issue, the Town of Riverhead and Twon of Riverhead Community Development Agency (collectively, Riverhead) challenged the amendments. Supreme Court dismissed the proceeding, finding that Petitioners did not have standing. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners lacked standing based on their failure to allege an injury in fact and that Petitioners’ substantive challenges were not yet ripe. The Court of Appeals held that Petitioners could proceed with three of their procedural claims, as they alleged a sufficient injury regarding these claims, but Petitioners lacked standing with respect to the substantive causes of action, as those claims were not yet ripe. View "In re Ass’n for a Better Long Island" on Justia Law