Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680, against the United States, alleging that they experienced various health problems after being exposed to toxic substances in the drinking water while living at Camp Lejeune, a military base in North Carolina. The United States argued that the North Carolina statute of repose, N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-52(16), precluded plaintiffs from bringing the case. The district court disagreed and certified two questions for interlocutory appeal. The court held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9568, does not preempt North Carolina's statute of repose. The court also held that North Carolina's statute of repose applies to plaintiffs' claims and does not contain an exception for latent diseases. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Bryant, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issued Frontier Fishing a notice of violation and assessment and a notice of permit sanction after determining that Frontier Fishing was liable for trawling in a restricted gear area in violation of regulations promulgated under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishing Conservation and Management Act. Frontier Fishing denied liability. On appeal, Frontier Fishing argued that the record lacked substantial evidence for a rational finding that its vessel trawled in the restricted area. The district court upheld the NOAA Administrator’s final decision. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the NOAA’s finding. View "Frontier Fishing Corp. v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) court decision on whether Idaho law required a remark authorizing storage rights to "refill,"under priority, space vacated for flood control. The SRBA court concluded that a remark was not necessary because a storage water right that is filled cannot refill under priority before affected junior appropriators satisfy their water rights once. The court declined to address when the quantity element of a storage water right is considered filled. Seven Magic Valley irrigation districts and canal companies (collectively the "Surface Water Coalition") appealed this decision in Docket No. 40974. The Boise Project Board appealed this decision in Docket No. 40975. Because both cases appealed the same decision of the SRBA court and had significant overlap, the Supreme Court addressed them together in this opinion, and held that the SRBA court abused its discretion in designating the question of whether Idaho law required remark as Basin-Wide Issue 17. The SRBA court did not abuse its discretion by declining to address when the quantity element of a storage water right is considered filled or in stating that such a determination was within the Director's discretion. View "In re: SRBA" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek vacatur of OSHA's Final Rule revising its Hazard Communication Standard requiring employers across industries to develop a program for classifying the dangers of workplace chemicals and conveying those dangers to their employees. Petitioners, businesses that handle and process grain and other agricultural products, and others, seek vacatur of the Final Rule as it applies to combustible dust. The court concluded that petitioners had express notice that combustible dust, however labeled, would be subject to the relevant requirements of the Final Rule; there was substantial evidence and an adequate explanation to support OSHA's decision to incorporate an interim definition of "combustible dust" and guidance until a more precise definitions is implemented in another rulemaking; petitioners' facial vagueness challenge is ripe for review; and on the merits, however, the vagueness claim fails because the Final Rule satisfies due process where the term "combustible dust" is clear enough to provide fair warning of enforcement, and OSHA has provided additional guidance on how the revised Hazard Communication Standard will be enforced. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Nat'l Oilseed Processors Assoc. v. OSHA" on Justia Law

In an effort to comply with the Clean Air Act, three states (New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming), one city (Albuquerque), and one county (Bernalillo County) adopted a regional cap-and-trade program regulating sulfur-dioxide emissions over the Colorado Plateau. New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, the City of Albuquerque, and Bernalillo County persuaded the EPA that the trading program would yield better results than the EPA's own compliance standards (referred to as "BART"). Five environmental groups filed petitions for review, arguing that the EPA should not have approved the trading program. Concluding that the EPA's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petitions for review. View "WildEarth Guardians v. EPA" on Justia Law

Passadumkeag Windpark, LLC (PW) sought approval to construct a wind farm on property owned by Penobscot Forest, LLC (PF) located in Grand Falls Township. The Department of Environmental Protection denied the requested permit. On review, the Board of Environmental Protection (Board) granted the permit. Passadumkeag Mountain Friends (PMF), a Maine nonprofit corporation, and Alexander and Rhonda Cuprak appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board, holding (1) the decision of the Board was operative for purposes of appellate review; (2) the Board’s findings and conclusion were supported by substantial evidence in the record; and (3) certain communications between the Board, PW, and PF during the application process did not affect the Cupraks’ due process rights. View "Passadumkeag Mountain Friends v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Headwaters Resources, Inc. carried commercial liability insurance issued by two insurance companies: Illinois Union Insurance Company and ACE American Insurance Company. Headwaters sought reimbursement for its litigation costs arising from a case brought by landowners in Virginia, alleging that Headwaters had caused personal injury and property damage during the construction of a nearby golf course. The complaint alleged that fly ash used in the construction process caused air and water pollution that devalued their homes and created health risks to the homeowners. The insurance companies told Headwaters that defense costs related to Headwaters’ pollution were outside the scope of the coverage and denied the claim. Headwaters sued, and the district court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies, finding that the pollution exclusions in the insurance policies precluded coverage. Jurisdictions that have addressed the scope of a "total pollution exclusion" were either: (1) courts that applied the pollution exclusions as written because they find them clear and unmistakable; or (2) courts that narrowed the exclusions to "traditional environmental pollution," because they found the terms of the exclusion to be ambiguous due to their broad applicability. The Utah Supreme Court had not yet weighed in on this debate, and the federal district court did not pick a side on its behalf. Instead, the district court found that certain of the at-issue pollution exclusions unambiguously applied to bar coverage and that the remaining pollution exclusions, although possibly ambiguous, still applied because the complaints unquestionably alleged traditional environmental pollution. As a result, the complaints triggered the pollution exclusions in all of the policies, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that each of the pollution exclusions was unambiguous, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Headwaters Resources v. Illinois Union Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Lower Teton Joint Objectors, water users who hold appropriation rights from the lower Teton River in Chouteau County, commenced an action claiming that the Water Commissioners’ practice of diverting water out of the natural channel of the Teton River and into the Bateman Ditch harmed their appropriation rights by depriving the Teton River aquifer of recharge water. The Water Master issued a report regarding the Bateman Ditch, and the Water Judge issued an “Order Amending Master’s Report and Adopting as Amended.” The Objectors and intervenor Patrick Saylor appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Water Court erred by concluding that the Bateman Ditch diversion to supply water to Choteau Cattle Company is a private right held by Saylor; and (2) the Water Court acted properly in listing the water rights that can be diverted through the Bateman Ditch. View "Eldorado Co-op Canal Co., Lower Teton Joint Objectors" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the NPS's enforcement of a regulation banning the operation of hovercrafts on the Nation River. Alaska intervened, challenging the NPS's authority to require its researchers to obtain a permit before engaging in studies on the Alagnak River. Plaintiff and Alaska argued that section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act precludes NPS from regulating activities on state-owned lands and navigable waters that fall within the boundaries of National Park System units in Alaska. The district court granted summary judgment to appellees. The court concluded that plaintiff had Article III standing, but that his interpretation of section 103(c) is foreclosed by the plain text of the statute. NPS's hovercraft ban applies to federally owned lands and waters administered by NPS nationwide, as well as navigable waters within national parks. The court rejected plaintiff's two additional arguments, that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority in promulgating the regulation at issue and that her action raises serious constitutional concerns. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff. The court held that Alaska lacked standing to bring its challenge and vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Sturgeon v. Masica" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the surface owner of various tracts of land in Sioux County, sued the alleged owners of severed mineral interests in those tracts, claiming that the defendants abandoned their interests because they did not comply with the requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. 57-229 by failing to exercise publicly the right of ownership of the severed mineral interests. All of the defendants filed verified claims to the mineral interests prior to the action filed by Plaintiff. The district court concluded (1) the alleged mineral owners had either strictly complied or substantially complied with the requirements of section 57-229; and (2) the alleged mineral owners had not forfeited their mineral interests, except for one of the claims, which was terminated. Rice appealed, and two of the defendants cross-appealed as to the mineral interests that were terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) strict compliance with section 57-229 is mandatory; (2) several of the defendants abandoned their interests by not strictly complying with the statute, and therefore, the district court erred in failing to terminate their interests; and (3) the district court correctly terminated the remaining mineral interests. View "Rice v. Bixler" on Justia Law