Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA) challenged certain regulations adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) requiring engine manufacturers to obtain a sample of emissions of in-use heavy-duty engines equipped with on-board diagnostic (OBD) systems that are nearing the end of their certified useful life and conduct a series of tests on these engines “to assure that engines certified for sale in California are equipped with OBD systems that properly function . . . .” The regulations at issue contained provisions requiring CARB to order the recall and repair of all engines that have been determined to be equipped with a non-conforming OBD system where certain conditions exist. EMA sought a judicial declaration that the challenged regulations were in excess of CARB’s statutory authority and therefore invalid. The trial court granted EMA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and declared the challenged regulations invalid. CARB appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed: the Legislature granted CARB broad authority to adopt regulations designed to reduce air pollution caused by motor vehicle emissions as expeditiously as possible, subject to cost-effectiveness and feasibility limitations. The challenged regulations fall within the scope of authority conferred by the Legislature unless manufacturer in-use testing of OBD systems on heavy-duty engines was prohibitively costly. The question of prohibitive cost could not be settled on the pleadings. The remaining question, whether the regulations were reasonably necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose, was not properly raised in EMA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court remanded remand the matter to the trial court with directions to deny EMA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. CA Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

After the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for its 2050 Regional Transportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy (transportation plan), CREED-2. The Affordable Housing Coalition of San Diego filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the EIR's adequacy under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Cleveland National Forest Foundation and the Center for Biological Diversity filed a similar petition, in which Sierra Club and the State of California later joined. The superior court granted the petitions in part, finding the EIR failed to carry out its role as an informational document because it did not analyze the inconsistency between the state's policy goals reflected in Executive Order S-3-05 and the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts after 2020. The court also found the EIR failed to adequately address mitigation measures for the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. Given these findings, the court declined to decide any of the other challenges raised in the petitions. SANDAG appealed, arguing the EIR complied with CEQA in both respects. Cleveland National Forest Foundation and Sierra Club (collectively, Cleveland) cross-appealed, arguing the EIR further violated CEQA by failing to analyze a reasonable range of project alternatives, failing to adequately analyze and mitigate the transportation plan's air quality impacts, and understating the transportation plan's impacts on agricultural lands. The State separately cross-appealed, arguing the EIR further violated CEQA by failing to adequately analyze and mitigate the transportation plan's impacts from particulate matter pollution. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the EIR failed to comply with CEQA in all identified respects. The Court modified the judgment to incorporate its decision on the cross-appeals and affirmed. View "Cleveland Nat. Forest v. San Diego Assn. of Gov." on Justia Law

This case raised the issue of whether Act 250 required consideration of alternative siting in every case in which a party objects to a proposed land-use project on aesthetic grounds, pursuant to 10 V.S.A. 6086(a)(8), without regard to the presence of competent evidence supporting alternative siting as a reasonable mitigating measure. Goddard College obtained an Act 250 permit from District Environmental Commission No. 5 in 2012, authorizing it to replace individual oil-fired systems in each of twenty-three campus buildings with a new central woodchip boiler system on its campus in Plainfield. Appellant-neighbor Karen Bouffard challenged the Superior Court's grant of the Act 250 permit, arguing that the court failed to properly consider measures to mitigate the aesthetic impact of the project by siting it elsewhere on the college property. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Goddard College Conditional Use, Goddard College Act 250 Reconsideration" on Justia Law

The Sacramento Kings have played at the Sleep Train Arena since 1988. In January 2013, the team’s then owners entered into a tentative agreement to sell the Sacramento Kings to a group of investors in Seattle, Washington. Seeking to keep the team in Sacramento, the City of Sacramento partnered with Sacramento Basketball Holdings LLC to build a new entertainment and sports center in downtown Sacramento at the site of a shopping mall with declining occupancy rates. In May 2013, the Board of Governors for the National Basketball Association (NBA) rejected an application to sell the team and move it to Seattle, and approved the sale of the team to Sacramento Basketball Holdings. The NBA’s board of governors also reserved the right to acquire the Sacramento Kings and relocate the team to another city if a new arena in Sacramento did not open by 2017. To meet the NBA’s deadline, the City and Sacramento Basketball Holdings developed a schedule that targeted October 2016 as the opening date for the downtown arena. To facilitate timely completion of the project, the Legislature added section 21168.6.6 to the Public Resources Code, which modified (only for construction of the downtown arena in Sacramento) several deadlines for review of the project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (sec. 21050 et seq.). Other than deadlines for review, section 21168.6.6 did not substantively modify CEQA as it applied to the downtown arena project. Adriana Saltonstall and 11 other individuals sued to challenge section 21168.6.6’s constitutionality as well as the project’s compliance with CEQA requirements. Saltonstall moved for a preliminary injunction on grounds of imminent harm to the public caused by the demolition of the shopping mall and construction of the downtown arena. The trial court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. She appealed the denial of the preliminary injunction, arguing: (1) section 21168.6.6 represents an unconstitutional intrusion of the legislative branch on the core function of the courts; and (2) the preliminary injunction should have been granted because section 21168.6.6 “harms [the public] and the environment,” but not the respondents. The Court of Appeal rejected Saltonstall’s constitutional challenge on the merits because section 21168.6.6 did not materially impair a core function of the courts. Moreover, CEQA review did not implicate any constitutionally granted right. View "Saltonstall v. City of Sacramento" on Justia Law

Alliance filed suit challenging the decision of the federal defendants, as well as MDOL, to permit recurring, low-altitude helicopter flights to haze bison in the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear Recovery Zone. Alliance alleged that the federal defendants and MDOL have violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq., because they have failed to undertake the proper procedures for reevaluating the effect of helicopter hazing on Yellowstone grizzly bears and have not issued an incidental take permit for the alleged harassment of Yellowstone grizzly bears. The court reversed the district court's holding that Alliance lacked standing to bring its ESA and NEPA claims; reversed the district court's ruling that Alliance failed to comply with the ESA citizen suit 60-day notice provision; affirmed the dismissal of all of Alliance's ESA claims against Inspection Service and FWS as they were not included in the 60-day notice on which Alliance relies; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and granted dismissal to MDOL on Alliance's ESA Section 7 claim as it is moot; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and granted dismissal to MDOL on Alliance's Section 9 claim where no genuine issues of material fact exist in the record concerning whether a take of a Yellowstone grizzly bear has occurred or is likely to occur; and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants on the NEPA and NFMA claims. View "Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. USDA" on Justia Law

Shell sought and obtained approval from the Bureau of two oil spill response plans, relating to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, required by the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321(j). After obtaining approval, Shell filed suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), against environmental organizations seeking a declaration that the Bureau's approval did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Shell lacked Article III standing where Shell does not have legal interests adverse to the Bureau under the APA and it may not file suit solely to determine who would prevail in a hypothetical suit between the environmental groups and the Bureau. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying the environmental groups' motion to dismiss. View "Shell Gulf of Mex. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity" on Justia Law

Alaska filed suit challenging the Forest Service's Roadless Rule in 2011. In 2001, the Forest Service adopted the Rule, which prohibited road construction, road reconstruction, and timber harvesting on millions of acres of national forest lands, including national forest land in Alaska. In 2005, the Forest Service repealed the Rule, but, in 2006, the District Court for the Northern District of California ordered reinstatement of the Rule. The court concluded that when the Rule was reinstated in 2006 after its repeal in 2005, a new right of action accrued. Under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), Alaska had six years from the time of the Rule's reinstatement in 2006 to file a lawsuit challenging the rule. Therefore, Alaska's suit is timely because it filed in 2011. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's complaint and remanded for further consideration. View "State of Alaska v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The Forest Service manages the Chatooga River under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA), 16 U.S.C. 1274 et seq. In 2012, the Forest Service revised its management plan for the Chatooga to allow floating on most of the Headwaters during the winter months, when flows are highest and conditions are best. American Whitewater argues that the revised plan does not go far enough and that the remaining limits on floating are inconsistent with the WSRA and arbitrary and capricious. Two intervening parties, ForestWatch and the Rusts, argue that the Forest Service's decision to allow floating goes too far, contending that the WSRA prohibits any floating on the Headwaters whatsoever, and that the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court agreed with the district court's well-reasoned opinion where the district court rejected both sets of challenges and found that the Forest Service's revised plan carefully balanced the wide-ranging interests advocated by the several parties and participants. The court affirmed the judgment. View "American Whitewater v. Thomas Tidwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Albert Thomas Paulek appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). He sought a writ to direct defendant-respondent California Department of Water Resources (Department) to vacate its approval of the final environmental impact report (EIR) with respect to the Perris Dam Remediation Project. In its draft EIR, the Department proposed three activities: (1) remediating structural deficiencies in the Perris Dam, (2) replacing the facility’s outlet tower, and (3) creating a new “Emergency Outlet Extension.” In response to comments on the draft EIR, the emergency outlet extension was split off into a separate environmental review process, and the final EIR at issue considers only dam remediation and outlet tower replacement. Paulek argued on appeal that the lack of an emergency outlet extension constituted a significant environmental impact that the project as finally approved failed to mitigate, and that the separation of the emergency outlet extension into a different project constitutes impermissible segmentation. He further contended that the Department did not adequately respond to written comments submitted by “Friends of the Northern San Jacinto Valley,” an organization of which Paulek was the “Conservation Chair.” Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that Paulek had standing, and found no abuse of discretion in its denial of the petition on its merits. View "Paulek v. CA Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

NRDC appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, arguing that defendants violated the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., by failing to properly evaluate and disclose the potential environmental impact of a planned expressway connecting the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The court concluded that the governing regulations do not decisively answer whether the CAA required qualitative hot-spot analysis within the immediate vicinity of the project area during the time period at issue; the EPA and DOT's Conformity Guidance implicitly, but authoritatively, fills the void by interpreting these ambiguous regulations to permit the type of analysis defendants performed here; and having concluded that the agencies' interpretation of the appropriate hot-spot analysis governs, it is clear that defendants' Conformity Determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Because the court was satisfied that defendants took a "hard look" at the Project's likely consequences and probable alternatives, the court agreed with the district court that the environmental impact statement comported with NEPA requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "NRDC V. USDOT" on Justia Law