Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

TAP filed suit against TCEQ under the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., seeking an injunction prohibiting TCEQ from issuing new permits to withdraw water from rivers that feed the estuary where whooping cranes make their winter homes. The district court granted the injunction, which also required TCEQ to seek an incidental-take permit (ITP) from the FWS. Because the deaths of the whooping cranes are too remote from TCEQ's permitting withdrawal of water from the San Antonio and Guadalupe Rivers, the state defendants could not be held liable for a take or for causing a take under the Act. The court concluded that the district court misapplied proximate cause analysis and, even if proximate cause had been proven, the injunction was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.View "The Aransas Project v. Shaw, et al." on Justia Law

The city of Jersey City and a coalition of environmental groups filed separate petitions challenging FERC's order granting a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction of a natural gas pipeline connecting New York and New Jersey. The court concluded that it could not consider the merits of the petitions where the environmental petitioners lacked Article III standing as an association; the court did not have original jurisdiction over claims arising from the Budget Act, Pub.L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251; and the court rejected the City's remaining standing claims. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions for lack of jurisdiction.View "NO Gas Pipeline v. FERC" on Justia Law

This matter comprised two joined cases, both involving claims to water diverted from the South Fork of Dupuyer Creek in Two Medicine River Basin, into Gansman Coulee, for irrigation in the Teton River Basin. Two sets of claimants (“Duncan” and “Skelton”) filed statements of claim for existing rights. A canal and reservoir company (“Pondera”) appeared in the adjudication of Duncan’s and Skelton’s claims. The Montana Water Court amended the Water Master’s Report and adopted it as amended. Duncan and Skelton appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Chief Water Judge properly admitted historical documents prepared by Pondera in anticipation of litigation under the ancient document exception to the hearsay rule; (2) the Chief Water Judge correctly rejected the Master’s findings regarding certain variables used to determine the historical capacity of a flume on the Thomas ditch; (3) the Chief Water Judge correctly determined that portions of the claimants’ water rights had been abandoned or never perfected; and (4) the Chief Water Judge correctly adopted the Master’s conclusion that the claimants did not acquire any water rights by adverse possession. View "Skelton Ranch, Inc. v. Pondera County Canal & Reservoir Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of the EPA's rule exempting from regulation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., certain hazardous residuals left over from the petroleum refining process (the Gasification Exclusion Rule). The court held that petitioners had standing; their petitions for review were timely; and the Gasification Exclusion Rule violates the plain statutory text of section 6924(q). Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review in No. 08-1145 and granted the petitions for review Nos. 08-1144 and 12-1295. The court vacated the Gasification Exclusion Rule.View "Sierra Club, et al. v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners sought review of a portion of a 1998 EPA rule creating a "Comparable Fuels Exclusion" from regulation under section 3004(q) of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6924(q). The court concluded that Environmental Petitioners have met their burden of demonstrating standing on behalf of their members. The court concluded that the Exclusion is inconsistent with the plain language of section 6924(q), which requires that EPA establish standards applicable to all fuel derived hazardous waste. Accordingly, the court granted the petitions for review and vacated the Exclusion. However, Environmental Technology Council lacked a cause of action and the court denied its petition for review. View "NRDC and Sierra Club v. EPA, et al." on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Wyoming Public Records Act, Plaintiff requested from the Office of the Governor and the Wyoming Game & Fish Department (together, the State) documents related to the status of grizzly bears under the Endangered Species Act. The State provided some documents and withheld others on grounds of the deliberative process privilege and the attorney-client communication privilege. The district court held (1) the Act incorporates the deliberative process privilege as a ground to exempt documents from disclosure under the Act, and the documents withheld under the deliberative process privilege were properly withheld by the State; and (2) two of the three documents withheld under the attorney-client privilege were properly withheld. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s ruling with respect to the documents withheld under the attorney-client privilege; (2) affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Act incorporates the deliberate process privilege; but (3) concluded that some of the documents withheld pursuant to the deliberative process privilege were not properly withheld because they were outside the scope of the privilege’s protection. View "Aland v. Mead" on Justia Law

Asarco appealed from the district court's dismissal of its Second Amended Complaint. As part of its Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court approved two settlement agreements related to the environmental contamination of the Everett Smelter and the Monte Cristo Mining area in Washington State. Asarco paid the United States as a result of those settlements and the Port of Everett $50.2 million for costs related to the remediation of the sites. Asarco then sought contribution, directly and as a purported subrogee, from the Trustees of the residuary trust created by the will of John D. Rockefeller Sr. in 1937. At issue was whether, in 2014, the Trustees may be made to contribute to cleanup costs of environmental contamination allegedly caused by corporations controlled by Rockefeller in Washington State between 1892 and 1903. Assuming arguendo that New York law permitted the imposition of liability on testamentary beneficiaries in this instance, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed Asarco's contribution claims because they were barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations, and its subrogation claims because Asarco was not a subrogee. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.View "Asarco LLC v. Goodwin" on Justia Law

US Oil Sands, Inc. applied for a discharge permit from the Utah Board of Water Quality (BWQ) for its tar sands bitumen-extraction project. In 2008, the BWQ issued the discharge permit. The 2008 decision was reaffirmed by the Executive Secretary in 2011. Living Rivers, an environmental advocacy organization, intervened and sought administrative review of the Secretary’s decision. The BWQ affirmed the issuance of the 2008 permit on its merits. Living Rivers petitioned for review of the BWQ’s decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because was no timely challenge to the 2008 decision, the original permit was final and not subject to further challenge on the merits.View "Living Rivers v. Utah Div. of Water Quality" on Justia Law

The issues on appeal to the Tenth Circuit in this case stem from pollution at a four-square-mile area in Denver where Debtor-ASARCO, Union Pacific Railroad Company, and Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Company., Inc. all operated facilities. All companies allegedly contributed to the release of hazardous substances at the site. The Environmental Protection Agency brought a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) action against debtor-ASARCO which was pending when the company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The EPA filed proofs of claim in the bankruptcy case seeking recovery of ASARCO's portion of the cleaning expenses. ASARCO moved to settle the claims to resolve its CERCLA liabilities. ASARCO sought contribution from Union Pacific and Pepsi. The district court ruled: (1) that ASARCO's direct contribution claim was time-barred under CERCLA section 113 (42 U.S.C. ß 9613); (2) that post-bankruptcy ASARCO was not a subrogee of pre-bankruptcy ASARCO; (3) and that ASARCO could not bring a subrogation claim. ASARCO appealed all three of these rulings. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.View "Asarco LLC v. Union Pacific, et al" on Justia Law

A mineral lessee operated two wells on two contiguous tracts of land. When one of the wells stopped producing, the lessee pooled parts of the two mineral leases. Landowners subsequently bought a tract of land that included the road the lessee used to access the producing well. The road was across the surface of the lease without production. After traffic on the road increased, the landowners filed suit against the lessee, claiming that the lessee had no legal right to use the surface of their tract of land to produce minerals from the operating well. The trial court determined that the lessee did not have the right to use the road to access the producing lease and granted declaratory and injunctive relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) once pooling occurred, the pooled parts of the two contiguous tracts no longer maintained separate identities insofar as where production from the pooled interests was located; and (2) therefore, the lessee had the right to use the road to access the pooled part of the tract of land containing the producing well.View "Key Operating & Equip., Inc. v. Hegar" on Justia Law