Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

In an effort to comply with the Clean Air Act, three states (New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming), one city (Albuquerque), and one county (Bernalillo County) adopted a regional cap-and-trade program regulating sulfur-dioxide emissions over the Colorado Plateau. New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, the City of Albuquerque, and Bernalillo County persuaded the EPA that the trading program would yield better results than the EPA's own compliance standards (referred to as "BART"). Five environmental groups filed petitions for review, arguing that the EPA should not have approved the trading program. Concluding that the EPA's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the petitions for review. View "WildEarth Guardians v. EPA" on Justia Law

Passadumkeag Windpark, LLC (PW) sought approval to construct a wind farm on property owned by Penobscot Forest, LLC (PF) located in Grand Falls Township. The Department of Environmental Protection denied the requested permit. On review, the Board of Environmental Protection (Board) granted the permit. Passadumkeag Mountain Friends (PMF), a Maine nonprofit corporation, and Alexander and Rhonda Cuprak appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Board, holding (1) the decision of the Board was operative for purposes of appellate review; (2) the Board’s findings and conclusion were supported by substantial evidence in the record; and (3) certain communications between the Board, PW, and PF during the application process did not affect the Cupraks’ due process rights. View "Passadumkeag Mountain Friends v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Headwaters Resources, Inc. carried commercial liability insurance issued by two insurance companies: Illinois Union Insurance Company and ACE American Insurance Company. Headwaters sought reimbursement for its litigation costs arising from a case brought by landowners in Virginia, alleging that Headwaters had caused personal injury and property damage during the construction of a nearby golf course. The complaint alleged that fly ash used in the construction process caused air and water pollution that devalued their homes and created health risks to the homeowners. The insurance companies told Headwaters that defense costs related to Headwaters’ pollution were outside the scope of the coverage and denied the claim. Headwaters sued, and the district court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies, finding that the pollution exclusions in the insurance policies precluded coverage. Jurisdictions that have addressed the scope of a "total pollution exclusion" were either: (1) courts that applied the pollution exclusions as written because they find them clear and unmistakable; or (2) courts that narrowed the exclusions to "traditional environmental pollution," because they found the terms of the exclusion to be ambiguous due to their broad applicability. The Utah Supreme Court had not yet weighed in on this debate, and the federal district court did not pick a side on its behalf. Instead, the district court found that certain of the at-issue pollution exclusions unambiguously applied to bar coverage and that the remaining pollution exclusions, although possibly ambiguous, still applied because the complaints unquestionably alleged traditional environmental pollution. As a result, the complaints triggered the pollution exclusions in all of the policies, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance companies. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that each of the pollution exclusions was unambiguous, and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Headwaters Resources v. Illinois Union Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, the Lower Teton Joint Objectors, water users who hold appropriation rights from the lower Teton River in Chouteau County, commenced an action claiming that the Water Commissioners’ practice of diverting water out of the natural channel of the Teton River and into the Bateman Ditch harmed their appropriation rights by depriving the Teton River aquifer of recharge water. The Water Master issued a report regarding the Bateman Ditch, and the Water Judge issued an “Order Amending Master’s Report and Adopting as Amended.” The Objectors and intervenor Patrick Saylor appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Water Court erred by concluding that the Bateman Ditch diversion to supply water to Choteau Cattle Company is a private right held by Saylor; and (2) the Water Court acted properly in listing the water rights that can be diverted through the Bateman Ditch. View "Eldorado Co-op Canal Co., Lower Teton Joint Objectors" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the NPS's enforcement of a regulation banning the operation of hovercrafts on the Nation River. Alaska intervened, challenging the NPS's authority to require its researchers to obtain a permit before engaging in studies on the Alagnak River. Plaintiff and Alaska argued that section 103(c) of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act precludes NPS from regulating activities on state-owned lands and navigable waters that fall within the boundaries of National Park System units in Alaska. The district court granted summary judgment to appellees. The court concluded that plaintiff had Article III standing, but that his interpretation of section 103(c) is foreclosed by the plain text of the statute. NPS's hovercraft ban applies to federally owned lands and waters administered by NPS nationwide, as well as navigable waters within national parks. The court rejected plaintiff's two additional arguments, that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority in promulgating the regulation at issue and that her action raises serious constitutional concerns. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to plaintiff. The court held that Alaska lacked standing to bring its challenge and vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Sturgeon v. Masica" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the surface owner of various tracts of land in Sioux County, sued the alleged owners of severed mineral interests in those tracts, claiming that the defendants abandoned their interests because they did not comply with the requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. 57-229 by failing to exercise publicly the right of ownership of the severed mineral interests. All of the defendants filed verified claims to the mineral interests prior to the action filed by Plaintiff. The district court concluded (1) the alleged mineral owners had either strictly complied or substantially complied with the requirements of section 57-229; and (2) the alleged mineral owners had not forfeited their mineral interests, except for one of the claims, which was terminated. Rice appealed, and two of the defendants cross-appealed as to the mineral interests that were terminated. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) strict compliance with section 57-229 is mandatory; (2) several of the defendants abandoned their interests by not strictly complying with the statute, and therefore, the district court erred in failing to terminate their interests; and (3) the district court correctly terminated the remaining mineral interests. View "Rice v. Bixler" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two conservation groups, brought two citizen enforcement suits alleging that endangered fish pass through the turbines of four hydroelectric dams operated by Defendants on the Kennebec River, resulting in injury and death to some of the fish. Among their claims, Plaintiffs contended that the Defendants were in violation of the Clean Water Act (CWA) because they had not conducted “site-specific qualitative studies” in accordance with a settlement agreement Defendants entered into in 1998 with various federal and state agencies. The studies are required if Defendants “desire” passage of the endangered fish through the turbines. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants as to the CWA claims in both cases. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s rulings on the narrow procedural grounds that the court failed to consider all relevant evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Remanded. View "Friends of Merrymeeting Bay v. Hydro Kennebec, LLC" on Justia Law

The linkage of the Mississippi River system to the Great Lakes and the effort to control weeds in southern aquatic farms by importing Asian carp, a voracious non-native fish, have combined to create a situation in which two species of carp have overwhelmed the Mississippi River and its tributaries and threaten to migrate into the Great Lakes. Plaintiffs, five states bordering the Great Lakes and an Indian tribe assert that the Asian carp either will soon invade, or perhaps already have invaded, the Great Lakes and are poised to inflict billions of dollars of damage on the ecosystem. Plaintiffs sued the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, seeking a preliminary injunction that would require aggressive interim measures to maximize the chances of preventing the spread of the carp. The district court denied that motion; the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court then dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the plaintiffs did not allege facts showing that the Corps and the District are operating in a manner that is likely to allow the Asian carp to reach Lake Michigan. View "State of Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the EPA seeking declaratory relief in connection with its administrative enforcement proceedings against her. CBF moved to intervene but the district court denied the motion as untimely. The court concluded that when CBF moved to intervene, the proceedings had already reached a relatively advanced stage. Further, CBF conceded that its belated intervention would cause some delay and would require plaintiffs to expend "extra effort." CBF's deliberate forbearance understandably engendered little sympathy. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to intervene.View "Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Alt" on Justia Law

In 2006, Plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), agreeing to pay for a study of an Ohio landfill site and to reimburse the government’s response costs in exchange for a partial resolution of liability. About four years later, Plaintiffs filed the first of two actions under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), both codified at 42 U.S.C. 9601–9675, and Ohio common law of unjust enrichment, seeking to recover costs or gain contribution from other entities responsible for the contamination. In 2012, Plaintiffs brought another case, alleging the same three causes of action, against additional defendants. In both cases, the district court dismissed the section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution claims as untimely and dismissed the unjust-enrichment claims for failing to state a valid cause of action. The court allowed limited discovery on the section107(a)(4)(B) cost-recovery claims but, ultimately, granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that CERCLA and controlling case law prohibit a party that has entered a liability-resolving settlement agreement with the government from prosecuting such an action. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.View "Hobart Corp. v. Coca-Cola Enters, Inc." on Justia Law