Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Alliance filed suit challenging the decision of the federal defendants, as well as MDOL, to permit recurring, low-altitude helicopter flights to haze bison in the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear Recovery Zone. Alliance alleged that the federal defendants and MDOL have violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq., because they have failed to undertake the proper procedures for reevaluating the effect of helicopter hazing on Yellowstone grizzly bears and have not issued an incidental take permit for the alleged harassment of Yellowstone grizzly bears. The court reversed the district court's holding that Alliance lacked standing to bring its ESA and NEPA claims; reversed the district court's ruling that Alliance failed to comply with the ESA citizen suit 60-day notice provision; affirmed the dismissal of all of Alliance's ESA claims against Inspection Service and FWS as they were not included in the 60-day notice on which Alliance relies; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and granted dismissal to MDOL on Alliance's ESA Section 7 claim as it is moot; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and granted dismissal to MDOL on Alliance's Section 9 claim where no genuine issues of material fact exist in the record concerning whether a take of a Yellowstone grizzly bear has occurred or is likely to occur; and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants on the NEPA and NFMA claims. View "Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. USDA" on Justia Law

Shell sought and obtained approval from the Bureau of two oil spill response plans, relating to the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas, required by the Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. 1321(j). After obtaining approval, Shell filed suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201(a), against environmental organizations seeking a declaration that the Bureau's approval did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 501 et seq. The court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because Shell lacked Article III standing where Shell does not have legal interests adverse to the Bureau under the APA and it may not file suit solely to determine who would prevail in a hypothetical suit between the environmental groups and the Bureau. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's order denying the environmental groups' motion to dismiss. View "Shell Gulf of Mex. v. Ctr. for Biological Diversity" on Justia Law

Alaska filed suit challenging the Forest Service's Roadless Rule in 2011. In 2001, the Forest Service adopted the Rule, which prohibited road construction, road reconstruction, and timber harvesting on millions of acres of national forest lands, including national forest land in Alaska. In 2005, the Forest Service repealed the Rule, but, in 2006, the District Court for the Northern District of California ordered reinstatement of the Rule. The court concluded that when the Rule was reinstated in 2006 after its repeal in 2005, a new right of action accrued. Under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), Alaska had six years from the time of the Rule's reinstatement in 2006 to file a lawsuit challenging the rule. Therefore, Alaska's suit is timely because it filed in 2011. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's complaint and remanded for further consideration. View "State of Alaska v. Department of Agriculture" on Justia Law

The Forest Service manages the Chatooga River under the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA), 16 U.S.C. 1274 et seq. In 2012, the Forest Service revised its management plan for the Chatooga to allow floating on most of the Headwaters during the winter months, when flows are highest and conditions are best. American Whitewater argues that the revised plan does not go far enough and that the remaining limits on floating are inconsistent with the WSRA and arbitrary and capricious. Two intervening parties, ForestWatch and the Rusts, argue that the Forest Service's decision to allow floating goes too far, contending that the WSRA prohibits any floating on the Headwaters whatsoever, and that the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court agreed with the district court's well-reasoned opinion where the district court rejected both sets of challenges and found that the Forest Service's revised plan carefully balanced the wide-ranging interests advocated by the several parties and participants. The court affirmed the judgment. View "American Whitewater v. Thomas Tidwell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Albert Thomas Paulek appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of mandate under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). He sought a writ to direct defendant-respondent California Department of Water Resources (Department) to vacate its approval of the final environmental impact report (EIR) with respect to the Perris Dam Remediation Project. In its draft EIR, the Department proposed three activities: (1) remediating structural deficiencies in the Perris Dam, (2) replacing the facility’s outlet tower, and (3) creating a new “Emergency Outlet Extension.” In response to comments on the draft EIR, the emergency outlet extension was split off into a separate environmental review process, and the final EIR at issue considers only dam remediation and outlet tower replacement. Paulek argued on appeal that the lack of an emergency outlet extension constituted a significant environmental impact that the project as finally approved failed to mitigate, and that the separation of the emergency outlet extension into a different project constitutes impermissible segmentation. He further contended that the Department did not adequately respond to written comments submitted by “Friends of the Northern San Jacinto Valley,” an organization of which Paulek was the “Conservation Chair.” Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that Paulek had standing, and found no abuse of discretion in its denial of the petition on its merits. View "Paulek v. CA Dept. of Water Resources" on Justia Law

NRDC appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, arguing that defendants violated the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., by failing to properly evaluate and disclose the potential environmental impact of a planned expressway connecting the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. The court concluded that the governing regulations do not decisively answer whether the CAA required qualitative hot-spot analysis within the immediate vicinity of the project area during the time period at issue; the EPA and DOT's Conformity Guidance implicitly, but authoritatively, fills the void by interpreting these ambiguous regulations to permit the type of analysis defendants performed here; and having concluded that the agencies' interpretation of the appropriate hot-spot analysis governs, it is clear that defendants' Conformity Determination was neither arbitrary nor capricious. Because the court was satisfied that defendants took a "hard look" at the Project's likely consequences and probable alternatives, the court agreed with the district court that the environmental impact statement comported with NEPA requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "NRDC V. USDOT" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680, against the United States, alleging that they experienced various health problems after being exposed to toxic substances in the drinking water while living at Camp Lejeune, a military base in North Carolina. The United States argued that the North Carolina statute of repose, N.C. Gen. Stat. 1-52(16), precluded plaintiffs from bringing the case. The district court disagreed and certified two questions for interlocutory appeal. The court held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9568, does not preempt North Carolina's statute of repose. The court also held that North Carolina's statute of repose applies to plaintiffs' claims and does not contain an exception for latent diseases. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Bryant, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) issued Frontier Fishing a notice of violation and assessment and a notice of permit sanction after determining that Frontier Fishing was liable for trawling in a restricted gear area in violation of regulations promulgated under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishing Conservation and Management Act. Frontier Fishing denied liability. On appeal, Frontier Fishing argued that the record lacked substantial evidence for a rational finding that its vessel trawled in the restricted area. The district court upheld the NOAA Administrator’s final decision. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that substantial evidence supported the NOAA’s finding. View "Frontier Fishing Corp. v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA) court decision on whether Idaho law required a remark authorizing storage rights to "refill,"under priority, space vacated for flood control. The SRBA court concluded that a remark was not necessary because a storage water right that is filled cannot refill under priority before affected junior appropriators satisfy their water rights once. The court declined to address when the quantity element of a storage water right is considered filled. Seven Magic Valley irrigation districts and canal companies (collectively the "Surface Water Coalition") appealed this decision in Docket No. 40974. The Boise Project Board appealed this decision in Docket No. 40975. Because both cases appealed the same decision of the SRBA court and had significant overlap, the Supreme Court addressed them together in this opinion, and held that the SRBA court abused its discretion in designating the question of whether Idaho law required remark as Basin-Wide Issue 17. The SRBA court did not abuse its discretion by declining to address when the quantity element of a storage water right is considered filled or in stating that such a determination was within the Director's discretion. View "In re: SRBA" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek vacatur of OSHA's Final Rule revising its Hazard Communication Standard requiring employers across industries to develop a program for classifying the dangers of workplace chemicals and conveying those dangers to their employees. Petitioners, businesses that handle and process grain and other agricultural products, and others, seek vacatur of the Final Rule as it applies to combustible dust. The court concluded that petitioners had express notice that combustible dust, however labeled, would be subject to the relevant requirements of the Final Rule; there was substantial evidence and an adequate explanation to support OSHA's decision to incorporate an interim definition of "combustible dust" and guidance until a more precise definitions is implemented in another rulemaking; petitioners' facial vagueness challenge is ripe for review; and on the merits, however, the vagueness claim fails because the Final Rule satisfies due process where the term "combustible dust" is clear enough to provide fair warning of enforcement, and OSHA has provided additional guidance on how the revised Hazard Communication Standard will be enforced. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Nat'l Oilseed Processors Assoc. v. OSHA" on Justia Law