Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from plaintiff-appellant Leona Kuhn's improper disposal of debris from her house in the Napoleon city dump in late June 2013, after her house had been severely damaged by fire. The City of Napoleon maintains an "inert waste landfill" for its residents, located about two miles southeast of the city. The landfill was subject to the North Dakota Department of Health's rules and regulations, which permits only certain types of garbage in the landfill sorted into separate piles, some of which is burned or buried under the regulations. Kuhn appealed a district court judgment entered after an appeal from a municipal court conviction finding her guilty of violating a City ordinance for improperly disposing of refuse, and a subsequent court order denying her request for a written restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, concluding sufficient evidence supported Kuhn's conviction, but reversed Kuhn's sentence and remanded for clarification. View "City of Napoleon v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

The Tussing Road Water Reclamation Facility in Fairfield County is required to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act from the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Ohio EPA). The Fairfield County Board of Commissioners challenged the validity of new phosphorus limitations added on to the Tussing Road plant’s renewed NPDES permit, alleging that Ohio EPA ignored the administrative rulemaking procedures required by the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act (the Act) and imposed the new limits solely on a federally approved total maximum daily load (TMDL) report previously issued for the watershed in question. Specifically, the County contended that it should have had a full and fair opportunity to be heard and the right to review and challenge the TMDL before it was submitted to United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). The Court of Appeals vacated the NPDES phosphorus limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a TMDL established by Ohio EPA is a rule that is subject to the requirements of the Act, and therefore, Ohio EPA must follow the rulemaking procedure in the Act before submitting a TMDL to U.S. EPA for its approval and before the TMDL may be implemented in an NPDES permit. View "Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Nally" on Justia Law

St. Marys makes portland cement at a plant in Charlevoix. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment deemed the plant’s pollution controls sufficient and excused St. Marys from the retrofitting requirement under the Clean Air Act’s Regional Haze Rule, 40 C.F.R. 51.308–.309, which requires the states to determine which facilities within their borders create visibility-impairing pollutants that may “be emitted and transported downwind” to a federal park or wilderness area. States then must decide which of those sources are eligible for “Best Available Retrofit Technology.” The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency disagreed with the state and required the plant to add more stringent pollution controls. The Second Circuit upheld the EPA decision, rejecting challenges to EPA’s scientific and technological assertions concerning the plant’s nitrous oxide emissions, and a claim that St. Marys was exempt from the retrofitting requirement. View "St. Marys Cement Inc. v. Envtl. Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Black Warrior Riverkeeper and Defenders of Wildlife appealed a district court’s grant of final summary judgment to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as well as to the Alabama Coal Association and several other intervenor mining companies. Riverkeeper challenges the 2012 version of Nationwide Permit 21 (“NWP 21”), a general permit that allowed surface coal mining operations to discharge dredged or fill materials into navigable waters. Riverkeeper argued that the Corps arbitrarily and capriciously found that NWP 21 would have no more than minimal environmental effects, in violation of both the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. After deciding Riverkeeper has standing to sue, the district court held that Riverkeeper’s lawsuit was, nonetheless, barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. After thorough review, however, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the intervenors have shown neither inexcusable delay on the part of Riverkeeper nor prejudice resulting from Riverkeeper’s alleged delay. To the extent that Riverkeeper lagged in filing suit, its delay was slight and excused by its need to adequately investigate and prepare its claims in this complex case. Moreover, the Intervenors’ modest showing of harm, stated only at the highest order of abstraction, does not outweigh the potential environmental benefits of allowing Riverkeeper to proceed. As for the merits of Riverkeeper’s environmental claims, the district court concluded, after thorough deliberation, that the Corps’ determinations that NWP 21 would have only “minimal cumulative adverse effect” on the environment, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, and “no significant impact” on the environment, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, were neither arbitrary nor capricious. However, literally on the eve of oral argument before the Eleventh Circuit, the Corps admitted that it had underestimated the acreage of waters that would be affected by the projects authorized under the permit. In the face of this change in facts, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the implications of the Corps’ error. The Corps then conceded that the district court’s decision must be reversed and the matter remanded to the Corps for further consideration based on a more accurate assessment of the potential impacts of NWP 21. The Eleventh Circuit agreed. View "Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, et al" on Justia Law

In the early 1980s, Georgia Power Company sold a number of its used electrical transformers to Ward Transformer Company (Ward). Because the electrical transformers contained toxic compounds that have been banned since 1979, Ward repaired and rebuilt the transformers for resale to meet third-party customers’ specifications. In the process, one of Ward’s facilities in Raleigh, North Carolina (the Ward Site) became contaminated. In the 2000s, the EPA initiated a costly removal action at the Ward Site. Consolidated Coal Company and PCS Phosphate Company, Inc. each paid more than $17 million in cleanup costs related to the Ward Site. In 2008 and 2009, they filed complaints under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act against Georgia Power alleging that, as supplier of some of the transformers to Ward, Georgia Power should be liable for a contribution to those costs. The district court granted summary judgment for Georgia Power. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the circumstances of the transformer sales did not indicate Georgia Power’s intent to dispose of the toxic compounds and therefore did not support arranger liability. View "Consolidation Coal Co. v. Georgia Power Co." on Justia Law

In July 2000, the Illinois Attorney General, on his own motion and at the request of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA), filed a complaint against JTE and Tri-State, alleging operation of a solid waste disposal site on 40 acres in Lynwood that had operated as a sand pit, without a permit, in violation of the Environmental Protection Act, 415 ILCS 5/1. The underlying individual owners were later added to the suit. The site was operational from 1995 until 2003. After several years of litigation, the circuit court ruled in the state’s favor, holding that defendants had violated the Act by engaging in open dumping and by permitting the deposit of construction and demolition debris waste above grade without a permit. Monetary penalties were imposed on each defendant. The court also ordered defendants to remove any and all material deposited above grade at the site. The appellate court affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed as to liability, but vacated the injunction, finding that section 42(e) of the Act may not be applied retroactively in this case. At the time the site was operational, the only injunctive relief available was prohibitory, that is, the restraint of future violations. View "Madigan v. J.T. Einoder, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the Environmental Law Foundation (ELF), filed a complaint against Beech-Nut Nutrition Corporation and various other food manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, seeking enforcement of the provisions of the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (commonly referred to as Proposition 65). ELF alleged certain of defendants’ products contain toxic amounts of lead sufficient to trigger the duty to provide warnings to consumers. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, concluding they had no duty to warn because they satisfactorily demonstrated that the average consumer’s reasonably anticipated rate of exposure to lead from their products fell below relevant regulatory thresholds. ELF appealed that ruling, but finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Environmental Law Found. v. Beech-Nut Nutrition" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Environmental Protection Agency determined that the Cincinnati-Hamilton metropolitan area had attained national air quality standards for particulate matter (Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7409), largely because of regional cap-and-trade programs that had reduced the flow of interstate pollution. EPA redesignated the area to “attainment” status even though the three states that administer its pollution controls had never implemented particular provisions, known as “reasonably available control measures” (RACM) applicable to nonattainment areas. Sierra Club challenged both actions. The Sixth Circuit vacated redesignation of the Ohio and Indiana portions of the Cincinnati area, first holding that the Club had standing. A State seeking redesignation “shall provide for the implementation” of RACM/RACT, even if those measures are not strictly necessary to demonstrate attainment, 42 U.S.C. 7502(c)(1). If the state has not done so, EPA cannot fully approve the area’s SIP, and redesignation to attainment status is improper. View "Sierra Club v. Envtl. Protection Agency" on Justia Law

The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved of the South Coast Air Quality Management District’s Rule 317 as a revision to California’s State Implementation Plan for the Clean Air Act (CAA). The EPA approved the Rule pursuant to section 172(e) of the CAA - the so-called “anti-backsliding” provision - which allows for not less stringent alternative controls, finding that the pollution controls the Rule imposed were not less stringent than section 185 of the CAA. In its analysis, the EPA interpreted the statute to mean that the CAA’s anti-backsliding provisions apply when air quality standards have been strengthened as well as when they have been relaxed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the EPA reasonably found that section 172(e) contained an ambiguous gap; (2) the EPA’s interpretation of the ambiguity was reasonable; and (3) EPA’s approval of Rule 317 as an alternative program was proper. View "Natural Res. Defense Counsel v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

The Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) extends roughly 200 miles into the ocean to the limit of U.S. international-law jurisdiction. Billions of barrels of oil and trillions of cubic feet of natural gas lie beneath the OCS. Concerns about ecological vulnerability and potential harm to coastal tourism led to moratoriums on OCS drilling from 1982 until they were partially lifted in 2009. In 2010, the Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster renewed debate about the safety of offshore drilling, but energy companies remain interested in offshore drilling. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) created a framework for exploration and extraction of OCS oil and gas deposits. It requires the Secretary of the Interior to prepare a program every five years with a schedule of proposed leases for OCS resource exploration and development; the program must balance competing economic, social, and environmental values, 43 U.S.C. 1344. CSE challenged the latest leasing program as failing to comply with Section 18(a), which governs the balancing of competing economic, social, and environmental values; quantifying and assessing environmental and ecological impact; and ensuring equitable distribution of benefits and costs between OCS regions and stakeholders. CSE claimed that the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement violated National Environmental Policy Act procedural requirements by using a biased analytic methodology and providing inadequate opportunities for public comment. The D.C. Circuit denied CSE’s petition. While CSE had associational standing to petition for review, its NEPA claims are unripe; two other challenges were forfeited and remaining challenges failed on their merits. View "Ctr. for Sustainable Econ. v. Jewell" on Justia Law