Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Visteon, a worldwide manufacturer headquartered in Michigan, sued National Union, from which it had purchased liability insurance between 2000 and 2002. The policy excluded liability resulting from pollution caused by Visteon, except liability arising from a “Completed Operations Hazard.” In 2001, the toxic solvent TCE that was used to clean machinery in Visteon’s Connersville, Indiana plant was discovered to have leaked into the soil and groundwater. Neighboring landowners sued Visteon. National Union has refused to indemnify or defend. Indiana does not enforce standard pollution-exclusion clauses. Michigan law does enforce the more general kind of pollution-exclusion clause found in the policy. The district court ruled that Michigan law governed and held that Visteon was not entitled to coverage under the Completed Operations Hazard clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The risk materialized in Indiana, but that could not have been foreseen. The Indiana victims were compensated by Visteon, and it is unclear what benefit the state would have derived from reimbursement of Visteon’s costs by National Union.” The court rejected Visteon’s argument that its “work” was “completed” each time a contract to supply products made at the plant was performed and concluded that the exception did not apply. View "Visteon Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

After issuing an environmental impact statement (EIS), the National Park Service adopted a plan for the management of deer in Rock Creek National Park in Washington, D.C. The plan involved the killing of white-tailed deer. Objectors argued that the plan violated statutes governing management of the Park and was not adopted in compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the EIS did not meet the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed. Noting that the Organic Act expressly provides that the Secretary of the Interior “may also provide in his discretion for the destruction of such animals and of such plant life as may be detrimental to the use of any said parks, monuments, or reservations,” so that the agency’s interpretation of its enabling act is reasonable. Given the impact of deer on plant life and vehicle collisions, the decision is not arbitrary. Finding no violation of NEPA, the court concluded that the EIS was not required to consider the psychological harm that some visitors may suffer from simply knowing that the intentional killing of deer happens at Rock Creek Park. View "Grunewald v. Jarvis" on Justia Law

Borg Warner appealed the district court's determination that it is liable to Vine Street for 75% of the costs associated with cleaning up a plume of perchlorethylene (PERC) that discharged from a dry cleaning business under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3), and the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA), Tex. Health & Safety Code 361.271(a)(3). The liability was associated with a former subsidiary of Borg Warner, Norge, which furnished dry cleaning equipment, design assistance, and an initial supply of PERC to the cleaning business. The court concluded that Borg Warner is entitled to judgment in its favor on the CERCLA and TSWDA claims because Norge did not intentional y dispose of a waste product when it sold dry cleaning equipment and an initial supply of PERC to the dry cleaning business. The court noted that the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States changed the relevant law while this case was on appeal. Therefore, the court held that the district court's decision cannot stand in light of Burlington Northern. View "Vine Street LLC v. Keeling" on Justia Law

The subject property was two large parcels of land in the Town of Manchester. Sand, rock, and gravel had been extracted from a portion of one or both parcels for decades. In September 1990, respondents' predecessor-in-interest received an Act 250 permit authorizing a nineteen-lot residential subdivision on the northern parcel. Among other conditions, the Act 250 permit provided that it would expire one year from the date of issuance if the permittee had not demonstrated an intention to proceed with the project in accordance with 10 V.S.A. 6091(b), and otherwise would expire on October 1, 2020 unless extended by the District Environmental Commission. Other permit conditions prohibited any "changes . . . in the design or use" of the project without written approval of the district coordinator or commission, and specified that the permit and all conditions therein would "run with the land and . . . be binding upon and enforceable against . . . all assigns and successors in interest." In September 1992, the district commission issued an amendment to the permit extending the time for construction of the project to October 1994. In June 1994, respondent Dorr Oil Company purchased a portion of the property designated as a residential tract. The warranty deed expressly referenced the Act 250 permit "and any and all amendments thereto." Shortly thereafter, respondent Donald Dorr, on behalf of Dorr Oil applied for and received a further permit amendment extending the time for construction to October 1995. During this period, another company operated by Dorr, respondent MGC, Inc., purchased the southerly parcel (the "adjacent tract"), and continued to operate a gravel pit "most or all" of which the trial court found was located on the adjacent tract. Dorr took no steps to begin the actual subdivision of the project tract or the development of an internal roadway. In March 2006, following a property-tax reappraisal of the tracts by the Town, respondents filed a request with the district commission to declare the Act 250 permit as abandoned through non-use. The commission, in response, issued a notice of intent to abandon the permit. The owners of a nearby residential property filed an objection, asserting that respondents had made a "material change" to the use authorized by the Act 250 permit by expanding gravel extractions activities onto the residential project tract. The commission then "tabled" the abandonment request "pending a jurisdictional opinion from the district coordinator on the material change question." The district coordinator thereupon requested further information from the parties, visited the site with respondent Dorr and his attorney, and issued a draft jurisdictional opinion for comment. In January 2007, the coordinator issued a formal opinion, finding that the "Dorr gravel pit has expanded onto the parcel covered by [the Act 250 permit]," that this constituted "a material change to that permit," and therefore that "a permit amendment [was] required." Respondents neither appealed the jurisdictional opinion to the Environmental Division, applied for a permit amendment, nor abated the gravel extraction activities on the project tract. Following respondents' inaction, in October 2008, the NRB chair issued an administrative order determining that respondents had violated conditions of the Act 250 permit by making a material change to the project without a land-use permit amendment. Respondents appealed the Superior Court, Environmental Division's judgment affirming the NRB's decision that respondents' gravel-extraction activities violated an Act 250 residential-subdivision permit. Respondents argued the ruling was in error because the permit had expired. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Nat. Resources Bd. Land Use Panel v. Dorr" on Justia Law

She-Sha Cafe and Hookah Lounge is a hookah bar that serves food in areas where smoking occurs. In 2010, the Montgomery County Health Department charged She-Sha with two violations of the Virginia Indoor Clean Air Act (VICAA), which prohibits smoking in restaurants. The Virginia Department of Health upheld the violations, concluding that She-Sha was correctly labeled as a restaurant and that none of the exceptions in the VICAA applied. The State Health Commissioner and the circuit court upheld the violations. A panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that She-Sha was not exempt from regulation as a “retail tobacco store” because it was not operating exclusively as such. The full Court of Appeals overruled the panel, concluding that She-Sha, as a restaurant, was exempt from VICAA because it was also a retail tobacco store. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that She-Sha was not exempt from regulation under the VICAA because it was not exclusively a retail tobacco store. View "Va. Dep't of Health v. Kepa, Inc." on Justia Law

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection approved a “Nonindustrial Timber Management Plan” (NTMP) authorizing logging on 615 privately held acres of north coast redwood and Douglas fir forest in Mendocino County. Opponents claimed violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA; ub. Resources Code, 21000) and the California Endangered Species Act (Fish & G. Code, 2050) and that the California Department of Fish and Wildlife failed to fulfill its public trust and statutory obligations by failing to object to the NTMP. The trial court denied relief. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the NTMP failed to adequately assess cumulative impacts of logging; that the NTMP contains no analysis of how the area will be retained as functional habitat; that the NTMP provided an inadequate description of the environmental setting, murrelet presence within the assessment area, and importance of the area to long-term murrelet survival and recovery. View "Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Cal. Dep't of Forestry & Fire Prot." on Justia Law

101 environmental groups filed a petition with EPA asking it to regulate spent lead bullets and shot. The environmental groups invoked section 21 of the Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2601(a)(1), which allows any person to petition EPA for a rulemaking proceeding to regulate "chemical substances" that "present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment[.]" The district court held that EPA had authority to classify the petition as non-cognizable under the Act and dismissed the complaint. The court disagreed with the district court where nothing in section 21 allowed EPA to dismiss the petition as non-cognizable. Nonetheless, the court affirmed the judgment because the environmental groups have suggested no way in which EPA could regulate spent lead bullets and shot without also regulating cartridges and shells, precisely what section 3(2)(B)(v) of the Act prohibits. View "Trumpeter Swan Society v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Department of Interior's Bureau of Reclamation asked the NMFS in 2006 to evaluate the impact of continuing water extraction in the Central Valley on certain threatened and endangered Salmonid species that live there. NMFS developed a Biological Opinion (BiOp) in which it determined that Reclamation's proposed project would jeopardize some of the Delta's endangered Salmonids. NMFS required Reclamation to change the way it pumps water out of the Valley's rivers and groups that depend on Central Valley's water sued to stop this change. The district court found that NMFS violated the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), arbitrary or capricious standard when developing much of the BiOp and defendants appealed. The court held that the district court did not give NMFS the substantial deference it is due under the APA; the court found that the components of the BiOp invalidated by the district court are reasonable and supported by the record; and the court upheld the BiOp in its entirety. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants. View "San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Authority v. Locke" on Justia Law

Sierra Club challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s decisions to redesignate three geographic areas—Milwaukee-Racine, Greater Chicago, and the Illinois portion of the St. Louis area—as having attained the 1997 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401. The CAA mandates that before redesignating an area, EPA must confirm not just that ozone in an area dropped below a certain level, but also that the improvement in air quality resulted from “permanent and enforceable reductions in emissions.” EPA interprets that edict to require a finding that the requisite ozone drops are “reasonably attributable” to permanent and enforceable reductions. Sierra Club argued that the Agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this causation finding in each of the redesignations. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. EPA demonstrated that it “examined the relevant data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, that the Agency’s decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors, and that the Agency has made no clear error of judgment.” View "Sierra Club v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Conservation Congress filed suit contending that the federal government violated national environmental laws in failing to consult adequately as to the Beaverslide Project's potential effects on the Northern Spotted Owl. The Project is a lumber thinning and fuel reduction project in northern California. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The court concluded that the district court properly held that Conservation Congress provided sufficient notice of intent to sue to confer jurisdiction on the district court to entertain the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., claims; the ESA claims are not moot; the district court properly granted summary judgment to the government on the merits of Conservation Congress's claims under the ESA where the Forest Service did not violate the consultation requirements of 50 C.F.R. 402.16; the district court properly concluded that the agencies did not fail to use "the best scientific and commercial data available," as required by the ESA; and the district court properly granted summary judgment on Conservation Congress's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., claims under the "hard look" standard. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Conservation Congress v. Finley" on Justia Law