Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

When Ferris Avenue Realty, LLC (Ferris) purchased twenty-two acres of property from Huhtamaki, Inc. (Huhtamaki), the parties executed an indemnity agreement providing that, upon the occurrence of certain conditions, Huhtamaki would reimburse Ferris for environmental cleanup costs. After hazardous substances were found on the property and Ferris incurred certain costs related to the cleanup of the substances, Ferris requested indemnification from Huhtamaki. Huhtamaki refused to indemnify Ferris. After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Ferris. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in (1) finding that Ferris’s notice to Huhtamaki constituted sufficient “claim notice” pursuant to the terms of the indemnity agreement; (2) admitting certain testimony from Ferris’s expert witness; (3) admitting evidence relating to excavated soil samples where Ferris excavated the soil before Huhtamaki could test it; and (4) instructing the jury. Lastly, contrary to Huhtamaki’s argument, Ferris’s case was not built on an improper “pyramid of inferences.” View "Ferris Avenue Realty, LLC v. Huhtamaki, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were smoking structures built by the owners and operators of two casinos in Great Falls (“Casino Owners”). After the Cascade City-County Board of Health (Board) commenced enforcement steps against the Casino Owners under the Montana Clean Indoor Air Act (MCIAA), the Casino Owners initiated an action against the Board seeking a declaration that their smoking structures were in compliance with the MCIAA. The district court granted summary judgment to the Casino Owners and awarded attorney fees. The Supreme Court reversed remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Board, holding (1) the MCIAA clearly delineates casinos on the statute’s list of public places wherein smoking is prohibited, and therefore, the district court erred in concluding that the smoking structures at issue were not subject to the smoking prohibition of the MCIAA; (2) the Casino Owners failed to establish that the Board was equitably estopped from enforcing the MCIAA; and (3) the district court improperly awarded the Casino Owners attorney fees. View "MC, Inc. v. Cascade City-County Bd. of Health" on Justia Law

The California Air Resources Board is charged with implementing the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. (Health & Saf. Code 38500). The Board’s mandate includes adopting rules and regulations to achieve the maximum “technologically feasible and cost effective” reductions in the emission of greenhouse gas (GHG) from sources or categories of sources subject to regulation under the terms of the Act. Objectors challenged the Board’s regulations implementing a market-based compliance mechanism for achieving reductions in GHG emissions: the “Cap-and-Trade” program. They argued that one component of the program, which affords offset credits for voluntary reductions in GHG emissions, violated the 2006 Act by failing to ensure that these credited reductions are “in addition to” any GHG emission reduction that is otherwise required by law or that would otherwise occur. The trial court rejected the argument. The court of appeal affirmed, noting the voluminous record summarizing the extensive evidence supporting the Board’s decision to adopt the Cap-and-Trade program regulation and to include offset credits as an integral component of that program and explaining the basis for the protocol and the additionality requirement applicable to that category of projects. View "Our Children's Earth Found. v. Cal. Air Res. Bd." on Justia Law

Defendant City of San Diego appealed a judgment granting the petition of plaintiff CREED-21 (CREED) for injunctive and other relief for violation of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) relating to emergency storm drainage repair and revegetation projects in La Jolla. The City argued: (1) the trial court erred by setting the CEQA baseline for the revegetation project prior to the issuance of a 2010 emergency permit for the emergency storm drain repair project; (2) the court erred by finding CREED had standing to challenge the prior CEQA emergency exemption for the emergency storm drain repair project; (3) City submitted substantial evidence to support its finding the regular permits for the revegetation project were exempt from CEQA; (4) CREED did not carry its burden to show an exception applied to the exemption for the revegetation project; (5) the court erred by finding CREED was denied due process of law when City did not timely disclose a document requested under the California Public Records Act (CPRA); and (6) the court erred by denying City's request for judicial notice and finding its appeal fee was unauthorized. After review, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court to the extent it declared City's assessment of the $100 appeal fee invalid and set it aside. In all other respects, the judgment was reversed and the matter was remanded to the trial court to: vacate its order granting the petition (except for its request for a refund of the appeal fee); withdraw, cancel, or otherwise void its peremptory writ of mandate (except for ordering City to refund the $100 appeal fee); and issue a new order denying the petition (except for granting its request for a refund of the appeal fee). View "CREED-21 v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Washington Supreme Court found that the State Legislature's 2003 amendments to the state's water law were facially constitutional. In this case, Appellants Scott Cornelius, Palouse Water Conservation Network, and Sierra Club Palouse Group (collectively Cornelius) brought an as-applied constitutional claim (among other claims) against Washington State University (WSU), the Department of Ecology, and the Pollution Control Hearings Board (PCHB). Upon further review, the Supreme Court found that the amendments were applied constitutionally, and found appellants' other claims unavailing. View "Cornelius v. Dep't of Ecology" on Justia Law

California's Department of Fish and Wildlife chose to use a program environmental impact report (EIR) to analyze enterprises' impacts on a statewide basis. Instead of addressing impacts on specific locations the Department stocked, the EIR addressed the enterprise's continuing and potential impacts on individual species that could be located at many locations. The EIR formulated, and the Department adopted, protocols and plans for discovering site-specific impacts at each of the nearly 1,000 water bodies the Department stocks and the 24 hatcheries it oversaw, and it committed to mitigating the impacts discovered from those reviews. These appeals presented for the Court of Appeals' review questions of whether the EIR complied with the California Environmental Quality Act. Furthermore the Court also addressed whether the Department's imposition of these mitigation measures on private fish vendors violated the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (the APA). In case Nos. C072486 and C073011, plaintiffs, Center for Biological Diversity and Californians for Alternatives to Toxics et al., respectively, argued the EIR was flawed because it: (1) did not perform site-specific review for each site in the state the Department stocks with fish; (2) deferred forming mitigation measures to the future formulation of protocols and management plans; (3) relied on the current stocking enterprise as the environmental baseline; and (4) did not review a reasonable range of alternatives, including a no project alternative consisting of ceasing all hatchery and stocking operations. The Court of Appeal disagreed with plaintiffs: given the history, nature, and scope of the project under review, the Department did not abuse its discretion in the manner it organized the EIR, analyzed the project, and mitigated its numerous impacts. In case No. C072790, plaintiff California Association for Recreational Fishing contended the Department violated the APA by imposing the qualification requirements and the monitoring and reporting obligations on private fish vendors without complying with the APA's notice and hearing procedures. The Court of Appeal concluded each measure qualified as a regulation under the APA that the Department did not properly adopt as such. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment in that appeal. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Dept. of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law

PaintCare and the American Coatings Association sought a writ of mandate, entered in favor of the California Department of Resources Recycling and Recovery to invalidate regulations adopted to implement and enforce the Architectural Paint Recovery Program (Pub. Resources Code, 48700). They argued that CalRecycle did not have the authority to adopt regulations to implement and enforce the Program and, even if it had the authority, the regulations improperly enlarge the scope of the Program by setting requirements for manufacturers that go beyond the Program. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the arguments. CalRecycle had authority to adopt the regulations, which do not go beyond the Program because they do not dictate how manufacturers comply with the Program. The regulations set forth what information manufacturers must provide to CalRecycle to comply with the Program. View "PaintCare v. Mortensen" on Justia Law

ICG operated Thunder Ridge surface mine, under a five-year Coal General Permit issued by the Kentucky Division of Water (KDOW) pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, which allowed ICG and others to discharge listed pollutants into the state’s water. Conditions included effluent limitations for specific pollutants, but not for selenium, a naturally occurring element that endangers aquatic life at certain concentrations. The permit acknowledged the possibility of selenium discharges. KDOW required a single selenium sampling during the five-year period. In 2009, ICG sought to expand its permit coverage and was required to submit water samples from a discharge point. Selenium exceeded the “acute” limit. Additional tests at six locations did not reveal selenium above the acute limit. Two sites exceeded the “chronic” limit. The Department of Natural Resources (KDNR) took a “preventive enforcement action,” requiring ICG to test again in 2011. The U.S. Office of Surface Mining deemed KDNR’s response appropriate and notified Sierra Club that it would take no further action. Sierra Club sued under the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251, and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. 1201. The district court awarded ICG summary judgment, finding that the permit shield precluded CWA liability. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the permit shield did not apply because the discharge was neither expressly authorized nor reasonably contemplated by KDOW. View "Sierra Club v. ICG Hazard, LLC" on Justia Law

In 1979, plaintiff Morristown Associates purchased commercial property located in Morristown. The property contained a strip-mall-style shopping center known as Morristown Plaza. Among the tenants was Plaza Cleaners, a dry cleaning business owned at the time by Robert Herring. Herring and his wife had entered into a lease with the property's previous owner, Morris Center Associates, in 1976. Due to construction, Herring was unable to occupy and operate Plaza Cleaners until 1978. At some point before moving in, Herring installed a steam boiler in a room at the rear of the leased space and an underground storage tank (UST) for fuel to operate the boiler. In 1985, Herring sold Plaza Cleaners to defendants Edward and Amy Hsi. The Hsis owned the business until 1998 when it was sold to current owner and third-party defendant, Byung Lee. In August 2003, a monitoring of a well installed near Plaza Cleaner's UST revealed fuel oil contamination. A subsequent investigation revealed that although the UST was intact, the fill and vent pipes were severely deteriorated, with large holes along a significant portion of their lengths. Plaintiff's experts concluded that those holes had developed as early as 1988 and, since that time, oil had been leaking from the pipes each time the tank was filled. Each of the named oil company defendants in this case allegedly supplied fuel oil to Plaza Cleaners at various times between 1988 and 2003. The issue in this appeal was whether the general six-year statute of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 applied to private claims for contribution made pursuant to the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f(a)(2)(a). Based on the plain language of the Spill Act, reinforced by its legislative history, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 s six-year statute of limitations was not applicable to Spill Act contribution claims. The Court therefore rejected the contrary determination of the Appellate Division and reversed and remanded this case to the Appellate Division for its consideration of other issues raised on appeal that were unaddressed. View "Morristown Associates v. Grant Oil Co." on Justia Law

Black Mesa sought costs and expenses from the OSM after Black Mesa participated in a successful challenge to OSM's grant of a coal mining permit revision. The ALJ denied the fee request, the IBLA affirmed, and the district court affirmed. The court held that, on the standard of review applicable here, the review of the agency's "eligibility" determination is de novo and its "entitlement" determination is reviewed for substantial evidence; on de novo review, Black Mesa is "eligible" for fees because it showed some degree of success on the merits; in light of the court's decision on "eligibility," the court declined to reach whether, on this record, Black Mesa was "entitled" to fees; and the court remanded for the agency to consider the issue. In addition, the court rejected Black Mesa's argument that the Secretary waived a challenge to the reasonableness of any award amount that the agency might grant on remand for costs and expenses reasonably incurred for Black Mesa's participation in the proceedings at the agency level. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Black Mesa Water Coalition v. Jewell" on Justia Law