Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The California Air Resources Board (CARB) is charged with developing a state implementation plan in compliance with federal air quality standards. CARB is solely responsible for vehicular sources of air pollution. Local and regional districts have responsibility for controlling air pollution from all other sources. Health and Safety Code section 42300(a) provides: "Every district board may establish by regulation, a permit system that requires . . . that before any person builds, erects, alters, replaces, operates, or uses any article, machine, equipment, or other contrivance which may cause the issuance of air contaminants, the person obtain a permit." Friends of Oceano Dunes claimed that the San Luis Obispo County Air Pollution Control District exceeded its authority in adopting rule 1001 of Regulation X, Fugitive Dust Emission Standards Limitation and Prohibitions, which requires that the California Department of Parks and Recreation obtain an air emissions permit to operate the 3,600-acre Oceano Dunes States Vehicular Recreation Area. The trial court found that section 42300(a) authorized District to impose a permit system to regulate sand and dust emissions caused by off-road recreational vehicles. The court of appeal reversed, holding that, for purposes of section 42300(a), a state park is not a "contrivance." View "Friends of Oceano Dunes, Inc. v. San Luis Obispo Cnty. Air Pollution Control Dist." on Justia Law

AmeriPride Services Inc. brought this contribution action against Texas Eastern Overseas, Inc. (TEO) under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) stemming from the contamination of the soil and groundwater in an industrial area of Sacramento, California. After a bench trial, the district court entered a final order and judgment against TEO. A panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) in allocating liability to a nonsettling defendant in a CERCLA contribution action, the district court is not required to apply either of the two leading methods for allocating liability to a nonsettling defendant after other responsible parties have entered into a settlement agreement to resolve their responsibility for an injury but, rather, has discretion to determine the most equitable method of accounting for settlements between private parties; and (2) because the district court did not explain its methodology for complying with CERCLA 9613(f) and furthering the goals of CERCLA, the panel could not determine whether the district court abused its discretion in allocating response costs. View "Ameripride Servs., Inc. v. Tex. Eastern Overseas Inc." on Justia Law

Blaine Carian appeals a postjudgment order denying his motion for attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. In or about 1975, the Fish and Game Commission adopted a regulation that designated Magnesia Spring Ecological Reserve (Reserve) in Riverside County as an ecological reserve. In or about 1976, the Department apparently adopted a wildlife management plan for the Reserve, which provided that "[e]nforcement of laws pertaining to [the Reserve] should be the responsibility of the Department." In or about 2007, the Department apparently adopted a multi-species habitat conservation plan, which stated that "[u]se of trails on [the Department's] land is subject to [California Code of Regulations] Title 14." It also contemplated that the "Bump and Grind" portion (Trail) of the Mirage Trail would be decommissioned and removed by the Department in the future. In January 2012, Assembly Bill No. 284 was introduced to enact a statute allowing access to the Trail. That bill apparently expired, or "died," pursuant to the California Constitution for lack of timely passage. In March 2012, a new bill, Assembly Bill No. 880, was introduced that contained the same language as the prior bill to enact a statute allowing access to the Trail. Carian filed the underlying lawsuit against defendants the California Department of Fish and Wildlife and Kimberly Nichol (a department manager), alleging causes of action for a writ of mandate directing the Department to reopen the Trail, taxpayer relief, quiet title to public easement, and declaratory relief. Assembly Bill No. 880 was ultimately passed, enacting former Fish and Game Code section 1587, effective as of January 2013, and the Governor signed the Bill. At the October 15 hearing on Defendants' demurrer, Carian conceded the new statute made his lawsuit moot. The court sustained Defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. In January 2013, Carian filed a motion for attorney fees under section 1021.5. In seeking an award of $100,000 in attorney fees against Defendants, Carian argued that his lawsuit was necessary to enforce an important right affecting the public interest and conferred a significant benefit on the general public by causing the State to open the Trail. The trial court found Carian did not, as required by 1021.5, make a reasonable attempt to settle his dispute before filing suit against defendants. On appeal, Carian argued the trial court erred in denying his motion for attorney fees because he gave the Department notice before filing his action, any attempt to settle the dispute would have been futile, and he satisfied all of the other requirements for an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5. The Court of Appeal confirmed the trial court's finding that Carian did not make a reasonable attempt to settle the dispute prior to filing his action against defendants. Therefore, Carian did not meet the requirement for an award of section 1021.5 attorney fees. View "Carian v. Dept. Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

The “Swampbuster” provisions of the Food Security Act deny certain farm-program benefits to persons who convert a wetland for agricultural purposes, 16 U.S.C. 3821. Smith challenged the USDA’s determination that Smith had converted 2.24 acres of wetland and was, therefore totally ineligible for benefits. Smith claimed that the Department erred in failing to: analyze whether his purported conversion would have only a minimal effect on surrounding wetlands, a finding that would exempt him from ineligibility; consider factors that would reduce his penalties; and exempt Smith’s parcel because it was originally converted and farmed before the enactment. The district court denied relief. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that, while this case only involves 2.24 acres, it has ramifications for thousands of corn and soybean farmers. The USDA had signed a mediation agreement with Smith, permitting him to plant the parcel in the spring and cut down trees so long as Smith did not remove stumps; USDA never argued that Smith intentionally violated this agreement, but permanently deprived him of benefits, in disregard of its own regulations. That Smith’s stance on mitigation may have “colored” the agency’s relationship with him does not mean that USDA is entitled to ignore minimal-effect evidence and a penalty-reduction request. View "Maple Drive Farms Ltd. P'ship v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

McGrath Lake has about 12 acres of surface area. Its subwatershed consists of approximately 1,200 acres including agricultural fields, petroleum facilities, park land, public roads and a closed landfill. Runoff reaches the lake by Central Ditch; there is no natural outlet. The lake and its bed sediment are polluted with pesticides and PCBs. California implements the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251) through the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (Wat. Code 13000), setting "total maximum daily load[s]" (TMDL) of pollutants for bodies of water. A Regional Board established TMDLs for pollutants coming from the Central Ditch and for pollutants in the lake bed sediment. The Basin Plan Amendment sets a goal of 14 years to achieve the TMDL for the lake bed sediment, but does not mandate any particular method of remediation. The trial court denied a challenge. The court of appeal affirmed. A TMDL is an informational document, not an implementation plan, so only first-tier analysis was necessary. Remediation measures are beyond the scope of the TMDL. Until a plan is formulated, full environmental analysis of any particular method of remediation is premature. View "Conway v. State Water Res. Control Bd." on Justia Law

The Alaska Board of Game has established two different systems of subsistence hunting for moose and caribou in Alaska’s Copper Basin region: (1) community hunts for groups following a hunting pattern similar to the one traditionally practiced by members of the Ahtna Tene Nene’ community; and (2) individual hunts. A private outdoors group, the Alaska Fish and Wildlife Conservation Fund, argued that this regulatory framework violated the equal access and equal protection clauses of the Alaska Constitution by establishing a preference for a certain user group. The Fund also argued that the regulations were not authorized by the governing statutes, that they conflicted with other regulations, and that notice of important regulatory changes was not properly given to the public. The Supreme Court concluded that the Board’s factual findings supported a constitutionally valid distinction between patterns of subsistence use, and because the Board’s regulations do not otherwise violate the law, the Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to the State, upholding the statute and the Board regulations against the Fund’s legal challenge. View "Alaska Fish & Wildlife Conservation Fund v. Alaska" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff-appellant Leona Kuhn's improper disposal of debris from her house in the Napoleon city dump in late June 2013, after her house had been severely damaged by fire. The City of Napoleon maintains an "inert waste landfill" for its residents, located about two miles southeast of the city. The landfill was subject to the North Dakota Department of Health's rules and regulations, which permits only certain types of garbage in the landfill sorted into separate piles, some of which is burned or buried under the regulations. Kuhn appealed a district court judgment entered after an appeal from a municipal court conviction finding her guilty of violating a City ordinance for improperly disposing of refuse, and a subsequent court order denying her request for a written restitution order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, concluding sufficient evidence supported Kuhn's conviction, but reversed Kuhn's sentence and remanded for clarification. View "City of Napoleon v. Kuhn" on Justia Law

The Tussing Road Water Reclamation Facility in Fairfield County is required to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act from the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (Ohio EPA). The Fairfield County Board of Commissioners challenged the validity of new phosphorus limitations added on to the Tussing Road plant’s renewed NPDES permit, alleging that Ohio EPA ignored the administrative rulemaking procedures required by the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act (the Act) and imposed the new limits solely on a federally approved total maximum daily load (TMDL) report previously issued for the watershed in question. Specifically, the County contended that it should have had a full and fair opportunity to be heard and the right to review and challenge the TMDL before it was submitted to United States Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA). The Court of Appeals vacated the NPDES phosphorus limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a TMDL established by Ohio EPA is a rule that is subject to the requirements of the Act, and therefore, Ohio EPA must follow the rulemaking procedure in the Act before submitting a TMDL to U.S. EPA for its approval and before the TMDL may be implemented in an NPDES permit. View "Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Nally" on Justia Law

St. Marys makes portland cement at a plant in Charlevoix. The Michigan Department of Natural Resources and Environment deemed the plant’s pollution controls sufficient and excused St. Marys from the retrofitting requirement under the Clean Air Act’s Regional Haze Rule, 40 C.F.R. 51.308–.309, which requires the states to determine which facilities within their borders create visibility-impairing pollutants that may “be emitted and transported downwind” to a federal park or wilderness area. States then must decide which of those sources are eligible for “Best Available Retrofit Technology.” The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency disagreed with the state and required the plant to add more stringent pollution controls. The Second Circuit upheld the EPA decision, rejecting challenges to EPA’s scientific and technological assertions concerning the plant’s nitrous oxide emissions, and a claim that St. Marys was exempt from the retrofitting requirement. View "St. Marys Cement Inc. v. Envtl. Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Black Warrior Riverkeeper and Defenders of Wildlife appealed a district court’s grant of final summary judgment to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as well as to the Alabama Coal Association and several other intervenor mining companies. Riverkeeper challenges the 2012 version of Nationwide Permit 21 (“NWP 21”), a general permit that allowed surface coal mining operations to discharge dredged or fill materials into navigable waters. Riverkeeper argued that the Corps arbitrarily and capriciously found that NWP 21 would have no more than minimal environmental effects, in violation of both the Clean Water Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. After deciding Riverkeeper has standing to sue, the district court held that Riverkeeper’s lawsuit was, nonetheless, barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. After thorough review, however, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the intervenors have shown neither inexcusable delay on the part of Riverkeeper nor prejudice resulting from Riverkeeper’s alleged delay. To the extent that Riverkeeper lagged in filing suit, its delay was slight and excused by its need to adequately investigate and prepare its claims in this complex case. Moreover, the Intervenors’ modest showing of harm, stated only at the highest order of abstraction, does not outweigh the potential environmental benefits of allowing Riverkeeper to proceed. As for the merits of Riverkeeper’s environmental claims, the district court concluded, after thorough deliberation, that the Corps’ determinations that NWP 21 would have only “minimal cumulative adverse effect” on the environment, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, and “no significant impact” on the environment, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act, were neither arbitrary nor capricious. However, literally on the eve of oral argument before the Eleventh Circuit, the Corps admitted that it had underestimated the acreage of waters that would be affected by the projects authorized under the permit. In the face of this change in facts, the Eleventh Circuit ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing on the implications of the Corps’ error. The Corps then conceded that the district court’s decision must be reversed and the matter remanded to the Corps for further consideration based on a more accurate assessment of the potential impacts of NWP 21. The Eleventh Circuit agreed. View "Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc., et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, et al" on Justia Law