Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners filed suit challenging the EPA's regional haze regulations for the State of Montana. Petitioner PPL Montana operates and partially owns the Colstrip Steam Electric Generating Station and the J.E. Corette Steam Electric Station. Petitioner NPCA are nonprofit conservation organizations. The court concluded, inter alia, that EPA’s best available retrofit technology (BART) determination for nitrogen oxide emissions at Colstrip Units 1 and 2 is arbitrary and capricious; EPA’s responses to petitioners’ more minor challenges to its cost-effectiveness analysis make clear that it is capable of the required rational explanation; because the rule offers no reasoned explanation to support its requirement of a fourth scrubber at Colstrip Units 1 and 2, the court concluded that such requirement is arbitrary and capricious; the inconsistency in EPA’s BART determinations at Colstrip Units 1 and 2 and Corette is, absent explanation, arbitrary and capricious; by requiring PPL Montana to install selective non-catalytic reduction (SNCR) at Colstrip Units 1 and 2 without sufficient assurance of any improvement at all, EPA has offered no reasoned explanation; and EPA’s determination that installation of additional technology to control emissions from Corette was not cost-effective suffers the same failure of explanation as its BART determinations at Colstrip. Finally, the court rejected NPCA's contention that EPA’s decision not to require any additional emission-reducing technology, let alone installation of selective catalytic reduction (SCR), at Colstrip Units 3 and 4 was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the petitions for review are granted in part, denied in part, and vacated and remanded. View "Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Department of Fish and Wildlife appealed a judgment in favor of the Siskiyou County Farm Bureau (Farm Bureau), interpreting a Fish and Game Code section 1602 requiring notification when an entity plans to "substantially divert" water from a river or stream. "The trial court appears to have been led astray by a questionable and aborted enforcement policy" issued by a single Department employee, as well as the deluge of extrinsic material proffered by the Farm Bureau in its effort to demonstrate a latent ambiguity in the statute. Although extrinsic evidence may reveal a latent ambiguity in a statute, "such ambiguity must reside in the statutory language itself. It cannot exist in the abstract, or by ignoring the statutory language." Here, the Court of Appeal found extrinsic evidence revealed no ambiguity in the statute: the term "divert" had a long-established meaning in the context of water law before enactment of the statute. Regardless of an entity’s legal right to take water, such as for agricultural purposes, and regardless of whether the taking alters the streambed itself, section 1602 unambiguously required notification to the Department if an entity plans to "substantially divert" water. After notification, a statutory mechanism--arbitration followed by court review--exists to resolve disputes about diversions. This notification requirement neither encroaches on any entity’s water rights, nor impairs the powers and duties of the State Water Resources Control Board. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed because the trial court incorrectly found the statute, section 1602, to be ambiguous, and then resolved the perceived ambiguity in a manner inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. View "Siskiyou Co. Farm Bureau v. Dept. Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

Petitioners seek review of EPA's final rule, which determined that supercritical carbon dioxide injected into Class VI underground wells for purposes of geologic sequestration is “solid waste” within the meaning of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6903(27). The court dismissed the petitions for review because petitioners lacked Article III standing. In this case, neither Southern nor Occidental can show any injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article III; Carbon Sequestration Council lacks standing because Southern lacks standing; and American Petroleum Institute lacks standing because Occidental lacks standing. View "Carbon Sequestration Council v. EPA" on Justia Law

WRC, operator of an oil refinery, seeks review of EPA's denial of its petition for an extension of its exemption from EPA's renewable fuels program. The court rejected WRC’s various challenges other than those identifying two mathematical errors in EPA’s independent analysis of WRC’s financial data. EPA concedes those errors. Because the conceded errors significantly alter important figures in EPA’s independent analysis of WRC’s financial data, the court cannot conclude with sufficient certainty that the agency would have made the same decision absent its errors.Therefore, the court vacated EPA’s decision and remanded to allow the agency to reevaluate WRC’s petition using the correct figures. View "Hermes Consol. v. EPA" on Justia Law

KIF is a Tennessee coal-fired plant generating electricity. In 2008, a KIF coal-ash containment dike failed, spilling 5.4 million cubic yards of coal-ash sludge over 300 acres of adjacent land. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) responded, pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan. EPA delegated authority to TVA, 42 U.S.C. 9604(a)-(b). TVA engaged Jacobs as the prime contractor for planning and oversight of remediation. Jacobs provided a Site Wide Safety and Health Plan that applies to all construction at the site, and to CERCLA remediation activities in accordance with EPA’s Standard Operating Safety Guide. The Plaintiffs worked on the KIF remediation and, in 2013, sued, alleging that Jacobs improperly monitored fly ash; inadequately trained workers about hazards of inhaling toxic fly ash; inadequately monitored their medical conditions; denied requests for respirators and dust masks; exposed them to high concentrations of flyash toxic constituents; and fraudulently concealed that exposure. The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that Jacobs was entitled to government-contractor immunity as a corollary of the discretionary-function exception to the Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2674. The Sixth Circuit reversed, finding that such immunity is not jurisdictional and that the court should have considered a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. View "Adkisson v. Jacobs Eng'g Grp, Inc" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA’s determination that certain geographic areas are, or are not, in “attainment” with the EPA’s ground-level ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS). The court concluded that the EPA’s final designations of Delaware and Connecticut counties are consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.; EPA's designation of Uinta Basin, Utah as "unclassifiable" is rational and in accordance with the CAA; EPA's refusal to use uncertified 2011 air-quality data during the designation process is rational and in accordance with the CAA; the EPA's use of 2008 to 2010 data to classify the counties within the Memphis, Tennessee area is rational and in accordance with the CAA; and the court rejected the remaining challenges. Accordingly, the court denied the consolidated petitions. View "MS Comm. Environ. Quality v. EPA" on Justia Law

Billings, Golden Valley, McKenzie, and Slope Counties in North Dakota, and the state, sued the United States under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, seeking to quiet title to alleged rights-of-way along section lines that run through lands owned by the federal government in the Dakota Prairie Grasslands and managed by the U.S. Forest Service. They alleged that in North Dakota, with a few exceptions, a public easement provides a right-of-way for public travel within 33 feet on either side of the section lines. The federal government does not recognize these rights-of-way. Nonprofit environmental organizations sought to intervene as defendants as of right under FRCP 24(a) or permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). They alleged that they possess important aesthetic, recreational, and environmental interests in preserving the Grasslands. The district court denied the motion to intervene as of right, finding that they failed to show injury in-fact or a recognized interest in the suit’s subject matter and that the United States adequately represented any legally protectable interest. The court also denied the alternative request for permissive intervention. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the groups did not overcome the presumption of adequate representation and noting that permissive intervention is “wholly discretionary.” View "North Dakota v. Badlands Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

Lost Tree entered into an option to purchase 2,750 acres on the mid-Atlantic coast of Florida, including a barrier island, a peninsula bordering the Indian River, and islands in the Indian River. From 1969 to 1974, Lost Tree purchased most of the land, including Plat 57, 4.99 acres on the Island of John’s Island and Gem Island, consisting of submerged lands and wetlands. Lost Tree developed 1,300 acres into a gated community, but had no plans of developing Plat 57 until 2002, when it learned that a developer applied for a wetlands fill permit for land south of Plat 57 and proposed improvements to a mosquito control impoundment on McCuller’s Point. Because Lost Tree owned land on McCuller’s Point, approval required its consent. Lost Tree sought permitting credits in exchange for the proposed improvements. To take advantage of those credits, Lost Tree obtained zoning and other local and state permits to develop Plat 57. The Army Corps of Engineers denied an application under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344 for a section 404 fill permit, finding that Lost Tree could have pursued less environmentally damaging alternatives and had adequately realized its development purpose. On remand, the trial court found that the denial diminished Plat 57’s value by 99.4% and constituted a per se taking and awarded Lost Tree $4,217,887.93. The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that a “Lucas” taking occurred because the denial eliminated all value stemming from Plat 57’s possible economic uses. View "Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioners, PVC manufacturers, challenged EPA's 2012 rule setting first-time-ever limits on the emission of most hazardous air pollutants from PVC productions. Petitioners raised many of their objections for the first time in petitions for reconsideration with EPA that are awaiting resolution. The court concluded that it was precluded from reviewing these objections under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7412. In regards to petitioners' objections that are ready for review, the court held that EPA acted reasonably and in accordance with the CAA where EPA’s PVC-combined process vent limits do not conflict with other emissions limits, and EPA’s decision not to subcategorize process vents on the basis of their emissions control technology was reasonable; EPA’s bypass opening requirements are not arbitrary and capricious, and its requirement that PVC manufacturers install monitoring equipment on pressure relief devices is not irrational; and petitioners’ argument that some of EPA’s bypass regulations are unlawful beyond-the-floor MACT requirements stems from misapprehension of the CAA and is without merit. Therefore, the court denied the petition View "Mexichem Specialty Resins v. EPA" on Justia Law

This case involves the authority of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to issue nationwide permits under section 404(e) of the Clean Water Act. These permits authorized activities involving discharge of dredged or fill material in U.S. waters and wetlands. TransCanada Corporation proposed to rely on the nationwide permit to build an oil pipeline, the Gulf Coast Pipeline, running approximately 485 miles and cross over 2,000 waterways. The Corps issued letters verifying that Nationwide Permit 12 would cover the proposed construction. Shortly thereafter, TransCanada began constructing the pipeline, which was completed. Three environmental groups (Sierra Club, Inc.; Clean Energy Future Oklahoma; and East Texas Sub Regional Planning Commission) challenged the validity of the nationwide permit and verification letters. The district court rejected these challenges and entered judgment for the defendants. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the entry of judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Sierra Club v. Bostick" on Justia Law