Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

WildEarth challenged the Forest Service's decision to designate over two million acres of public land in the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest for use by winter motorized vehicles, principally snowmobiles. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling that the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) sufficiently analyzed the conflicts between snowmobiles and other recreational uses in the Revised Forest Plan; the court agreed that WildEarth’s challenge to the Subpart C exemption in the Travel Management Rule (TMR) is not ripe for review; the court reversed the district court’s National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., ruling, in part, because the Forest Service did not properly disclose the information underlying its analysis of snowmobile impacts on big game wildlife in the EIS; the court reversed the district court’s ruling that the Forest Service adequately applied the minimization criteria in the TMR; and the court remanded for further proceedings. View "WildEarth Guardians v. USFS" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Albert Paulek petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate, alleging defendant-respondent Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority (the Agency) erred by concluding: (1) a particular activity was not a project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA); and (2) that, if it were a project, then it was exempt from CEQA. The activity at issue involved removing a conservation designation from one parcel of land, and placing the designation on two others. The trial court found Paulek had standing and the moving of the conservation designation qualified as a "project" under CEQA. The trial court denied the writ petition because it found the project fell within a CEQA exemption. Paulek argued on appeal of that judgment that: (1) he had standing; (2) the moving of the restrictions was a CEQA project; and (3) the project did not fall within the identified CEQA exemptions. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, finding substantial evidence did not support application of the Class 7 and Class 8 exemptions relied upon in the resolution. "[i]f the Agency seeks to proceed with the criteria refinement, then the Agency must move to the next step of the analysis and conduct an initial threshold study to see if the criteria refinement will have a significant impact on the environment, in order to determine whether a negative declaration may be issued." The trial court was directed to grant Paulek’s petition for a writ of mandamus and require the Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority to: (1) vacate and set aside its February 6, 2012, passing, approval, and adoption of Resolution No. 12-002 certifying and approving the Warm Springs Criteria Refinement; and (2) rescind the February 6, 2012, Notice of Exemption concerning the MSHCP Criteria Refinement. View "Paulek v. Western Riverside Co. Regional Conserv. Auth." on Justia Law

The Forest Service initiated consultation with FWS under Section 7 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2), and the FWS determined that the Forest Service’s standards and guidelines did not jeopardize the Canada lynx. FWS subsequently discovered that its decisions relating to the designation of critical habitat for the Canada lynx were flawed. After re-evaluating the data, FWS designated extensive National Forest land as critical habitat. Cottonwood filed suit alleging that the Forest Service violated the ESA by failing to reinitiate consultation after the FWS revised its critical habitat designation to include National Forest land. As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that Cottonwood's claim is justiciable. The court also concluded that the Forest Service violated the ESA because, pursuant to the ESA’s implementing regulations, the Forest Service was required to reinitiate consultation when the FWS designated critical habitat in National Forests. Finally, the district court erred in denying injunctive relief to Cottonwood. The court concluded that there is no presumption of irreparable injury where there has been a procedural violation in ESA cases. A plaintiff must show irreparable injury to justify injunctive relief. The court acknowledged that Thomas v. Peterson's ruling on injunctive relief is no longer good law. Cottonwood should not be faulted for relying on Thomas and its progeny as a basis for injunctive relief. Although the court affirmed the district court's ruling, the court remanded for further proceedings to allow Cottonwood an opportunity to make the necessary showing in support of injunctive relief. View "Cottonwood Environmental Law Center v. U.S. Forest Service" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Coastal Conservation League filed suit against various parties under federal law to stop what it fears will be significant degradation to 485 acres of freshwater wetlands and its conversion to saltwater wetlands. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action as moot where the record on appeal does not support the proposition that granting the League the relief it seeks on any of its claims will likely prevent the water within the Embanked Tract from becoming more saline. Because the district court’s mootness ruling is sound and the League has offered no additional basis for standing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying, on the ground of futility, the League’s motion seeking leave to amend its First Amended Complaint. View "South Carolina Coastal v. U.S. Army Corps" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari filed by appellants Judson Turner, the Director of the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (DNR), and the Grady County Board of Commissioners. They appealed the Court of Appeals' decision in "Georgia River Network v. Turner," (762 SE2d 123 (2014)). In 2010, Grady County received federal approval to construct a 960-acre fishing lake. The project also entailed building a large dam and inundating wetlands and nine miles of streams to create the lake. To proceed with the project, Grady County was required to apply for a buffer variance through the EPD in order to disturb the stream waters that would be affected by the project. Non-profit appellees Georgia River Network and American Rivers challenged the variance, arguing that Grady County's application was deficient because it failed to address buffers for the wetlands that would also be affected by the project. The Director granted the variance over appellees' objections. In a separate letter, the EPD advised appellees that wetlands did not require buffers because they generally lack wrested vegetation and were not subject to a variance request. An ALJ overturned the variance, reasoning that OCGA 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A) of the Erosion and Sedimentation Act required a buffer for all state waters, including wetlands. The Director and Grady County filed challenged the ALJ's decision in the superior courts of Fulton County and Grady County, respectively. On the substantive issue of the construction and interpretation of OCGA 12-7-6 (b) (15) (A), both trial courts determined that the Director's construction of the statute was correct and that the buffer requirement only applies to state waters that have wrested vegetation. Appellees then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals found the ALJ had not erred and reversed the decisions of the trial courts. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in its judgment, and reversed. View "Turner v. Georgia River Network" on Justia Law

The Provincial Government of Marinduque (the Province), was a political subdivision of the Republic of the Philippines. Placer Dome Inc. (PDI), was incorporated under the laws of British Columbia, Canada. A predecessor of PDI formed Marcopper Mining Corp. to undertake mining activities in the Province. The predecessor and PDI controlled all aspects of Marcopper’s operations. During the course of the corporation’s operations, Marcopper caused significant environmental degradation and health hazards to the people living in the Province. The Province filed its complaint in a Nevada district court. Shortly thereafter, PDI and another business entity amalgamated under the laws of Ontario, Canada to form Barrick Gold Corporation. Barrick’s subsidiaries had substantial mining operations in Nevada. Barrick and PDI moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens. The district court found that dismissal for form non conveniens was warranted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that dismissal for forum non conveniens was proper because this case lacked any bona fide connection to the state, adequate alternative fora existed, and the burdens of litigating in Nevada outweighed any convenience to the Province. View "Provincial Gov't of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (“BSEE”) acted unlawfully in approving two of Shell’s oil spill response plans (“OSRPs”). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants and intervenor-defendant Shell. The court concluded that plaintiffs’ claim that BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs was arbitrary and capricious on the ground that Shell assumed an impossibly high recovery rate fails because the record simply does not support plaintiffs’ claim that Shell assumed an impossibly high recovery rate of almost 100 percent. According deference to the agency's interpretation of its own statute and regulations, the court held that BSEE's approval of the OSRPs was a nondiscretionary act that did not trigger a requirement for inter-agency consultation pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(4). Finally, the court concluded that BSEE is not required to prepare an environmental impact statement prior to approving the OSRPs pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(C). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alaska Wilderness League v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a request that the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission issue a declaratory ruling clarifying the application of the Commission’s groundwater protection rules to coal ash lagoons. After the Commission issued its declaratory ruling, Petitioners sought judicial review, claiming that the Commission had misconstrued the applicable regulations and erred in failing to construe the applicable regulations in the manner contended for by Petitioners in their original request for declaratory relief. The trial court determined that portions of the Commission’s decision were plainly erroneous and inconsistent with the regulations and reversed the Commission’s decision with respect to Petitioners’ second request for a declaratory ruling. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded to the trial court with instructions to dismiss Petitioners’ appeal from the Commission’s declaratory ruling on mootness grounds, holding that the General Assembly’s enactment of Chapter 122 of the 2014 North Carolina Session Laws supersedes the rule at issue in this appeal with respect to coal ash lagoons located at facilities with active permits. Remanded. View "Cape Fear River Watch v. N.C. Envtl. Mgmt. Comm’n" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on plaintiffs' claims under the Growth Management Act (GMA), chapter 36.70A RCW, and Planning Enabling Act (PEA), chapter 36.70 RCW, were properly dismissed as time barred. The trial court granted defendant-Skamania County's summary judgment motion on each of the plaintiffs' claims, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the GMA and PEA claims, reasoning that a genuine issue of fact remained as to: (1) whether Skamania County actually completed periodic review on August 2, 2005, which Skamania County argues triggered the clock for the GMA claim; and (2) the date on which the inconsistency, if any, arose between the unmapped classification and the conservancy designation, which would have triggered the clock for the PEA claim. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in part, holding that both claims were timely because: (1) inaction generally does not trigger the GMA 60-day appeal period; and (2) in this case, no actionable inconsistency existed between a 1986 ordinance and the "2007 Comprehensive Plan" (2007 Plan) until August 2012. Because further factual development was unnecessary to address the time bar issue, The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Save Our Scenic Area v. Skamania County" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged EPA’s anticipated rule restricting carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants. Petitioners argue that section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7411(d), does not grant EPA authority to limit carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants and therefore, petitioners ask the court to enjoin EPA from issuing a final rule limiting those carbon dioxide emissions. The court concluded that the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a), does not authorize a court to circumvent finality principles in order to review proposed agency rules; EPA's public statements about its legal authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions does not constitute final agency action subject to judicial review; and the court rejected petitioners' challenge of a 2011 settlement agreement that EPA reached with several other states and environmental groups. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review and the petition for a writ of prohibition where the court does not have authority to review proposed agency rules. View "In Re: Murray Energy Corp." on Justia Law