Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

St. Jude’s Co. made a direct appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court a water court decision entered in favor of the Roraring Fork Club, LLC. With regard to the Club’s two applications for water rights, the water court granted appropriative rights, approved the Club’s accompanying augmentation plan, and amended the legal description of the Club’s point of diversion for an already decreed right. With regard to the separate action filed by St. Jude’s Co., the water court denied all but one of its claims for trespass, denied its claims for breach of a prior settlement agreement with the Club, denied its claims for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning its asserted entitlement to the exercise of powers of eminent domain, quieted title to disputed rights implicated in the Club’s application for an augmentation plan, and awarded attorney fees in favor of the Club, according to the terms of the settlement agreement of the parties. Upon review of St. Jude's arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded the Club failed to demonstrate an intent to apply the amount of water for which it sought a decree to any beneficial use. Accordingly, the Court reversed the water court with regard to appropriative rights. The Court found no other reversible errors in the water court's decision. The case was remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of the Club's request for appellate attorney fees. View "St. Jude's Co. v. Roaring Fork Club, L.L.C." on Justia Law

AEWC petitioned for review of the Beaufort Permit issued by the EPA under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) provisions of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1342, 1343, which authorizes the discharge by oil and gas exploration facilities of 13 waste streams into the Beaufort Sea. The court remanded, in light of EPA's acknowledged error, to the EPA for a determination regarding whether the discharge of non-contact cooling water (alone or in combination with other authorized discharges) into the Beaufort Sea will cause unreasonable degradation of the marine environment because of the effect of such discharge on bowhead whales, including deflection from their migratory paths. The court denied the petition in all other respects because the EPA’s issuance of the Permit is otherwise supported by the record evidence, does not reflect a failure to consider an important aspect of the problem, and is not otherwise arbitrary or capricious. . View "Alaska Eskimo Whaling Comm'n v. EPA" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two water court rulings upholding the Special Improvement District No. 1 (“Subdistrict”) of the Rio Grande Water Conservation District’s (“District”) and the State Engineer’s approval of the 2012 Annual Replacement Plan (“ARP”) developed pursuant to the Subdistrict’s decreed Plan of Water Management (“Amended Plan”). In "San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association v. Special Improvement District No. 1" (“San Antonio”), (270 P.3d 927 (Colo. 2011)), the Supreme Court affirmed the water court’s May 2010 Decree that approved the Subdistrict’s Amended Plan and imposed additional decree conditions on that Plan. The 2012 ARP under review here was the first ARP prepared pursuant to the Subdistrict’s Amended Plan. Water levels in the unconfined aquifer within the Subdistrict declined significantly due to increased groundwater consumption and sustained drought. The Amended Plan required the Subdistrict to prepare, and obtain the State Engineer’s approval of, an ARP that prevented injury to senior water rights. Objectors San Antonio, Los Pinos and Conejos River Acequia Preservation Association Save Our Senior Water Rights, LLC, Richard Ramstetter, and Costilla Ditch Company were senior surface water right holders on the Rio Grande River and its tributaries. They appealed two pretrial rulings as well as a judgment and decree upholding the 2012 ARP. Upon review of the objections, the Supreme Court concluded that the 2012 ARP complied with the Amended Plan and 2010 Decree, and protected against injury. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the water court's pretrial orders, judgment and decree pertaining to the 2012 ARP. View "San Antonio, Los Pinos & Conejos River Acequia Preservation" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act (CAA) directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate emissions of hazardous air pollutants from stationary sources, such as refineries and factories, 42 U.S.C. 7412; it may regulate power plants under this program only if it concludes that “regulation is appropriate and necessary” after studying hazards to public health. EPA found power-plant regulation “appropriate” because power plant emissions pose risks to public health and the environment and because controls capable of reducing these emissions were available. It found regulation “necessary” because other CAA requirements did not eliminate those risks. EPA estimated that the cost of power plant regulation would be $9.6 billion a year, but that quantifiable benefits from the reduction in hazardous-air-pollutant emissions would be $4-$6 million a year. The D. C. Circuit upheld EPA’s refusal to consider costs. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. EPA interpreted section 7412(n)(1)(A) unreasonably when it deemed cost irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants. “’Appropriate and necessary’ is a capacious phrase.” It is not rational, nor “appropriate,” to impose billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits. That other CAA provisions expressly mention cost indicates that section 7412(n)(1)(A)’s broad reference to appropriateness encompasses multiple relevant factors, including cost. The possibility of considering cost at a later stage, when deciding how much to regulate power plants, does not establish its irrelevance at the earlier stage. Although the CAA makes cost irrelevant to the initial decision to regulate sources other than power plants, the point of having a separate provision for power plants was to treat power plants differently. EPA must decide how to account for cost. View "Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

McGinnes Industrial Waste Corporation dumped pulp and paper mill waste sludge into disposal pits near the San Jacinto River in Pasadena, Texas (the site). After environmental contamination was discovered at the site, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) instituted superfund cleanup proceedings under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). During the period that McGinnes was dumping waste at the Site, it was covered by standard-form commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies issued by Phoenix Insurance Company and Travelers Indemnity Company (together, the Insurers). McGinnes requested a defense in the EPA proceedings from the Insurers. The Insurers refused, determining that the proceedings were not a “suit” under the policy. McGinnes sued the insurers in federal court seeking a declaration that the policies obligated them to defend the EPA’s CERCLA proceedings. The district court granted the Insurers’ motion for partial summary judgment on the duty-to-defend issue. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified a question regarding the issue to the Texas Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered that “suit” in the CGL policies at issue must also include CERCLA enforcement proceedings by the EPA. View "McGinnes Indus. Maint. Corp. v. Phoenix Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Zaremba Group was the owner of the 10.08-acre plot of land in question in this case. The proposed building site lies within the floodway of Lovers Lane Brook. The Project, the building of a Dollar General store, would result in a loss of flood-water storage of 1,305 cubic yards, but was designed to include a flood-mitigation cut area, which would provide additional flood-water storage of 2,544 cubic yards. The Project would narrow the Brook floodway at two points, but both of these areas are at least as wide as the Brook's narrowest section, which is just south of the Project site. The Project includes a minimum fifty-foot buffer along the Brook. Neighbors of the plot of land appealed the environmental division's decision to grant an Act 250 permit amendment to Zaremba Group to build the store on that plot. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In re Zaremba Group Act 250 Permit" on Justia Law

In 2004, the FWS promulgated a Final Rule designating particular areas as critical habitat for the Santa Ana sucker, a small freshwater fish. In a subsequent 2005 Final Rule and in a 2009 Proposed Rule, the FWS excluded certain areas covered by local conservation plans from critical habitat designation. But in a 2010 Final Rule, the FWS changed course and designated as critical habitat several thousand acres of land that had previously been excluded. Plaintiffs, several municipalities and water districts, filed suit against the FWS and others, challenging the FWS's rulemaking. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on all claims. The court agreed with the district court that the FWS satisfied its statutory obligation to cooperate with state agencies; that the critical habitat designation was not arbitrary or capricious; and that any claims under the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., were barred by this Court’s decision in Douglas County v. Babbitt. The court concluded that section 2(c)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, does not create an independent cause of action; the critical habitat designation of land was proper; the FWS's designation of critical habitat in unoccupied areas was proper; and plaintiff's NEPA claim fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. v. Jewell" on Justia Law

AIR petitioned for review of the EPA's promulgation of 40 C.F.R. 52.245, a regulation that revised the scope of a previous EPA decision. The EPA promulgated the regulation under section 110(k)(6) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7410(k)(6), an error-correcting provision, after the Agency determined that it had mistakenly approved certain New Source Review rules in 2004 as part of California’s State Implementation Plan (SIP). The court concluded that the EPA was not arbitrary, nor did it abuse its discretion in correcting its prior approval of the New Source Review rules after it learned that California law, specifically Senate Bill 700, did not authorize the San Joaquin Air Control District to require new source permits or emissions offsets for minor agricultural sources; because those rules conflicted with state law, they should not have been incorporated into the SIP in 2004; and therefore, the EPA did not act improperly in correcting its prior approval. The court held, as a matter of first impression, that the EPA reasonably interpreted section 110(k)(6)’s requirement that the EPA “revise such [erroneous] action as appropriate” to encompass a retroactive limitation of its previous approval. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 1989, FBI agents raided the nuclear weapons production facility known as Rocky Flats, first operated by Dow Chemical Company, then Rockwell International Corporation. The agents discovered that plant workers had been mishandling radioactive waste for years. The waste found its way into the nearby soil and groundwater.The plant's neighbors followed the government's criminal action with a civil suit, citing the federal Price-Anderson Act and state nuisance law as grounds for relief. A jury found for plaintiffs, and the district court approved roughly $177 million in compensatory damages and $200 million in punitive damages, as well as $549 million in prejudgment interest. Defendants appealed, arguing that the district court had failed to instruct the jury properly about the terms of the Price-Anderson Act. Dow and Rockwell made a "curious tactical decision," arguing that the district court's jury instructions about what constituted a nuclear incident were too permissive. The Tenth Circuit agreed that the district court's jury instructions about what did and did not qualify as a nuclear incident were too permissive. On this basis, it vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings in light of the Act's correct construction. Plaintiffs appealed, renouncing the benefits the Act provided to both parties. Plaintiffs accepted the premise that they could not prove a nuclear incident as the term was interpreted by the Tenth Circuit. Instead, plaintiffs relied on their state law tort claim. Defendants countered with the argument that the Act precluded plaintiffs' state law claim. Furthermore, defendants argued that the Tenth Circuit's mandate in the first appeal of this case barred plaintiffs from relief on their state law nuisance verdict. The district court ruled in favor of defendants, and again this case came before the Tenth Circuit on appeal. "In two separate appeals spanning many years the defendants have identified no lawful impediment to the entry of a state law nuisance judgment on the existing verdict. They have shown no preemption by federal law, no error in the state law nuisance instructions, no mandate language specifically precluding this course. No other error of any kind is even now alleged." The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cook v. Rockwell International" on Justia Law

Mark Runkle and TAGS Realty, LLC were the locators of several adjacent and overlapping mining claims. This case concerned a pile of mining waste that was located on both Runkle’s and TAGS’s claims. The mining waste contained gold deposits that were not economically viable at the time they were removed from an historic mine. By 2011, however, the deposits became valuable, and Runkle removed and sold all of the waste that year. Runkle also removed the waste located within TAGS’s claim. TAGS filed a complaint asserting trespass and conversion causes of action, alleging that Runkle was not entitled to remove the waste material located on TAGS’s claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Runkle. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that TAGS’s mining claim was not a property interest sufficient to support TAGS’s causes of action; and (2) erred by granting summary judgment on an issue never raised, addressed, or conceded by the parties. View "TAGS Realty, LLC v. Runkle" on Justia Law