Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners challenge the EPA's 2012 regulation revising Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7412(d), standards for emissions of hexavalent chromium. The new rule imposes more stringent emissions limitations than its predecessor and mandates the phase-out of a category of fume suppressants containing the toxic compound perfluorooctyl sulfonate (PFOS). The court rejected, as contrary to the court's precedent, environmental petitioners' contention that EPA was required to calculate a new maximum achievable control technology (MACT) floor when it revised emissions standards pursuant to its technology review under section 112(d)(6) of the CAA; the court deferred to EPA’s methodology as well as its ultimate balancing decisions where it took into account the statutorily required considerations, inter alia, cost, emissions reductions, and health risk, as well as provided a transparent, reasoned explanation of its decision; the court was satisfied with the EPA's data-gathering and analysis and therefore, rejected the Association's argument that EPA unreasonably determined in its technology review that “developments” had occurred after the original rulemaking that required revision of the existing emissions standards; it suffices for EPA to show that non-PFOS based suppressants are as effective at controlling surface tension as PFOS-based suppressants; and EPA's risk review under section 112(f)(2) was reasonable. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review and upheld the rule. View "Nat'l Assoc. for Surface Finishing v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, which owned facilities used for earth materials excavation and processing, submitted to the Department of Environmental Protection five individual applications for water diversion permits. The Department requested additional information for all five of Plaintiff’s applications. Plaintiff did not fully comply with the Department’s request. Instead of submitting the requested information, Plaintiff filed a petition for a declaratory ruling to address the scope of the Department’s authority to request information for Plaintiff’s water diversion permit applications. The Commissioner of Environmental Protection deemed all of the Department’s actions authorized under the Connecticut Water Diversion Policy Act (Act). The trial court endorsed in all material respects the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Act does not authorize the Department’s attempts to regulate Plaintiff’s excavation activities; (2) the Act does not authorize the Department to request a wetlands mitigation plan for the alteration of wetlands that had been authorized by prior municipal wetlands permit; and (3) the Department may not delay processing Plaintiff’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit application due to a pending water diversion permit application. View "Tilcon Connecticut, Inc. v. Comm’r of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

Pit River appealed the district court's order granting judgment on the pleadings of its action challenging BLM's continuation of geothermal leases. The court concluded that the district court incorrectly treated Pit River’s claims as arising under only section 1005(a) of the Geothermal Steam Act, 30 U.S.C. 1005(a). In this case, BLM’s 1998 decision to continue the 26 unproven leases in the Glass Mountain unit under section 1005(a) was issued simultaneously with its decision to reverse and vacate its earlier decision to extend those leases on a lease-by-lease basis under section 1005(g). Thus, Pit River’s challenge to the decisions implicates both section 1005(a) and section 1005(g). The court further concluded that Pit River's claims fall within the zone of interests under section 1005(g) and Pit River has stated a claim under section 1005(g) where BLM must conduct environmental, historical and cultural review under relevant federal law before granting lease extensions under section 1005(g). The district court did not consider the merits of Pit River’s Geothermal Steam Act claims, and determining whether BLM violated provisions of the Geothermal Steam Act will require careful analysis. Therefore, the court declined to rule on the merits of this issue and remanded for further proceedings. The court reversed the district court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings. View "Pit River Tribe v. BLM" on Justia Law

Lake and Peninsula Borough voters passed an initiative prohibiting large-scale mining activities that had a "significant adverse impact" on anadromous waters within the Borough. Pebble Limited Partnership and Alaska (first in separate suits, later consolidated) brought suit against the Borough claiming that the initiative was preempted by state law. Two of the initiative sponsors intervened to support the initiative. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Pebble and the State and enjoined the Borough from enforcing the initiative. The sponsors appealed, arguing that the dispute was unripe and that the superior court's preemption analysis was erroneous. But because at least the State has articulated a concrete harm stemming from the initiative's mere enactment, the Supreme Court found the case ripe for adjudication. And because the initiative purported to give the Borough veto power over mining projects on state lands within its borders, it seriously impeded the implementation of the Alaska Land Act, which granted the Department of Natural Resources "charge of all matters affecting exploration, development, and mining" of state resources. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in favor of Pebble and the State. View "Jacko v. Alaska" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Maine dairy farmer, had a business dispute with Defendant, his neighbor, and the former Commissioner of the Maine Department of Agriculture (DOA). Soon after taking office, the Commissioner recused himself from regulatory matters involving Plaintiff. The DOA eventually took four adverse regulatory actions against Plaintiff, including the action of ceasing to protect Plaintiff from the regulatory authority of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The DEP then issued several notices of violation of Plaintiff’s license conditions. As a result, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began administrative and judicial proceedings against Plaintiff that resulted in Plaintiff losing his farm. Plaintiff brought this suit for damages against Defendant, claiming that Defendant had violated his First Amendment rights through the adverse actions taken by the DOA. The district court awarded summary judgment against Plaintiff. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) summary judgment was correctly granted with respect tot he three adverse regulatory actions that the DOA was alleged to have taken after the Commissioner’s purported recusal; but (2) there was a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the Commissioner’s retaliatory intent was a substantial or motivating factor in the one alleged adverse action that occurred prior to the recusal. Remanded. View "McCue v. Bradstreet" on Justia Law

Petitioners, several biofuel producers and others, want EPA to approve E30, which is a fuel that contains about 30% ethanol, for use as a test fuel. EPA has adopted regulations that require vehicle manufacturers to test the emissions of new vehicles. Vehicle manufacturers must conduct emissions testing using a “test fuel” that must be a fuel that is “commercially available.” As a preliminary matter, the court concluded that petitioners have Article III standing to maintain their suit; petitioners are within the zone of interests protected by the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1); petitioners' challenge is timely; and petitioners' suit is ripe. On the merits, the court concluded that it is entirely commonsensical and reasonable for EPA to require vehicle manufacturers to use the same fuels in emissions testing that vehicles will use out on the road. Moreover, the regulation is rooted in (if not compelled by) the statute, which says that EPA must ensure that “vehicles are tested under circumstances which reflect the actual current driving conditions under which motor vehicles are used, including conditions relating to fuel.” Because the “commercially available” requirement is not arbitrary and capricious, the court denied the petition for review. View "Energy Future Coalition v. EPA" on Justia Law

ASARCO appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for CNA in ASARCO's suit for contribution under section 113(f)(3)(B) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(3)(B). The district court dismissed the complaint. The court held that a judicially approved settlement agreement between private parties to a CERCLA cost-recovery suit starts the clock on the three-year statute of limitations in section 113(g)(3)(B), and that a later bankruptcy settlement that fixes the costs of such a cost recovery settlement agreement does not revive a contribution claim that has otherwise expired. The court's holding that a later bankruptcy settlement with the government cannot revive an otherwise expired contribution claim ensures that a party does not receive a benefit that it had not paid for in the bankruptcy settlement. In this case, the court concluded that ASARCO's time to file contribution claims pursuant to the Wickland Agreement has expired, and that the Wickland Agreement covered all response costs at the Selby Site and the 2008 bankruptcy settlement merely fixed costs. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "ASARCO v. Celanese Chem. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's conclusion that the agencies' procedures leading to the designation of critical habitat for a threatened species - the southern distinct population segment of green sturgeon - complied with the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1533, and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. The district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed the case. The court concluded that, when considering the economic impact of its designation, NMFS complied with section 4(b)(2) of the ESA and was not required to follow the specific balancing-of-the-benefits methodology argued for by plaintiffs; section 4(b)(2) establishes a discretionary process by which the agency may exclude areas from designation, but does not set standards for when areas must be excluded from designation; accordingly, an agency’s discretionary decision not to exclude an area from designation is not subject to judicial review; and plaintiffs' National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(C), claim fails because NEPA does not apply to critical habitat designations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Building Indus. Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce" on Justia Law

Chesapeake Bay is plagued by dead zones with opaque water and algae blooms that render significant areas unable to support aquatic life. Surrounding jurisdictions recognize that the Bay absorbs far too much nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment to be a healthy ecosystem and threatens the livelihood of many. In 2010, the Environmental Protection Agency published the “total maximum daily load” (TMDL) of nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment that can be released into the Bay under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251. Opponents alleged that aspects of the TMDL that go beyond an allowable sum of pollutants (i.e., the most nitrogen, phosphorous, and sediment the Bay can safely absorb) exceeded EPA’s regulatory authority, because they may intrude on states’ role in regulating land use. The district court and Third Circuit ruled in favor of EPA, stating that Bay pollution is a complex problem affecting at least 17,000,000 people. Any solution will have winners and losers, considering the interests of: environmental groups, adjoining states, tourists, fishermen, municipal waste water treatment works, urban centers, rural counties, nonpoint source polluters, and agriculture. Congress determined, with the Act, that the states and the EPA could, working together, best allocate the benefits and burdens of lowering pollution. The Bay TMDL will require sacrifice as a consequence of the tremendous effort necessary to restore the Bay’s health. View "Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Envt'l Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Maryland residents, filed suit against defendants, current and former owners of an industrial property in Baltimore, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., alleging that the property has been contaminated by hazardous waste. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. In granting the motion to dismiss as to CBAC Gaming, the district court did not state whether its ruling was based upon Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of the complaint under either Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6) was incorrect; it would have been error to dismiss the complaint against CBAC Gaming for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) because a defense to liability under RCRA based on section 6905(a) does not implicate jurisdiction; and, under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court failed to identify how the complaint’s RCRA allegations are “inconsistent” with the the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387. The court concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged a claim against the City and Maryland Chemical. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing all of plaintiff's RCRA claims against CBAC Gaming, the City , and Maryland Chemical and remanded for further proceedings. View "Goldfarb v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law