Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

At dispute in this case was an environmental impact report (EIR) certified by the Board of Trustees (Board) of the California State University (CSU) that concerned the Board’s project to expand the campus of San Diego State University (SDSU) to accommodate more than 10,000 additional students. The SDSU project will contribute significantly to traffic congestion off-campus in the City of San Diego. The Board declined to use any of its budgeted funds, or any of CSU’s financial resources, for off-site environmental mitigation, finding that mitigation was infeasible. The Court of Appeal directed the Board to vacate its certification of the EIR. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the EIR in this case did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act where the Board erroneously assumed that a state agency may contribute funds for off-site environmental mitigation only through earmarked appropriations, to the exclusion of other available sources of funding. View "City of San Diego v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ." on Justia Law

WildEarth filed suit to enjoin the government's participation in the killing of predatory animals in Nevada. The district court dismissed the suit based on lack of standing, holding that WildEarth had not shown that its alleged injuries were caused by the government’s reliance on the programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS), and that, in any event, Nevada could choose to implement an independent predator damage management program if the federal government ceased its activities, so WildEarth’s injuries were not redressable. Claims One and Two challenged APHIS’s failure to supplement the 1994/1997 PEIS for its predator damage programs nationwide. The court concluded that WildEarth has standing for Claims One and Two because WildEarth member Don Molde would have standing to bring Claims One and Two on his own, and WildEarth also satisfies the other associational standing requirements. Claims Three and Four alleged that APHIS violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, by preparing an inadequate environmental assessment for Nevada and consequently failing to prepare a Nevada-specific EIS. The court concluded that WildEarth meets the injury-in-fact and causation requirements for standing to challenge APHIS’s predator damage management activities in Nevada based on Molde’s injuries, as well as the other requirements for associational standing, and that Molde's injury is redressable. Finally, the court concluded that the mere existence of multiple causes of an injury does not defeat redressability, particularly for a procedural injury. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "WildEarth Guardians v. USDA" on Justia Law

Rancho Pauma Mutual Water Company filed a petition to enforce a water rights judgment against the Yuima Municipal Water District entered about 60 years earlier. The District appealed the trial court's order, contending the trial court misunderstood subsequent amendments to the judgment and improperly limited the amount of water the District could withdraw. Rancho Pauma argued the appeal should have been dismissed as the order was not appealable. Upon review, the Court of Appeal rejected Rancho Pauma's argument regarding appealability of the order. The Court also rejected the District's arguments and affirmed the order. View "Rancho Pauma Mut. Water Co. v. Yuima Mun. Water Dist." on Justia Law

The City appealed the trial court's judgment directing it to approve Carson Harbor Village's application to convert its mobilehome park from a rental facility to a subdivision of resident-owned lots. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the City’s findings that allowing the conversion would be inconsistent with the open space element of its general plan by placing at risk a state and federally regulated wetlands area within the confines of the mobilehome park. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded. View "Carson Harbor Village v. City of Carson" on Justia Law

At dispute in this case was the Crow Water Compact - an agreement among the United States, the Crow Tribe, and the State - which recognizes a Tribal Water Right of the Crow Tribe and its members in a number of sources of water that abut or cross the Crow Indian Reservation in Montana. Here, a group of Crow tribal member Allottees - persons who hold interests in parcels of former Tribal land mostly created by the General Allotment Act - objected to the Compact in the Water Court, claiming that the United States breached its fiduciary duties to the Allottees by failing to protect their water rights in the Compact and failing to adequately represent them in Compact proceedings. The Water Court dismissed the Allottees’ objections. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court (1) applied the proper legal standard of review in dismissing the Allottees’ objections; (2) did not exceed its jurisdiction by dismissing the Allottees’ action rather than staying consideration of the Compact pending resolution of the Allottees’ action in federal district court; and (3) did not err in determining that the Allottees have rights to a share of the Crow Tribal Water Right and that the United States adequately represented the Allottees during the Compact negotiations. View "In re Crow Water Compact" on Justia Law

Farmers Cooperative Canal Company (FCCC) was incorporated in 1897 for the purpose of appropriating, transporting, and using irrigation water from the Teton River. FCCC acquired two water rights with priority dates of 1895 and 1897. FCCC constructed two reservoirs, Harvey Lake Reservoir in 1913 and Farmers Reservoir in 1942. Using its reservoirs, FCCC began to store portions of the water diverted to it during the year, which allowed it to release water as needed throughout the year. Based on its rights and these practices, FCCC filed statements of claim for its 1895 and 1897 rights, claiming use of the two reservoirs as part of those rights. Teton Cooperative Reservoir Company (TCRC) objected to FCCC’s claims, arguing that FCCC’s reservoirs were not part of its 1895 or 1897 rights and, instead, were new, independent appropriations not entitled to the priority dates of either claim. The Water Court concluded that the reservoirs could be used as part of the 1895 and 1897 rights because they did not expand the period of diversion, volume, or flow rate of those rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Water Court correctly concluded that FCCC’s reservoirs did not expand FCCC’s water rights and that the reservoirs could be included in FCCC’s 1895 and 1897 rights. View "Teton Coop. Reservoir Co. v. Farmer Coop. Canal Co." on Justia Law

Reichmann Land and Cattle, LLP managed a winter feeding facility. In 2011, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) issued an administrative order requiring Reichmann to obtain national-pollutant-discharge-elimination-system (NPDES) and state-disposal-system (SDS) permits or discontinue the winter feeding operation. Reichmann requested a contested case hearing. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that Reichmann’s winter feeding fields constituted a “concentrated animal feeding operation” and were not “pastures.” Therefore, Reichmann was required to apply for an NPDES/SDS permit. The Commissioner of the MPCA adopted the findings and conclusions of the ALJ. The court of appeals affirmed the Commissioner’s conclusion that Reichmann must apply for an SDS permit but reversed the Commission’s requirement that Reichmann must apply for an NPDES permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Reichmann need not obtain an NPDES permit because its winter feeding facility is not an animal feeding operation as required by 40 C.F.R. 122.23(b)(1); and (2) Reichmann is required to obtain an SDS permit because it does not qualify for the pasture exemption. View "In re Reichmann Land & Cattle, LLP" on Justia Law

Monsanto operated chemical plants and disposed of waste, including PCBs, at sites within Sauget Area 1. In 1999, the government filed suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), to recover EPA costs in removing hazardous substances from Area 1, which follows Dead Creek through Sauget and Cahokia, Illinois. Monsanto (later Pharmacia) and Solutia, original defendants, filed a third-party complaint adding Rogers, which formerly operated trucking depots near Area 1, alleging that Rogers washed trucks after hauling hazardous substances, releasing substances into drainage systems that emptied into Dead Creek. The government added Rogers as a defendant, and other defendants brought cross-claims. In 2003, the court dismissed other claims against Rogers because it had been found not liable on the government’s claim under 42 U.S.C. 9607. In 2007, the Supreme Court decided “Atlantic Research,” establishing that potentially responsible parties that incur voluntary CERCLA cleanup costs may seek contribution from other potentially responsible parties. Four defendants filed an amended cross-claim; Rogers filed counterclaims, alleging that Monsanto had arranged for transport and disposal of hazardous substances without informing Rogers of the nature of the substances involved. The four settled, with Rogers paying $50,000 if it cooperated in efforts to recover the difference from its insurer. The settlement released all claims “brought or alleged, or which could have been brought or alleged” in the EPA action. The agreement contemplated that cleanup of Rogers’s depot would be paid for out of settlement proceeds. Rogers leased that land from ConocoPhillips, which filed a separate action against Rogers, seeking contribution for its voluntary cleanup costs. Rogers filed a third-party complaint against Pharmacia and Solutia. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the subsequent dismissal, finding the claim barred, by the settlement, and sanctions against Rogers. View "Rogers Cartage Co. v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

An oyster farmer closed his farm after dozens of people became sick from eating his oysters. He sued the state Department of Environmental Conservation, alleging that the agency negligently informed him that the site of his farm was suitable for shellfish farming. The superior court granted summary judgment for the agency, concluding that the farmer’s misrepresentation claim was barred by state sovereign immunity. The farmer argued on appeal that the agency’s sovereign immunity defense was inapplicable because his complaint alleged a claim of negligence, not negligent misrepresentation. After review, the Supreme Court found the allegations in the farmer’s complaint supported only a negligent misrepresentation claim. Therefore, the Court affirmed the superior court's order granting summary judgment to the agency. View "Miller v. Dept. of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the Commission's issuance of a certificate of public convenience and necessity to Columbia Gas conditionally authorizing the company to extend a natural gas pipeline in Maryland. The court concluded that petitioners satisfied the requirements of Article III standing; the court has jurisdiction over the present controversy and the case is not moot; but petitioners' interest in protecting its members property from eminent domain in the face of alleged non-compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), and Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1341(a)(1), does not fall within the zone of interest protected by the NEPA, the CWA, and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. 71. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review for want of a legislatively conferred cause of action. View "Gunpowder Riverkeeper v. FERC" on Justia Law