Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

ONRC, an environmental group based in Oregon, field a citizen suit under section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act, (CWA), 33 U.S.C.1365(a), contending that the Bureau and other defendants violated the CWA by discharging pollutants from the Klamath Straits Drain (KSD) into the Klamath River without a permit. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. After the district court entered its decision in this case, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which held that the flow of water out of a concrete channel within a river does not rank as a discharge of pollutant under the CWA. A water transfer counts as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA only if the two separate bodies of water are “meaningfully distinct water bodies.” In this case, the court found that the record demonstrates that the waters of the KSD are not meaningfully distinct from those of the Klamath River. Therefore, a permit is not required under the CWA. The court affirmed the judgment. View "ONRC Action v. Bureau of Reclamation" on Justia Law

The water appropriation in this case was a surface water right to divert a specified volume of water from the North Loup River to “be used for irrigation purposes only.” Appellant held the appropriation and the lands covered by it. The Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (Department) issued a notice of preliminary determination of nonuse of the appropriation to Appellant. The Department cancelled the appropriation in its entirety, concluding that the lands designated under the appropriation had not been irrigation for more than five consecutive years and that Appellant had failed to establish sufficient cause for nonuse. The Supreme Court affirmed the Department’s order of cancellation, holding that Appellant failed to establish sufficient cause to excuse its nonuse of the appropriation and that the Department’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. View "In re Appropriation A-7603" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the Planning and Zoning Commission’s denial of its subdivision permit. Intervenor intervened in the appeal to the trial court pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-19(a), raising claims related to the environmental impact of the proposed development. After remanding the matter back to the Commission for further fact-finding relating to Intervenor’s claims, the trial court set aside the Commission’s findings and adjudicated the factual issues itself. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Intervenor and forbade Plaintiff’s proposed subdivision from going forward because of its potential environmental impact. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Environmental Protection Act does not empower a trial court to enter an injunction in an administrative appeal of a zoning decision involving an intervention under section 22a-19; and (2) the trial court could not have properly relied on Conn. Gen. Stat. 22a-18(b) through (d) to remand the matter back to the Commission for consideration of Intervenor’s claims or to independently adjudicate the factual issues raised in those claims. View "Hunter Ridge, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n" on Justia Law

In the third and final phase of the general adjudication of water rights in the Big Horn River, the Wyoming Board of Control recommended elimination of certain unused and unadjudicated water rights under Farmers Canal Permit 854, including that rights to irrigate Tract 109. Frank Mohr, the owner of Tract 109, objected, admitting that Tract 109 had never been adjudicated under the Farmers Canal Permit but was adjudicated under the Perkins Ditch Enlargment Permit. In conjunction with his application for that permit, Mohr’s predecessor submitted an affidavit relinquishing his right to water under the Farmers Canal Permit. The Special Master recommended elimination of Tract 109 from the Farmers Canal Permit, finding that relinquishment of the Farmers Canal Permit by Mohr’s predecessor was final and not subject to attack by Mohr. The district court approved the Special Master’s recommendation, concluding that Tract 109 was serviced under the Perkins Ditch Enlargement and not the Farmers Canal Permit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Mohr was bound by the acts of his predecessor-in-interest and the previous adjudication of water rights to Tract 109; and (2) the district court gave Mohr a fair opportunity to present his case in accordance with the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. View "In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River Sys." on Justia Law

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a groundwater extraction fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is statutorily vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of both the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D, subject to some constraints, but is also a charge for water service, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification. A pre-suit claim submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D and, because the matter was treated as a simple action for damages when it should have been treated as a petition for a writ of mandate, the trial court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Shortly after plaintiff John Ross signed a contract to sell his home, he learned of contamination on his property as a result of a leak that previously existed in an underground oil storage tank located on a neighboring property. The prospective purchaser then cancelled the contract, and plaintiffs commenced suit against the current and former owners of the neighboring property, and their respective insurers. After the insurers remediated the contamination on the property, the lawsuit proceeded on the claims for damages against all defendants on theories of negligence, strict liability, private nuisance and trespass, as well as violations of the Spill Compensation and Control Act. In this appeal, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether plaintiffs' claims were properly dismissed, and whether plaintiffs could maintain claims as third-party beneficiaries against the insurers which provided coverage to the former owner of the neighboring property where the underground storage tank was located. The Court found no basis for the claims of private nuisance or trespass against the homeowner defendants because there was no proof of negligence, recklessness, intentional conduct, or the conduct of an abnormally dangerous activity, by these parties. Additionally, the Court declined to expand these causes of action to impose strict liability upon defendants. Plaintiffs could not proceed with a direct claim against the defendant insurers for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in the insurance contracts because they did not hold an assignment of rights from the named insured, and there was no evidence that the named insured or her insurers agreed to recognize plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries of the insurance contracts. View "Ross v. Lowitz" on Justia Law

KS Wild filed suit against the Forest Services, alleging that the Forest Service had permitted suction dredge mining in the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest, which provides designated critical habitat for coho salmon, without consulting with NMFS, in violation of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2). The district concluded that KS Wild's notice of intent to sue under the ESA was deficient and, therefore, the district court dismissed the claim against the Forest Service for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that KS Wild's June notice letter was sufficient notice under the citizen suit notice provision of the ESA, and that there is subject matter jurisdiction in the district court over KS Wild’s suit to enforce the Forest Service’s obligations under Section 7. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Klamath-Siskiyou Wildlands v. MacWhorter" on Justia Law

Under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401, the EPA sets the maximum permissible atmospheric concentrations for harmful air pollutants, including ozone and classifies geographic areas as “attainment” or “nonattainment.” Each state drafts a State Implementation Plan (SIP) for each pollutant, identifying how it seeks to achieve or maintain attainment. SIPS and their revisions must be approved by EPA. If an area is in nonattainment for ozone, the SIP must include an automobile emissions testing program that meets certain performance standards. Illinois previously tested emissions of vehicles from all model years; that program was included in its SIP. Illinois exempted pre-1996 model-year vehicles that met certain standards, effective in 2007, but did not seek EPA approval until 2012. Indiana objected to the proposed change. EPA approved Illinois’s SIP revision in 2014. Indiana sought review, arguing that the change will decrease the likelihood that the “Chicago area,” which includes two Indiana counties, will achieve attainment with regard to ozone in the near future. Indiana provided analysis, indicating that Illinois’s (unauthorized) relaxation of testing procedures after 2007 caused a Chicago-area violation of the national ozone standard in 2011. The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana had standing, but that EPA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in approving the SIP revision. View "Indiana v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

M&M Constructors, owned by James McGlinchy, submitted a permit application to the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to mine a mineral deposit for use as construction rock. DNR denied M&M’s permit application because it concluded that the mineral deposit was common variety stone. Under the Common Varieties Act, “common varieties” of stone are not subject to “location,” meaning they could not be permitted through the mining law’s location process. M&M appealed to the superior court, arguing that DNR wrongly denied its permit application and also denied it procedural due process. After the superior court affirmed, M&M appealed to the Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed because M&M sought to mine for common variety stone that was "well within the ambit" of the Common Varieties Act, and it received "ample" due process in the DNR proceeding. View "McGlinchy v. Alaska Dept. of Nat. Resources" on Justia Law

Respondent AVX Corporation manufactured electronic parts at a plant in North Myrtle Beach. In 1980, respondent began using a chemical called trichloroethylene (TCE) as a degreaser to clean machine tools and parts. At some point, TCE escaped the plant and migrated beyond the boundaries of respondent's property, contaminating surrounding properties and groundwater. In December 1996, respondent entered into a consent order with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), in which respondent admitted that it had violated certain state environmental statutes and regulations. DHEC required respondent to implement a plan to clean up the TCE. In 2007, environmental testing performed in a ten block section north of respondent's plant showed levels of TCE greater than considered safe. On November 27, 2007, a group of residents who own real property near respondent's plant filed suit alleging causes of action for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability. The residents brought the suit both individually and as class representatives pursuant to Rule 23, SCRCP. The circuit court granted respondent's Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed appellants' claims with prejudice. In dismissing appellants' trespass, negligence, and strict liability claims, the circuit court stated that such claims "cannot be maintained when there is no evidence that alleged contamination has physically impacted [appellants'] properties." Further, with respect to appellants' nuisance claim, the circuit court noted that a claimant must plead an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of his or her property in order to state a claim for nuisance. Therefore, the circuit court found that because their properties are not contaminated, appellants' allegations did not state a claim for nuisance. Appellants appealed. We affirm the circuit court's dismissal of both appellants' nuisance and strict liability claims because the complaint alleges actual contamination of the property in pleading both of these causes of action. Since each of these claims was pled only on behalf of the Subclass A plaintiffs and not on behalf of appellants, we uphold the circuit court's dismissal of these two causes of action pursuant to Rule 220(c), SCACR. As explained below, however, we find the complaint sufficiently pleads a negligence cause of action on behalf of appellants, and therefore reverse the dismissal of this claim. View "Chestnut v. AVX Corporation" on Justia Law