Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioners seek review of a Vessel General Permit (VGP) issued by EPA to regulate the discharge of ballast water from ships under section 402(a) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1342(a). The court concluded that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing parts of the 2013 VGP. Therefore, the court granted the petition for review with respect to (1) EPAʹs decision to set the technology‐based effluent limits (TBELs) at the IMO Standard, (2) EPAʹs failure to consider onshore treatment for ballast water discharge, (3) EPAʹs decision to exempt pre‐2009 Lakers from the TBELS in the 2013 VGP permit, (4) EPAʹs narrative standard for water quality‐based effluent limits (WQBELs), and (5) the monitoring and reporting requirements established by EPA for WQBELs. The court remanded for further proceedings in these respects. The court denied the petition for review with respect to TBELs for viruses and protists and the monitoring and reporting requirements established by EPA for TBELs. View "NRDC v. EPA" on Justia Law

This matter concerned a parcel of commercial/industrial property located in Springettsbury Township, which was owned by appellee Harley-Davidson Motor Company. Approximately 110 acres of the parcel contained buildings and other improvements, and the remaining 119 acres were considered “excess” land. Previously, the United States Navy, from 1941 until 1964, and, later, a private firm, American Machinery and Foundry Company (“AMF”), with whom Harley-Davidson merged in 1969, used the parcel to operate a weapons manufacturing plant and, in the course of their business, buried numerous contaminants (as well as unexploded military ordnance) in the subsurface strata. This use caused significant environmental damage to the property. In 1993, Harley-Davidson repurposed a portion of the site to operate a motorcycle manufacturing plant. In 2003, the Assessment Office of York County notified Harley-Davidson that it intended to increase the parcel’s property tax assessment. Harley-Davidson filed an appeal with the York County Board of Assessment Appeals, which affirmed. Harley-Davidson then filed a de novo appeal with the trial court. Appellant Central York School District (“School District”) intervened, and the parties proceeded to a three-day bench trial to determine the parcel’s assessments for tax years 2004 through 2010, pursuant to the Second Class A and Third Class County Assessment Law. This appeal by allowance before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court involved the proper determination of the fair market value of Harley-Davidson's property for purposes of property tax assessment, including consideration of environmental contamination, remediation, and stigma, as well as the potential for future subdivision of the property. After review, the Supreme Court found: (1) hypothetical ways in which a property could be used by potential buyers are properly considered by an expert in evaluating what a willing buyer would pay for a property; (2) the potential effect of agreements concerning possible environmental remediation liability and ongoing environmental restrictions and maintenance is a relevant factor that must be taken into account when determining the fair market value of property, and (3) environmental stigma may be relevant to determining fair market value of real estate for tax purposes in appropriate circumstances. The Supreme concluded: (1) the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding that the School District’s expert valued the subject property as already subdivided, and, thus, its determination in this regard was reversed; (2) the Commonwealth Court properly concluded that these agreements were not accounted for by the trial court; thus, the Commonwealth Court’s remand was affirmed; and (3) the trial court properly relied upon the School District’s expert’s opinion regarding a 5% environmental stigma devaluation for the property; thus, reversed the Commonwealth Court’s rejection of the trial court’s reliance upon such stigma in its valuation of the property. View "Harley-Davidson v. Central York Sch District et al" on Justia Law

The Gallatin Gateway County Water & Sewer District sought a permit for a proposed wastewater treatment system. The Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) granted a wastewater discharge permit. Gateway Village, LLC, which owns land adjacent to and down-gradient from the proposed activities, requested judicial review of DEQ’s issuance of the permit and alleged that the discharge of wastewater into groundwater extending under its surface property would constitute a common law trespass. The district court determined that further environmental analysis was necessary and remanded the case to DEQ. The court also denied DEQ’s and the District’s motions for summary judgment or dismissal of Gateway Village’s trespass claim and denied Gateway Village’s request for attorneys’ fees. The Supreme Court (1) vacated the portion of the district court’s order addressing the trespass claim, holding that, having remanded the case, the district court should have declined to address the trespass claim; and (2) affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Gateway Village’s request for attorney’s fees. View "Gateway Village, LLC v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law

Sierra Club filed suit against the government seeking to set aside several federal agencies' regulatory approvals relating to the Flanagan South pipeline and to enjoin the pipeline's construction and operation in reliance on any such approvals. The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief and entered summary judgment in favor of the agencies and Enbridge. The court held that the federal government was not required to conduct National Environment Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370h, analysis of the entirety of the Flanagan South pipeline, including portions not subject to federal control or permitting; the court rejected Sierra Club’s Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251-1387, challenge to the Corps’s verifications of Flanagan South’s water crossings under Nationwide Permit 12 because the Corps was authorized to conduct its review on a regional rather than nationwide basis, and the Corps’s District Managers adequately supported their verification decisions; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sierra Club’s motion to supplement and amend its complaint, because the proposed new allegations would not have affected the dispositive legal analysis. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps" on Justia Law

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7491, and EPA regulations require states to evaluate the impact of emissions from certain pollution sources within their borders on atmospheric visibility in national parks and wilderness areas. After conducting this evaluation, Pennsylvania declined to require its sources to implement additional pollution controls, concluding that costs associated with the controls outweighed the limited visibility improvements they would produce, and set forth its conclusions in its 2010 State Implementation Plan (SIP), which was approved by the EPA in 2014. Conservation Groups sought review. The Third Circuit denied the petition to the extent it challenged the Transport Rule or Pennsylvania’s reliance on it in lieu of conducting source-specific best available retrofit technology (BART) analysis regarding SO2 and NOx emissions from each source with an electricity generating capacity of at least 750 megawatts. This appeal was not the appropriate vehicle to challenge EPA’s finding that the Transport Rule is better-than-BART or decision to approve state reliance on that rule; both stem from a final rule and separate rule-making proceeding not before the court. The court nonetheless vacated and remanded, finding that Pennsylvania’s source-specific BART analysis failed to comply with the Guidelines, and that the EPA arbitrarily approved the SIP despite these flaws. View "Nat'l Parks Conservation Ass'n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

Relevant to this appeal, set net and drift net commercial fishers both targeted sockeye salmon returning to the Kasilof and Kenai Rivers. The 2013 commercial fishing season in the Upper Cook Inlet saw strong sockeye salmon runs, but the Kenai River king salmon run was the weakest on record. The Alaska Department of Fish and Game (Department) regulated commercial and sport fishing. Attempting to achieve the minimum escapement goal for Kenai River kings while also keeping the strong sockeye run in check, and recognizing that set netters’ incidental harvest of those kings posed a greater risk to the king run than did drift netters’ substantially smaller incidental harvest, the Department’s Commissioner used her emergency order authority to limit time for and then close the set net fishery while also increasing the drift net fishery time. The set netters filed suit and sought an emergency preliminary injunction to re-open their fishery. The superior court declined to issue an injunction. The set netters amended their complaint to request a declaratory judgment recognizing the validity of the Board of Fisheries’ management plans and a permanent injunction directing the Department to follow those plans. They also sought damages, asserting constitutional claims and a claim for negligent or willful fisheries mismanagement. The superior court granted summary judgment in full to the Department and assessed an attorney’s fees award against the set netters, who appealed both orders. Because there were no genuine issues of material fact and the Department was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. Furthermore, because the Court found no abuse of discretion in the superior court’s attorney’s fees award, it affirmed that award. View "Cook Inlet Fisherman's Fund v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

In 1920 Peoples Gas and Beazer’s predecessor entered into a contract, Beazer agreed to to operate a plant for coke by-products and carbureted water gas (Chicago Coke), at Crawford Station, Chicago, using its patented coke-oven technology. Peoples agreed to purchase all of the gas and coke manufactured at the plant for distribution to consumers. Chicago Coke opened in 1921. Seven years later, Peoples acquired its assets. Later, Peoples purchased Coke’s stock and took over operations until 1956. Some of the land is still owned by Peoples. Peoples worked with the U.S. EPA and the Illinois EPA to investigate environmental contamination at the Crawford site and entered into agreements with the EPA. For investigation and removal at Crawford, Peoples incurred over $70,000,000 in costs. Peoples sued Beazer to recover costs under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) and 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(3)(B). The district court dismissed in part, finding that Peoples had resolved its liability to the government via administrative settlement and, therefore, only had a claim for contribution; that each consent order was subject to the three-year limitations period under 42 U.S.C. 9613(g)(3)(B); and that a contribution claim under the 2011 consent order was barred by Beazer’s operator liability. The court denied Beazer’s motion as to claim ownership liability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: the 1920 agreement bars Peoples’ contribution claims against Beazer. View "Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co, v. Beazer East Inc." on Justia Law

FWS conducted a formal consultation under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., and determined in a Biological Opinion (Biop) that FWS’s execution of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) would not jeopardize the Moapa dace. After CBD filed suit challenging the Biop, the district court granted summary judgment to FWS and Intervenors SNWA and CSI. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that CBD has standing; no evidence in the record demonstrates that FWS relied on improper factors, failed to consider important aspects of the problem, offered explanations for its decision that were counter to the evidence before it, or offered implausible explanations for its decision; and FWS’s determination that its participation in the MOA would not cause jeopardy to the Moapa dace was not arbitrary, capricious, or in violation of the ESA. View "Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. USFWS" on Justia Law

This proceeding was the third and final phase of the general adjudication of water rights in the Big Horn River. The State recommended adjudicating water rights for fifty-two acres of land owned by Hat Bar Cattle Company. Neighboring landowner Betty Whitt objected to the recommendation. After a contested case hearing, the Special Master recommended adjudicating the right to irrigate the fifty-two acres at issue. The district court adopted the Special Master’s report and recommendation and adjudicated Hat Bar’s rights. Whitt appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Special Master correctly applied the burden of proof and that the finding regarding beneficial use of the water were not clearly erroneous. View "Whitt v. Hat Bar Cattle Co." on Justia Law

The controversial “8 Washington Street Project,” a plan to develop waterfront land near the San Francisco Ferry Building, includes “Seawall Lot 351,” which is currently owned by the City and County of San Francisco through its Port Commission, subject to the public trust for uses benefiting the people of California. The public trust restriction on the use of Seawall Lot 351 is inconsistent with the 8 Washington Street Project as conceived by the project developers. To remove this inconsistency, the Developers and the City devised a plan to transfer Seawall Lot 351 out of the public trust and replace it with a different parcel in a land exchange agreement with the State Lands Commission (SLC). SLC approved land exchange agreement, finding that the agreement was a statutorily exempt activity under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21000. Opponents challenged SLC’s reliance on a CEQA exemption for “settlements of title and boundary problems by the State Lands Commission and to exchanges or leases in connection with those settlements.” The trial court held and the court of appeal affirmed that the proposed land exchange agreement is not statutorily exempt from CEQA review. View "Defend Our Waterfront v. Cal State Lands Comm'n" on Justia Law