Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

EPA exercised its authority under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401-7671q, to issue a Final Rule designating 29 areas as not meeting its new sulfur dioxide standards. Treasure State Resource Industry Association challenged the one designation for part of Yellowstone County, Montana, and U.S. Steel challenged the one for part of Wayne County, Michigan. The court upheld the Final Rule's designation of part of Yellowstone County as nonattainment and rejected the Association's argument that the data on which EPA relied were so unreliable that its reliance was arbitrary and capricious, and the Association's argument that EPA's application of the Act was retroactive within the meaning of Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Products. The court rejected the Association's remaining claims. The court concluded that U.S. Steel meets the requirements of standing by demonstrating a rederessable injury in fact, and rejected EPA's argument that its Final Rule is not final. On the merits, the court upheld EPA's designation of part of Wayne County as nonattainment because the court found neither a violation of the Act nor any arbitrariness in EPA's action. The court denied the petitions for review of the Final Rule and EPA's denial of petitions for reconsideration. View "Treasure State Resource v. EPA" on Justia Law

Diageo distills and ages whiskey in Louisville, resulting in tons of ethanol emissions. Ethanol vapor wafts onto nearby property where the ethanol combines with condensation to propagate whiskey fungus. Ethanol emissions are regulated under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401. Plaintiffs complained to the air pollution control district, which issued a Notice of Violation, finding that Diageo caused and allowed the emission of an air pollutant which crossed its property line causing an injury and nuisance to nearby neighborhoods and the public. Diageo disputed that its operations violated any district regulation. Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint, seeking damages for negligence, nuisance, and trespass, and an injunction. The district court concluded that state common law tort claims were not preempted by the Clean Air Act;” dismissed plaintiffs’ negligence claim on the ground that plaintiffs had not pled facts sufficient to establish that Diageo owed them a duty of care, or that Diageo had breached that duty; and declined to dismiss the remaining causes of action, concluding that plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient to establish nuisance and trespass. On interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, based on the Act’s text, the Act’s structure and history, and relevant Supreme Court precedents. View "Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs allege that, beginning in 2008, they have had a persistent film of dust over their properties, coming from Cane Run power plant, which is owned and operated by LGE. Louisville’s Air Pollution Control District, the agency charged with enforcing environmental regulations in Jefferson County, investigated and issued several Notices of Violation concerning particulate emissions and odors, finding finding that LGE allowed fly ash particulate emissions to enter the air and be carried beyond its property line. The NOVs were resolved by an administrative proceeding before Louisville’s Air Pollution Control Board, which resulted in an Agreed Board Order, requiring LGE to implement and comply, with a “Plant-Wide Odor, Fugitive Dust, and Maintenance Emissions Control Plan.” Plaintiffs provided a Notice of Intent to Sue, alleging violations of the Clean Air Act and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and state-law claims of nuisance, trespass, negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. The district court dismissed all federal law claims except the claim that Cane Run was operating without a valid Clean Air Act permit and rejected defendants’ argument that the Clean Air Act preempted plaintiffs’ state common law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, View "Little v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co." on Justia Law

The State Water Engineer granted the applications of Kobeh Valley Ranch, LLC to change the point of diversion, place of use, and manner of use of other of its existing rights in Eureka County. Eureka County and other appellants holding existing senior rights in Kobeh Valley petitioned the district court for judicial review of the State Engineer’s decision. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the State Engineer’s decision to grant KVR’s applications, when the result of the appropriations would conflict with existing rights, and based upon unsupported findings that mitigation would be sufficient to rectify the conflict, violated the Legislature’s directive that the State Engineer must deny use or change applications when the use or change would conflict with existing rights. View "Eureka County v. State Engineer" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) required that owners of underground storage tanks demonstrate their ability to pay cleanup costs and compensate third parties for bodily injury and property damage arising out of releases of petroleum products from their tanks. New Hampshire’s Oil Discharge and Disposal Cleanup Fund (ODD Fund) was an EPA-approved program that complied with the federal requirement. In 2003, the State sued several gasoline suppliers, refiners, and chemical manufacturers seeking damages for groundwater contamination allegedly caused by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). In 2012, petitioners sought a declaratory judgment and equitable relief against the State. Each petitioner was a “distributor” of oil under RSA chapter 146-D and paid fees into the ODD Fund. They alleged that “[t]o date, the costs of MTBE remediation in the State of New Hampshire has been paid for primarily through” the ODD Fund, and that that fund was financed, in part, through fees that they paid. Petitioners sought a declaration that those fees “are unconstitutional as the [State] has recovered and/or will recover funds from the MTBE Lawsuit for the cost of MTBE remediation,” and that those fees should be reimbursed to them from: (1) “the settlement proceeds the [State] has received and will receive through the MTBE Litigation”; (2) “any future recovery the [State] receives through the MTBE Litigation”; and (3) “[a]dditionally, or in the alternative, . . . from the funds recovered, and/or to be recovered in the future in the MTBE Litigation, . . . under principles of equitable subrogation and/or unjust enrichment.” On appeal, the petitioners argue that the trial court erred in ruling that they lacked standing to seek reimbursement of their fees from the settlement funds. They also argued that the trial court erred in ruling that their equitable claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Find View "Aranosian Oil Co., Inc. v. New Hampshire" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether a non-attorney trustee of a trust could proceed pro se before the water court. Appellant-trustee J. Tucker appealed the water court’s ruling that as trustee of a trust, he was not permitted to proceed because he was representing the interests of others. He also appealed the court’s order granting appellee Town of Minturn’s application for a finding of reasonable diligence in connection with a conditional water right. Appellant’s pro se issue was one of first impression before the Supreme Court, and the Court held that the water court correctly ruled that as a non-attorney trustee, appellant could not proceed pro se on behalf of the trust. In light of that determination, the Court did not address appellant’s other arguments regarding the sufficiency of the verification. View "Tucker v. Town of Minturn" on Justia Law

In 1976, the City of Santa Cruz sought to protect its urban forest by adopting the “Heritage Tree Ordinance,” which governs the protection of large trees and trees having other significance. The city later adopted the “Heritage Tree Removal Resolution,” which governs the removal of heritage trees. In 2013, the city amended both, concluding that these amendments were categorically exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21000) because they assured the “maintenance, restoration, enhancement, and protection” of natural resources and the environment. Save Our Big Trees unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate directing the city to set aside its amendments for failure to comply with CEQA. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the city had the burden to demonstrate with substantial evidence that the amendments fell within a categorical exemption to CEQA and failed to meet that burden. View "Save Our Big Trees v. City of Santa Cruz" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Valley Authority, a federal agency, operates power plants that provide electricity to nine million Americans in the Southeastern United States, 16 U.S.C. 831n-4(h). Like private power companies, TVA must comply with the Clean Air Act. In 2012, the Environmental Protection Agency told TVA that it needed to reduce emissions from some of the coal-fired units at its plants, including the Drakesboro, Kentucky, Paradise Fossil Plant. TVA considered several options, including maintaining coal-fired generation by retrofitting the Paradise units with new pollution controls and switching the fuel source from coal to natural gas. After more than a year of environmental study, TVA decided to switch from coal to natural-gas generation and concluded that the conversion would be better for the environment. TVA issued a “finding of no significant impact” on the environment stemming from the newly configured project. The district court denied opponents a preliminary injunction, and granted TVA judgment on the administrative record. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that TVA acted arbitrarily in failing to follow the particulars of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act for making such decisions, and in failing to consider the project’s environmental effects in an impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act. View "Ky. Coal Ass'n, Inc. v. Tenn. Valley Auth." on Justia Law

Metro approved the Westside Subway Extension Project in May 2012, which will extend the Metro Purple Line heavy rail transit (HRT) subway system to the Westside of Los Angeles. To reach the Constellation station, the subway will travel through a tunnel to be constructed under Beverly Hills High School. The School District and the City filed petitions for writ of mandate, challenging Metro's approval of the Project. The trial court denied the petitions. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports Metro’s decision not to recirculate the environmental impact statement/environmental impact report (EIS/EIR), and that the EIS/EIR adequately discussed air pollution and public health impacts. The court also concluded that Metro did not violate the statutory requirements in conducting the transit hearing, that the City received a full and fair hearing, and that substantial evidence supports Metro’s decision and findings of fact in light of the issues tendered for hearing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Beverly Hills USD v. LA Metro." on Justia Law

James Pyne, who died during these proceedings, was the founder and sole stockholder of Remet Corporation. Pyne sold Remet’s stock and facilities, along with real property he had been leasing to Remet, to Burmah Castro Holding, Inc. The sales agreement contained an indemnification provision obligating Pyne to indemnify, defendant, and holder the buyer harmless for certain environmental losses. Remet later received a letter from the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) notifying Remet that it was a potentially responsible party for environmental contamination at the Erie Canal Site adjacent to Remet’s real property. Remet filed notices of claim against Pyne’s estate seeking indemnification for environmental liabilities under the sales agreement. Remet then brought this action against the Estate asserting claims for contractual and common-law indemnification. Supreme Court granted Remet summary judgment on liability. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that DEC’s letter did not require Remet to take action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the letter was sufficiently coercive and adversarial as to require action in connection with any environmental law pursuant to the sales agreement; and (2) Remet was entitled to contractual indemnification for past and future environmental losses arising out of DEC’s investigation and remediation of the Erie Canal Site. View "Remet Corp. v. Estate of Pyne" on Justia Law