Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) prepared and certified a programmatic environmental impact report (EIR) for a seven-year program to eradicate an invasive pest, the light brown apple moth (LBAM), but “at the last minute” approved instead a seven-year program to control LBAMs based on new information that eradication was no longer attainable. The EIR did not evaluate control as a reasonable alternative to eradication, and there was no supplemental environmental review in connection with the last-minute change. In two appeals, consolidated for the Court of Appeal's review, challenged trial court decisions that denied petitions for writ of administrative mandamus that asserted California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) violations and challenging the program approved by the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDFA) and its former Secretary A.G. Kawamura. Appellants contended the EIR violated CEQA by making assumptions unsupported by substantial evidence and by inadequately addressing environmental impacts, a reasonable range of alternatives, and cumulative impacts. Appellants also contended the CDFA’s “last-minute” approval of a control program instead of the eradication program rendered the environmental review deficient in failing to provide an accurate and stable project description, inadequately discussing alternatives, and improperly “segmenting” the project by reviewing a seven-year program but approving a seven-year program that will have to continue beyond seven years. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that, even before the new information came to light that eradication was no longer attainable, the EIR violated CEQA by giving the project’s “objective” an artificially narrow definition (“eradication of LBAMs”) and thereby omitting analysis of pest control as a reasonable alternative to the eradication program. The EIR acknowledged the project’s “purposes” included protecting California native plants and agricultural crops from damage. "The EIR’s omissions leave the record devoid of evidence to prove CDFA’s claim that the last-minute change was legally acceptable because the adopted control program was narrower than the EIR’s eradication program." The trial court judgments were reversed and the cases remanded for further proceedings. View "North Coast Rivers Alliance v. Kawamura" on Justia Law

The Lieutenant Governor declined to certify a proposed ballot initiative that would ban commercial set net fishing in nonsubsistence areas, reasoning that the initiative was a constitutionally prohibited appropriation of public assets. The superior court approved the initiative, concluding that set netters were not a distinct commercial user group and that the legislature and Board of Fisheries would retain discretion to allocate the salmon stock to other commercial fisheries. After the Supreme Court's review of the matter, it concluded that set netters were a distinct commercial user group that deserved recognition in the context of the constitutional prohibition on appropriations. The Court therefore reverse the superior court’s judgment because this proposed ballot initiative would have completely appropriated salmon away from set netters and prohibited the legislature from allocating any salmon to that user group. View "Lieutenant Governor of the State of Alaska v. Alaska Fisheries Conservation Alliance" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned individual objectors to the Crow Water Compact, an agreement to distribute and manage water rights among the United States, the Crow Tribe, and the State of Montana. The Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court’s order, holding (1) the Water Court applied the proper legal standard of review in approving the Compact in the final order; (2) the Objectors failed to meet their burden of showing that the Compact was unreasonable and materially injured their interest; and (3) the Compact negotiation process did not violate the Objectors’ due process rights. View "In re Crow Tribe Water Compact" on Justia Law

Through Pennsylvania’s Land Recycling and Environmental Remediation Standards Act, ("Act 2"), the General Assembly created a scheme for establishing “cleanup standards” applicable to voluntary efforts to remediate environmental contamination for which a person or entity may bear legal responsibility. Appellant EQT Production Company (“EPC”), owned and operated natural gas wells in the Commonwealth. In May 2012, the company notified Appellee, the Department of Environmental Protection (the “Department” or “DEP”), that it had discovered leaks in one of its subsurface impoundments containing water that had been contaminated during hydraulic fracturing operations. Subsequently, EPC cleared the site of impaired water and sludge and commenced a formal cleanup process pursuant to Act 2. In May 2014, the agency tendered to EPC a proposed “Consent Assessment of Civil Penalty,” seeking to settle the penalty question via a payment demand of $1,270,871, subsuming approximately $900,000 attending asserted ongoing violations. EPC disputed the Department’s assessment, maintaining that: penalties could not exceed those accruing during the time period in which contaminants actually were discharged from the company’s impoundment; all such actual discharges ended in June 2012; and the Act 2 regime controlled the extent of the essential remediation efforts. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether ECT had the right to immediately seek a judicial declaration that the DEP's interpretation of the Act was erroneous. The Court held that the impact of the Department’s threat of multi-million dollar assessments against EPC was sufficiently direct, immediate, and substantial to create a case or controversy justifying pre-enforcement judicial review via a declaratory judgment proceeding, and that exhaustion of administrative remedies relative to the issues of statutory interpretation that the company has presented was unnecessary. View "EQT Production Co. v. DEP" on Justia Law

Friends petitioned the Service to list certain species of sturgeon as endangered or threatened. The Service went more than 12 months without making any determinations – initial or final – on Friends’ petition. The district court held that Friends did not give the Service adequate notice before suing and dismissed the complaint. Because Friends did not wait until after the issuance of the positive initial determinations to provide 60 days’ notice of the allegedly overdue final determinations, its suit seeking to compel the final determinations is barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Friends of Animals v. Ashe" on Justia Law

Appellees were 34 individuals who owned or resided on properties adjacent to a 220-acre farm in York County, owned since 1986 by appellant George Phillips. Phillips operated his own farm, Hilltop Farms, and leased part of the land to appellant Steve Troyer, who raised various crops. Appellants Synagro Central, LLC and Synagro Mid-Atlantic are corporate entities engaged in the business of recycling biosolids for public agencies for land application; they contracted with municipalities to recycle and transport biosolids, which were then used as fertilizer. Over approximately 54 days between March 2006 and April 2009, approximately 11,635 wet tons of biosolids were applied to 14 fields at the farm. The biosolids were spread over the fields’ surface and not immediately tilled or plowed into the soil. Appellees contended that as soon as the biosolids were applied, extremely offensive odors emanated. In July 2008, appellees filed two similar three-count complaints, which were consolidated; they also filed an amended complaint in 2010. In Count I, appellees alleged appellants’ biosolids activities created a private nuisance. Count II alleged negligence by appellants in their duty to properly handle and dispose of the biosolids. Count III alleged appellants’ biosolids activities constituted a trespass on appellees’ land. Appellees sought injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. In October 2009, after receiving the third notice of violation from the PaDEP, Synagro suspended the use of biosolids at Hilltop Farms, rendering appellees’ request for injunctive relief moot. The last application of biosolids at the farm occurred in April 2009. Appellants moved for summary judgment on the basis that appellees’ nuisance claims were barred by the one-year statute of repose in section 954(a) of the Right To Farm Act (RTFA). The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether a trial court or a jury should have determined the applicability of section 954(a), and whether the trial court properly concluded the land application of biosolids as fertilizer is a “normal agricultural operation,” rendering section 954(a) applicable. The Court held that section 954(a) was a statute of repose; its applicability, as determined by statutory interpretation, was a question of law for courts to decide. Further, the trial court properly held biosolids application fell within the RTFA’s definition of “normal agricultural operation,” which barred appellees’ nuisance claims. Accordingly, the Court reversed the portion of the Superior Court’s order that reversed the grant of summary judgment for appellants on the nuisance claims; the remainder of the order was affirmed. View "Gilbert v. Synagro Central" on Justia Law

Dalton Trucking and ARTBA challenged the EPA's final decision authorizing California regulations intended to reduce emissions of particulate matter and oxides of nitrogen from in-use nonroad diesel engines. Dalton Truck sought review of the same EPA decision at the same time in the Ninth Circuit, where ARTBA intervened in Dalton Trucking's behalf. Before this court, Dalton Trucking and ARTBA argue that the Ninth Circuit is the proper venue for their challenges and seek dismissal or transfer of their petitions for review. The court agreed that, pursuant to section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1), venue is not proper in this court because EPA’s decision does not satisfy either of the statutory avenues for filing in the D.C. Circuit. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petitions for review. View "Dalton Trucking, Inc. v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Bar Area Air Quality Management District passed a resolution adopting new thresholds of significance for air pollutants and published new California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) air quality guidelines. The California Building Industry Association (CBIA) filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging these thresholds. The superior court entered judgment in favor of CBIA, concluding that the District’s promulgation of the 2010 thresholds was a “project” subject to CEQA review, and the District was bound to evaluate the thresholds’ potential impact on the environment. The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the promulgation of the 2010 thresholds was not a project subject to CEQA review. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) CEQA does not generally require an agency to consider the effects of existing environmental conditions on a proposed project’s future users or residents except in specific instances; and (2) because the Court of Appeal’s analysis of CBIA’s petition for writ relief did not address potentially important arguments for and against such relief in light of CEQA’s requirements as interpreted in this opinion, this case is remanded so the court may have an opportunity to address those issues. View "Cal. Building Ind. Ass’n v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist." on Justia Law

In 1982, Teton Co-Operative Canal Company (Teton Canal) filed a statement of claim for existing water rights for the Eureka Reservoir. Teton Cooperative Reservoir Company (Teton Reservoir) objected to Teton Canal’s claims. The Water Master held a hearing in 2012 and, in 2015, adjudicated Teton Canal’s claims. Teton Reservoir appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the Water Court’s order regarding Teton Canal’s water right claims to the Eureka Reservoir, holding that the Water Court erred in determining that off-stream water storage in the Eureka Reservoir was included as part of Teton Canal’s April 18, 1890 Notice of Appropriation. Remanded to the Water Court to assign a new priority date to Teton Canal’s rights to the Eureka Reservoir and for further proceedings. View "Teton Co-op Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir Co." on Justia Law

The government filed suit against Dico to recover damages for cleanup costs after Dico sold buildings to SIM, which were then torn down and stored in an open field where PCBs were later found. The government alleged that Dico violated the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3), and the EPA order governing use of the buildings at issue. The district court found Dico liable for both violations. The court reversed and vacated the district court's summary judgment order holding Dico "arranged" for disposal of hazardous materials as a matter of law where the evidence does not demonstrate that Dico was merely trying to get rid of a hazardous substance. The fact that some parts from the buildings were worthless after disassembly does not necessarily transform a potentially legitimate sale of the buildings in which Dico would receive some commercial value into a ploy to simply get rid of the buildings just to dispose of the hazardous substance. The court vacated the district court's order with respect to any response costs associated with the issue of "arranger" liability. The court also reversed the award of punitive damages because the Fund did not incur any costs as a result of Dico's violation of the EPA Order. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "United States v. Dico, Inc." on Justia Law