Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Sierra Club brought a citizen suit seeking civil penalties against Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company “(OG&E)” for alleged violations of the Clean Air Act. Sierra Club claimed that in March and April 2008, OG&E, the owner and operator of a coal-fired power plant in Muskogee, modified a boiler at the plant without first obtaining an emission-regulating permit as required under the Act. Because Sierra Club filed its action more than five years after construction began on the plant, the district court dismissed its claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on statute of limitations grounds. The court also dismissed Sierra Club’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because these remedies were predicated on the unavailable claim for civil penalties. Finding no error in the district court's conclusions, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Sierra Club v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

In a contested enforcement action, the Department of Environmental Management (DEM) ordered Power Test Realty Company Limited Partnership to remediate a site onto and under which petroleum had been released and imposed an administrative penalty. A hearing justice with the superior court affirmed. Power Test filed a writ of certiorari, arguing that the superior court erred in imposing liability upon it because it did not cause the discharge of petroleum, there was insufficient evidence demonstrating that it had knowledge of the leaching petroleum, and it owned only a portion of the contaminated site. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Power Test was correctly held liable under the OPCA even where Power Test did not cause the initial discharge of contaminants; (2) there was legally competent evidence to conclude that Power Test had knowledge that its property was the source of petroleum contamination; and (3) the superior court properly determined that DEM did not err in holding Power Test liable for remediating both its own property and a nearby parcel. View "Power Test Realty Co. Ltd. P’ship v. Coit" on Justia Law

Energy Answers seeks to build a waste incinerator in Arecibo, Puerto Rico. Sierra Club seeks to vacate a 1980 rule promulgated by EPA that implements the Clean Air Act's (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7470 et seq., and 7501 et seq., permitting scheme as it relates here to the regulation of the waste incinerator’s lead emissions. The court concluded that, because Sierra Club does not bring its petition within 60 days of any after-arising grounds, its petition is time-barred under 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition. View "Sierra Club de Puerto Rico v. EPA" on Justia Law

This appeal stems from a dispute between Shell and Greenpeace over the search for oil in the Chukchi Sea. The parties now dispute the propriety of a preliminary injunction entered by the district court to protect Shell from certain more vigorous and more intrusive aspects of Greenpeace’s activism. The court did not reach any of Greenpeace's challenges to the injunction because the court concluded that the appeal is moot. Here, the preliminary injunction has expired and will not be renewed. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal and remanded for further proceedings. View "Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the FAA's decision that no Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is necessary to commence operating commercial passenger service at Paine Field in Snohomish County. The court held that the scope of the FAA's demand-based projections were not arbitrary and capricious. In this case, the FAA determined that there were no connected actions for this project and petitioners have failed to provide anything more than mere speculation that the FAA’s actions now will lead to more aircraft activity at Paine Field in the future than covered in the Environmental Assessment (EA). Therefore, it was not arbitrary for the FAA to have included no connected actions in the final EA. The court also concluded that the FAA’s Finding of No Significant Impact was not predetermined by the creation of an optimistic schedule for completing the environmental review or statements favoring commercial service at Paine Field. Here, the FAA performed its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370h, obligations in good faith and did not prematurely commit resources to opening the terminal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "City of Mukilteo v. US DOT" on Justia Law

Study of the I-69 extension between Evansville and Indianapolis began in 1944. The 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Act designated a new route from Indianapolis to Memphis,, via Evansville as a “high priority corridor” for development. As the project progressed, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) divided the project into two “tiers” for environmental analysis. After the plans were finalized, construction work on the six sections of Tier 2 began; 90 percent of the work on the extension is complete. The FHWA and Indiana Department of Transportation issued a Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Tier 2, Section 4, in 2010. A Final Environmental Impact Statement and a Record of Decision issued in 2011. The agencies selected the final route and construction plan for Section 4 after reviewing 48 options and produced a record reflecting consideration of impact on historic sites, geological formations, and air-quality, among other factors. Pursuant to its obligations under the Endangered Species Act, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service engaged in consultation and issued a Biological Opinion regarding the possible impact of tree-clearing on the endangered Indiana bat. Opponents filed suit. After a lengthy period of inactivity by Plaintiffs, including several missed case management deadlines, the district court granted summary judgment upholding the approvals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Citizens for Appropriate Rural Roads v. Foxx" on Justia Law

After analyzing the effects of grazing domestic sheep in the Payette, the Service prepared a draft supplemental environmental impact statement (DSEIS), an update to the DSEIS, and a final supplemental environmental impact statement (FSEIS) and Record of Decision (ROD). The Service concluded that there is a significant risk of fatal disease to the small and insular populations of bighorn sheep in the Payette and decided in the ROD to close to domestic sheep grazing approximately 70% of the allotments on which grazing had been permitted. Wool Growers challenged the Service's decision. The court concluded that, because the lack of consultation of the Agricultural Research Service (ARS) did not prevent the Service or the public from considering information about the uncertainties in transmission of disease from domestic to bighorn sheep such as ARS would have offered, and because information about the precise mechanisms of such transmission was not a basis of the Service’s decision, no prejudice resulted from the lack of consultation. The court also concluded that the Service did not act arbitrarily or capriciously or abuse its discretion by declining to supplement the FSEIS. Finally, the court rejected Wool Growers’ challenge to the modeling the Service used to analyze bighorn sheep home ranges and movement, and the potential impacts of various management alternatives. Because the Service committed no reversible error in preparing the FSEIS and ROD, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Idaho Wool Growers Ass'n v. Vilsack" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit challenging the Service's withdrawal of its 2010 proposal to list the dunes sagebrush lizard, whose habitat is in New Mexico and Texas, as endangered. Between the time the Service proposed listing the lizard and the time it decided to withdraw that proposal, the Service received updated information about the conservation efforts in the two States and by the Bureau of Land Management in New Mexico. Based on this information, the Service concluded that “current and future threats are not of sufficient imminence, intensity, or magnitude to indicate that the . . . lizard is in danger of extinction (endangered), or likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future (threatened), throughout all or a significant portion of its range.” The court concluded that appellants failed to show the Service did not rationally apply its policy in evaluating the Texas plan inasmuch as the Service’s factual conclusions are supported by substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Defenders of Wildlife v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Fellows filed the underlying complaint challenging the Water Commissioner’s administration of water under the Perry v. Beattie decree. The district court dismissed Fellows’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that Fellows’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim. Fellows then requested the district court to certify a question to the Water Court. The district court granted the request. The Water Court entered a final order that tabulated the water rights necessary to address Fellows’s underlying complaint. By the time of its certification order, the water claims had been adjudicated in a temporary preliminary decree, and therefore, the Water Court ordered that the matter be closed and returned to the district court. The Perry Defendants filed a motion to alter or amend the Water Court’s judgment. The Water Court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Water Court correctly followed the law of the case; (2) Fellows’s petition for certification was proper; and (3) the Water Court did not err in defining the scope of the controversy, in determining the purpose of the tabulation, and in tabulating the applicable rights involved in the controversy. Remanded. View "Fellows v. Saylor" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706 et seq., challenging FWS's designation of an area of Alaska’s coast and waters as critical habitat for the polar bear. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs on two grounds: the district court faulted FWS for failing to identify specifically where and how existing polar bears utilize the relatively small portion of critical habitat designated as Units 2 and 3; and the district court faulted FWS for failing to provide Alaska with adequate justification for adopting a final rule not fully consistent with the State’s submitted comments. The district court vacated the entire designation. In this case, the standard FWS followed, looking to areas that contained the constituent elements required for sustained preservation of polar bears, was in accordance with statutory purpose and hence could not have been arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court concluded that FWS’s designation of Unit 2 as critical denning habitat was not arbitrary and capricious. Unit 2 contains areas requiring protection for both birthing and acclimation of cubs, and FWS adequately explained its treatment of the relatively few areas of known human habitation. The court also concluded that, with respect to Units 2 and 3, FWS's definition of the denning habitat was in accord with the statutory purposes and it was not arbitrary and capricious for FWS to include areas necessary for such related denning needs. The court further concluded that FWS provided adequate justification to Alaska pursuant to section 4(i) of the ESA. Finally, the court concluded that the district court court correctly upheld the no-disturbance zone as a part of Unit 3 because it provides refuge from human disturbance; FWS’s assessment of the potential economic impacts was not arbitrary and capricious; and the district court was correct in denying Alaska’s claim, although the court did not agree with the district court to the extent that it held that Section 7 of the ESA creates any independent duty to consult apart from the requirements of Section 4. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Alaska Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Jewel" on Justia Law