Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Ranco Sand and Stone Corporation, the owner of two parcels of contiguous property in an area zoned for residential use, applied to rezone one parcel to heavy industrial use. The Town of Smithtown’s Planning Board, acting as the lead agency under State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), adopted a resolution issuing a positive declaration that rezoning the parcel may have a significant effect on the environment and required Ranco to prepare a draft environmental impact statement (DEIS). Ranco commenced this N.Y. C.P.L.R. 78 proceeding against the Town and the members of the Town Board, seeking to annul the positive declaration and requesting mandamus relief directing the Town to process the rezoning application without a DEIS. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding the matter not ripe for judicial review. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the SEQRA positive declaration was the initial step in the decision-making process and did not give rise to a justiciable controversy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Town’s SEQRA positive determination was not ripe for judicial review. View "Ranco Sand & Stone Corp. v. Vecchio" on Justia Law

The Coalition filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., challenging the issuance of a 2009 Finding Of No Significant Impact based on a 2009 Environmental Assessment for redevelopment of a four-block site owned by the United States Navy in downtown San Diego. On appeal, the Coalition challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Federal Defendants, as well as the denial of the Coalition's motion for summary judgment against the Federal Defendants. In San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, this court held that while “security considerations may permit or require modification of some . . . NEPA procedures,” such modifications do not absolve an agency for its legal duty to fulfill NEPA’s requirements, such as public contribution to the NRC’s decision-making process. The court determined that the NRC’s categorical dismissal of the possibility of a terrorist attack was unreasonable and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, given the government’s assessed general risk of terrorism, the location of the redevelopment project, and the military commands to be housed in the Navy Broadway Complex, the court rejected the Federal Defendants’ arguments against applying Mothers for Peace I and find that they must address the risk of a possible terrorist attack in their NEPA analysis. The court further concluded that Federal Defendants did not abuse their discretion in determining that there was no significant impact from the possible environmental effects of potential terrorism at the Navy Broadway Complex, and a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement is thus not required. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "SDNBCC v. USDOD" on Justia Law

The parties to this appeal were Gene Curry, Cheryl Curry, and Curry Cattle Co. (collectively, Curry) and Pondera County Canal & Reservoir Company (Pondera). Both Curry and Pondera owned rights to divert waters from Birch Creek. Curry filed a complaint alleging interference with his water rights by Pondera. The Montana Water Court determined that Pondera was entitled to claim beneficial use based on the maximum number of shares authorized by the Montana Carey Land Board, a service area for Pondera’s place of use, the extent of the acreage included in the service area, the adjustment of the flow rate for two claims, and the reversal of the dismissal of a third claim. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the Water Court (1) did not err when it determined that Pondera’s rights were not limited by the actual acreage historically irrigated by its shareholders; (2) did not err in concluding that Pondera was entitled to a service area; (3) erred when it determined the acreage included in the service area; (4) applied the appropriate standard of review and did not misapprehend the effect of the evidence; and (5) did not err in tabulating two of the claims at issue. View "Curry v. Pondera County Canal & Reservoir Co." on Justia Law

The Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. (UMMP) appealed the trial court's denial of its petition for writ of mandate seeking to set aside under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) an ordinance prohibiting mobile medical marijuana dispensaries in the City of Upland. UMMP contended the City's adoption of the ordinance violated CEQA because the City did not first consider the ordinance's reasonably foreseeable environmental impacts. The City argued that the ordinance was not a "project" subject to CEQA, or was exempt under CEQA's "common-sense" exemption for projects that have no potential to cause a significant effect on the environment. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the ordinance was not a project under CEQA, and affirmed on that basis. View "Union of Medical Marijuana Patients, Inc. v. City of Upland" on Justia Law

The Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc. (“IGWA”) and the City of Pocatello filed separate appeals to a district court order, affirming in part and vacating in part an order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”) that curtailed junior ground water pumping in the Eastern Snake Plains Aquifer (“ESPA”). In late 2011, Rangen, Inc. petitioned for a delivery call, alleging that junior ground water pumping in the ESPA was materially injuring its water rights sourced from the Martin-Curren Tunnel. The Director held an evidentiary hearing in the Spring of 2013. As relevant to these appeals, the Director concluded: (1) that the Martin-Curren Tunnel was a surface water source and, therefore, not subject to the Ground Water Act; (2) ground water pumping in the ESPA was materially injuring Rangen’s water rights and that a curtailment order was appropriate; (3) however, the benefits of curtailment diminished significantly if the order extended to pumping east of a volcanic rift zone in the ESPA known as the Great Rift. The Director issued a curtailment order on January 24, 2014, mandating that ground water users located west of the Great Rift, with water rights junior to Rangen’s, refrain from diverting water from the ESPA. Rangen and IGWA petitioned for judicial review of the Director’s decision. The district court upheld the Director’s decision in significant part but vacated the Director’s application of a trim line at the Great Rift, concluding that the Director did not have a legal basis to apply a trim line in this case. Rangen, IGWA, and Pocatello each appealed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court, save and except for the district court’s vacation of the Great Rift trim line, which was reversed. View "Idaho Ground Water Appropriators v. Dept of Water Resources" on Justia Law

Boulder County chose to develop "the Bailey Farm" into a public open-space park which would feature several ponds formed from abandoned gravel pits filled with groundwater. The County had to replace out-of-priority stream depletions caused by evaporation from those ponds. To meet this obligation, the County filed an application for underground water rights, approval of a plan for augmentation, a change of water rights, and an appropriative right of substitution and exchange. The water court dismissed the application without prejudice, and the County now appeals that judgment. The components of the County’s application were interdependent, such that approval of the application as a whole hinged on approval of the plan for augmentation, which in turn hinged on approval of the change of water rights. To ensure this change would not unlawfully expand the Bailey Farm's water rights, the County conducted a parcel-specific historical consumptive use (“HCU”) analysis of that right. The water court found this HCU analysis inadequate for several reasons and therefore concluded the County failed to carry its burden of accurately demonstrating HCU. The pivotal consideration in this case was whether the County carried its burden of proving HCU. Like the water court, the Supreme Court concluded it did not. The Court therefore affirmed the water court’s judgment on that basis. View "Cty. of Boulder v. Boulder & Weld Cty. Ditch Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case were municipal separate storm sewer system discharge permits the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) most recently issued to several counties and one city (collectively, the Counties). Multiple organizations challenged the permits in several respects, including (1) the requirement to restore impervious surface area, (2) the requirement to submit plans for total maximum daily loads (TMDLs), (3) the monitoring requirements, and (4) the public’s ability to participate in the development of the permits. The Supreme Court upheld the MDE’s decision to issue the permits on all grounds, holding (1) the MDE’s decision to include a twenty percent restoration requirement in the permits was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious; (2) the MDE’s requirement that the Counties submit plans for all Environmental Protection Agency-approved TMDLs one year after the issuance of the permits complied with 40 C.F.R. 122.44(d)(1)(vii)(B); (3) the MDE’s monitoring scheme is sufficient to comply with the applicable federal regulations; and (4) the permits satisfy public participation requirements. View "Dep’t of Env’t v. Anacostia Riverkeeper" on Justia Law

The City of Poway (Poway) was known as the "City in the Country." Harry Rogers had operated a horse boarding facility called the Stock Farm in Poway, but he decided to close the Stock Farm and build 12 homes in its place (the Project). Having the Stock Farm close down impacted members of the Poway Valley Riders Association (PVRA), whose 12-acre rodeo, polo, and other grounds were across the street from the Stock Farm. Over the objections of the PVRA and others, Poway's city council voted unanimously to approve the Project under a mitigated negative declaration (MND). Subsequently, project opponents formed Preserve Poway (Preserve) and instituted this litigation, asserting the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) required an environmental impact report (EIR) to be prepared instead of an MND. The trial court ruled an EIR was necessary because there was substantial evidence that the Project's elimination of the Stock Farm may have a significant impact on Poway's horse-friendly "community character" as the "City in the Country." The Court of Appeal reduced the real issue in this case to not what was proposed to be going in (homes with private horse boarding), but what was coming out (the Stock Farm, public horse boarding). Project opponents contended that because Rogers obtained a conditional use permit to operate horse stables they have enjoyed using for 20 years, the public had a right under CEQA to prevent Rogers from making some other lawful use of his land. "Whether the Project should be approved is a political and policy decision entrusted to Poway's elected officials. It is not an environmental issue for courts under CEQA." The trial court's judgment was reversed insofar as the judgment granted as to an issue of community character. The judgment was also reversed insofar as the judgment directed the City of Poway to "set aside its adoption of the Mitigated Negative Declaration for the Tierra Bonita Subdivision Project located on Tierra Bonita Road in the City of Poway ('Project')"; "set aside its approval of Tentative Tract Map 12-002 for the Project"; and "not issue any permits for the subject property that rely upon the Mitigated Negative Declaration or Tentative Tract Map for the Project." Additionally, the judgment was reversed to the extent the judgment provided that the trial court "retain[ed] jurisdiction over the proceedings by way of a return to the peremptory writ of mandate until the court has determined the City of Poway has complied with the provisions of CEQA." The trial court was directed to enter a new judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate as to community character. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "Preserve Poway v. City of Poway" on Justia Law

The Association has successfully applied to the District’s Historic Preservation Review Board to have the former Spingarn Senior High School designated a historic landmark. Next to Spingarn is Langston Terrace, a 13-acre public housing complex built in the 1930s as segregated housing for African Americans. The Association now challenges the District's development of a streetcar program and Car Barn that would be centered in this neighborhood. The district court rejected the Association's claims in dismissals for failure to state a claim and summary judgment. The City Council passed the “Wire Acts” to allow the construction of aerial wires to supply streetcars with power: Transportation Infrastructure Emergency Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-486; Transportation Infrastructure Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-583; Transportation Infrastructure Amendment Act of 2010, D.C. Act 18-684 (codified at D.C. Code 9-1171(a)). Determining that the Association has standing, the court concluded that taking into account the Home Rule Act's, District. D.C. Code 1-201.02(a), 1-206.02(a), stated purpose, the Wire Acts do not violate an 1888 statute barring the District from authorizing telegraph, telephone, electric lighting or other wires, D.C. Code 34-1901.01. The court upheld that district court's dismissal of the Association's environmental impact statement (EIS) claim. The court rejected the Association's Equal Protection claim, concluding that the project and the associated site selection appear to have been facially neutral and to serve legitimate government purposes. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kingman Park Civic Ass'n v. Bowser" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the Service's application of the 2012 Colorado Rule to allow development of a proposed egress ski trail on once-roadless land within the Special Use Permit boundary for the Snowmass Ski Resort in Aspen. The court agreed with the district court that the Service offered ample reasons for its decision to exclude existing designated ski areas from the Colorado roadless inventory, and that the Service’s six-year public rulemaking process satisfied all applicable notice requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment because the Service adequately explained the limited ski-area exclusion and did not violate any applicable notice requirements. View "Ark Initiative v. Tidwell" on Justia Law