Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided a case regarding the regulation of two tracts of land in Livingston Parish, Louisiana. The landowners, Garry L. Lewis and G. Lewis-Louisiana, L.L.C. (collectively referred to as "Lewis"), had been contending with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for ten years over the agency's assertion of jurisdiction over alleged "wetlands" on their property under the Clean Water Act.The case had a complex history, involving two Supreme Court cases, three Approved Jurisdictional Determinations (AJDs), two federal court cases resulting in two remand orders, and two appeals to the Fifth Circuit. Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sackett v. EPA controlled the facts of this case and dictated that Lewis' property lacked "wetlands" that had "a continuous surface connection to bodies that are 'waters of the United States' in their own right," such that there was no clear demarcation between "waters" and wetlands. As a result, the property was not subject to federal jurisdiction.The court noted that Lewis' property, used primarily as a pine timber plantation, was composed of two approximately twenty-acre tracts of "grass-covered, majority dry fields, with gravel logging and timber roads on two sides of each tract." Despite this, the USACE had concluded after numerous site visits that certain percentages of these tracts contained jurisdictional wetlands, thereby restricting Lewis' development plans without a federal permit.The court rejected the government's arguments that the case was moot following the withdrawal of the 2020 AJD and that further remand was necessary for the USACE to reevaluate the jurisdictional issue. The court held that the voluntary cessation of the allegedly wrongful behavior did not moot the case as there was no reasonable expectation of non-recurrence, and remand was inappropriate as the facts and governing law made it clear that Lewis' property was not subject to federal Clean Water Act regulation.The court ultimately vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Lewis, confirming that the tracts in question were not "waters of the United States" under the Sackett ruling. View "Lewis v. USA" on Justia Law

In this consolidated appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled on a decade-long dispute between landowners Garry L. Lewis and G. Lewis-Louisiana, L.L.C. (together referred to as "Lewis") and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) over the federal jurisdiction of "wetlands" on their Louisiana property under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The case involved numerous Supreme Court cases, jurisdictional determinations, federal court cases, and appeals.Lewis's property was primarily used as a pine timber plantation. In 2013, Lewis requested a jurisdictional determination from the USACE to develop the property, which went unanswered until a formal request two years later. The USACE concluded in 2016 that portions of the property contained wetlands subject to CWA jurisdiction. Lewis appealed, leading to a reconsideration and a substantially unchanged jurisdictional determination in 2017. Lewis then filed suit in federal court, claiming that the Corps' action was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The district court found the administrative record insufficient to support the conclusion that wetlands on the property met the "adjacency" test or had a "significant nexus" to traditional navigable waters and remanded the case back to USACE for further review.On remand, USACE revised the data and applied a recently issued regulation. However, the revised determination nearly doubled the alleged wetlands on one of Lewis's property tracts. After another round of litigation and appeals, the case reached the Fifth Circuit, where Lewis argued that under no interpretation of the administrative facts could his property be regulated as "wetlands" subject to the CWA.The Fifth Circuit agreed with Lewis, drawing upon the Supreme Court's recent decision in Sackett v. EPA which held that the CWA only extends to wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are "waters of the United States" in their own right. The Fifth Circuit found that there was no such connection between any plausible wetlands on Lewis's property and a "relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters," and thus, there was no factual basis for federal Clean Water Act regulation of these tracts.The court also rejected the government's arguments that the appeal was moot due to the withdrawal of the 2020 jurisdictional determination, and that the case should be remanded to USACE for reevaluation. The court held that the agency's unilateral withdrawal of a final agency action did not render the case moot and that remand was not appropriate because there was no uncertainty about the outcome of the agency's proceedings on remand.Consequently, the Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Lewis that the tracts in question are not "waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act as interpreted by Sackett v. EPA. View "Lewis v. USA" on Justia Law

In December 2018, the State Water Resources Control Board (the Board) adopted amendments to the water quality control plan for the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Estuary and certified a substitute environmental document supporting the amendments. The San Joaquin Tributaries Authority (SJTA), along with other entities, filed lawsuits against the Board challenging the amendments. These lawsuits were coordinated in Sacramento County, and the SJTA filed a motion to intervene in all of the cases that were part of the coordination proceeding. The trial court denied the motion, and the SJTA appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. It found that SJTA did not meet the requirements for mandatory intervention because it was already a party to the coordination proceeding and could adequately represent its own interests. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying permissive intervention, as SJTA's participation would largely be duplicative and would complicate an already complex case. The court noted that intervention was not necessary because SJTA was already a part of the coordination proceeding and could fully protect its interests. View "State Water Board Cases" on Justia Law

The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) failed to comply with both the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in its decision to amend the registration of streptomycin for use on citrus crops. The case was brought by a group of environmental advocacy and public interest organizations against the EPA.The EPA had concluded that the registration of streptomycin for use on citrus would not cause "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." However, the court disagreed, finding a lack of substantial evidence for some of the EPA’s conclusions. In particular, the court held that the EPA’s assessment of the risk to pollinators (bees) was incomplete or inadequately explained, and the agency failed to provide a sufficient explanation for the registration labels’ suggestion that streptomycin could be used to prevent citrus diseases.Furthermore, the court also found that the EPA failed to comply with the ESA. According to the ESA, the EPA should have determined whether the pesticide registration "may affect" any endangered species or critical habitat, which it failed to do.As a result, the court vacated the EPA’s amended registration of streptomycin for use on citrus crops and remanded the case back to the agency to address the errors in its FIFRA analysis and to conduct an ESA effects determination. View "MIGRANT CLINICIANS NETWORK V. USEPA" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Forest Service in a case brought by Earth Island Institute and the Center for Biological Diversity. The plaintiffs challenged the Forest Service's approval of the Three Creeks Project, which aimed to restore the Inyo National Forest to its pre-European settlement conditions by thinning excess trees, removing excess fire fuel, and using prescribed fire. The plaintiffs argued that the Forest Service failed to adequately consider alternatives to logging, failed to solicit public comments following its 2018 Environmental Assessment, and failed to supplement its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis following a 2020 bark-beetle outbreak. The court found that the plaintiff had not shown that the Service's approval of the Three Creeks Project was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise unlawful. The Service considered a reasonable range of alternatives, offered the public a reasonable opportunity to comment, and was not required to conduct further NEPA analysis following the bark-beetle outbreak. The court also held that the plaintiff had not properly raised its proposed alternatives during the comment period, and therefore it failed to exhaust its argument. Additionally, the court did not consider the plaintiff's claim regarding the Inyo Craters Project since it was not included in its amended complaint. View "EARTH ISLAND INSTITUTE V. USFS" on Justia Law

In the case of PNW Metal Recycling, Inc., et al. v. Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ) internal decision to adopt a new interpretation of a statute did not constitute a "rule" under the Oregon Administrative Procedures Act (APA).The case emerged when the DEQ changed its interpretation of the "auto-dismantler exception" in the solid waste management regulations. Previously, facilities dismantling and recycling used vehicles were not required to obtain a permit for solid waste disposal, even if they also disposed of non-vehicle solid waste. However, in 2018, the DEQ informed the petitioners that it had revised its interpretation of the relevant statutes, and the facilities would now be required to obtain permits.The petitioners, who operate such facilities, challenged this change, arguing that the DEQ's new position constituted a "rule", meaning it should have been adopted following the APA rulemaking procedures. The Court of Appeals agreed with the petitioners and held the DEQ's decision invalid.However, the Oregon Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the judicial review. The court reasoned that an agency's internal decision to adopt a new statutory interpretation is not, by itself, a "rule" under the APA. Instead, a "rule" is a more formal, generally applicable agency directive, standard, regulation, or statement that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy.The court highlighted that the APA provides different avenues for agencies to announce policy, not all of which require formal rulemaking. Specifically, an agency can announce a general policy applicable to a case and future similar cases during a contested case proceeding, without going through formal rulemaking procedures. The court concluded that the DEQ's revised interpretation of the auto-dismantler exception and its stated intention to require the petitioners to obtain a permit were precursors to an enforcement action that may lead to a contested case proceeding, not a rule. The decision of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the judicial review was dismissed. View "PNW Metal Recycling, Inc. v. DEQ" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska upheld a lower court's decision that Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc. and The Williams Companies, Inc. (collectively, "Williams") were strictly liable for the release of hazardous substances at a North Pole refinery they previously owned and operated. The substances, including sulfolane, a purifying solvent, had contaminated local groundwater. The court also upheld the ruling that Williams was responsible for paying damages to the State of Alaska and making contributions to the current owner, Flint Hills Resources, for its remediation costs.The court rejected Williams's claims that sulfolane was not a hazardous substance under state law. It also rejected the argument that the company's due process rights were violated because, it argued, it did not have fair notice that its conduct was prohibited. The court further denied Williams's argument that the imposition of retroactive liability for past releases constituted an unconstitutional taking of property.In addition, the court determined that Williams had retained liability for offsite sulfolane releases when it sold the refinery to Flint Hills. It also found that Flint Hills could seek statutory contribution from Williams for certain costs related to the contamination. However, the court remanded the grant of injunctive relief for more specificity as required by rule. Williams was ordered to pay damages for loss of access to groundwater due to sulfolane contamination, and for the costs of response, containment, removal, or remedial action incurred by the state. View "Williams Alaska Petroleum, Inc. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a Biological Opinion (BiOp) by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) and remanded the case for further consideration. The case involved a dispute over the use of water from the San Pedro River Basin in Arizona by the U.S. Army's Fort Huachuca. The Army uses water from the basin, which is also home to several species protected under the Endangered Species Act. To compensate for the water use, the federal government proposed a "conservation easement" that would limit the use of nearby land for agricultural purposes, therefore saving water and protecting the wildlife that depend on the basin. The plaintiffs, environmental organizations, argued that the BiOp lacked evidence to support the claim of water savings from the easement. The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that the government's determination that the easement would not jeopardize wildlife was arbitrary and capricious due to the lack of evidence supporting the claimed water savings. The court stated that the government must show that the benefit from the conservation easement would be "reasonably certain" under the relevant regulations. The court also held that the government's conclusion that reduced flow in the Babocomari River, a tributary of the San Pedro River, would not jeopardize the northern Mexican gartersnake was not arbitrary and capricious. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. DEB HAALAND" on Justia Law

In this case, the Town of Milton, Massachusetts, petitioned for a judicial review of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) final order authorizing a new flight procedure at Boston's Logan International Airport. The new procedure, aimed at increasing safety and efficiency, covers a narrower swath of airspace over the Town of Milton. The Town argued that the FAA's environmental analysis of the noise impacts failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). However, the United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit dismissed the Town's petition, ruling that the Town does not have standing to challenge the FAA's final order. The court concluded that the harms the Town asserted, including the impact of noise on its residents and the time and money spent addressing these issues, were not legally cognizable harms to the Town itself. The court agreed with other courts of appeals that have dismissed municipal NEPA challenges to FAA orders for lack of Article III standing because those challenges failed to show cognizable injury to the municipalities themselves. View "Milton, MA v. FAA" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court ruling in favor of the Montana Environmental Information Center and Sierra Club (collectively, Conservation Groups) and vacating the Montana Department of Environmental Quality's (DEQ) permit for Westmoreland Rosebud Mining, LLC's proposed coal mine expansion, holding that the Board of Environmental Review (Board) made several errors when it upheld DEQ's findings.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in concluding that reversal of the burden of proof was prejudicial error; (2) the Board committed reversible error in limiting the Conservation Groups' evidence and argument; (3) the district court erred in determining that it was reversible error to admit certain testimony as proper rebuttal; (4) the Board erred when it concluded that no water quality standard violation could occur; (5) the Board properly considered cumulative impact of mining activity in its analysis; (6) the Board properly relied on evidence regarding aquatic life; (7) the attorney fee award was improper; and (8) the district court erred in ruling that the Board was properly included as a party on judicial review. View "Mont. Environmental Information Center v. Westmoreland Rosebud Mining" on Justia Law