Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

After its closure, a landfill continued to discharge contaminants into a creek that ran into a lake on adjoining property. After several failed remedial measures, ACC, LLC (ACC), the landfill owner, and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation agreed to a plan to abate the discharge. The plan required ACC to divert water from entering the landfill and, within a four-year period, to remove and relocate the landfill waste. StarLink Logistics, Inc., the landowner of the property on which the lake was located, objected to the plan. The Tennessee Solid Waste Disposal Control Board approved ACC’s plan of action. The trial court affirmed. The Court of Appeals rejected the Board’s decision and remanded the case to the Board to explore more options. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals misapplied the arbitrary and capricious standard and instead substituted its judgment for that of the Board. Remanded. View "Starlink Logistics, Inc. v. ACC, LLC" on Justia Law

Nelson Industrial Steam Company (“NISCO”) was in the business of generating electric power in Lake Charles. In order to comply with state and federal environmental regulations, NISCO introduces limestone into its power generation process; the limestone acts as a “scrubbing agent.” The limestone chemically reacts with sulfur to make ash, which NISCO then sells to LA Ash, for a profit of roughly $6.8 million annually. LA Ash sells the ash to its customers for varying commercial purposes, including roads, construction projects, environmental remediation, etc. NISCO appealed when taxes were collected on its purchase of limestone over four tax periods. NISCO claimed its purchase of limestone was subject to the “further processing exclusion” of La. R.S. 47:301(10)(c)(i)(aa), which narrowed the scope of taxable sales. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted NISCO’s writ application to determine the taxability of the limestone. The trial court ruled in the Tax Collectors' favor. After its review, the Supreme Court found that NISCO’s by-product of ash was the appropriate end product to analyze for purposes of determining the “further processing exclusion’s” applicability to the purchase of limestone. Moreover, under a proper “purpose” test, the third prong of the three-part inquiry enunciated in "International Paper v. Bridges," (972 So.2d 1121(2008)) was satisfied, "as evidenced by NISCO’s choice of manufacturing process and technology, its contractual language utilized in its purchasing of the limestone, and its subsequent marketing and sale of the ash." Therefore the Court reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of NISCO. View "Bridges v. Nelson Industrial Steam Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was amendments to a Houston air-quality ordinance (the Ordinance). BCCA Appeal Group filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that Ordinance was invalid and unenforceable under the Texas Clean Air Act, the Water Code, and the Texas Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment for BCCA, concluding that the Ordinance violated the Texas Constitution and was preempted by the Act, and enjoined the City from enforcing the Ordinance. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Ordinance was consistent with the Act and the Water Code and did not violate the nondelegation doctrine of the Texas Constitution by incorporating Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) rules in such a way as to include future amendments. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the Ordinance’s enforcement provisions and registration requirement are preempted and therefore unenforceable; but (2) the Ordinance’s incorporation of TCEQ rules does not violate the nondelegation doctrine of the Texas Constitution. View "BCCA Appeal Group, Inc. v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

This case was the second segment of Water Court Case 41O-129. Case 41O-129A was limited to the issues involving the use of the Bateman Ditch. Here, the Supreme Court reviewed the parties’ appeals of the Water Court’s determination of the remaining aspects of the case, styled as Water Court Case 41O-129B. The Water Master issued a report with his findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding each of Eldorado Coop Canal Company’s four claimed water rights to water from the Teton River. The Montana Water Court entered an order amending and adopting the master’s report. Eldorado, the Lower Teton Joint Objectors (LTJO), and Teton Coop Reservoir Co. (TCRC) appealed the Water Court’s order. The Supreme Court affirmed the Water Court’s order regarding Case 41O-129B, holding that the Water Court’s factual findings produced the proper result, the Water Court did not err when it assigned one volume maximum for all four of Eldorado’s named rights, and the Water Court applied the appropriate standard of review to the Master’s factual findings. View "Eldorado Coop Canal Co. v. Teton Coop Reservoir Co" on Justia Law

In 2003, William Hueble purchased 220 acres of farming and hunting property in Greenwood County. At the time of closing, the seller informed Hueble that Respondent Eric Vaughn, a corporal for the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (DNR), had a personal deer stand on the property and had hunted there in the past. The seller indicated it would be a "good idea" to allow Vaughn continued access. Hueble declined the suggestion. During 2004, Hueble received a call from the seller informing him that Vaughn had recently been on the property and left four wheeler tracks. The seller again suggested that it would be in Hueble's "best interest" to allow Vaughn to hunt on the property, and provided Vaughn's phone number to Hueble. Hueble once again declined the suggestion and did not contact Vaughn. Hueble then acquired additional land and invested substantial sums of money to improve and maintain his property for hunting dove. More than one month prior to the opening day of dove season, Hueble believed the field was non-baited and in compliance with all regulations and guidelines. On opening day, Hueble's friends and family joined him for the first hunt of the season. Shortly into the hunt, Vaughn and other DNR officers entered Hueble's property unannounced. Vaughn and the DNR officers gathered the hunters together and began threatening them with fines and confiscation of property for baiting the dove field. Vaughn dug into Hueble's property with a knife blade to produce seeds and claimed that one seed constituted baiting a field. During this interaction, Hueble learned Vaughn was the DNR officer the seller had mentioned. Ultimately, Hueble was the only hunter charged by DNR with baiting the field. Hueble ultimately pled no contest to the baiting charge, believing this would resolve Vaughn's animosity. Hueble was accused of baiting at the start of turkey season too. Based on these encounters with Vaughn, Hueble believed that Vaughn had a "vendetta" against him and that Vaughn's supervisor was fully aware of the alleged threats he was making against Hueble. Because of these concerns, Hueble initiated a complaint with Vaughn's supervisor at DNR. However, the supervisor responded with allegations of Hueble's illegal activity based upon Vaughn's version of the events. Hueble filed a complaint against DNR and Vaughn. He obtained a Rule 68, SCRCP, judgment of $5,100 in his favor at the close of litigation. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Hueble was a prevailing party within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988 (2006), and was therefore entitled to attorneys' fees. The Court held that he was, and reversed the lower courts' holdings to the contrary, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hueble v. SCDNR" on Justia Law

NRDC challenged the NRC's denial of NRDC’s request for a hearing and subsequent application for a waiver, asserting this process was inconsistent with the procedural rigor mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The denial thwarted NRDC’s attempt to intervene in the license renewal proceeding for Exelon’s Limerick nuclear power station where NRDC sought to present “new and significant” information regarding severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMAs) relevant to Limerick. The court found that the Commission reasonably concluded that NRDC's request to intervene was a challenge to a general rule - 10 C.F.R. 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L) (Rule (L)) - improperly raised in an individual adjudication. The court further stated that, contrary to NRDC’s view, while NEPA requires agencies to take a hard look before approving a major federal action, it does not mandate adoption of a particular process for doing so. Because NRDC failed to show its contentions were unique to Limerick, NRDC also was not entitled to a waiver. Therefore, the Commission’s actions were not arbitrary and capricious, and the court denied the petition. View "NRDC v. NRC" on Justia Law

This was an appeal of a district court order affirming in part an order issued by the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (“IDWR”). In response to a delivery call filed by Rangen, Inc., the Director had issued an order curtailing certain junior-priority ground water pumping in the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer (“ESPA”). The order provided that the junior-priority ground water users could avoid curtailment by participating in an approved mitigation plan. The Idaho Ground Water Appropriators, Inc. (“IGWA”) filed several mitigation plans for approval. The Director issued an order conditionally approving IGWA’s Fourth Mitigation Plan, which proposed leasing water from another surface water right holder and piping the water to the Rangen facility. Rangen petitioned for review. The district court upheld the Director’s order in significant part. Rangen appealed. Finding no reversible error with the district court's order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rangen, Inc. v. Dept of Water Resources" on Justia Law

The Ohio Power Siting Board granted a certificate to Champaign Wind, LLC to construct a wind farm in Champaign County. Appellants, a collection of local governmental entities and residents, appealed the Board’s decision, challenging various discovery and evidentiary rulings by the Board and the Board’s determination that the proposed wind farm meets the statutory criteria for siting a major utility facility. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants failed to demonstrate that the Board’s decision was unreasonable or unlawful or that the Board’s discovery and evidentiary rulings meaningfully affected the outcome of the proceeding. View "In re Application of Champaign Wind, LLC" on Justia Law

For more than a century, Asarco LLC and its predecessors operated a lead smelting facility (the Site). For almost fifty years, Atlantic Richfield Company’s predecessor operated a zinc fuming plant on land leased from Asarco at the Site. Atlantic Richfield subsequently sold the plant and related property to Asarco. Due to extensive contamination at the Site, the Environmental Protection Agency determined that Asarco was obligated to fund cleanup efforts at the Site. After conducting extensive remediation at the Site, Asarco filed a complaint seeking contribution pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) from Atlantic Richfield, asserting that Atlantic Richfield was liable under CERCLA for its equitable share of costs related to the Site’s cleanup. The federal district court granted summary judgment for Atlantic Richfield, concluding that Asarco’s claims were untimely under CERCLA’s statute of limitations. Asarco then commenced the present action against Atlantic Richfield alleging several state-law claims. The district court granted Atlantic Richfield’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred Asarco’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that claim preclusion barred Asarco’s action because Asarco could have brought its state-law claims before the federal district court in Asarco I. View "Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co." on Justia Law

The parties in this case disputed who had rights to certain spring waters. The state engineer adjudicated the parties’ rights and entered a final order of determination. Both parties filed exceptions to the state engineer’s final order. Before the matter was heard before the district court, Respondent filed a motion to supplement his earlier filed exceptions to include property access claims arising from its water rights. The district court granted Respondent’s request. The district court then affirmed the state engineer’s order of determination, as modified. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly considered the notice of supplemental exceptions in affirming the state engineer’s order of determination, as modified, including Respondent’s supplemental request that the district court’s judgment confirm Respondent’s right of access to certain property to repair and maintain the facilities necessary to convey water; and (2) the district court’s findings were based on substantial evidence. View "Jackson v. Groenendyke" on Justia Law