Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries
Bay Area Citizens v. Ass’n Bay Area Gov’ts
The 2008 Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act (SB 375), was enacted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Earlier measures empowered the Air Resources Board to enact statewide mandates to reduce emissions. SB 375 empowers the Board to set targets for regional planning agencies to reduce emissions from automobiles and light trucks and requires each regional agency, after extensive planning, to develop a “sustainable community strategy” to meet those targets using regional land use and transportation policies. In 2010, the Board issued targets for the Bay Area region, calling for the Metropolitan Transportation Commission and the Association of Bay Area Governments to develop strategies that would result in per capita percentage reductions in emissions of 7 percent by 2020 and 15 percent by 2035, as compared to emissions in 2005. These reductions were to be in addition to those expected from pre-existing statewide mandates. The Agencies updated the regional transportation plan and prepared their first sustainable communities strategy, “Plan Bay Area” and approved a final environmental impact report. The Board accepted the Agencies’ determination that Plan Bay Area would meet its emission reduction targets. Citizens offered an alternative plan that counted on reductions expected from pre-existing statewide mandates and challenged the environmental impact report and the Plan aa “draconian.” The trial court, concluding that reliance on pre-existing statewide mandates to meet the regional targets would constitute improper double counting not permitted by SB 375, denied Citizens’ petition. The court of appeal affirmed. Citizens’ approach was contradicted by SB 375’s emphasis on regional innovations and legislative declarations and findings. View "Bay Area Citizens v. Ass'n Bay Area Gov'ts" on Justia Law
Markle Interests v. US Fish & Wildlife Serv.
Landowners challenged the Service's final designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. The district court granted summary judgment for Landowners on the issue of standing and granted summary judgment for the Service on the merits. The court concluded that Landowners have standing to challenge the Service’s critical-habitat designation. The court also concluded that the designation of Unit 1 as critical habitat was not arbitrary and capricious nor based upon an unreasonable interpretation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, where the Service reasonably determined (1) that designating occupied habitat alone would be inadequate to ensure the conservation of the dusky gopher frog and (2) that Unit 1 is essential for the conservation of the frog. Even if the court assumed that Landowners are correct that the economic benefits of exclusion outweigh the conservation benefits of designation, the Service is still not obligated to exclude Unit 1. That decision is committed to the agency’s discretion and is not reviewable. Because Landowners concede that the critical habitat provision of the ESA is a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, the court can likewise conclude that the application of the ESA’s critical habitat provision to Unit 1 is a constitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause power. Finally, the court concluded that the Service was not required to complete an environmental impact statement before designating Unit 1 as critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog, and Landowners lack standing to sue to enforce the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Markle Interests v. US Fish & Wildlife Serv." on Justia Law
Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv.
Pursuant to 30 U.S.C. 185(a), in 1953, the U.S. Forest Service issued Enbridge’s predecessor a permit for use of an 8.10-mile strip within the Lower Michigan National Forest for a crude oil pipeline (Line 5). In 1992, USFS reissued the permit through December 2012, noting that USFS “shall renew the authorization” if the line "is being operated and maintained in accordance with" the authorization and other applicable laws. In 2011-2012, after a different Enbridge pipeline spilled oil into the Kalamazoo River, Enbridge obtained permit amendments to install “emergency flow release device[s]” on Line 5. In 2012, Enbridge requested permit renewal for Line 5. USFS conducted field studies on the potential impact on wildlife and vegetation; contacted the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to confirm compliance with pipeline regulations; and accepted public comments. USFS proposed a categorical exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C), from the requirement of an Environmental Impact Statement or Environmental Assessment, categorizing the application as replacement of an existing or expired special use authorization, "the only changes are administrative, there are not changes to the authorized facilities or increases in the scope or intensity of authorized activities, and the holder is in full compliance." Sierra Club objected, noting that no EA or EIS had ever been completed for Line 5 because the original permit issued before enactment of NEPA and that intensity of activities along the pipeline had increased. USFS granted a categorical exclusion after considering biological assessment reports and finding “no extraordinary circumstances which may result in significant individual or cumulative effects on the quality of the environment.” The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, upholding re-issue of Enbridge’s permit. USFS followed appropriate decision-making processes and reached a non-arbitrary conclusion. View "Sierra Club v. United States Forest Serv." on Justia Law
Sierra Club, et al v. FERC
The Associations filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., challenging the Commission’s decision authorizing Freeport to redesign its liquefied natural gas terminal in Texas to support export operations. The court held that the Associations have standing to press their challenges to the Commission’s orders and that their case is not moot. However, the court denied the petition on the merits. The court concluded that, to the extent the Associations complain about the environmental consequences of exporting natural gas from Freeport’s terminal, those objections should be raised in the pending challenge to the Department of Energy’s order authorizing Freeport to export natural gas. The court found no error in the Commissions analysis of the non-export-related environmental consequences of Freeport's proposal that would rise to the level of arbitrary and capricious decision-making. Accordingly, the court rejected the Associations' challenges. View "Sierra Club, et al v. FERC" on Justia Law
Sierra Club v. FERC
Sierra Club filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., seeking review of the Commission's authorization of an increase in production capacity at a liquefied natural gas terminal in Louisiana. The court concluded that Sierra Club has standing but that its challenges to the Commission’s orders fail on the merits, largely for the reasons stated in the companion case, Sierra Club v. FERC (Freeport), No. 14-1275 (D.C. Cir June 28, 2016). The court also concluded that the court otherwise lacks jurisdiction over challenges to the Commission’s cumulative impacts analysis because Sierra Club failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Accordingly, the court dismiss the petition in part and denied the petition in part. View "Sierra Club v. FERC" on Justia Law
Idaho Conservation League v. BPA
Petitioner filed suit under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., challenging the agencies' decision to change how they operated the Albeni Falls Dam during the winter months. The environmental assessment (EA) here concludes that no environmental impact statement (EIS) is required because the proposed action will not “result in any new significant impacts to the human environment.” The court concluded that NEPA only requires the preparation of an EIS when a proposed federal action is major. In this case, actions taken with respect to winter dam management since 1995 reinforce the conclusion that there was no change to the status quo. Because the period when the agencies held winter lake levels constant did not change the operational status quo, neither does the decision to revert to flexible winter operations. The court also concluded that, because the decision adopting flexible winter operations does not trigger NEPA’s requirement to publish an EIS, this and petitioner’s other challenges to the EA’s finding of no significant impact are moot. The court rejected petitioner's challenge to the BPA's failure to prepare a supplemental EIS. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Idaho Conservation League v. BPA" on Justia Law
Ukiah Citizens for Safety First v. City of Ukiah
In 2011, Costco sought a use permit and rezoning for 15.33 acres in southeast Ukiah. In 2013, the city released an environmental impact report (EIR), pursuant to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21050), describing the project as a 148,000-square-foot retail facility with a bakery, pharmacy, optical center, hearing aid center, food court, photo center, tire center, 16-pump gas station, and 608 customer parking spots. The EIR included mitigation measures to reduce the impact, including modifications to impacted intersections, but due to uncertainty of timing and funding of those measures, concluded that the traffic impacts cannot be mitigated to a level that is less than significant. The EIR also concluded that the increase in traffic volumes would result in higher noise levels along local roadways but that traffic noise associated with the project would be less than significant. The city certified the EIR, adopted a statement of overriding considerations, and adopted the rezoning legislation. Opponents unsuccessfully challenged the rezoning and the sufficiency of the EIR. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing that the EIR failed to sufficiently analyze potential energy impacts and that the adoption of an EIR addendum after approval of the EIR and of the project violated CEQA. View "Ukiah Citizens for Safety First v. City of Ukiah" on Justia Law
Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers v. Fargo-Moorhead Flood Diversion
The Authority is in development of a diversion project on the Red River with the Corps. In this appeal, the Authority alleged that the district court made numerous errors in granting a preliminary injunction to JPA, prohibiting the Authority's continued construction of a ring levee in communities in North Dakota (OHB ring levee). The court concluded that the district court’s finding of fact that the OHB project is a part of the larger diversion project is not clearly erroneous and broadly supports the district court’s decision to grant the injunction; the district court found adequate procedural harm and harm to the JPA’s specific environmental interests sufficient to support a preliminary injunction; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the balance of harms favored an injunction. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in finding that the dormant Commerce Clause does not preclude JPA’s Minnesota Environmental Procedure Act (MEPA), Minn. R. 4410.3100, claim. Finally, the court concluded that it was permissible for the district court to waive the bond requirement based on its evaluation of public interest in this specific case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Richland/Wilkin Joint Powers v. Fargo-Moorhead Flood Diversion" on Justia Law
Whittaker Corp. v. United States
After Whittaker was found liable for injuries caused by its pollution and paid to clean up the pollution, Whittaker filed suit under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., against the United States to recover expenses that it had incurred. The district court concluded that the Castaic Lake lawsuit triggered Whittaker’s right to bring an action for contribution, and that the instant lawsuit sought expenses that could have been reimbursed through such a contribution action. The court held, however, that Whittaker was not required to bring its claims in this case in a section 113(f) contribution action after its liability was resolved in Castaic Lake. In this case, Whittaker was found liable to the Castaic Lake plaintiffs for the expenses specifically related to removing perchlorate from the plaintiffs’ wells and replacing their water. Whittaker now seeks reimbursement from the government for a different set of expenses, for which Whittaker was not found liable in Castaic Lake. The court did not believe that Congress mandated parties who have been sued in section 107 cost recovery actions to bring all of their own CERCLA claims in the form of a contribution action, on an accelerated timeframe, regardless of the merit or the result of the section 107 cost recovery suit. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Whittaker Corp. v. United States" on Justia Law
Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri
JAC filed suit contending that the NIGC violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4370h, when it approved the Tribe's gaming ordinance without first conducting a NEPA environmental review. The district court denied JAC's petition for a writ of mandamus under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, holding that NIGC’s approval of the 2013 gaming ordinance was not “major federal action” within the meaning of NEPA. Even if NIGC's approval of the ordinance was a major Federal action, the court held that an agency need not adhere to NEPA where doing so would create an irreconcilable and fundamental conflict with the substantive statute at issue. In this case, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701–2721, requires NIGC to approve a gaming ordinance or resolution pursuant to a mandatory deadline. There is no question that it would be impossible for NIGC to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) in the ninety days it has to approve a gaming ordinance. Contrary to JAC’s arguments, NIGC’s approval of the Tribe’s gaming ordinance without conducting a NEPA environmental review did not violate NIGC’s obligations under NEPA because "where a clear and unavoidable conflict in statutory authority exists, NEPA must give way.” Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of plaintiff's requested writ of mandamus. View "Jamul Action Comm. v. Chaudhuri" on Justia Law