Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs challenge the NMFS's decision to calculate the amount of their initial share of the total allowable catch of Pacific whiting based on their participation in the fishery prior to 2003 and 2004, respectively, rather than on their much greater participation in the years immediately before 2010, when the regulations implementing this program were issued. The court concluded that NMFS's decision to apply the 2004 control date to processors was not arbitrary or capricious; with respect to the proposed decision on the 2003 and 2004 end dates for allocating quota shares, NMFS explained its analysis of dependence; because NMFS adequately took into account “dependence on the fishery” under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act), 16 U.S.C. 1853 (b)(6)(B), and “investments in, and dependence upon, the fishery” under section 1853a(c)(5)(A)(iii), its decision was not inconsistent with those statutory requirements; nor was NMFS’s decision inconsistent with the related standards identified by Pacific Dawn; because NMFS reasonably determined that retaining the 2003 and 2004 end dates would be the least disruptive to current fishing practices, its conclusion was not inconsistent with Objective 14 of the Groundfish Management Plan; and the court rejected Pacific Dawn's argument that NMFS’s decision was inconsistent with its practices in other fisheries, where NMFS had concluded that more recent participation reflected greater dependence on the fishery. Therefore, because NMFS properly considered the relevant factors and reasonably decided to maintain the 2003 and 2004 end dates, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants. View "Pacific Dawn LLC v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

In consolidated petitions for review, petitioners challenged three regulations - the Major Boilers Rule, the Area Boilers Rule, and the Commercial/Industrial Solid Waste Incinerators (CISWI) Rule - promulgated by the EPA under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., that sets emissions limits on certain combustion machinery known to release hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). The court vacated the “maximum achievable control technology” (MACT) standards for all major boiler subcategories that would have been affected had the EPA considered all sources included in the subcategories. The court remanded, without vacature to the EPA to: (1) adequately explain how CO acts as a reasonable surrogate for nondioxin/furan organic HAPs; (2) set emission standards for cyclonic burn barrels; (3) determine whether burn-off ovens, soil treatment units, and space heaters are CISWI units and, if so, to set standards for those types of units; (4) adequately explain the exclusion of synthetic boilers from Title V’s permitting requirements; and (5) adequately explain the choice of “generally available control technologies” (GACT) standards over MACT standards for non-Hg metals. View "U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA" on Justia Law

During the time EPA had been applying the incorrect (and more relaxed) statutory framework to fine particulate matter, some of the stricter compliance deadlines that would have applied under the correct statutory framework had already elapsed. In its implementation rule, the agency made certain adjustments to those deadlines in an effort to avoid treating states as having already missed deadlines of which they were never aware. WildEarth Guardians challenges EPA’s authority to adjust the deadlines. The court held that, in the novel circumstances presented here, EPA reasonably acted within its statutory authority in adopting new deadlines aimed to avoid imposing retroactive burdens on states seeking to achieve compliance with governing air quality standards. Accordingly, the court dismissed the petition as it concerns the 1997 standard and otherwise denied the petition for review. View "WildEarth Guardians v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Cowlitz gained legal status as a tribe in the eyes of the government in 2002 and then successfully petitioned the Department of the Interior to take into trust and declare as their “initial reservation” a parcel of land. The Cowlitz wish to use this parcel for tribal government facilities, elder housing, a cultural center, as well as a casino. Two groups of plaintiffs, Clark County and Grande Ronde, filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., challenging the Interior Secretary’s decision to take the land into trust and to allow casino-style gaming. The district court consolidated the actions and subsequently ruled in favor of the Secretary and Cowlitz. The court concluded that the Secretary reasonably interpreted and applied the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. 461 et seq., to conclude that the Cowlitz are a recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction; the Secretary reasonably determined that the Cowlitz meet the “initial-reservation” exception to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. 2701 et seq.; and the court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims of error under the IRA, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and 25 C.F.R. 83.12(b), based on the Secretary’s alleged failure independently to verify the Tribe’s business plan and membership figures. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Confederated Tribes of the Grand Ronde v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs' fouth amended complaint alleged that, in addition to dumping hazardous substances into the Columbia River, Teck also emitted hazardous substances into the air, in violation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a)(3). The Ninth Circuit issued Center for Community Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF Railway Co., which held that emitting diesel particulate matter into the air and allowing it to be “transported by wind and air currents onto the land and water” did not constitute “disposal” of waste within the meaning of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq. The court held that the owner-operator of the smelter can not be held liable for cleanup costs and natural resource damages under CERCLA. The court concluded that, while plaintiffs present an arguably plausible construction of “deposit” and “disposal,” Carson Harbor Vill Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., compels the court to hold otherwise, and while Center for Community Action does not totally foreclose plaintiffs’ interpretation of CERCLA, its textual analysis of 42 U.S.C. 6903(3) is persuasive. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's orders denying Teck’s motion to strike and/or dismiss and motion for reconsideration, and remanded for the processing of plaintiffs’ remaining claims. View "Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals" on Justia Law

This dispute involved multiple water right holders on the mainstream of the Teton River in Teton and Chouteau Counties. Teton Prairie owned property upstream from Appellees’ properties. Appellees held water rights for stock water purposes and for domestic use. Teton Prairie’s water rights were for irrigation and were junior to all of Appellees’ rights. Appellees filed suit against Teton Prairie, claiming wrongful interference of a water right and wrongful diversion of water by a junior water right holder, and requested injunctive relief. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees, finding that Teton Prairie violated the prior appropriation doctrine by ignoring Appellees’ call for water. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) correctly applied the prior appropriation doctrine; (2) correctly found that Teton Prairie failed to establish the necessary elements to raise the defense of futile call doctrine; and (3) correctly granted injunctive relief to Appellees. View "Kelly v. Teton Prairie LLC" on Justia Law

The City approved a conditional use permit (CUP) for construction of a combination car wash and coffee shop on a vacant lot adjacent to homes owned by appellants. Appellants filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the City's finding that the project is categorically exempt from the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code 21000 et seq. The trial court denied the petition. The court concluded that the City properly determined that the car wash and coffee shop project satisfies the categorical exemption requirements of Guidelines section 15303, subdivision (c) because there is no dispute that the proposed car wash and coffee shop is a commercial structure of less than 10,000 square feet that is to be built in an urbanized area zoned for commercial use. There also is no dispute that “all necessary public services and facilities are available” and that the surrounding area is not considered “environmentally sensitive.” Furthermore, appellants’ speculation that the car wash operation might include hazardous substances is not supported by the administrative record. The court concluded that the unusual circumstances exception is not applicable in this case. Finally, appellants' argument that the City erred in issuing the CUP pursuant to the Municipal Code is without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Walters v. City of Redondo Beach" on Justia Law

The Corps issued Mingo Logan a permit to excavate the tops of several West Virginia mountains, then the EPA withdrew approval from two of the disposal sites, and Mingo Logan challenged the EPA's statutory authority to withdraw the two sites from the Corps permit after it had been issued but the court determined that the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C 1251, authorized the EPA to do so. The court remanded for the district court to consider Mingo Logan's remaining challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. This appeal concerns the district court's resolution of the APA claims. The court concluded that the EPA did not violate the APA in withdrawing specification of certain disposal areas from the permit; rather, it considered the relevant factors and adequately explained its decision. The EPA’s ex post withdrawal is a product of its broad veto authority under the CWA, not a procedural defect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mingo Logan Coal v. EPA" on Justia Law

Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) determined that its approval for a Richmond rail-to-truck facility to transload crude oil instead of ethanol was “ministerial” and exempt from California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) review. Transloading of crude oil began in September 2013. The trial court dismissed a challenge filed in March 2014 as time-barred under Public Resources Code 21167(d), because it was filed more than 180 days after “the date of the public agency’s decision to carry out or approve the project,” the Authority to Construct issued in July 2013. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that the action was timely under the discovery rule, which postpones the accrual of an action from the date an injury occurs until the date the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice of the facts constituting the injury. The plaintiffs claimed they could not have learned about BAAQMD’s determination any earlier, as BAAQMD gave no “public notice” and “the project itself [was] hidden from the public eye.” An action to challenge such a determination accrues on one of three alternative dates listed in section 21167(d). A plaintiff is deemed to have constructive notice of a potential CEQA violation on all three alternative dates of accrual under section 21167(d). View "Communities for a Better Env't v. Bay Area Air Quality Mgmt. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a citizen enforcement action under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act against Defendants, the owner of a neighboring parcel of land and the business operating on it, alleging that contaminated stormwater runoff from the property was being discharged into United States waters, contaminating Plaintiffs’ property, and that Defendants lacked a valid Rhode Island Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit. After a trial, the district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof. Thereafter, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion for attorney’s fees. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge did not err in excluding from evidence a portion of certain expert witness testimony as a result of Plaintiffs’ tardiness in filing the witness’s revised expert report; (2) the district court did not err in granting judgment for Defendants; and (3) the district court’s award of attorney’s fees was not a clear error of judgment. View "Paolino v. JF Realty, LLC" on Justia Law