Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

O’Malley is serving 10 years in prison for violating the Clean Air Act by improperly removing and disposing of insulation containing regulated asbestos, 42 U.S.C. 7413(c)(1). After the Seventh Circuit upheld his convictions on direct appeal, O’Malley filed what he called a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(b)(1) for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. That rule authorizes a district court to grant a timely request for a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” The district court concluded that O’Malley’s submission contained constitutional theories that, the court reasoned, are incompatible with Rule 33 and cognizable only under 28 U.S.C. 2255 and that the remainder of O’Malley’s motion could not entitle him to relief under Rule 33, because the new evidence, purportedly discrediting a prosecution witness, was not material. The Seventh Circuit vacated, concluding that the entirety of O’Malley’s submission was within the scope of Rule 33(b)(1) even if his theories overlap with section 2255 and that the district court should have respected his choice between these available means of relief. View "United States v. O'Malley" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the EPA and the Corps' joint promulgation of the Clean Water Rule, which defines the term “Waters of the United States” for purposes of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. The district court subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that 33 U.S.C. 1369(b)(1) gives courts of appeals exclusive original jurisdiction over challenges to the rule. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiffs in this case also filed in this court what they termed a “protective” petition for direct review of their Clean Water Rule challenge. The court concluded that, because of the Sixth Circuit’s nationwide stay of the Clean Water Rule, those opposing the rule are not being harmed by it in the interim. And, if the Sixth Circuit holds that the rule is invalid, that will end the matter, subject (as all panel decisions are) to the possibility of en banc and certiorari review. In any event, the decision of that court will likely narrow and refine, if not render moot, at least some of the issues this court asked the parties to brief. For all of these reasons, the court exercised its discretion to stay its hand in this case pending a decision of the Sixth Circuit or further developments. Accordingly, the court held the appeal in abeyance and ordered the district court to stay all further proceedings. View "State of Georgia v. McCarthey" on Justia Law

In 2013, BLM adopted a new Recreation Area Management Plan (RAMP) where the 26,098-acre North Algodones Dunes Wilderness tract would remain closed to off-road vehicles, as would 9,261 acres of milkvetch critical habitat. BLM additionally prepared an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) analyzing the 2013 RAMP, and consulted with the Service pursuant to section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. As a result, the Service issued a new Biological Opinion finding that the 2013 RAMP was not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the milkvetch or desert tortoise. The Center brought challenges under the ESA; the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.; the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1701–1785; the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.; and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for BLM on all but one issue. The court concluded that the ESA does not require Biological Opinions to contain Incidental Take Statements for threatened plants. Therefore, the court need not consider separately the Services' interpretation of the statute. The court rejected the Center's remaining claims, concluding that the Center has failed to demonstrate that BLM’s emissions analysis was arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Center for Bio. Diversity v. BLM" on Justia Law

In 2005 Constand alleged that William Cosby had drugged and sexually assaulted her at his home. During the​ discovery process, Constand’s counsel took Cosby’s deposition and questioned him regarding whether other women had ingested Quaaludes prior to a sexual encounter with Cosby. The deposition resulted in discovery disputes. The court entered an interim order, requiring the parties to file discovery documents under seal. The Associated Press (AP) moved to intervene and opposed the order. The court denied the motion, stating that the record was not yet sufficient to determine whether a permanent seal was warranted. The sealed documents reveal several damaging admissions during Cosby's deposition, including that he had: engaged in extramarital affairs; acquired Quaaludes and engaged in sexual relations with a woman after she ingested the drug; and given money to one woman and offered money to Constand. Before the court could rule on whether the documents should remain sealed permanently, Cosby and Constand reached a confidential settlement. The case was dismissed. The interim sealing order continued in effect and the documents remained sealed. Though Local Rules require that the Clerk of Court send a notice stating that the documents will be unsealed unless an objection is filed, eight years passed without the Clerk taking action. In 2015, the court unsealed the records, following a request by AP. Finding an appeal moot, the Third Circuit declined to address whether the court properly balanced the public and private interests. View "Constand v. Cosby" on Justia Law

The City of San Jose proposed to demolish the Willow Glen Railroad Trestle and replace it with a new, steel truss pedestrian bridge to service its trail system. The City found that the Trestle was not a “historical resource,” and therefore the project would not have a significant effect on the environment. It adopted a mitigated negative declaration (MND) under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Public Resources Code 21000). Opponents argued that an environmental impact report (EIR) was required. The trial court invalidated approval of the project, finding that there was a “fair argument” that the Trestle was a historical resource. The court of appeal reversed. The statutory scheme requires application of a deferential substantial evidence standard of judicial review. Substantial evidence means enough relevant information and reasonable inferences from this information that a fair argument can be made to support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be reached. Whether a fair argument can be made that the project may have a significant effect on the environment is to be determined by examining the whole record before the lead agency. View "Friends of Willow Glen Trestle v. City of San Jose" on Justia Law

This case came before the Vermont Supreme Court following the Environmental Division's decision on remand that a rock-crushing operation by North East Materials Group, LLC, (NEMG) was exempt from Act 250 as a preexisting development. The Environmental Division reached the same conclusion in its first decision, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the court used the wrong legal standard in deciding that the rock-crushing operation did not constitute a cognizable physical change to the preexisting development and that one of the main factual findings in support of the decision was clearly erroneous. Appellants, a group on thirteen neighbors to the operation, appealed, arguing that the Environmental Division erred in applying the Supreme Court's instructions on remand. After review a second time, the Supreme Court concluded that, even assuming that crushing operations were part of the preexisting quarrying development, findings on the location and volume of the crushing operations were too limited to support a conclusion that the present operations did not constitute a cognizable change to the existing development. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re North East Materials Group LLC Act 250 JO #5-21" on Justia Law

Glacier challenges the fee imposed on it by the NMFS pursuant to the agency’s cost recovery program developed under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1853(a). The final regulations required members of a catcher-processor coop to pay a percentage of the revenue earned by each vessel as a fee to NMFS. The court concluded that, because the catcher-processor coop permit is a limited access privilege, and Glacier can reasonably be said to be a “holder” of that permit, NMFS had the authority to collect a fee from the individual members of the coop, including Glacier. Therefore, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to NMFS on this issue. Because NMFS’s regulations include the Council’s definition of incremental costs as net costs with and without the trawl rationalization program, NMFS complied with section 1853a(e), and the court rejected Glacier’s argument to the contrary. Finally, the court concluded that NMFS’s calculation of the 2014 cost recovery fee of the catcher-processor sector was inconsistent with NMFS’s own regulations. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the extent it upheld NMFS’s fee calculation and remanded to the agency to re-determine that fee in accordance with its regulations. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. View "Glacier Fish Co. v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Transco, which operates the 10,000-mile Transcontinental pipeline, extending from South Texas to New York City, sought federal approval to expand a portion of the pipeline, called the Leidy Line, which connects gas wells in Central Pennsylvania with the main pipeline. Pursuant to the Clean Water Act, the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Departments of Environmental Protection (PADEP; NJDEP) reviewed the proposal for potential water quality impacts and issued permits. Environmental groups challenged the approvals. The Third Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the petitions and that NJDEP and PADEP did not act arbitrarily in issuing the permits. To bar review of PADEP’s actions in permitting an interstate natural gas facility pursuant to the Natural Gas Act and the Clean Water Act would frustrate the purpose of Congress’s grant of jurisdiction and render superfluous the explicit exception from federal judicial review of the Coastal Zone Management Act. The court also rejected NJDEP’s arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over the Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits or the Water Quality Certifications, and even if it had jurisdiction over those authorizations, it could not reach issues regarding aspects of Freshwater Wetlands Individual Permits that concern transition areas and threatened and endangered species, Letters of Interpretation, or Flood Hazard Area Individual Permits. View "Dela. Riverkeeper Network v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot." on Justia Law

After the Service issued Buckeye an incidental take permit to build a wind farm in Ohio, Union Neighbors filed suit challenging the issuance of the permit. Union Neighbors claimed that the Service failed to comply with its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and failed to make required findings under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531. The court concluded that the Service failed to comply with its NEPA obligations when it failed to consider an economically feasible alternative that would take fewer bats than Buckeye’s proposal. Therefore, the court reversed the district court on this issue. The court concluded, however, that the Service’s interpretation of the ESA is entitled to deference, and the Service complied with its ESA obligations. Therefore, the court affirmed as to this issue. View "Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a decision of the environmental division of the superior court affirming several permits issued to appellee Costco Wholesale Corporation for the expansion of its existing retail store and the addition of an adjacent six-pump gasoline station in the Town of Colchester. Appellants R.L. Vallee, Inc. and Timberlake Associates LLP owned retail gasoline-service facilities located near the planned development. Appellant Vallee argued the trial court erred in: (1) determining that Costco’s proposed traffic-mitigation measures were sufficient for issuance of an Act 250 permit; (2) making findings concerning the impact of an underground stormwater outlet pipe, and with respect to which the court limited cross examination by Vallee’s counsel; (3) concluding that the project would not adversely affect a Class 2 wetland for issuance of an individual wetland permit; and (4) excluding testimony and a related exhibit prepared by appellant Vallee’s wetland consultant. Appellant Timberlake argued that the trial court erred in relying on a presumption with respect to the project’s impact on water pollution and waste disposal under Act 250. The Supreme Court found no error in the environmental division's order and affirmed it. View "In re Costco Stormwater Dishcharge Permit" on Justia Law