Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Seneca, an oil and natural gas exploration and production company, sought to convert a natural gas well in Highland Township into a Class II underground injection control well in which to store waste from fracking. Highland Township, in Elk County, Pennsylvania, enacted an ordinance that, among other things, prohibited “disposal injection wells” from existing within Highland. In Seneca’s lawsuit, challenging the ordinance, the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund sought to intervene on the side of the Township to represent the interests of underlying environmental groups (appellants). The district court denied its motion to intervene, holding that the Township adequately represented underlying interests in defending the ordinance. While a motion for reconsideration was pending, the Township repealed the ordinance and entered into a settlement with Seneca that culminated in a consent decree adopted by the district court. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that original motion to intervene was moot because there is no longer an ordinance to defend. The Consent Decree does not bind any of the appellants nor does it deprive them of any rights after the ordinance has been repealed. Because the appellants are nonparties, they cannot appeal the Consent Decree. View "Seneca Resources Corp v. Township of Highland" on Justia Law

The Attorney General and various environmental groups challenged on several grounds an EIR accompanying a regional development plan for the San Diego area that was intended to guide the area’s transportation infrastructure from 2010 to 2050. As relevant to this appeal, Plaintiffs claimed that the EIR failed adequately to analyze the plan’s impacts on greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. The superior court issued a writ of mandate in Plaintiffs’ favor, concluding that the EIR failed to fulfill its role as an informational document and did not adequately address mitigation measures for significant emission impacts. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment setting aside the EIR certification. The Supreme Court reversed insofar as the court of appeal determined that the EIR’s analysis of greenhouse gas emission impacts rendered the EIR inadequate and required revision, holding that the regional planning agency that issued the EIR, in analyzing greenhouse gas impacts at the time of the EIR, did not abuse its discretion by declining to adopt Executive Order No. S-3-05 as a measure of significance or to discuss the Executive Order more than it did. View "Cleveland National Forest Foundation v. San Diego Ass’n of Governments" on Justia Law

The Environmental Protection Agency designated Williamson County, Illinois, as a nonattainment area for national air quality standards for sulfur dioxide. The rule is not limited to Williamson County; it makes attainment designations for 61 geographic areas spanning 24 states. Southern Illinois Power Cooperative sought judicial review. The EPA moved to dismiss or transfer the petition to the D.C. Circuit under the terms of the judicial-review provision of the Clean Air Act, which designates that circuit as the exclusive venue for review of “nationally applicable” agency actions. 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). The Seventh Circuit agreed that the challenged rule is nationally applicable and transferred the petition to the D.C. Circuit. The court noted that its decision conflicts with its 1993 decision, Madison Gas & Electric Co. v. EPA, which it overruled. View "Southern Illinois Power Cooperative v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

Environmental and Industry Petitioners challenged the EPA's promulgation of a final rule, pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901-6992k, governing when certain hazardous materials qualify as "discarded" and are thus subject to the agency's regulatory authority. The D.C. Circuit upheld Factor 3; vacated Factor 4 insofar as it applied to all hazardous secondary materials via 40 C.F.R. 261.2(g); vacated the Verified Recycler Exclusion except for its emergency preparedness provisions and its expanded containment requirement; and reinstated the Transfer-Based Exclusion. Consequently, the removal of the Transfer-Based Exclusion's bar on spent catalysts was vacated, subject to such arguments as the parties may raise supporting a different outcome. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioner Chelan Basin Conservancy (Conservancy) sought the removal of six acres of fill material that respondent GBI Holding Co. added to its property in 1961 to keep the formerly dry property permanently above the artificially raised seasonal water fluctuations of Lake Chelan. At issue was whether the State consented to the fill's impairment of that right and, if so, whether such consent violated the public trust doctrine. After review, the Washington Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the legislature consented to the fill's impairment of navigable waters under RCW 90.58.270 (the Savings Clause), but the Court of Appeals prematurely concluded such consent did not violate the public trust doctrine. Because the trial court never reached the highly factual public trust issue, the Court reversed and remanded to the trial court to determine in the first instance whether RCW 90.58.270 violated the public trust doctrine. View "Chelan Basin Conservancy v. GBI Holding Co." on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's decision to stay implementation of portions of a final rule concerning methane and other greenhouse gas emissions. The DC Circuit held that, although absent a stay, it would have no authority to review the agency's decision to grant reconsideration, because EPA chose to impose a stay suspending the rule's compliance deadlines, the court must review its reconsideration decision to determine whether the stay was authorized under section 307(d)(7)(B) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(7)(B). The court also held that the 90-day stay was unauthorized by section 307(d)(7)(B) and was thus unreasonable. View "Clean Air Council v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

Conservation Groups filed a complaint in the district court under the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., and a petition for review in the DC Circuit pursuant to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 136 et seq. The court granted the Conservation Groups' petition, holding that FIFRA grants the court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review an ESA claim that is "inextricably intertwined" with a challenge to a pesticide registration order. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA" on Justia Law

The federal court's authority under the Clean Air Act (CAA) to correct an alleged failure by the EPA to perform a non-discretionary, CAA-based act or duty, does not extend to review of the EPA's management of its continuous duty to evaluate the potential employment impact of CAA administration and enforcement. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgments insofar as they impact the EPA, and remanded with instructions to have Murray's suit dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The court dismissed as moot Mon Valley's appeal of the denial of its motion to intervene. View "Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Third Circuit affirmed the approval of a settlement of an FRCP 23(b)(3) class action arising out of hexavalent chromium contamination in Jersey City, New Jersey. The class action was brought on behalf of property owners in several neighborhoods whose homes were allegedly contaminated by by-products disposed of at chromium chemical manufacturing plants, owned and operated by the predecessors of Honeywell and PPG. Plaintiffs asserted common law tort claims and civil conspiracy claims for depreciation of their property values due to the alleged contamination, but not claims for harm other than economic loss to property value, such as personal injury or medical monitoring claims. The district court certified a settlement-only class as to the claims against Honeywell and approved a $10,017,000 settlement fund, which included an award of costs and attorneys’ fees for plaintiffs’ counsel. Overruling an objection by a member of the Honeywell settlement class, the Third Circuit concluded that the class certification requirements of FRCP 23(a) and (b)(3) are satisfied, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the settlement under FRCP 23(e) and the award of attorneys’ fees under FRCP 23(h). The court remanded for reconsideration of the award of costs under Rule 23(h). View "Halley v. Honeywell International Inc" on Justia Law

Ground Zero filed suit challenging the Navy's expansion of a TRIDENT nuclear submarine operating center pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The Ninth Circuit held that the Navy violated NEPA's public disclosure requirement by not revealing that the Safety Board withheld approval of its plan for the construction of a second Explosives Handling Wharf (EHW-2), and by withholding the now-disclosed portions of the appendices to the environmental impact statement (EIS). However, such errors were harmless. In all other respects, the Navy satisfied NEPA's requirements. Therefore, the panel affirmed summary judgment for the Navy. The panel narrowly construed the district court's order restricting Ground Zero's use of portions of the record. Even with this reading, it was not clear that the district court's order comports with the First Amendment. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Ground Zero Center for Nonviolent Action v. US Department of the Navy" on Justia Law