Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Tennessee Gas applied to several federal and state agencies seeking approval to build the Orion interstate pipeline project, comprising 12.9 miles of pipeline looping that would transport 135,000 dekatherms of natural gas per day via Pennsylvania. Approximately 99.5% of the new pipeline would run alongside existing pipeline. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection issued a permit approving the project. Riverkeeper argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to rule on its challenge because PADEP’s order was not final and that PADEP made an erroneous “water dependency” finding and improperly rejected a “compression” alternative to the pipeline project. The Third Circuit concluded that PADEP’s decision was final and upheld the decision on the merits because the agency’s unique interpretation of water dependency was reasonable and worthy of deference. PADEP considered and rejected the compression alternative for reasons that are supported by the record. Where an interstate pipeline project is proposed to be constructed,15 U.S.C. 717f provides “original and exclusive jurisdiction over any civil action for the review of an order or action of a . . . State administrative agency acting pursuant to Federal law to issue . . . any permit, license, concurrence, or approval . . . required under Federal law,” View "Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Secretary, Pennsylvania Department Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's approval of a consent decree between the EPA and the Sierra Club that set a schedule for the EPA to promulgate designations whether geographic areas met national ambient air quality standards for sulfur dioxide under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7401. The panel rejected the States' objections to the consent decree, holding that as long as the EPA sticks to the schedule in the consent decree, the Sierra Club will not advance its lawsuit against the EPA. Therefore, the consent decree did not prohibit the EPA from promulgating designations prior to those deadlines, nor did it otherwise constrain the agency's discretion. The panel explained that, because the consent decree did not bind the States to do nor not to do anything, imposed no legal duties or obligations on them at all, and did not purport to resolve any claims they might have, the States could not block the consent decree by merely withholding their consent. View "North Dakota v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the FWS in an action challenging the FWS's determination that the Sonoran Desert Area bald eagle was not a distinct population segment eligible for listing under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1533. The panel held that FWS reasonably concluded that, while the combination of unusual characteristics in a discrete population was sufficient to satisfy the persistence factor, those characteristics did not by themselves necessarily require a conclusion that the desert eagle population segment was ecologically or biologically significant for the bald eagle taxon as a whole; FWS reasonably concluded that if the desert eagle population segment were "extirpated," this would not create a significant gap in the range of the taxon; and FWS directly addressed climate change in its 2012 decision. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Zinke" on Justia Law

In 2010, Omni, the landowner and developer, sought approval for construction of a shopping center on 11 acres of property zoned commercial, to consist of 10 retail buildings. Monterey County approved the project. An association of community members challenged the approval under the California Environmental Quality Act, Public Resources Code 21000 (CEQA). The trial court denied the petition as to the claimed CEQA violations but ordered an interlocutory remand to allow the county to clarify whether the project was consistent with the county’s general plan requirement that the project have a long-term, sustainable water supply. On remand, the Board of Supervisors clarified that the project “has a long-term sustainable water supply, both in quality and quantity to serve the development in accordance with the 2010 Monterey County General Plan Policies. The court entered judgment in favor of the county and Omni. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting claims that the county violated the association’s right to procedural due process on interlocutory remand and violated CEQA because the water supply analysis was inadequate, the analysis of the project’s consistency with the general plan was inadequate, the environmental impact report’s traffic analysis was inadequate, and environmental review of Omni’s project was improperly segmented. View "Highway 68 Coalition v. County of Monterey" on Justia Law

About 99.5% of the Orion Project, 12.9 miles of pipeline looping that would transport an additional 135,000 dekatherms per day of natural gas through Pennsylvania, would run alongside existing pipelines. According to Riverkeeper, construction will lead to deforestation, destruction of wetland habitats, and other forms of environmental damage. Riverkeeper asserts that such damage can be avoided by building or upgrading a compressor station. The Army Corps of Engineers, which administers certain provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1344(a), 1362(7) issued a Section 404 permit approving the project. The Third Circuit rejected Riverkeeper’s challenge. The Corps considered the compression alternative but rejected it for reasons supported by the record. While the compression alternative would disturb less land, its impact would be mostly permanent. The pipeline project would disturb more land, but its impact would be mostly temporary. In making a policy choice between those environmental tradeoffs, the agency’s discretion “was at its apex.” View "Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the Government's approval of the location, construction, and specifications for a military base in Okinawa, Japan. Plaintiffs sought claims for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the Government's alleged violations of Section 402 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), 54 U.S.C. 307101(e), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs have standing to bring declaratory relief claims limited to whether the Government's evaluation, information gathering, and consultation process discharged the Government's obligations under the NHPA and otherwise satisfied the requirements of the APA. The panel also held that plaintiffs' injunctive relief claim did not present a political question. Accordingly, the panel affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief did not present a political question; reversed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek declaratory relief; and reversed the district court's conclusion that plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief presented a political question. The panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Mattis" on Justia Law

Constitution petitioned for review of the Department's decision denying its application for certification pursuant to Section 401 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, more commonly known as the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. 1341. Constitution sought certification that its proposed interstate natural gas pipeline would comply with New York State water quality standards. NYSDEC denied the application on the ground that Constitution had not provided sufficient information. The Second Circuit held that, to the extent Constitution challenged the timeliness of the NYSDEC decision, the petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On the merits, the court held that NYSDEC's actions were within its statutory authority and that its decision was not arbitrary or capricious. The court deferred to NYSDEC's expertise as to the significance of the information requested from Constitution, given the record evidence supporting the relevance of that information to NYSDEC's certification determination. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Constitution Pipeline Co. v. New York Sate Department of Environmental Conservation" on Justia Law

The Oak Ridge, Tennessee uranium-enrichment facilities for the Manhattan Project, the World War II effort to build the first atomic bomb, have been inactive since the mid-1980s. The Department of Energy has worked to clean up the hazardous waste and hired Bechtel, a global engineering and construction firm. Bechtel hired Eagle to help decontaminate the complex, which required the demolition of buildings and equipment across the 2,200-acre complex and removal of radioactive nuclear waste, followed by decontamination of the soil and groundwater to make the site safe for redevelopment. Eagle’s work proved significantly more challenging and expensive than either party anticipated. Their contract allowed Bechtel to make changes; if those changes caused Eagle’s costs to increase, Bechtel was to make equitable adjustments in price and time for performance. Eight years after completing its work, Eagle filed suit, seeking compensation for its extra work and for excess waste that Eagle removed. The district court awarded Eagle the full amount of each request, plus interest and attorney’s fees. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the award of damages and attorney’s fees, but remanded so that the court can recalculate the interest to which Eagle is entitled under the Tennessee Prompt Pay Act. View "Eagle Supply & Manufacturing L.P. v. Bechtel Jacobs Co." on Justia Law

In an amendment to the Clean Air Act (CAA), Congress directed the EPA to operate a Renewable Fuel Standards Program (the RFS Program) to increase oil refineries’ use of renewable fuels. But for small refineries that would suffer a “disproportionate economic hardship” in complying with the RFS Program, the statute required the EPA to grant exemptions on a case-by-case basis. Petitioner Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company owned and operated two refineries in Wyoming: one in Sinclair, and another in Casper. Both fell within the RFS Program’s definition of “small refinery” and were exempt from the RFS requirements until 2011. Those exemptions were extended until 2013 after the Department of Energy found Sinclair’s Wyoming refineries to be among the 13 of 59 small refineries that would continue to face “disproportionate economic hardship” if required to comply with the RFS Program. Sinclair then petitioned the EPA to extend their small-refinery exemptions. The EPA denied Sinclair’s petitions in two separate decisions, finding that both refineries appeared to be profitable enough to pay the cost of the RFS Program. Sinclair filed a timely petition for review with the Tenth Circuit court, which concluded the EPA exceeded its statutory authority under the CAA in interpreting the hardship exemption to require a threat to a refinery’s survival as an ongoing operation. Because the Court found the EPA exceeded its statutory authority, it vacated the EPA’s decisions and remanded to the EPA for further proceedings. View "Sinclair Wyoming Refining v. EPA" on Justia Law

Sierra Club challenged the Department's grant of an application to export liquified natural gas (LNG) using terminals and liquefaction facilities (Freeport Terminal) on Quintana Island. On the merits, the DC Circuit held that the Department did not fail to fulfill its obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by declining to make specific projections about environmental impacts stemming from specific levels of export-induced gas production; the Department did not fail to fulfill its obligations with respect to the potential for the U.S. electric power sector to switch from gas to coal in response to higher gas prices; the court rejected Sierra Club's challenges to the Department's examination of the potential greenhouse-gas emissions resulting from the indirect effects of exports; and Sierra Club has given the court no reason to question the Department's judgment that the FLEX application was not inconsistent with the public interest. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Sierra Club v. DOE" on Justia Law