Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

This water rights appeal stemmed from two consolidated subcases, litigated in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA). The subcases concerned the United States’ late claims (Late Claims) filed in January 2013, which asserted “supplemental beneficial use storage water rights” claims under the constitutional method of appropriation to store water in priority after flood-control releases. The special master recommended that the State’s motion for summary judgment be granted, concluding the Late Claims should be disallowed because, as the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (Director) recommended, the Late Claims asserted rights that had not been claimed when the underlying water rights were adjudicated and decreed. Alternatively, the special master concluded the Late Claims should be disallowed because, as intervenor Black Canyon Irrigation District (BCID) asserted, the decreed water rights already authorized the rights the Late Claims were asserting, thus, unnecessary. The district court agreed with the special master insofar as the Late Claims were precluded. However, the district court rejected the special master’s alternative recommendation that the Late Claims were duplicative of the rights already decreed and unnecessary. The district court entered judgment reflecting these conclusions. BCID timely appeals and the Idaho Supreme Court affirm the district court’s conclusion the special master exceeded the district court’s orders of reference by making the “alternative basis” recommendation. View "Black Canyon Irrig Dist v. State / Suez Water" on Justia Law

Petitioner Atlantic Richfield Company (“ARCO”) petitioned the Montana Supreme Court seeking reversal of five district court orders. Relevant here, the underlying action concerned a claim for restoration damages brought by property owners in and around the town of Opportunity, Montana. As part of ARCO’s cleanup responsibility relating to the Anaconda Smelter, EPA required ARCO to remediate residential yards within the Smelter Site harboring levels of arsenic exceeding 250 parts per million in soil, and to remediate all wells used for drinking water with levels of arsenic in excess of ten parts per billion. The Property Owners, a group of ninety-eight landowners located within the bounds of the Smelter Site, sought the opinion of outside experts to determine what actions would be necessary to fully restore their properties to pre-contamination levels. The experts recommended the Property Owners remove the top two feet of soil from affected properties and install permeable walls to remove arsenic from the groundwater. Both remedies required restoration work in excess of what the EPA required of ARCO in its selected remedy. The Property Owners sued, seeking restoration damages. ARCO conceded that the Property Owners could move forward on their first four claims, but contended that the claim for restoration damages was preempted by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”). The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the Property Owners’ claims for restoration damages was barred by CERCLA. View "Atlantic Richfield v. 2nd Jud. Dist" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit granted a petition for writ of mandamus in an action filed by environmental groups seeking to compel the EPA to act upon a rulemaking petition it granted eight years ago concerning dust-lead hazard and lead-paint standards. The panel held that the EPA had a duty to act under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the amendments to it from the Paint Hazard Act, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Furthermore, the TRAC factors (Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) favor issuance of the writ in this case. The panel ordered that the EPA issue a proposed rule within ninety days of the date that this decision becomes final; EPA promulgate the final rule within one year after the promulgation of the proposed rule; and the deadlines for both the proposed rule and the final rule will only be modified if EPA presents new information showing modification is required. View "A Community Voice v. EPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the NMFS's decision allowing a Hawaii-based swordfish fishery to increase its fishing efforts, which may result in the unintentional deaths of endangered sea turtles. Plaintiffs also challenged the FWS's decision to issue "special purpose" permit to the NMFS, which authorizes the fishery to incidentally kill migratory birds. The Ninth Circuit held that the FWS's grant of an incidental take permit to the NMFS in reliance on the special purpose permit provision in 50 C.F.R. 21.27 was arbitrary and capricious because the FWS's interpretation of section 21.27 did not conform to either the Migratory Bird Treaty Act's (MBTA) conservation intent or the plain language of the regulation. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment affirming the FWS's decision to issue the permit. The panel also held that NMFS's 2012 BiOp's on jeopardy finding as to the loggerhead sea turtles was arbitrary and capricious because the scientific data suggested that the loggerhead population would significantly decline, and the agency failed to sufficiently explain the discrepancy in its opinion and the record evidence. Therefore, the panel reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment upholding this portion of the BiOp. The panel otherwise affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Turtle Island Restoration Network v. DOC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the Conservancy's petition for a writ of mandate to compel the City of West Hollywood to set aside the City's approval of a real estate development project. The court held that the environmental impact report's (EIR) analysis of alternatives to the project was adequate. Although the EIR did not include a conceptual design of Alternative 3, the Conservancy did not cite any legal authority requiring an EIR to include design plans for project alternatives, and the court declined to so hold. Furthermore, the imprecision inherent in the estimates of space reduction did not render the EIR defective. The court also held that the EIR's response to public comments was adequate, and there was substantial evidence to support the finding of infeasibility of Alternative 3. View "L.A. Conservancy v. City of West Hollywood" on Justia Law

After the Garcias bought their Lake Station Property in 2004, it was used as an automobile repair shop and a day spa. It previously was used as a dry cleaning facility and contained six underground storage tanks: four were used for petroleum-based Stoddard solvent, one was used for gasoline, and the last for heating oil. In 1999, the dry cleaning company reported a leak from the Stoddard tanks to the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM). In 2000, a site investigation was conducted and five groundwater monitoring wells were installed. IDEM requested additional information and testing in 2001 and 2004. The Garcias claim they had no knowledge of the preexisting environmental contamination before insuring with Atlantic. A 2014 letter from Environmental Inc. brought the contamination to the Garcias’ attention. The Garcias hired Environmental to investigate and learned that Perchloroethylene solvent and heating oil still affected the property. Atlantic obtained a declaration that its Commercial General Liability Coverage (CGL) policies did not apply. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reading a “Claims in Process” exclusion to preclude coverage for losses or claims for damages arising out of property damage—known or unknown—that occurred or was in the process of occurring before the policy’s inception. View "Atlantic Casualty Insurance Co v. Garcia" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Appellants’ complaint without leave to amend. The complaint stemmed from Nebraska Department of Natural Resources’s (DNR) issuance of closing notices to holders of surface water permits, which barred Appellants from using the surface waters of the Republican River and its tributaries to irrigate their crops. Appellants alleged claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and that they had been subject to an inverse condemnation. Appellants also alleged that their due process rights had been violated and sought restitution. The district court dismissed the amended complaint pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 6-1112(b)(6) without leave to amend. The Supreme Court held (1) Appellants failed to state a claim for inverse condemnation; but (2) the district court erred in failing to find that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Appellants’ claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983, due process, and restitution. The court remanded with directions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction those claims barred by sovereign immunity. View "Cappel v. State" on Justia Law

This water rights appeal stems from two consolidated subcases, numbers 65-23531 and 65-23532, litigated in the Snake River Basin Adjudication (SRBA). The subcases concerned the United States’ late claims filed in January 2013, which asserted “supplemental beneficial use storage water rights” claims under the constitutional method of appropriation to store water in priority after flood-control releases. The special master recommended that the State’s motion for summary judgment be granted, concluding the Late Claims should be disallowed because, as the Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (Director) recommended, the Late Claims asserted rights that had not been claimed when the underlying water rights were adjudicated and decreed. Alternatively, the special master concluded the Late Claims should be disallowed because, as intervenor Black Canyon Irrigation District (BCID) asserted, the decreed water rights already authorized the rights the Late Claims now assert, and hence, the Late Claims were unnecessary. The district court agreed with the special master insofar as the Late Claims were precluded. However, the district court rejected the special master’s alternative recommendation that the Late Claims were duplicative of the rights already decreed and unnecessary. The district court entered judgment reflecting these conclusions. The United States appealed the district court’s ruling on preclusion, but finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "United States v. Black Canyon Irrigation Dist." on Justia Law

Landowners Harlan and Maxine Douglass (Douglass) brought a private right of action against Shamrock Paving Inc. under the Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA), chapter 70.105DRCW, to recover costs incurred from an alleged remedial action. Shamrock trespassed onto Douglass' vacant property and spilled an unknown amount of lube oil.Douglass paid for soil testing and soil removal to clean up his property and sought recovery of those costs under the MTCA. At issue for the Washington Supreme Court's consideration was the interpretation of "remedial action" within the statute, whether the lube oil on Douglass' property created a "potential threat" to human health or the environment, in addition to which party would thus be considered the "prevailing party." The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' holding that Douglass' soil testing was a remedial action, but the soil removal was not. The Court also reversed the appellate court's prevailing party designation because it was premature. The matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Douglass v. Shamrock Paving, Inc." on Justia Law

In Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates, 1 Cal.5th 749 (2016) ("Department of Finance"), the California Supreme Court upheld a Commission ruling that certain conditions a regional water quality control board imposed on a storm water discharge permit issued under federal and state law required subvention and were not federal mandates. The Supreme Court found no federal law, regulation, or administrative case authority expressly required the conditions; the federal requirement that the permit reduce pollution impacts to the “maximum extent practicable” was not a federal mandate, but rather vested the regional board with discretion to choose which conditions to impose to meet the standard. The permit conditions resulting from the exercise of that choice were state mandates. In this appeal, the Court of Appeal faced the same issue: the parties and the permit conditions were different, but the legal issue was the same - whether the Commission correctly determined that conditions imposed on a federal and state storm water permit by a regional water quality control board are state mandates. The Commission reached its decision by applying the standard the Supreme Court later adopted in "Department of Finance." The trial court, reviewing the case before "Department of Finance" was issued, concluded the Commission had applied the wrong standard, and it remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. The Court of Appeal concluded here the Commission applied the correct standard and the permit requirements were state mandates. View "Dept. of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates" on Justia Law