Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Monterey County Water Resources Agency (MCWRA) is a flood control and water agency. Coastkeeper sued, alleging that MCWRA had violated the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act (Wat. Code 13000) by failing to report to the regional water quality board its discharges of agricultural pollutants into the Reclamation Ditch and the Blanco Drain and breach of fiduciary duty under the public trust doctrine. The trial court granted the petition as to the claim of failure to report waste discharge and denied it as to breach of fiduciary duty, commanding MCWRA “to prepare and file a report of waste discharge ... with the Central Coast Regional Water Quality Control Board.” The court of appeal reversed, finding that Coastkeeper failed to exhaust its administrative remedy under the Act, which provides that any person aggrieved by a regional water board’s action or failure to act is entitled to administrative review by the State Water Board, and then by petition for administrative mandamus in the superior court. The regional board was apparently investigating MCWRA's actions; Coastkeeper failed to file a petition for review with the State Water Board of the regional board’s action or failure to act with regard to MCWRA’s alleged waste discharges. View "Monterey Coastkeeper v. Monterey County Water Resources Agency" on Justia Law

In this second appeal, challenging the environmental impact report (EIR) and related project approvals for two natural resource plans for the proposed Newhall Ranch development, the Court of Appeal affirmed the post-remand judgment and accompanying writ. The court held that both actions were legally permissible under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), and rejected plaintiffs' claim that Public Resources Code section 21168.9 prohibits partial decertification of an EIR, and that the same section prohibits leaving project approvals in place while decertifying an EIR. The court held that a trial court has authority to partially decertify an EIR; a trial court has the power to leave some project approvals in place after partial decertification of an EIR; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the limited writ; and the writ provided an adequate remedy for a Fish and Game Code section 5515 violation. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. California Department of Fish and Wildlife" on Justia Law

Philip Hudson appealed a district court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the State of Idaho, the Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho Department of Lands (collectively, the “State”). The district court found that Hudson violated the Idaho Lake Protection Act (the “LPA”) when he placed fill in the bed of Priest Lake without a permit. Hudson disputed the location of the Ordinary High Water Mark (the “OHWM”) and argued the fill was placed on his own property to protect it from erosion. Hudson argued that there was an issue of material fact regarding the location of the OHWM, which made summary judgment improper. Finding the dispute regarding the OHWM was not a material fact in determining whether Hudson violated the LPA, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment. View "Idaho Board of Land v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The broad waiver of sovereign immunity found in section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) waived sovereign immunity for all non-monetary claims, and section 704 of the APA's final agency action requirement constrained only actions brought under the APA, 5 U.S.C. 702, 704. The Navajo Nation filed suit challenging Interior's published guidelines clarifying how it would make surplus and shortage determinations for delivery to Western states of the waters of the Colorado River. The panel affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Nation's claims under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., based on lack of standing where the challenged guidelines did not present a reasonable probability of threat to either the Nation's adjudicated water rights or its practical water needs. The panel also held that the Nation's breach of trust claim sought relief other than money damages, and the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 702 applied squarely to the claim. Therefore, the panel reversed and remanded as to this issue. Finally, the district court acted within its discretion in refusing post-judgment leave to amend. View "Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

At issue in this matter was landowners’ recourse against an irrigation district for diverting a portion of their water source to other landowners within the district. The appellants-landowners owned farms in Jerome County; A&B Irrigation District (the “District”) distributed water to these farms and others throughout its service area in Jerome and Minidoka Counties. The District serves two distinct sub-areas in its district: Unit A and Unit B. The water the District distributes comes from two sources: (1) surface water from the Snake River and associated reservoirs, and (2) groundwater from the Eastern Snake Plain Aquifer. These two water sources were historically what separated Units A and B, and many owners based their land choices in the 1950s on the water source. Unit A farms have received surface water exclusively since the District’s inception. For decades Unit B farms received only groundwater, but the District converted approximately 1400 Unit B acres to surface water in the 1990s in response to decreasing groundwater supply. Appellants claimed the Project primarily benefited Unit B landowners at the expense of Unit A by diverting a portion of Unit A’s sole water source (surface water) onto Unit B land and “diluting” their annual water supply. Additionally, the District divided Project costs equally among all landowners despite what Appellants claim was the Project’s primary purpose: to help sustain Unit B farms as their groundwater supply continues to decline. The landowners brought an action for a declaratory judgment regarding their constitutional water and property rights. They also sought injunctive relief against the irrigation district for a breach of fiduciary duty. The district court granted the irrigation district’s motion to dismiss on all three of the landowners’ claims. The landowners’ appeal centered on two issues with respect to their three claims against the District: the legal standard under which the district court dismissed Appellants’ claims, and the court’s substantive determinations under that standard. Appellants contend the district court erred both procedurally and substantively in dismissing all three counts in its amended complaint. Procedurally, they claimed the district court improperly considered matters outside the pleadings in dismissing all three claims under Rule 12(b)(6), rather than converting to the Rule 56 summary judgment standard. Substantively, Appellants contended that Counts I and III were justiciable as presented on the face of their amended complaint, and that res judicata did not bar relief under Count II. The Idaho Supreme Court found after review that the landowners failed to demonstrate justiciable claims in their Counts I and III, and that the district court erred in dismissing their property rights claim in Count II by considering matters outside the pleadings under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Paslay v. A&B Irrigation District" on Justia Law

Schweitzer Fire District (the District) appealed a district court’s grant of a writ of prohibition on behalf of Schweitzer Basin Water Company (the Company) that prevented the District from taking proposed enforcement action against the Company related to perceived flow-rate deficiencies of fire hydrants owned by third-party homeowners and installed on the Company’s private water system. The district court granted the writ of prohibition after concluding that the District did not have jurisdiction over the Company under Idaho Code section 41-259. The district court awarded attorney fees and costs to the Company after determining that the District’s position was without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The District timely appealed. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court found the district court correctly concluded the District did not have jurisdiction over the Company’s water system under 41-259. Finding no other grounds for reversal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Schweitzer Basin Water Co. v. Schweitzer Fire Dist." on Justia Law

Allco Renewable Energy Ltd. (Allco) appealed the denial of its motion to intervene, and its renewed motion to intervene, in a certificate-of-public-good (CPG) proceeding for a solar electric generation facility. The applicant, GMPSolar–Richmond, LLC (GMPSR), was an affiliate of Green Mountain Power Corp. (GMP), an electricity utility, owned by GMP and an investor. Allco was developing a number of solar electric generation facilities in Vermont. A hearing officer denied Allco’s request for intervention as of right and permissive intervention; the Public Service Board (PSB) also denied the motion for reconsideration. On appeal to the Vermont Supreme Court, Allco argued PSB used the wrong framework in reviewing its request and incorrectly applied the intervention criteria. Finding no reversible error, however, the Supreme Court affirmed the PSB. View "In re Petition of GMPSolar-Richmond, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the County's certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) and approval of a project to modify an oil refinery in Bakersfield. The court held that the EIR's choice of 2007 as the measure of an existing conditions baseline for an operating refinery was supported by substantial evidence; appropriately deviated from the normal baseline; and conformed to the principles set forth by the California Supreme Court in Communities for a Better Environment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist. (2010) 48 Cal.4th 310. Therefore, the baseline complied with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The court also held that the EIR's discussion of greenhouse gas emissions contained no prejudicial error. However, the EIR containde factual error in its description of federal railroad safety data and the error caused the EIR to underestimate the risk of a release by fivefold. Finally, the EIR erroneously stated federal law preempted CEQA review of certain environmental impacts of off-site rail activities. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Association of Irritated Residents v. Kern County Board of Supervisors" on Justia Law

In these consolidated appeals requiring the Supreme Court to interpret various provisions of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Rule (WVSCMRR), W.Va. CSR 38-2-1, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court. The Supreme Court held that the circuit court (1) did not err in finding that the WVSCMRR does not require a coal company, in its application for modification of its mining permit, to demonstrate compliance with the Utility Protection Standard found at W.Va. 38-2-14.17; (2) did not err in ruling that the permit application sufficiently described how the coal operator would comply with the Utility Protection Standard; but (3) erred in finding that the WVSCMRR applied regardless of a coal operator’s common law property rights. View "Texas Eastern Transmission v. W. Va. Department of Environmental Protection" on Justia Law

After the San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) certified an environmental impact report (EIR) for its 2050 Regional Transportation Plan/Sustainable Communities Strategy (transportation plan), CREED-21 and Affordable Housing Coalition of San Diego filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the EIR's adequacy under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). Cleveland National Forest Foundation and the Center for Biological Diversity filed a similar petition, in which Sierra Club and the State later joined. The superior court granted the petitions in part, finding the EIR failed to carry out its role as an informational document because it did not analyze the inconsistency between the state's policy goals reflected in Executive Order S-3-05 (Executive Order) and the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts after 2020. The court also found the EIR failed to adequately address mitigation measures for the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. The California Supreme Court granted review on the sole issue of whether the EIR should have analyzed the transportation plan's impacts against the greenhouse gas emission reduction goals in the Executive Order and reversed the Court of Appeal "insofar as it determined that the [EIR's] analysis of greenhouse gas emission impacts rendered the EIR inadequate and required revision." Cleveland and the State requested the Court of Appeal keep the remainder of its decision substantially intact and publish it as revised. SANDAG asserted the case was moot because the EIR and the transportation plan have been superseded by more recent versions, which Cleveland and the State did not challenge. The Court of Appeal agreed with Cleveland and the State that SANDAG did not establish this case was moot. The Court exercised its discretion and reversed to the extent the superior court determined the EIR failed to adequately analyze the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. The judgment was affirmed to the extent the superior court determined the EIR failed to adequately address the mitigation measures for the transportation plan's greenhouse gas emissions impacts. The judgment was modified to incorporate this court's decision on the cross-appeals. The matter was remanded to the superior court with directions to enter a modified judgment and order the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate conforming to the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland II and to this court's decision on remand. View "Cleveland Nat. Forest Foundation v. San Diego Assn. etc." on Justia Law