Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

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Kevin Shibilski was charged with environmental and wire-fraud crimes and conspiracy to defraud the United States, related to his operation of three Wisconsin-based companies involved in recycling electronic equipment. Shibilski pleaded guilty to a single felony count of willful failure to pay employment taxes, and in exchange, the government dropped the other charges. During the sentencing hearing, Shibilski objected to the presentence report’s recommendations regarding relevant conduct under the Sentencing Guidelines, particularly the recommendation to hold him responsible for the total amount of unpaid employment taxes for all three companies. The district judge held a seven-hour sentencing hearing, most of which was consumed by the presentation of documents and testimony, including testimony from Shibilski himself.The district judge found Shibilski responsible for the full amount of unpaid taxes. The judge also declined to award credit for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), finding that Shibilski had falsely denied responsibility for relevant conduct. After weighing the statutory sentencing factors, the judge imposed a sentence of 33 months in prison, the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range.Shibilski appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the judge violated Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by unduly curtailing his attorney’s presentation of evidence, that the judge improperly denied credit for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a), and that the judge committed procedural error by failing to meaningfully address the statutory sentencing factors. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the district court's decision. View "United States v. Shibilski" on Justia Law

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The case involves four North Carolina-based citizen groups ("Petitioners") who petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) to require testing of fifty-four Per- and Poly- Fluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS) prevalent in their community. The EPA granted the petition, agreeing to require testing on PFAS as a class through its own testing protocol. Petitioners sought judicial review of the EPA’s decision, contending it was in effect a denial of their petition.The district court dismissed Petitioners’ complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The court reasoned that the EPA reasonably chose to grant Petitioners’ request to test the fifty-four PFAS as a category—PFAS generally—which the TSCA encourages the EPA to do. As to the EPA’s failure to adopt Petitioners’ specific testing program, the district court explained that Petitioners “have a right to petition [the] EPA to initiate proceedings for the issuance of rules and orders, but [they] do not have a right to compel the content of [the] EPA’s proceedings or to compel [the] EPA to issue a specific rule or order.”On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the EPA’s decision was a grant in fact. The court reasoned that the TSCA allows the EPA to group chemicals into scientifically appropriate categories for testing. The court also held that the TSCA does not give petitioners the unrestrained ability to force companies to conduct specific testing when the § 2603 requirements are met. The court concluded that by promptly commencing a proceeding for determining how to best test PFAS, the EPA gave Petitioners all that they were entitled to receive. View "Center for Environmental Health v. Regan" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Puget Soundkeeper Alliance (Soundkeeper), an environmental organization, and the Port of Tacoma and SSA Terminals, LLC (collectively, the Port), operators of the West Sitcum Terminal, a marine cargo terminal. The dispute centers on a portion of the terminal known as "the Wharf," where stormwater runoff carries pollutants into Puget Sound. The Soundkeeper alleges that the Port violated the Clean Water Act by not implementing stormwater controls across the entire facility, including the Wharf. The Port argues that the Wharf is not subject to regulation because it does not conduct industrial activities that require a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, which granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Port. The court concluded that the Industrial Stormwater General Permits (ISGPs) issued by the Washington State Department of Ecology did not extend coverage to the Wharf, as the Wharf did not conduct the industrial activities specified in the permits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the plain text of the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs required a transportation facility conducting industrial activities to implement stormwater controls across the entire facility. Therefore, the Port needed to implement appropriate stormwater controls across the Terminal while the 2010 and 2015 ISGPs were in effect. The court also held that the ISGPs were enforceable in a citizen suit, even if they exceeded the requirements of the federal regulations.However, the court vacated the district court's decision regarding the 2020 ISGP, which was subject to an ongoing state-court challenge, and remanded the case for further consideration. The court instructed the district court to consider the effect of the state proceedings on this case. View "PSA V. PORT OF TACOMA" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of California reviewed a case involving the University of California, Berkeley's (UC Berkeley) plan to build a housing project on a site called People's Park. The plaintiffs, Make UC a Good Neighbor and People’s Park Historic District Advocacy Group, challenged the certification of an environmental impact report (EIR) for the project, arguing that it failed to consider the environmental impacts of "student-generated noise" and did not adequately consider alternatives to the People’s Park location. The Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs.The Supreme Court of California granted review of the Court of Appeal’s decision. During the review, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1307, which added sections to the Public Resources Code stating that noise generated by project occupants and their guests is not a significant environmental effect for residential projects, and that public higher education institutions are not required to consider alternatives to the location of a proposed residential or mixed-use housing project if certain requirements are met. The plaintiffs conceded that this new law applied to the case and made clear that the EIR was not required to examine "social noise" or potential alternative locations to People’s Park.The Supreme Court of California concluded that none of the plaintiffs' claims had merit in light of the new law. The court held that the new law applied to both the People’s Park housing project and the development plan, and the EIR was not inadequate for having failed to study the potential noisiness of future students at UC Berkeley in connection with this project. The court declined to consider the plaintiffs' alternative locations argument with respect to potential future housing projects. The court reversed the Court of Appeal’s judgment. View "Make UC a Good Neighbor v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

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Several Louisiana coastal parishes, joined by the Louisiana Attorney General and the Louisiana Secretary of Natural Resources, filed lawsuits against various oil and gas companies, alleging violations of Louisiana’s State and Local Coastal Resources Management Act of 1978. The companies removed these cases to federal court, asserting that they satisfy the requirements of the federal officer removal statute due to their refining contracts with the government during World War II. The district courts granted the parishes’ motions to remand these cases to state court, concluding that the oil companies did not meet their burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.The oil companies appealed the district courts' decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ orders remanding these cases to state court. The court concluded that the oil companies failed to satisfy the “acting under” requirement of the federal officer removal statute, as their compliance with federal regulations or cooperation with federal agencies was insufficient to bring a private action within the statute. The court also found that the oil companies failed to establish that the conduct challenged in the parishes’ lawsuits was “connected or associated with” acts the companies had taken under color of federal office. View "Plaquemines Parish v. BP America Production Co." on Justia Law

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The case involves Aerie Point Holdings, LLC (Aerie Point) and Vorsteveld Farm, LLC (Vorsteveld). Aerie Point owns a property in Panton, Vermont, which is located downhill from Vorsteveld's dairy farm. In 2017, Vorsteveld began installing tile drains in its fields to improve soil quality. The excess water drained from these tiles was discharged into public ditches, then through culverts, and finally towards Lake Champlain over Aerie Point’s property. This led to increased water flow, sediment, and contaminants on Aerie Point's land, causing shoreline erosion and algae blooms in Lake Champlain. In April 2020, Aerie Point filed a lawsuit against Vorsteveld for trespass and nuisance.The civil division found in favor of Aerie Point in March 2022, concluding that Vorsteveld's actions constituted trespass and nuisance. The court issued an injunction in August 2022, preventing Vorsteveld from allowing water from its drain tile system to flow into the public ditches and culverts on Arnold Bay Road. Vorsteveld did not appeal this judgment.In August 2023, Vorsteveld moved for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(5) and (6), arguing that postjudgment changes in fact and law justified relief from the injunction. Vorsteveld claimed that an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigation regarding filled wetlands on the farm prevented it from complying with the injunction, and that the federal investigation/enforcement action preempted the state injunction. Vorsteveld also argued that changes to Vermont’s Right-to-Farm law justified relief from the injunction. The court denied the motion and the request for an evidentiary hearing.On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court found that Vorsteveld's arguments were attempts to relitigate issues that had been resolved by the judgment. The court also found that Vorsteveld had not demonstrated that there were significant postjudgment changes in factual circumstances or the law that made prospective application of the injunction inequitable. The court concluded that Vorsteveld's arguments relating to the EPA investigation and changes to the Right-to-Farm law were insufficient to merit relief under Rule 60(b). The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vorsteveld's request for an evidentiary hearing. View "Aerie Point Holdings, LLC v. Vorsteveld Farm, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and other environmental groups sued the Bureau of Reclamation and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), alleging that they violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Endangered Species Act (ESA) by failing to adequately consult over whether the renewal of government water supply contracts would likely jeopardize the existence of the delta smelt and by failing to reinitiate consultation with the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) regarding the contracts’ effects on Chinook salmon. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the federal agencies complied with their obligations under the APA and ESA. The court found that FWS's consultation on the renewal of the contracts was not arbitrary and capricious, and that Reclamation did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by relying on it. The court also rejected NRDC's argument that Reclamation violated its obligations under the ESA by misinforming FWS regarding the scope of its discretion to negotiate the contracts. Finally, the court concluded that the renewed contracts did not give Reclamation the discretion to take measures that would benefit the Chinook salmon, and therefore the district court did not err in dismissing NRDC's fifth claim for relief for failure to state a claim. View "NRDC v. Haaland" on Justia Law

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A condominium resident suffered serious injuries due to a gasoline leak from an underground storage tank owned and operated by a gas station located over a mile away. The resident filed a lawsuit against the owners and operators of the gas station, alleging common-law negligence and liability based on the violation of Illinois environmental statutes and regulations governing underground storage tanks. The resident passed away during the course of the litigation, and her daughter was appointed as a special representative to continue the action.The Cook County circuit court dismissed the statutory claims, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. The courts held that the statutes at issue did not create private statutory rights of action, express or implied. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that there was no express private right of action under the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Program (LUST Program) provisions of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act. The court also concluded that implying a private right of action was not necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. The court noted that the plaintiff's common-law negligence claim, based on the same acts and omissions that she alleged violated the LUST Program of the Act, was a sufficient remedy. Therefore, it was not necessary to imply a private right of action. View "Rice v. Marathon Petroleum Corp." on Justia Law

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Tri-Plex Technical Services, Ltd., an Illinois corporation that develops, manufactures, distributes, and sells commercial-grade carpet cleaning products, filed a complaint against its competitors, including Jon-Don, LLC, alleging violations of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to disclose that their cleaning products contained excessive amounts of phosphorous and volatile organic material, in violation of Illinois environmental laws. The plaintiff argued that this harmed its business because its products complied with Illinois law and the carpet cleaning companies preferred and purchased the defendants’ products because they contained phosphorus and cleaned better, albeit illegally.The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint on several grounds, including that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim and that the plaintiff lacked standing. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reversed the judgment of the appellate court and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint. The court found that the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing its claims under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to plead all the elements of a Consumer Fraud Act claim, as it did not plead that it was the intended recipient of the defendants’ alleged deceptions. The court further held that the plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim, which rested upon the validity of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and the Consumer Fraud Act claims, also failed. View "Tri-Plex Technical Services, Ltd. v. Jon-Don, LLC" on Justia Law

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A group of environmental organizations challenged the U.S. Forest Service's approval of the Long Valley Exploration Drilling Project, a mineral exploration project on land in the Inyo National Forest in California. The Forest Service had approved the project by invoking two Categorical Exclusions (CEs) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which allow certain actions to bypass more extensive environmental review. The environmental groups argued that the Forest Service could not combine two CEs to approve the project when neither CE alone could cover the entire project.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service and KORE Mining Ltd., the company that proposed the project. The environmental groups appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The court found that the two-phase project was a single proposed action and that the Forest Service's regulations prohibited combining CEs when no single CE could cover a proposed action alone. The court also held that the Forest Service's error in combining the two CEs was not harmless and remanded the case to the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the environmental groups, vacating the agency's decision. View "FRIENDS OF THE INYO V. USFS" on Justia Law