Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

Contra Costa County certified an environmental impact report (EIR) and approved a land use permit for a “Propane Recovery Project” at a Rodeo oil refinery owned and operated by Phillips 66. The trial court ordered the county to set aside the certification of the EIR and approval of the land use permit and to correct specified inadequacies in the EIR in the analysis of air quality issues. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments by project opponents that the trial court erred in rejecting its additional arguments that the project description and the analysis of greenhouse gas emissions and environmental hazards failed to comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000). With respect to the description, the court noted substantial evidence that Phillips’ propane recovery project is independent of any purported change in the crude oil feedstock used at the Refinery and will not increase its present capacity to refine heavier crude oils. View "Rodeo Citizens Association. v. County of Contra Costa" on Justia Law

In 2014, several hundred thousand gallons of gasoline spilled from a rupture in an underground pipeline near Belton, South Carolina. The gasoline seeped into nearby waterways. Following a cleanup, at least 160,000 gallons allegedly remained unrecovered. Plaintiffs allege that the gasoline has continued to travel a distance of 1000 feet or less from the pipeline to Browns Creek and Cupboard Creek, which are tributaries of the Savannah River, and their adjacent wetlands Conservation groups brought a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251–1387, alleging violations by polluting "navigable waters of the United States" without a permit and seeking relief to remediate the ongoing pollution. The district court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the pipeline has been repaired and the pollutants currently pass through groundwater to reach “navigable waters.” The Fourth Circuit vacated. Citizens may bring suit under 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) for discharges of pollutants that derive from a “point source,” defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, [or] container” and continue to be “added” to navigable waters. Plaintiffs have stated a valid claim for a discharge under the Act. View "Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and intervenor Newhall Land and Farming in an action challenging the Corps’ issuance of a permit, pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, to Newhall Land, authorizing the discharge of materials into the Santa Clara River as part of the Newhall Ranch project in Los Angeles County near Santa Clarita, California. The Court rejected challenges under the Clean Water Act to the Corp’s permit issuance. The Court concluded that the Corps complied with its obligations under the Clean Water Act because the Corps properly considered practicability as required under the Section 404(b) Guidelines. Furthermore, the Court concluded concluded that the Corps complied with the Endangered Species Act (ESA) because its determination that Southern California steelhead would not be affected by the Project, and its corresponding decision not to consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service, were not arbitrary and capricious. For similar reasons, the panel concluded that the Corps reasonably assessed the Project’s potential impacts to the steelhead and provided sufficient discussion to satisfy its National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) obligations. View "Friends of the Santa Clara River v. US Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

Front Range Resources, LLC, a private company that owned or managed various water rights, applied for a replacement plan in the Lost Creek Designated Ground Water Basin. Under the plan, Front Range sought to divert water from its existing water rights to recharge the Lost Creek Basin’s alluvial aquifer. It then planned to withdraw the recharged water by increasing the use of its existing wells and by constructing new wells. Defendants (parties that believed their water rights would be impaired by the plan) objected to Front Range’s replacement plan, and the Ground Water Commission ultimately dismissed Front Range’s application with prejudice, allowing Front Range to appeal to the district court. Meanwhile, Front Range and the City of Aurora entered into an option contract for Aurora to purchase some or all of the replacement-plan water upon the replacement plan’s approval. On appeal, the district court rejected Front Range’s use of water rights in the South Platte River in the replacement plan. It further found the replacement plan involved new appropriations and changes of water rights, triggering the anti-speculation doctrine. In granting summary judgment against Front Range, the district court concluded Front Range’s planned use of the replacement-plan water (including its option contract with Aurora) violated the anti-speculation doctrine. Some of the Defendants then pursued attorney fees, arguing Front Range’s claims lacked substantial justification. But the district court denied their motion. After review, the Colorado Supreme Court held the anti-speculation doctrine applied to replacement plans involving new appropriations or changes to designated ground water rights. Because Front Range could not demonstrate that it or Aurora would put the replacement-plan water to beneficial use, the district court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendants’ motion for attorney fees. View "Front Range Resources, LLC v. Colorado Ground Water Commission" on Justia Law

The City of Kennett, Missouri, sued the Environmental Protection Agency, challenging the EPA’s approval of a total maximum daily load for Buffalo Ditch. Buffalo Ditch was a stream that ran southwest into Arkansas from the City. The City’s Wastewater Treatment Plant was a point source of pollutants into it. Parts of Buffalo Ditch had been on Missouri’s EPA-approved list of impaired waters since 1994, due to low levels of dissolved oxygen (DO), which supported aquatic life. The final total maximum daily load” (TMDL) set wasteload allocations for pollutants from the Treatment Plant. These wasteload allocations were more stringent than the limited in the City’s National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The City’s permit was to expire in 2015; in its “Implementation Plan” for point sources, the TMDL stated if it was determined the current water quality criterion for dissolved oxygen was appropriate, the wasteload allocations from the TMDL would be implemented. If not appropriate, and a new dissolved oxygen criterion was promulgated, then new wasteload allocations would be calculated and implemented. Despite this intention, the DO criterion and the TMDL did not change. The City sued, alleging: (1) the EPA exceeded its authority in approving the TMDL; (2) the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously; (3) the EPA failed to provide the required notice and comment. The Eighth Circuit determined the City waived a claim by failing to mention or argue for summary judgment on that claim, and by failing to respond to the EPA's motion for summary judgment on the claim. With respect to its remaining claims and the issue of standing, the City established injury in fact as it would incur costs in complying with any new limits on pollution discharge from its waste water plant. Similarly, because the injury was impending, the City also established redressability, and it had standing to bring this action. Further, the Court determined the case was ripe, and the district court erred in granting the EPA summary judgment based on a lack of standing and ripeness. The EPA argued the City waived its remaining claims by failing to raise them in the administrative process; because it would be beneficial to permit the district court to address this issue in the first instance, the matter was remanded for further proceedings on this question and, if necessary, the merits of those issues. View "City of Kennett v. Env. Prot. Agency" on Justia Law

The first of these two consolidated cases involved a lawsuit filed by multiple individual plaintiffs against defendant coal companies alleging that Defendants’ mining activities had contaminated Plaintiffs’ well water with lead and arsenic. The jury returned verdicts for Defendants. During the course of the underlying litigation, Plaintiffs invoked the water replacement provisions of the West Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, W. Va. Code 22-3-1 et seq. The circuit court issued a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to provide replacement water until liability for the well water contamination had been established. After the jury rendered its verdicts, Defendants requested that the circuit court dissolve the injunction. The circuit court refused to dissolve the injunction while the matter was pending on appeal.The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the circuit court’s ruling refusing Plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the jury verdicts and for a new trial, holding that there was no error requiring reversal; and (2) reversed the circuit court’s ruling refusing to dissolve the preliminary injunction, holding that the injunction should have been dissolved. However, because during the pendency of the instant appeal Defendants failed to comply with the injunction, this case must be remanded for the parties to address that issue. View "Belcher v. Dynamic Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed an April 27, 2016 order of the Montana Water Court adjudicating Teton Cooperative Reservoir Company’s (Teton Reservoir) water rights. The Court held that the Water Court did not err in (1) determining that Teton Reservoir’s 1902 Notice of Appropriation was valid; (2) applying the equitable doctrine of laches to Teton Reservoir’s 1902 Notice of Appropriation; (3) decreeing Teton Reservoir an annual volume totaling 60,000 acre feet for storage in the Bynum Reservoir; and (4) refusing to limit Teton Reservoir’s wintertime diversions to one-half of the available water in the Teton River. View "Teton Cooperative Reservoir Co. v. Farmers Cooperative Canal Co." on Justia Law

Three federal agencies and intervenor-defendants challenged injunctions issued by the district court to protect salmon and steelhead species listed under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531-1544. The Ninth Circuit held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) did not bar plaintiffs' January 2017 injunction motions; the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the spring spill injunction; the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the PIT tag monitoring injunction; and the district court's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321-4347, disclosure was not properly before the panel. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting injunctive relief to plaintiffs. The panel dismissed intervenor-defendants' appeal of the district court's NEPA disclosure order. View "National Wildlife Federation v. NMFS" on Justia Law

Front Street filed a citizen suit under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7604, to enjoin Mississippi Silicon from constructing a silicon plant. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim against Mississippi Silicon where section 7604(a)(3) did not authorize suits against facilities that have either obtained a permit or were in the process of doing so, and thus it did not apply here. The court held, however, that the district court should not have dismissed the claims against MDEQ based on the time-of-filing rule. In this case, Front Street has cited no decision in which the Supreme Court or a Circuit Court has held that the time-of-filing rule applies to facts like those in the present case. The court rejected Mississippi Silicon's argument that Front Street lacked standing to appeal their claim against MDEQ. Finally, the court denied Mississippi Silicon's motion for attorneys' fees. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "16 Front Street, LLC v. Mississippi Silicon, LLC" on Justia Law

Front Street filed a citizen suit under the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. 7604, to enjoin Mississippi Silicon from constructing a silicon plant. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claim against Mississippi Silicon where section 7604(a)(3) did not authorize suits against facilities that have either obtained a permit or were in the process of doing so, and thus it did not apply here. The court held, however, that the district court should not have dismissed the claims against MDEQ based on the time-of-filing rule. In this case, Front Street has cited no decision in which the Supreme Court or a Circuit Court has held that the time-of-filing rule applies to facts like those in the present case. The court rejected Mississippi Silicon's argument that Front Street lacked standing to appeal their claim against MDEQ. Finally, the court denied Mississippi Silicon's motion for attorneys' fees. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "16 Front Street, LLC v. Mississippi Silicon, LLC" on Justia Law