Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

In September 2013, the New Mexico Water Quality Control Commission (Commission) adopted the Copper Mine Rule, 20.6.7 NMAC (Copper Rule). Petitioners argued the Copper Rule violates the Water Quality Act (WQA) because it was premised on an impermissible construction of the statutory phrase “place of withdrawal of water for present or reasonably foreseeable future use.” Petitioners asserted that, as a consequence of this impermissible construction of the statutory phrase, the Copper Rule permitted rather than prevented groundwater contamination at open pit copper mining facilities. The New Mexico Supreme Court rejected these arguments, concluding that the Copper Rule was premised on a permissible construction of the statutory phrase, and affirmed the Commission’s decision to adopt the Copper Rule. View "Gila Res. Info. Project v. N.M. Water Quality Control Comm'n" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied without prejudice a petition for a writ of mandamus where federal defendants sought an order directing the district court to dismiss a case seeking various environmental remedies. Plaintiffs, twenty-one young individuals, filed suit alleging defendants have contributed to climate change in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendants argued that allowing the case to proceed would result in burdensome discovery obligations on the federal government that would threaten the separation of powers. The panel held that defendants did not not satisfy the Bauman factors at this stage of the litigation, and the issues that defendants raised on mandamus were better addressed through the ordinary course of litigation. In this case, the district court had not issued a single discovery order, plaintiffs have not filed a single motion seeking to compel discovery, any merits errors were correctable through the ordinary course of litigation, and there was no controlling Ninth Circuit authority on any of the theories asserted by plaintiff. Therefore, the panel declined to exercise its discretion in granting mandamus relief. View "United States v. USDC-ORE" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit denied without prejudice a petition for a writ of mandamus where federal defendants sought an order directing the district court to dismiss a case seeking various environmental remedies. Plaintiffs, twenty-one young individuals, filed suit alleging defendants have contributed to climate change in violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Defendants argued that allowing the case to proceed would result in burdensome discovery obligations on the federal government that would threaten the separation of powers. The panel held that defendants did not not satisfy the Bauman factors at this stage of the litigation, and the issues that defendants raised on mandamus were better addressed through the ordinary course of litigation. In this case, the district court had not issued a single discovery order, plaintiffs have not filed a single motion seeking to compel discovery, any merits errors were correctable through the ordinary course of litigation, and there was no controlling Ninth Circuit authority on any of the theories asserted by plaintiff. Therefore, the panel declined to exercise its discretion in granting mandamus relief. View "United States v. USDC-ORE" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's final rule that defined when certain hazardous materials were deemed discarded—as opposed to legitimately recycled—and therefore subject to EPA's oversight. In 2017, the DC Circuit upheld some aspects of the rule and vacated others, inviting the parties to consider briefing some of the issues. After reviewing the petitions, the court modified it's 2017 decision in three ways: (1) the court severed and affirmed EPA's removal of the spent catalyst bar from the vacated portions of the "Verified Recyler Exclusion"; (2) the court vacated Factor 4 in its entirety; and (3) the court clarified the regulatory regime that replaced the vacated Factor 4. The court denied the petitions for rehearing in all other respects. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the EPA's final rule that defined when certain hazardous materials were deemed discarded—as opposed to legitimately recycled—and therefore subject to EPA's oversight. In 2017, the DC Circuit upheld some aspects of the rule and vacated others, inviting the parties to consider briefing some of the issues. After reviewing the petitions, the court modified it's 2017 decision in three ways: (1) the court severed and affirmed EPA's removal of the spent catalyst bar from the vacated portions of the "Verified Recyler Exclusion"; (2) the court vacated Factor 4 in its entirety; and (3) the court clarified the regulatory regime that replaced the vacated Factor 4. The court denied the petitions for rehearing in all other respects. View "American Petroleum Institute v. EPA" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature enacted Water Code section 1525, which required the holders of permits and licenses to appropriate water to pay an annual fee according to a fee schedule established by the Board. At the same time, the Legislature enacted sections 1540 and 1560, which allowed the Board to allocate the annual fee imposed on a permit or license holder who refuses to pay the fee on sovereign immunity grounds to persons or entities who contracted for the delivery of water from that permit or license holder. Plaintiffs Northern California Water Association, California Farm Bureau Federation, and individual fee payors claimed that the annual fee imposed in fiscal year 2003-2004 constituted an unlawful tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee because it required fee payors to pay more than a de minimis amount for regulatory activities that benefited nonfee-paying right holders. Plaintiffs also claimed that the fees allocated to the water supply contractors violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because they exceeded the contractors’ beneficial interests in the USBR’s water rights. The California Supreme Court previously ruled sections 1525, 1540, and 1560 were constitutional on their face. The Supreme Court found that the record was unclear as to: (1) “whether the fees were reasonably apportioned in terms of the regulatory activity’s costs and the fees assessed;” and (2) “the extent and value of the [contractors’ beneficial] interests.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court to make findings on those issues. Following a 10-day bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision that determined inter alia that the statutory scheme as applied through its implementing regulations imposed a tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee, by allocating the entire cost of the Division’s regulatory activities to permit and license holders, while nonpaying-water-right holders who benefit from and place burdens on the Division’s activities pay nothing. The trial court likewise found that the fees passed through to the water supply contractors in fiscal year 2003-2004 pursuant to regulation 1073 ran afoul of the supremacy clause “because the allocation of fees [was] not limited to the contractors’ beneficial or possessory use of the [USBR’s] water rights.” In addition, the trial court found that the fee regulations were invalid because they operated in an arbitrary manner as to a single payor, Imperial Irrigation District. Accordingly, the trial court invalidated regulations 1066 and 1073, “as adopted by Resolution 2003-0077 in 2003-2004.” The Board appealed, contending the trial court erred in invalidating the fee regulations. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s central premise was wholly incorrect because it failed to recognize the role that general fund money played in fiscal year 2003-2004: the fees assessed on permit and license holders were proportionate to the benefits derived by them or the burdens they placed on the Division. The trial court erred in determining that the fee regulations were invalid based on their application to a single payor. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment invalidating the fee regulations. View "No. CA Water Assn. v. St. Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

Gary and Glenna Eden sought to file a late notice of claim for their Water Right No. 37-864 which was not claimed during the pendency of the Snake River Basin Adjudication (“SRBA”), and therefore was decreed disallowed. In the SRBA, the Edens alleged that the SRBA’s Final Unified Decree and the Closure Order should have been set aside as void because they did not receive sufficient notice of the SRBA proceedings to satisfy due process. Further, the Edens argued they were not personally served with the required notice of default pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2). Furthermore, the Edens claimed that unique and compelling circumstances justify relief from the final judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The SRBA court disagreed and denied the Edens’ relief on any of these grounds. Finding no reversible error in the SRBA court's judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Eden v. Idaho" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of a motion for partial summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims of nuisance, trespass, and negligence arising from water contamination as barred by the statute of limitations. The court held that the statute of limitations began to run when the water district learned of the potential need to remediate, or at least when a reasonable water provider would have taken action to protect the water. In this case, the court agreed with the district court that the record established as a matter of law that the water district had suffered injury and was aware of that injury before November 2010. Therefore, the water district's claims for damages arising from contamination of Plant 4 was barred by the statute of limitations. Furthermore, the water district's claims regarding radium were also time-barred where there was a seven year gap between the discovery of the injury and the discovery of the source of the injury. View "Bethpage Water District v. Northrop Grumman Corp." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions in favor of the Service in consolidated cases brought by fishing industry groups challenging the Service's decision to end a 1987 sea otter translocation program. After determining that plaintiffs had standing, the panel held that the Service acted lawfully in terminating the southern sea otter relocation program authorized by Public Law 99-625. The panel explained that, in light of the expressly stated goals of Public Law 99-625, it was reasonable to interpret the "mandatory" language in the statute as conditioned on an ongoing successful translocation program. The panel also held that, in the circumstances here, where the agency has discretion to implement an experimental program, it can reasonably interpret the statute to allow it to terminate that program if the statute's purpose was no longer being served. View "California Sea Urchin Commission v. Bean" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals granting summary judgment to the chief of the oil-and-gas resources-management division of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR), the director of ODNR, the state, and the governor of Ohio (collectively, Appellees) on the grounds that Food and Water Watch (FWW) and FreshWater Accountability Project (FWAP) lacked standing to bring this action for a writ of mandamus to compel the ODNR to promulgate rules relating to the storage, recycling, treatment, processing, and disposal of waste substances associated with oil and gas drilling. The court held (1) because FWAP did not demonstrate that its individual members would have standing in their own right, its claim for associational standing failed; (2) this court declines to extend State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999); and (3) FWAP waived other arguments regarding standing and did not otherwise demonstrate that it had standing to proceed in this mandamus action. View "State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State" on Justia Law