Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Bank in an action challenging the Bank's authorization of nearly $4.8 billion in financing for two liquid natural gas projects near the Great Barrier Reef. The panel held that events occurring after the district court's ruling did not make environmental group plaintiff's claims moot. However, plaintiffs lacked standing because, even under the relaxed redressability standards applicable in this case, plaintiffs failed to show that performance of the additional procedures required under the Endangered Species Act and the National Historic Preservation Act could redress the alleged environmental injury. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. Export-Import Bank of the United States" on Justia Law

In 1995, Orchard purchased the Warmke Parcel, 13 acres of wetlands, for residential development. Orchard requested a determination from the Army Corps of Engineers that the wetlands were not jurisdictional “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). Before 2015, the Corps defined waters of the United States to include waters “subject to the ebb and flow of the tide,” “rivers” that could be used for interstate recreation or commerce, “tributaries” of such waters, and “wetlands adjacent to” other waters of the United States, including tributaries. The Warmke wetlands are surrounded by residential development. The closest navigable water, Little Calumet River, is 11 miles away. In between the Warmke wetlands and Little Calumet River are man‐made ditches, sewer pipes, and Midlothian Creek—a tributary of the Little Calumet River. The Warmke wetlands drain, via sewer pipes, to Midlothian Creek. While the Warmke issue was pending, the Supreme Court decided that a wetland’s adjacency to a tributary of a navigable‐in‐fact water is alone insufficient to make the wetland a water of the United States, “the Corps’ jurisdiction over [such] wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.” The Seventh Circuit reversed the Corps’ claim of jurisdiction, finding that the Corps has not provided substantial evidence of a significant nexus to navigable‐in‐fact waters. View "Orchard Hill Building Co. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

This case centered on Coors Brewing Company’s application to amend its decreed augmentation plans to authorize the reuse and successive use of return flows from water that Coors diverted out of priority pursuant to those plans. The City of Golden opposed this application, arguing that Coors could not proceed by amendment but had to adjudicate a new water right to reuse or make successive use of the return flows. The water court ruled: (1) any amount of water not beneficially used by Coors for the uses specified in its decreed augmentation plans had to be returned to the stream; (2) Coors’s decreed augmentation plans did not authorize the reuse or successive use of such water; and (3) Coors could not obtain the right to reuse or make successive use of such water by way of amendment to its augmentation plans but could only obtain such rights by adjudicating a new water right. Coors appealed, arguing that the water court erred: (1) by holding that Coors could not proceed by amendment but had to adjudicate a new water right; (2) by concluding that water unconsumed by Coors’s initial use had to be returned to the stream and was subject to appropriation by other water users; and (3) interpreting Coors’s augmentation plan decrees to require permanent dedication of return flows to the stream. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that in order to obtain the right to reuse and make successive use of the return flows at issue, Coors had to adjudicate a new water right and could not circumvent this requirement by amending its decreed augmentation plans. Furthermore, the Court held that the diversion of native, tributary water under an augmentation plan did not change its character. Accordingly, the general rule, providing that return flows belong to the stream, applied. Finally, the Court concluded the water court correctly construed Coors’s augmentation plans. View "Coors Brewing Co. v. City of Golden" on Justia Law

This appeal was one in a series of successive appeals brought by Kenneth Manning challenging the moose and caribou subsistence hunt regulations that governed a portion of southcentral Alaska. Manning filed this lawsuit in 2013 challenging the eligibility criteria for subsistence hunt permits, the point system for allocating Tier II subsistence permits, and the criteria for establishing nonsubsistence hunting areas. While these claims were pending, the Alaska Supreme Court issued a 2015 decision resolving similar claims brought by Manning in an earlier suit. Manning then moved to amend his complaint in this case and to add an individual official as a defendant. The superior court denied both motions, concluding that amendment would be futile because all of Manning’s claims would fail under Supreme Court precedent. The superior court also denied the State’s motion for attorney’s fees, concluding that Manning was exempt from an adverse attorney’s fees award under the constitutional litigant exception. Manning appealed the denial of his motion to amend; he also raised various allegations of deprivation of due process. The State cross-appeals the denial of its motion for attorney’s fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the motion to amend because Manning failed to adequately brief (thus forfeiting) his arguments on some of the counts, and the remaining counts would have been futile. And the Court affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees to the State because none of Manning’s claims were frivolous. View "Manning v. Alaska Dept. of Fish & Game" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (Act) preempts, and thus invalidates, a local antilitter ordinance prohibiting merchants from providing “single use” plastic and paper bags to customers for point-of-sale purchases.The trial court upheld the ordinance, which makes it unlawful for any “commercial establishment” to provide or sell certain plastic or paper “checkout bags” to customers. Specifically, the court ruled that the ordinance was not void because reasonable constructions existed under which both the Act and the ordinance could be effective. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the ordinance was preempted by the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the ordinance regulated solid waste containers within the Act’s meaning and that the ordinance was not “authorized by state law"; and (2) therefore, the Act preempted the ordinance. View "City of Laredo, Texas v. Laredo Merchants Ass’n" on Justia Law

This case presented two questions arising out of the operation of the Suncook Wastewater Treatment Facility (the “Facility”) in Allenstown, New Hampshire, for the New Hampshire Supreme Court's review. First, under an intermunicipal agreement, must defendant Town of Allenstown, share any of the profits generated from septage haulers who discharge their waste at the Facility with the plaintiff, Town of Pembroke? And second, after Allenstown used a portion of those profits to increase the Facility’s wastewater treatment capacity, must Allenstown allocate any of that increased capacity to Pembroke? Because the Supreme Court, as did the Superior Court, answered both questions “no,” the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Town of Pembroke v. Town of Allenstown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the EPA failed to perform its nondiscretionary duty under the Clean Water Act to promulgate pollutant limits for biologically impaired waters in West Virginia. The court held that plaintiffs have standing to bring the claim, but reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs. In this case, because West Virginia has demonstrated that it is making — and will continue to make — good-faith efforts to comply with SB 562, and because West Virginia has a credible plan in concert with the EPA to produce ionic toxicity total maximum daily loads, if the constructive submission doctrine were to apply, it would not be satisfied. View "Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition, Inc. v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit claiming that the Secretary's failure to supplement the Federal Coal Management Program's programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) violated both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The DC Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Secretary's motion to dismiss, holding that neither NEPA nor the APA required the Secretary to update the PEIS for the Program. Accordingly, the court lacked jurisdiction to compel the Secretary to update the PEIS. View "Western Organization of Resource Councils v. Zinke" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought an administrative writ and declaratory relief, contending that the lease replacement between PG&E and the Commission should not have been subject to the existing facilities exemption, and that even if it was, the unusual circumstances exception to the exemption should apply. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's rejection of petitioner's contentions and denied the writ and declaratory relief. The court held that the record supported the Commission's application of the existing facilities exemption where the lease replacement would not expand the existing use of the plant. In this case, PG&E has leased the same land from the Commission for nearly 50 years, and the lease replacement maintained rather than expanded the plant's current operational capacity. The court also held that the Commission properly applied the fair argument standard in considering possible effects on the environment due to any unusual circumstances. The court rejected petitioner's remaining arguments. View "World Business Academy v. California State Lands Commission" on Justia Law

The state formed BBGHAD to restore 46 acres of Malibu's Broad Beach. The project requires 300,000 cubic yards of sand initially, with subsequent deposits at five-year intervals, and supplemental deposits as needed. Each of the five major deposits will generate 44,000 one-way truck trips, primarily from quarries adjacent to State Highway 23 between Fillmore and Moorpark. Moorpark officials expressed concern that truck traffic would negatively impact residents. A settlement prohibited sand trucks from using certain roads and from stopping in specific areas. The Coastal Commission approved a coastal development permit, including the settlement agreement. The trial court found the project exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Pub. Resources Code, 21000(a) but that BBGHAD improperly contracted away to Moorpark its police power in prohibiting BBGHAD from modifying haul routes in response to changed circumstances. The court of appeal held that the beach restoration, including the agreement, is a single “project” that is exempt from CEQA review as an “improvement” (section 26505) undertaken by a geologic hazard abatement district “necessary to prevent or mitigate an emergency.” The agreement's traffic restrictions are not preempted by the Vehicle Code, nor do they constitute extraterritorial regulations; they represent a valid exercise of Moorpark’s contracting authority. The court agreed that BBGHAD abdicated its police power in portions of the agreement. View "County of Ventura v. City of Moorpark" on Justia Law