Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

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The Fourth Circuit held that agency decisions that provided necessary approvals for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) were arbitrary and capricious. In Case No. 18-1083, petitioners challenged the Incidental Take Statement (ITS) authorizing the pipeline to take five species listed as threatened or endangered. The court held that, although FWS was not required to set a numeric limit, it can only use a habitat surrogate if it demonstrates a causal link between the species and the delineated habitat, shows that setting a numerical limit was not practical, and set a clear standard for determining when incidental take is exceeded. In this case, FWS failed some or all of these requirements for all five challenged species, and thus the agency's take limits were not enforceable.In Case No. 18-1082, petitioners argued that NPS lacked the authority to grant a right-of-way to a gas pipeline and that doing so violated the statutory mandate that agency decisions not be inconsistent with the Parkway's conservation purpose. The court assumed that NPS had the requisite statutory authority but held that NPS did not explain how the pipeline crossing was not inconsistent with the purposes of the Parkway and the overall National Park System. View "Sierra Club v. National Park Service" on Justia Law

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PRP Group, an association cooperating with the EPA to pay costs associated with cleanup of a superfund site in Pasadena, Texas, filed suit against 1200 parties they believed should be responsible for part of the environmental remediation costs. PRP Group filed claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), and its state law counterpart, the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA).The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying the state agency and university defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the agencies and universities were entitled to state sovereign immunity. Therefore, the district court erred when it concluded that state sovereign immunity did not bar PRP Group's CERCLA claims. The court likewise reversed as to PRP's state law claims. View "US Oil Recovery Site Potentially Responsible Parties Group v. Railroad Commission of Texas" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment sustaining respondents' demurrer in an action seeking a writ of mandate to declare the Hetch Hetchy Reservoir and O'Shaughnessy Dam unreasonable methods of diverting water under article X, section 2 of the California Constitution. The trial court concluded that petitioners' claims were preempted by the Raker Act, federal legislation granting certain rights-of-way to San Francisco subject to various conditions.The court held that the savings clause contained in the Raker Act does not preclude a finding of conflict between the asserted claims of this case and the express determination by Congress to divert water on a permanent basis at the site of the O’Shaughnessy Dam. Therefore, petitioners' claims failed under preemption principles and the court need not reach the trial court's alternative holding that the claims were time barred. View "Restore Hetch Hetchy v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

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The Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review of Virginia's certification under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act that it had reasonable assurance that certain activities regarding the construction of a natural gas pipeline would not degrade the state's water. As a preliminary matter, the court held that petitioners had standing to assert the claims contained in their petition for review. On the merits, the court held that the state agencies did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the December 401 Certification. The court held that the DEQ had a sufficient basis to find reasonable assurance that the types of measures, restrictions, and programs in place to prevent excess sediment from entering state waters would be effective to satisfy the requirements of Virginia's antidegradation policy. The court also held that the state agencies' segmented approach to the certification, even if unorthodox, was not arbitrary and capricious. View "Sierra Club v. State Water Control Board" on Justia Law

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The Fourth Circuit granted petitions for review of the BLM's decision granting a right of way through federal land for construction and operation of a pipeline proposed by MVP, and the Forest Service's decision to amend the Jefferson National Forest Land Resource Management Plan to accommodate the right of way and pipeline construction.The court held that the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by adopting an environmental impact statement (EIS) without undertaking the required independent review of the EIS's sedimentation analysis. Because the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously, the court remanded for further explanation. The court deferred to the agencies conclusions on the issue of forest effects and rejected petitioners' claims as to the Draft EIS. However, in regard to petitioners' claims under the National Forest Management Act, the court held that the requirements in the 2012 Planning Rule were directly related to the instant Forest Service amendments to the Jefferson Forest Plan and the Forest Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding otherwise. Therefore, the court remanded to the Forest Service for proper application of the Planning Rule soil and riparian requirements to the Forest Plan amendment. Finally, the court held that the BLM failed to acknowledge its obligations under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sierra Club v. USFS" on Justia Law

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The Network petitioned for a writ of mandate to compel the County to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) before issuing well permits. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition on demurrer, holding that the well permits were ministerial actions under Chapter 8.40 of the San Luis Obispo County Code exempt from review under CEQA. The court reasoned that, if an applicant meets fixed standards, the County must issue a well permit. On the other hand, the ordinance did not require use of personal or subjective judgment by County officials. Therefore, there was no discretion to be exercised and CEQA was inapplicable. View "CA Water Impact Network v. County of San Luis Obispo" on Justia Law

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LandWatch filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate, alleging that the District, in approving an emergency water supply project, failed to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). LandWatch elected to prepare the administrative record, but the District ended up preparing the record. After the District prevailed, it moved for costs that included the costs of preparing the administrative record and an appendix. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's finding that the agency acted properly in preparing the record and appendix and held that the trial court had the discretion to award the agency costs for preparing the record notwithstanding the petitioner's election under Public Resources Code 21167.6, subdivision (b)(2). Finally, the court held that the trial court did not err by awarding fees for the appendix and for fees to CourtCall for 12 telephonic appearances. View "LandWatch San Luis Obispo County v. Cambria Community Services District" on Justia Law

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Petitioners challenged FERC's approval of an application from Algonquin to undertake an upgrade to its natural gas pipeline system. The DC Circuit dismissed the Delegation's petition for review for lack of jurisdiction because the Delegation failed to establish that it had standing to seek review of the Commission's decision where its individual members did not suffer an injury in fact from the pipeline project. The court held that the remaining petitioners adequately demonstrated standing and thus reached the merits of their petitions.On the merits, the court held that the Commission did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in declining to consider Algonquin's three projects in a single environmental impact statement. The court explained that, for purposes of the AIM Project, the Commission adequately considered the cumulative impacts of the other two projects based on the information then available to the agency. The court also held that the Commission gave adequate consideration to the cumulative environmental impacts of the three upgrade projects. View "City of Boston Delegation v. FERC" on Justia Law

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In this case, the Oregon Supreme Court reviewed a final order of the Department of State Lands (DSL) that granted a permit to the Port of Coos Bay (Port) in connection with the construction of a deep water marine terminal in Coos Bay. The permit allowed the Port to dredge 1.75 million cubic yards of material from the bay, while also imposing a number of conditions to address environmental concerns. Petitioners were environmental advocacy groups who argued the Port’s application did not meet the requirements for issuing a permit set out in ORS 196.825. An Administrative Law Judge held a contested case hearing and rejected petitioners’ arguments. DSL reviewed the conclusions of the ALJ and issued a final order affirming the permit. The Court of Appeals affirmed DSL’s final order. Petitioners contended DSL erred in failing to consider evidence of certain negative effects of the construction and operation of the terminal in the permit application review process. The Oregon Supreme Court held DSL properly considered the criteria set out in ORS 196.825 and did not err in granting the permit. View "Coos Waterkeeper v. Port of Coos Bay" on Justia Law

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Alliance filed suit against Federal Defendants to enjoin implementation of the East Reservoir Project on the Kootenai National Forest in northwest Montana. While this appeal was pending, the Forest Service reinitiated consultation with the FWS and subsequently issued a new biological opinion for the Lynx Amendment, completing a reconsultation process. Therefore, the panel rejected Alliance's assertion that the Forest Service's decision to approve the Project was arbitrary and capricious because it improperly relied on the Lynx Amendment in determining the impact of Project activities on lynx and lynx critical habitat. The panel dismissed the claim and remanded to the district court with directions to vacate the part of its summary judgment ruling that addressed this lynx related claim and to dismiss it as moot.However, the panel held that Alliance was entitled to summary judgment on its claim that the Forest Service failed to comply with the Motorized Vehicle Access Act (Access Amendments). In this case, the Forest Service's failure to analyze whether the Project will increase the total linear miles of permanent roads within the Tobacco BORZ polygon (the overlapping area in which Cabinet-Yaak grizzly bears were sometimes found) beyond the baseline did not satisfy the plain terms of the Access Amendments and was therefore arbitrary and capricious. The panel reversed the district court's judgment as to this claim and remanded for further proceedings. View "Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Savage" on Justia Law