Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

by
In 2021, the Montana Legislature amended the Opencut Mining Act to create "dryland" permits for mining projects that do not affect water sources and are located away from populated areas. LHC, Inc. applied for such a permit for a project near the Clearwater River. The Montana Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) approved the permit after LHC addressed initial deficiencies. Protect the Clearwater, an environmental group, challenged the permit, arguing it did not meet statutory requirements and that DEQ's environmental assessment was inadequate.The Fourth Judicial District Court granted a preliminary injunction to Protect the Clearwater, halting LHC's mining activities. The court found that Protect the Clearwater was likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that DEQ erred in issuing the dryland permit. The court also determined that Protect the Clearwater would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, that the balance of equities favored the injunction, and that the injunction was in the public interest. The court's decision was based on Montana's general preliminary injunction statute, rather than the specific provisions of the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and concluded that the District Court improperly applied the general preliminary injunction statute. The Supreme Court held that Protect the Clearwater should have sought relief under MEPA's exclusive remedy provisions, given that the permit was issued under Title 75 and Title 82. The Supreme Court vacated the District Court's preliminary injunction and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the application for the injunction. View "Protect the Clearwater v Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

by
The case involves current and former San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) employees who sued the United States, alleging that the Navy misled the City of San Francisco and the SFPD about the safety of a contaminated former Naval shipyard leased by the City for use as a facility for SFPD employees. The plaintiffs claimed that the Navy's misrepresentations about the safety of the site caused them to be exposed to hazardous substances, resulting in health problems.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, indicating that the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) misrepresentation exception likely barred their claims. The plaintiffs then filed a Second Amended Complaint, which the district court also dismissed, concluding that the misrepresentation exception applied because the plaintiffs' claims were fundamentally based on the Navy's alleged misrepresentations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception applied because the plaintiffs' claims arose out of the Navy’s alleged misrepresentations, even if the misrepresentations were made to the City and the SFPD rather than directly to the plaintiffs. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) implicitly limited or suspended the misrepresentation exception, finding no indication that Congress intended CERCLA to override the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception. The court concluded that the claims were barred by the FTCA’s misrepresentation exception and affirmed the dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "ABBEY V. USA" on Justia Law

by
The case involves the Westside Los Angeles Neighbors Network (appellant) challenging actions taken by the Los Angeles City Planning Commission (CPC) in March 2018 to implement parts of the Westside Mobility Plan. This plan aims to address congestion and mobility issues in the western part of Los Angeles. The appellant argued that the CPC’s actions did not comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and sought to invalidate them.The Los Angeles County Superior Court reviewed the case and rejected most of the appellant’s contentions, denying the petition. The court found that the CPC was a decision-making body authorized to certify the Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the Streetscape Plan was categorically exempt from CEQA. The court also found that the EIR was legally adequate.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the CPC was authorized to certify the EIR as it was a decision-making body for the project. The court also found that the Streetscape Plan was categorically exempt from CEQA under Guidelines section 15301, which covers minor alterations to existing public structures. The court concluded that the appellant did not demonstrate that the Streetscape Plan fell within any exceptions to the categorical exemptions. Additionally, the court held that the EIR’s analysis of growth-inducing impacts was adequate and that the City had ensured that mitigation measures would be implemented.The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed, and the City of Los Angeles was awarded costs on appeal. View "Westside Los Angeles Neighbors Network v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

by
David Schaffner, Jr. and Theresa Sue Schaffner filed a lawsuit against Monsanto Corporation, alleging that Monsanto violated Pennsylvania law by failing to include a cancer warning on the label of its weed-killer, Roundup. The Schaffners claimed that this omission caused Mr. Schaffner to develop non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma due to his exposure to Roundup. The case was initially filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and was later removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation (JPML) then transferred the case to the Northern District of California for consolidated pretrial proceedings.In the Northern District of California, the MDL Court had previously ruled in similar cases that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) did not preempt state-law tort duties to include a cancer warning on Roundup’s label. Following this precedent, the MDL Court denied Monsanto’s motion for summary judgment on preemption grounds. The case was subsequently remanded to the Western District of Pennsylvania, where the parties stipulated to a judgment in favor of the Schaffners, reserving Monsanto’s right to appeal the preemption issue.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and focused on whether FIFRA preempted the Pennsylvania duty to warn. The court held that FIFRA’s preemption provision, which prohibits states from imposing labeling requirements different from those required under federal law, did preempt the state-law duty to include a cancer warning. The court reasoned that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had approved Roundup’s label without a cancer warning, and FIFRA regulations require pesticide labels to conform to the EPA-approved label. Therefore, the Pennsylvania duty to warn was not equivalent to the federal requirements and was preempted by FIFRA. The Third Circuit reversed the judgment of the District Court. View "Schaffner v. Monsanto Corporation" on Justia Law

by
The case involves the Center for Biological Diversity's efforts to protect the Canadian lynx, a threatened species, from incidental trapping in Minnesota. The Center sued the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, alleging that the state had not done enough to prevent trappers from accidentally capturing lynx. This led to a proposed consent decree requiring Minnesota to implement additional restrictions on trapping methods to protect the lynx.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota reviewed the case and approved the consent decree over objections from three pro-trapping organizations. These organizations argued that the decree was prejudicial and harmful to their interests and that state law did not permit the adoption of the new regulations in the manner proposed. The district court found the consent decree to be a reasonable compromise that balanced the interests of both parties and had a reasonable relationship to the claims and defenses in the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's approval of the consent decree. The appellate court examined whether the consent decree was procedurally fair and reasonable. It found that the negotiations were conducted in good faith and at arm's length, and that the trappers had ample opportunity to raise their objections. The court also determined that the consent decree was reasonable because it aimed to reduce the number of lynx deaths and furthered the objectives of the Endangered Species Act. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in approving the consent decree and affirmed the judgment. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. MN Trappers Association" on Justia Law

by
The case involves the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and its denial of small refinery exemptions under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) program. The RFS program mandates that refineries blend renewable fuels into fossil fuels or purchase credits to comply. Small refineries can petition for exemptions if compliance causes disproportionate economic hardship. In 2022, the EPA denied all pending exemption petitions, arguing that compliance costs are passed on to consumers, thus no refinery faces economic hardship due to the RFS program. The EPA also provided alternative compliance options for certain refineries whose exemptions were initially granted but later denied.Previously, the EPA had granted exemptions based on a Department of Energy (DOE) study and a scoring matrix that considered various economic factors. However, following a Tenth Circuit decision and the Supreme Court's ruling in HollyFrontier, the EPA revised its approach, focusing solely on compliance costs and the RIN cost passthrough theory. This led to the denial of all pending petitions, including those of Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company and Wynnewood Refining Company, which had initially received exemptions.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the EPA's rationale for denying the exemptions was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The court held that the EPA's interpretation of "disproportionate economic hardship" was too narrow and inconsistent with the Clean Air Act. The court also found that the EPA failed to adequately support its assumption that refineries could always purchase RINs ratably and pass the costs to consumers. Consequently, the court vacated the EPA's denial actions, except for two refineries deemed ineligible on other grounds, and dismissed Growth Energy's petition for lack of standing. The court denied Sinclair's petition challenging the alternative compliance action and dismissed Wynnewood's petition for not challenging a final agency action. View "Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company LLC v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

by
A chemical manufacturer and two trade associations challenged an EPA rule regulating emissions from certain facilities, specifically disputing the EPA’s assessment of cancer risk from ethylene oxide emissions. The EPA had determined that emissions from these sources posed an unacceptable risk to public health and tightened emissions standards accordingly. The EPA’s assessment concluded that the maximum lifetime individual risk of cancer from exposure to ethylene oxide was significantly higher than what is generally considered acceptable.The petitioners initially raised their complaints during the EPA’s rulemaking process and sought reconsideration after the final rule was issued. The EPA granted reconsideration and solicited further public comment, ultimately affirming its decision to use its existing cancer-risk assessment and rejecting an alternative assessment proposed by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). The petitioners then sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and found that the EPA had adequately explained its modeling approach and decisions. The court held that the EPA’s reliance on its 2016 cancer-risk assessment was not arbitrary or capricious and that the EPA had properly considered and rejected the TCEQ’s alternative assessment. The court also found that the EPA had provided sufficient opportunities for public comment and had not violated any procedural requirements. The court denied the petitions for review, upholding the EPA’s rule and its assessment of the cancer risk from ethylene oxide emissions. View "Huntsman Petrochemical LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

by
A neighbor, Myrna Nathin, appealed the Environmental Division's denial of her motion to reopen a judgment declaring an Act 250 land-use permit for an adjoining property abandoned. Nathin argued she did not receive adequate notice of the petition to abandon the permit. The property in question, located on Burchard Road in Dover, Vermont, was initially permitted for subdivision and infrastructure development in 1993, with extended deadlines for completion. However, no construction occurred, and the current landowners, the Beasleys, sought to abandon the permit in 2022.The district commission declined to review the abandonment petition, citing jurisdictional issues, and the Environmental Division later declared the permit abandoned in January 2023. Nathin, who lives in New Jersey, claimed she did not receive the notice sent to her Vermont address and only learned of the abandonment in August 2023. She filed a motion for relief from judgment under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which the Environmental Division denied, stating she lacked standing as she was not a party to the original proceeding.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Environmental Division's decision. The Court held that Nathin did not have standing to file a Rule 60(b) motion because she was not a party to the abandonment proceeding. The Court also found that the Environmental Division had adhered to its procedural rules and that Nathin's lack of notice did not warrant reopening the case. The Court emphasized that procedural rules must be enforced to ensure fairness and regularity, and Nathin's failure to intervene in the original proceeding precluded her from seeking relief. View "In re Burchard Road Petition" on Justia Law

by
3M Company operates a manufacturing facility in Cordova, Illinois, producing chemical products containing PFAS. The State of Illinois sued 3M, alleging that PFAS from the Cordova Facility contaminated the Mississippi River, violating state environmental laws. The State's complaint specifically excluded PFAS contamination from any other source, including AFFF used by the U.S. military at the nearby Rock Island Arsenal.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court. 3M removed it to the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, citing the federal officer removal statute, arguing that some contamination might have come from AFFF provided to the military, thus invoking a federal government contractor defense. The State moved to remand the case back to state court. The district court granted the motion, finding that the State's complaint excluded AFFF-related contamination, focusing solely on PFAS from the Cordova Facility.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that 3M could not satisfy the fourth element required for removal under the federal officer removal statute, which necessitates a colorable federal defense. The court noted that the State had unequivocally conceded that it would not seek relief for mixed PFAS contamination and that any recovery would be barred if contamination was not solely from the Cordova Facility. Consequently, 3M's government contractor defense was deemed irrelevant under the State's theory of recovery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to remand the case to state court. View "Raoul v. 3M Company" on Justia Law

by
The case involves the proposed development of the Betabel Project by the McDowell Trust, which includes a large commercial roadside attraction in San Benito County. The County's Board of Supervisors certified an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and approved a conditional use permit for the project. The Center for Biological Diversity and the Amah Mutsun Tribal Band opposed the project, arguing that the EIR violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) and that the project approval violated state planning and zoning laws. They filed a petition for a writ of mandate to challenge the project approval.The San Benito County Planning Commission initially approved the project and filed a Notice of Determination (NOD) on October 14, 2022. The Center and the Amah Mutsun Tribal Band appealed this decision to the County Board of Supervisors, which denied the appeals and filed a second NOD on November 10, 2022. The trial court sustained the McDowell Trust's demurrer, agreeing that the CEQA causes of action were time-barred because the petitions were filed more than 30 days after the first NOD.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred. The appellate court determined that the 30-day limitations period for filing a CEQA challenge began with the second NOD filed on November 10, 2022, following the final decision by the Board of Supervisors. The court emphasized that the Planning Commission's decision was not final due to the timely appeals. Therefore, the writ petitions filed on December 9, 2022, were within the 30-day period. The appellate court reversed the judgments of dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court with directions to overrule the demurrer. View "Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Benito" on Justia Law