Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

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A lawyer representing Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a disability accommodation request under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, seeking extensions of time and relief from procedural obligations due to his bipolar disorder. FSFG had previously challenged the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection's (CalFIRE) approval of a timber harvest plan, arguing that the plan's approval was deficient in several respects, including inadequate consideration of geologic, biologic, and cultural resources. Although the trial court granted FSFG's petition in part, it denied the claim that CalFIRE's tardy publication of a complete written response to public comments rendered the approval defective.The Sonoma County Superior Court had granted six prior requests for scheduling relief based on the lawyer's mental health disability but denied the seventh request. The court found that the repeated requests for postponements created an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally altered the nature of the expedited California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding. FSFG appealed the denial of the seventh request, arguing that the trial court had no choice but to grant the accommodation due to the lawyer's qualifying disability.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh request for accommodation. The court noted that FSFG had ample opportunity to retain additional counsel and that the repeated requests for extensions unduly burdened the court and altered the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The appellate court concluded that the trial court's decision was reasonable and supported by the record. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Dept. of Forestry & Fire Protection" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge to the adequacy of an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for a project proposing major changes to the California State Capitol. The Department of General Services (DGS) and the Joint Committee on Rules of the California State Senate and Assembly prepared both an EIR and a revised EIR under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The project includes demolishing the existing Capitol Annex, constructing a new attached Annex, building an underground visitor center, and constructing a new underground parking garage. Save Our Capitol! challenged the revised EIR, arguing it failed to comply with CEQA.The Superior Court of Sacramento County rejected Save Our Capitol!'s claims, leading to this appeal. Previously, the court had issued a peremptory writ of mandate after finding certain aspects of the original EIR flawed. DGS revised the EIR, reapproved the project without the visitor center, and the trial court discharged the writ. Save Our Capitol! then filed a new petition for writ of mandate, which the trial court also rejected.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, citing recent legislation, Senate Bill No. 174, which exempts the Capitol Annex Project from CEQA’s requirements. The court found that the new law, effective immediately, dictates that all work performed under the Annex Act is exempt from CEQA. Save Our Capitol!'s arguments that DGS violated CEQA were rejected based on this exemption. The court also addressed and dismissed Save Our Capitol!'s constitutional challenge to Senate Bill 174, finding that the bill does not violate article IV, section 28 of the California Constitution. The judgment was affirmed, and DGS was entitled to recover its costs on appeal. View "Save Our Capitol! v. Dept. of General Services" on Justia Law

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A company applied to convert an old oil well into an injection well to dispose of produced water back into the aquifer. The well, located in Contra Costa County, had been drilled in 1963 and operated for over 20 years before being plugged. The project involved minor alterations to the well, such as removing the plug and installing injection equipment. Regulatory agencies, including CalGEM and the Regional Water Quality Control Board, reviewed the application and approved it, determining that the injected water would be confined within the aquifer by thick layers of shale.The Contra Costa County Superior Court ruled in favor of Sunflower Alliance, concluding that the project did not qualify for a Class 1 categorical exemption under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because converting the well to an injection well constituted a significant change in use. The court issued a writ of mandate directing CalGEM to set aside its notice of exemption and project approval.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the well conversion project fell within the Class 1 categorical exemption as it involved only minor alterations and the change in use posed negligible environmental risks. The court found substantial evidence supporting CalGEM's determination that the project would not have significant environmental effects. The court also rejected Sunflower's argument that CalGEM improperly imposed mitigation measures, concluding that the conditions imposed were part of the regulatory requirements for Class II wells. The appellate court directed the lower court to deny Sunflower's petition for writ of mandate and to order CalGEM to reinstate its project approval and notice of exemption. View "Sunflower Alliance v. Cal. Dept. of Conservation" on Justia Law

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The case involves the Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment and Advocates for the Environment (collectively, SCOPE) challenging the County of Los Angeles and Williams Homes, Inc. (Williams) over the approval of a residential housing development project in the Santa Clarita Valley. SCOPE's lawsuit contested the County's approval of a conditional use permit, an oak tree permit, and a vesting tentative tract map, alleging violations of the Subdivision Map Act (SMA) and the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Williams's motion for judgment on the pleadings without leave to amend, finding that SCOPE's claims were barred under Government Code section 66499.37 of the SMA because SCOPE failed to serve a summons within 90 days of the County's approval of the vesting tentative tract map. The court concluded that section 66499.37 applied to both the SMA and CEQA causes of action, as the CEQA claims were intertwined with the SMA claims.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court held that section 66499.37 does not bar SCOPE's CEQA claims to the extent they allege procedural violations of CEQA and the County's failure to analyze and disclose the project's environmental impacts, as these claims are unique to CEQA and could not have been brought under the SMA. However, the court found that section 66499.37 does apply to SCOPE's CEQA claims challenging the reasonableness of the conditions of approval of the vesting tentative tract map, specifically the mitigation measures adopted as a condition of approval.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case, directing the trial court to enter a new order denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the first cause of action for violation of CEQA and granting the motion with respect to the second cause of action for violation of the SMA and zoning and planning law. View "Santa Clarita Organization for Planning the Environment v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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The case involves a proposed residential housing development project near the University of Southern California (USC) by the City of Los Angeles. The project, which includes 102 units and various amenities, was found by the City to be exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) as a Class 32 urban in-fill development. The appellants, West Adams Heritage Association and Adams Severance Coalition, challenged this determination, arguing that the City abused its discretion by not finding the project consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan, improperly relying on mitigation measures for noise impacts, and failing to show the project would not have significant adverse impacts on traffic safety.The Los Angeles County Superior Court denied the appellants' writ petition, rejecting their challenges to the project. The court found that the City did not abuse its discretion in concluding the project would not have significant impacts on traffic or historical resources. The appellants then appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court initially reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the City improperly relied on mitigation measures for noise impacts. However, the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal with instructions to reconsider in light of Assembly Bill No. 1307 and the Make UC A Good Neighbor v. Regents of University of California decision.Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal held that under the new law, noise generated by project occupants and their guests is not considered a significant environmental effect under CEQA. Therefore, the noise concerns do not preclude the application of the Class 32 exemption. The court also determined that the City must assess whether the project is consistent with the applicable redevelopment plan before granting the exemption. The court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for the City to conduct this analysis. The court also concluded that the state density bonus law preempts the redevelopment plan's density provisions, allowing the City to calculate the project's allowable density based on the general zoning ordinance. View "West Adams Heritage Assn. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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Best Development Group, LLC proposed to develop a Grocery Outlet store in King City. The King City Planning Commission approved the project, determining it was exempt from the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) under the class 32 categorical exemption for infill development. Efrain Aguilera appealed this decision to the King City Council, which denied the appeal and upheld the exemption. Aguilera and Working Families of Monterey County then filed a petition for writ of mandate, arguing that the class 32 exemption did not apply because the project was not in an urbanized area and the environmental assessment was inadequate.The Monterey County Superior Court denied the petition, ruling that the class 32 exemption did not require the project to be in an urbanized area as defined by CEQA and that substantial evidence supported the City’s determination that the project met the exemption criteria. The court also found that the City was not required to conduct a formal environmental review.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the terms “infill development” and “substantially surrounded by urban uses” in CEQA Guidelines section 15332 should not be interpreted using the statutory definitions of “infill site,” “urbanized area,” and “qualified urban uses” from other sections of CEQA. The court found that the regulatory intent was to reduce sprawl by exempting development in already developed areas, typically but not exclusively in urban areas. The court also determined that substantial evidence supported the City’s finding that the project site was substantially surrounded by urban uses, based on the environmental assessment and aerial photographs.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, concluding that the class 32 exemption for infill development applied to the Grocery Outlet project, and no further CEQA compliance was required. View "Working Families of Monterey County v. King City Planning Com." on Justia Law

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Friends of the South Fork Gualala (FSFG) filed a California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) proceeding against the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CalFIRE) regarding the approval of a timber harvesting plan by Richardson Ranch, LLC. FSFG's counsel, Daniel Garrett-Steinman, who suffers from bipolar disorder, requested disability accommodations under rule 1.100 of the California Rules of Court, seeking extensions of time and other procedural relief. The trial court granted six of these requests over eight months but denied the seventh request, leading to this appeal.The Sonoma County Superior Court had previously granted FSFG's petition in part, vacating CalFIRE's approval of the timber plan due to inadequate consideration of various environmental impacts. However, the court denied FSFG's claim that the late publication of a complete response to public comments rendered the approval defective. FSFG argued that the trial court's denial of the seventh accommodation request prevented a fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the incomplete response.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the seventh accommodation request. The appellate court found that the trial court had reasonably concluded that further delays would create an undue financial and administrative burden and fundamentally alter the nature of the expedited CEQA proceeding. The court also noted that FSFG had the option to retain additional counsel, which it failed to do. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Friends of the So. Fork Gualala v. Department of Forestry and Fire Protection" on Justia Law

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Casa Mira Homeowners Association (Casa Mira) applied for a coastal development permit to construct a 257-foot seawall to protect a condominium complex, sewer line, apartment building, and a segment of the Coastal Trail in Half Moon Bay from erosion. The California Coastal Commission (Commission) denied the request for the condominiums and sewer line, built in 1984, but approved a 50-foot seawall for the apartment building, built in 1972, and concluded that relocating the Coastal Trail inland was a feasible alternative to shoreline armoring.The San Mateo County Superior Court granted Casa Mira's petition for a writ of mandate, vacating the Commission's decision. The court found that the Commission misinterpreted "existing structures" in the California Coastal Act to mean structures existing before January 1, 1977, and concluded that the Commission's finding regarding the feasibility of relocating the Coastal Trail was not supported by substantial evidence.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that "existing structures" in section 30235 of the Coastal Act refers to structures that existed before the Act's effective date of January 1, 1977. Therefore, the condominiums and sewer line built in 1984 are not entitled to shoreline armoring. However, the court also found that the Commission's decision to relocate the Coastal Trail inland was not supported by substantial evidence, as the original staff report indicated that rerouting the trail would sacrifice its aesthetic and recreational value and was not a viable alternative.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment regarding the interpretation of "existing structures" but affirmed the trial court's determination that there was no substantial evidence supporting the Commission's finding that armoring was unnecessary to protect the Coastal Trail. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs of appeal. View "Casa Mira Homeowners Assn. v. Cal. Coastal Com." on Justia Law

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Port City Air Leasing, Inc. (Port City) leases land and buildings at Pease International Tradeport for aircraft-related services. Pease Aviation Partners LLC, doing business as Million Air Portsmouth (Million Air), proposed to lease adjacent land to build a similar facility and applied for a permit to dredge and fill wetlands to construct an access road. The New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services (DES) issued the permit in June 2022. Port City filed an administrative appeal with the New Hampshire Wetlands Council (Council), arguing that the permit issuance was unlawful and unreasonable. Million Air intervened and moved to dismiss the appeal, claiming Port City lacked standing.The Hearing Officer ruled that Port City lacked standing because it was not a "person aggrieved" under RSA 482-A:10, I, which includes the applicant and those entitled to notice by mail under RSA 482-A:8 and RSA 482-A:9. The Hearing Officer determined that Port City was not an "abutting landowner" entitled to notice. Port City's motion for reconsideration and rehearing was denied, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and affirmed the Council's decision. The court held that Port City is not a "landowner" under RSA 482-A:9 because its lease does not grant interests equivalent to fee ownership. Consequently, Port City is not a "person aggrieved" with standing to appeal under RSA 482-A:10, I. The court also rejected Port City's due process claims, concluding that the absence of an administrative remedy does not violate its state or federal due process rights, as Port City still has potential legal remedies for any injuries. The court affirmed the dismissal of Port City's appeal. View "Appeal of Port City Air Leasing, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a final rule implementing section 2613 of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), as amended by the Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act. The rule concerns the assertion and treatment of confidential business information (CBI) claims for information reported to or obtained by the EPA under the TSCA. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) challenged three aspects of the rule, arguing that it was contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. The American Chemistry Council (ACC) also challenged the rule, arguing that it allowed for the unlawful disclosure of information protected by section 2613(a) of the TSCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. EDF argued that the EPA's regulatory definition of "health and safety study" was impermissibly narrow, that the EPA should require substantiation and routine review of pre-commercialization CBI claims after commercialization, and that the EPA's use of permissive language in the rule was inappropriate. ACC argued that the rule allowed for the unlawful disclosure of specific chemical identities when downstream entities reported information without knowledge of the specific chemical identity.The court denied EDF's petition for review, holding that the EPA's definition of "health and safety study" was consistent with the statute and not arbitrary or capricious. The court also held that the TSCA does not require reassertion and substantiation of pre-commercialization CBI claims after commercialization and that the EPA's use of permissive language was reasonable. However, the court granted ACC's petition for review, holding that the rule was unlawful to the extent it required entities reporting by non-confidential accession numbers and without knowledge of the underlying chemical identity to assert CBI claims for the underlying chemical identity. The court vacated these requirements under the rule. View "Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA" on Justia Law