Justia Environmental Law Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) decision to implement a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) to regulate emissions in Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had initially submitted a State Implementation Plan (SIP) to the EPA for approval, as required by the Clean Air Act. The EPA initially approved the plan, but the approval was later vacated by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which directed the EPA to either approve a new state-made plan or formulate a new federal plan within two years. The EPA decided to create its own plan, which was challenged by the Commonwealth and one of the three coal power companies affected by the plan.The petitioners argued that the EPA exceeded its statutory authority when it promulgated the plan and that the plan was arbitrary and capricious because the EPA failed to show its work. However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that the EPA acted in accordance with the Clean Air Act and denied the petition for review. The court held that the EPA properly exercised its authority under the Clean Air Act by partially disapproving the 2016 SIP and promulgating the FIP. The court also held that the contents of the FIP were not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the EPA’s discretion. View "Keystone-Conemaugh Projects LLC v. EPA" on Justia Law

The Center for a Sustainable Coast and its member, Karen Grainey, filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, alleging that the Corps had issued a dock permit without a full environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Center claimed that several of its members regularly visit Cumberland Island, where the dock is located, and suffer an ongoing aesthetic injury due to the dock's presence. The Center argued that the environmental review the Corps skipped could have protected that interest.The district court dismissed the lawsuit, concluding that the Center did not have standing because its harm was not redressable. The court reasoned that since the dock had already been built, the court’s ability to provide relief had ended along with construction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the Center had standing to bring at least one of its procedural rights claims. The court reasoned that the Center had identified a concrete aesthetic interest and pleaded that the NEPA process would protect that interest. Directing full NEPA review would thus redress the Center’s procedural injury. Furthermore, the permit issued by the Corps authorized not just the construction of the dock, but also its continued existence. Therefore, the case was not moot because the challenged project was already completed. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the Seashore Act claim, as the Center abandoned that argument on appeal. View "Center for a Sustainable Coast v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) certification of the Evangeline Pass Expansion Project, a series of expanded pipelines, compression facilities, and meter stations in the Southeastern United States. Environmental groups, including the Sierra Club and Healthy Gulf, challenged the certification, alleging that FERC improperly applied the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Additionally, the Alabama Municipal Distributors Group, a municipal customer of Southern Natural Gas Company, argued that a new lease from Southern to Tennessee Gas may mean more profits for Southern, so Alabama Municipal should receive a portion of those profits.Prior to reaching the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, FERC had unanimously issued a Certificate Order to Tennessee Gas and Southern, denying all objections. FERC reaffirmed its determination on rehearing. The Sierra Club and Alabama Municipal timely petitioned for review.The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld FERC's certification of the Evangeline Pass Expansion Project. The court found that FERC's certification was reasonable and reasonably explained, as was its decision to deny a windfall to a pipeline owner's existing customers. The court rejected the Sierra Club's arguments that FERC failed to consider the full scope of environmental effects of the project, erred by failing to account for the environmental impact of two ongoing authorizations to export gas, and was required to use the "social cost of carbon" tool. The court also rejected Alabama Municipal's argument that it should receive a future credit on the existing rates it pays. The court concluded that all of FERC's decisions in this case were reasonable and reasonably explained, and therefore denied the petitions for review. View "Alabama Municipal Distributors Group v. FERC" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge by the Sierra Club to the pre-construction permits issued by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) to Commonwealth LNG, LLC for its planned liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility. The Sierra Club argued that the facility’s emissions would exceed National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and that LDEQ failed to require Commonwealth to use the best available control technology (BACT) to limit those emissions.Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, LDEQ argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, asserting that the claim arose under state law, not federal law. However, the court found that it had jurisdiction to review the petition because when LDEQ issued the permit, it was acting pursuant to federal law, not merely state law.On the merits, the court found that LDEQ did not act arbitrarily in its use of significant impact levels (SILs) to calculate which pollutants will have an insignificant effect on the NAAQS. The court also found that LDEQ did not act arbitrarily in its use of AP-42 emission factors to determine potential emissions from an LNG facility that has not yet been built. Furthermore, the court held that LDEQ did not violate its public trustee duty under Louisiana law, which requires LDEQ to evaluate and avoid adverse environmental impacts to the maximum extent possible.The court denied Sierra Club’s petition for review and affirmed LDEQ’s permitting decision. View "Sierra Club v. Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

In 2022, the California Legislature directed Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) to extend operations at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, despite PG&E's previous plans to cease operations. However, the deadline for a federal license renewal application for continued operation had already passed. PG&E requested an exemption from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to this deadline, which the NRC granted. The NRC found that the exemption was authorized by law, would not pose an undue risk to public health and safety, and that special circumstances were present. The NRC also concluded that the exemption met the eligibility criteria for a categorical exclusion, meaning no additional environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act was required.Three non-profit organizations, San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Friends of the Earth, and the Environmental Working Group, petitioned for review of the NRC's decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed whether it had jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal from an NRC exemption decision. The court held that it did have jurisdiction, as the substance of the exemption was ancillary or incidental to a licensing proceeding. The court also concluded that the petitioners had Article III standing to bring the case, as they alleged a non-speculative potential harm from age-related safety and environmental risks, demonstrated that Diablo Canyon would likely continue operations beyond its initial 40-year license term, and alleged members’ proximity to the facility.On the merits, the court held that the NRC’s decision to grant the exemption was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. The court also held that the NRC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in invoking the National Environmental Policy Act categorical exclusion when issuing the exemption decision. The court concluded that the NRC was not required to provide a hearing or meet other procedural requirements before issuing the exemption decision because the exemption was not a licensing proceeding. The court denied the petition for review. View "SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE V. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Good River Farms and Martin Marietta Materials and TXI Operations, who own land directly across from each other along the Colorado River. In 2015, a "120-year flood" event occurred near Austin, Texas, causing severe damage to Good River's pecan farm. Good River claimed that Martin Marietta's strip mining activities resulted in a large pit filled with groundwater that breached and released a deluge of impounded surface water onto their property. Following a jury trial, Good River was awarded $659,882.00 in damages, prevailing on claims for violations of Texas Water Code § 11.086 and for negligence. Martin Marietta appealed the decision.The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The jury rejected Good River's nuisance claims but found in favor of Good River on the issues of water diversion and negligence. The trial court entered final judgment on that verdict, awarding Good River $659,882.00 in damages. Martin Marietta filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b), which the trial court denied.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusions that Martin Marietta violated Texas Water Code § 11.086 and committed common law negligence. The court noted that the jury verdict demands deference and that the unique factual scenario presented in this case supported the jury's conclusions. View "Good River Farms v. TXI Operations" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over the construction of an offshore wind project aimed at reducing reliance on fossil fuels. The project, proposed by Vineyard Wind 1, LLC, was expected to provide energy sufficient to power 400,000 Massachusetts homes. However, residents of Martha's Vineyard and Nantucket opposed the project, arguing that federal agencies failed to properly assess the potential impact of the project on the endangered North Atlantic right whale.Previously, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts had granted summary judgment in favor of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and Vineyard Wind, rejecting the residents' challenge to a biological opinion issued by the NMFS and relied on by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management in permitting the construction of the wind power project.In the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, the residents challenged the lower court's decision, arguing that the NMFS's determination that the incidental harassment of up to twenty right whales constituted a "small number" under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) was arbitrary, capricious, and unlawful. They also argued that NMFS's consideration of the "specified activity" and the "specific geographic region" within which that activity would occur for purposes of issuing the Incidental Harassment Authorization (IHA) to Vineyard Wind was impermissibly narrow in scope.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, finding that the NMFS's determination was not arbitrary or capricious and that it had properly delineated the "specific geographic region" for the purposes of the IHA. The court also found that the residents' concerns about the broader effect of the project on the right whale population were unwarranted, as the agency had considered the impact on the entire right whale population in its "negligible impact" analysis, its biological opinion, and in its participation in the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management's Environmental Impact Statement. View "Melone v. Coit" on Justia Law

A group of Nantucket residents, organized as Nantucket Residents Against Turbines, challenged the approval of the Vineyard Wind project by the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM). The project involves the construction of a wind power facility off the coast of Massachusetts. The residents alleged that the federal agencies violated the Endangered Species Act by concluding that the project's construction would not jeopardize the critically endangered North Atlantic right whale. They also claimed that BOEM violated the National Environmental Policy Act by relying on a flawed analysis by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).The case was initially heard in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which granted summary judgment in favor of the federal agencies. The court found that NMFS and BOEM had followed the law in analyzing the right whale's current status and environmental baseline, the likely effects of the Vineyard Wind project on the right whale, and the efficacy of measures to mitigate those effects. The court also found that the agencies' analyses rationally supported their conclusion that Vineyard Wind would not likely jeopardize the continued existence of the right whale.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The appellate court found that the lower court had correctly interpreted the law and that the federal agencies had not violated the Endangered Species Act or the National Environmental Policy Act. The court concluded that the agencies' analyses were rational and that their conclusion that the Vineyard Wind project would not likely jeopardize the continued existence of the right whale was supported by the evidence. View "Nantucket Residents Against Turbines v. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management" on Justia Law

A landowner in Blaine County, Idaho, John Hastings Jr., made unauthorized alterations to the Big Wood River. The Idaho Department of Water Resources (the Department) issued a notice of violation to Hastings and ordered him to cease all unauthorized work and submit a plan for river restoration. Hastings and the Department entered into a consent order, which required Hastings to pay a civil penalty and submit a restoration plan. However, the Department rejected Hastings' proposed restoration plans. Hastings then filed a petition for a hearing to express his disagreement with the terms of the Department's conditional approval for a permit.The Department initiated an administrative proceeding against Hastings, and later filed a counterclaim in Hastings's district court action seeking specific performance, which would require Hastings to comply with the Consent Order. Hastings asserted that the Department's enforcement action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations set forth in Idaho Code section 42-3809. The district court granted summary judgment to the Department on the statute of limitations issue, and Hastings appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Department's enforcement action was not time-barred by the statute of limitations under Idaho Code section 42-3809. The court found that the earliest possible date that the Department “ought to have reasonably known” that Hastings did not intend to comply with the Consent Order was when he filed the underlying declaratory judgment action. Until then, Hastings was in compliance with the Consent Order and had given every indication that he was attempting to remain in compliance. Therefore, the Department was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on this issue. View "Hastings v. IDWR" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over Montana's laws authorizing recreational wolf and coyote trapping and snaring. The plaintiffs, Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force and WildEarth Guardians, alleged that these laws allowed the unlawful "take" of grizzly bears, a threatened species, in violation of the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, limiting wolf trapping and snaring in certain parts of Montana to a specific period in 2024.The defendants, the State of Montana, the Chair of the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission, and the Governor, appealed the decision. They argued that the district court had erred by considering new arguments and materials submitted with the plaintiffs' reply brief, by applying the wrong preliminary injunction standard, and by finding a reasonably certain threat of imminent harm to grizzly bears.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in part and vacated it in part. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering new arguments and materials, as the defendants had an opportunity to respond. The court also held that the district court applied the correct preliminary injunction standard and did not abuse its discretion in finding serious questions going to the merits of the plaintiffs' claim.However, the court found that the injunction was geographically overbroad and remanded the case for the district court to reconsider the geographic scope. The court also held that the injunction was overbroad because it prevented the State of Montana from trapping and snaring wolves for research. The court vacated that part of the injunction and remanded the case for the district court to make proper modifications to the scope of its order. View "FLATHEAD-LOLO-BITTERROOT CITIZEN TASK FORCE V. STATE OF MONTANA" on Justia Law